


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
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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JANUARY 1938.

• • ENGLAND AND GERMANY.

GERMANY is the focus of most of the anxiety which is felt to-day in regard to the international situation, and there is much heart-searching in regard to her claims and the possibility of meeting them, her ambitions and the degree to which they must be feared, her régime and its prospects of permanence. Differing ideas upon the internal situation of the Reich colour much of the thinking which is devoted to the question of Germany's relations with this country and with the rest of Europe.

During a recent visit to Germany I found that criticism of the régime had increased greatly. In unofficial circles one hears witty stories at the expense of General Goering. One of these anecdotes, for example, relates to a supposed visit by the General to a friend of his in Cologne. General Goering is said to have asked his friend whether he was still popular, or whether there were any people in Cologne who spoke against him. The friend replied that he thought there were two or three who might speak against him, and he knew who they were. At once the General pressed him for the names of his traducers, but the friend refused to name them offhand, and Goering had to be satisfied with the promise that the list should be sent on to him in Berlin. A few days later, the story goes, General Goering received at his house in Berlin a bulky package. This, when opened, proved to be the Cologne telephone directory, and with it was a covering letter from the friend, who wrote that he sent the promised list, and had crossed out the names of those who did *not* speak against the General. Inspection of the directory showed only one name crossed out—that of the sender.

Discontent may undoubtedly be discovered in private conversations, but the Government is much assisted by the prevalence of the view that the downfall of the Nazis would be followed by a new dictatorship, this time of the Communists. Moderate people seem to prefer the rulers they know to their probable successors. There would be a great deal more discontent with the régime than there actually is, were it not

that the public mind is much occupied by the grievances which Germany feels as a nation, and against which the present Government is a doughty champion. All Germans want to see these grievances redressed, and can therefore be relied upon to back up the Government in its efforts to that end.

The prevalent indignation against England comes as a surprise to those of us who have not been conscious of unfriendly action towards Germany on the part of our Government in recent times. It is almost the rule for politically minded Germans to embark upon a protest against England's refusal to recognise her position and rights, and our insistence upon obstructing Germany at every point. Pressed to specify more clearly, one's German friend is found to refer to the campaign against Bolshevism; and the opposition which we offer to it. We insist on siding with the Russians; we stick closely to France, and by doing so (as well as by our attitude in regard to Spain) we are defending Bolshevism. Indeed, France herself is virtually Bolshevik! One asks for evidence, and learns that Russian money is being poured out in Germany, and also in France. One replies that at least the flow has ceased in England, and is confronted with the view that the troubles in Palestine and in India are the result of Bolshevik money, whatever we may think.

Passing to other subjects, there are further complaints to be found. For example, that the Führer's many offers of friendship have been refused; that criticisms of the régime are made in England, but not in France, and that the criticism of a friend hurts more than the attacks of others; that we constantly rub in our love for the League of Nations, while advocacy of the League to a German is like a red flag to a bull; that responsible Englishmen, and especially Labour leaders, insult German statesmen by calling them gangsters; that the Naval Agreement was an act of great friendship, and has never been repaid; in general, that it is essential to agree on the aims of the two countries before we can proceed to definite agreements. However good an answer we may have to some or all of these complaints, the existence of such feelings is a factor which we cannot afford to ignore.

It is certainly the case that the sense of English unfriendliness has penetrated the public mind. Germans have shown, ever since the War, an extraordinary absence of any cold manner arising from war-time bitterness or from more recent

grievances; they are still intensely polite. It is therefore perhaps significant of a changed state of public feeling that lately in a railway dining-car an English traveller found himself shouted at in loud and rude tones, the allocution containing references to colonies and to English culture, and ending with the German equivalent of "To Hell with England!" No doubt such an incident is quite unrepresentative, but I cannot believe it would have occurred before the beating up of feeling in recent times.

Much of the grievance is cloudy. The German Government insists on the danger of Bolshevism, and accordingly concentrates upon a policy which is in practice anti-Russian. This attitude creates difficulties for English and French negotiators because, while neither England nor France views with favour the propagandist activities of the Communists outside the boundaries of the U.S.S.R., both countries are glad to feel that, in any international dispute at the present time, Russia is likely to be found on the side of law and order; and this is a comforting factor in a lawless world. Thus, Germany's anti-Bolshevism is embarrassing politically, even to those who by no means sympathise with Communism.

But apart from the Communist question, there is a solid basis of reason which gives strength to German demands; this is particularly true with regard to the former German colonies, and also to the sufferings of the "Sudeten Deutsch" minority in Czechoslovakia. It must be the aim of British statesmen, not only for the sake of peace, but in the interests of that world justice which we all desire to establish, to come to terms with Germany over the whole field of foreign policy. Never was there greater need to act upon the mandate: "agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art in the way with him." An understanding between England and Germany is vital to the peace of the world. It may possibly be out of reach; but it is our primary duty to see that understanding is not lost through any prejudice or any lack of effort on our part. It must be admitted that hitherto we have been somewhat liable to both these failings. Whatever defects we may see in Germany, she can point to defects in us. We have allowed the impression to arise that our friendship with France implies coldness towards Germany, and personal contact, which has been constant with Paris, has, until the visit of Lord Halifax, been neglected in regard to Berlin.

Speeches have been made on several occasions by the German Chancellor which opened up the prospect of hopeful plans of settlement, such as would allay many anxieties; but insistence on our part seemed inadequate to translate those aspirations into the black and white of actual agreements. Tactlessness (though by no means all on one side) has played its part. The British Questionnaire of May 1936, though couched in friendly terms, and directed to the ascertainment of matters which had to be ascertained, was nevertheless not calculated to please the Germans, and was in fact partly instrumental in shelving the whole discussion for nearly a year. We, for our part, must endeavour to avoid errors of diplomacy, and continue to exert ourselves to the utmost to obtain agreement about the issues which endanger good feeling. Whether the Germans really wish to talk business, or whether they prefer to let themselves be put off by the spectre of Bolshevism, we cannot allow the responsibility for failure to be ours, in however slight a degree. We must recognise calmly the claims that Germany is putting forward at the present time, and do our best to see that these claims are met, in so far as they are well founded.

* * * *

One of these claims relates to the population of German race and language which lives in the border districts of Bohemia, forming a German minority in the Czechoslovak Republic. These people remained separated from the German Empire by the historical accident which divided the Habsburg dominions from the rest of Germany, and the geographical fact that the Erzgebirge, the Riesengebirge and the Isergebirge formed an exceptionally good frontier. Anyone who visits this country, as I have lately done, is fortunate to find himself in a delightful land of wooded foothills, among which factories are scattered in such a way as to avoid spoiling the scenery. The late President Masaryk, before the end of the War, disclaimed the desire to incorporate in the new Czechoslovak State the districts predominantly inhabited by Germans. In this he showed a rare statesmanship, for much sorrow would have been avoided had his proposal been carried out. Unfortunately, the completeness of victory led to the constitution of the Czechoslovak State (so far as its Western part is concerned) in the historic frontiers of the

Kingdom of Bohemia. Public feeling would not have approved the addition to the defeated German Empire of new territories that had not previously belonged to her, and the former owner, Austria-Hungary, was defunct. The land of the "Sudeten Deutsch" was thus added to Czechoslovakia, though under the stringent guarantees of a treaty specially designed to secure the proper treatment of the minority populations by the Republic, under the guardianship of the League of Nations. The Foreign Minister (now President) Beneš produced at Paris a project: "accepting as a basis of national rights the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is, to make of the Czechoslovak Republic a sort of Switzerland, taking into consideration, of course, the special conditions of Bohemia."

The grievances of the Sudetic Germans are of great concern to Europe, because they form a compact block of population, occupying the territory which lies along the frontiers of the German Reich. Any very serious disturbance among these people would subject the German Government (which naturally regards them as blood brothers) to an irresistible temptation to march to their rescue. Such trouble may well arise, if the present disagreements between the Sudetic Germans and the Czech authorities should continue.

Among the Sudeten Deutscher, the older people remember the days when they were the ruling race in Bohemia; and the present Czech officials who have dealings with these Germans remember that same past with bitterness; they are often unwilling to allow the fallen tyrants to forget that their rôles have been reversed. The younger Germans of Bohemia have not the old loyalty to the defunct Habsburg régime, and feel themselves akin to their German brothers over the frontier. Thus, their patriotism is directed towards the State erected by Herr Hitler, and they have formed a Sudeten Deutsch Partei, in as close imitation of the Nazi Party as the Czech authorities will permit. This movement, led by Herr Henlein, obtained in the last elections 70 per cent. of the votes of the whole German minority, and can thus claim to be the true representative of the Germans of Bohemia.

The growth of the Henlein Party has been startling. At the election of 1935, out of 25,000 voters in the town of Reichenberg, the German Socialists (who were formerly so powerful) only secured 1,100 votes; the Henlein Party received 17,000.

The recent incident at Teplice, when two Sudeten Deutsch Members of Parliament are supposed to have been assaulted, and there followed a diplomatic squabble with Germany, found feeling so well prepared that it brought a new influx of members to the Sudeten Deutsch Partei. I was told in Reichenberg that in that town alone some 600 new members had been secured in three weeks. A further result was the postponement of the already overdue local elections, and the prohibition of public meetings; a semi-military state of affairs which again must add fuel to the flames. Another factor contributing to the growth of Herr Henlein's Party is said to be the experience of Germans who go over to Germany to obtain work. On their return they report on the scale of unemployment relief, so much greater than the tiny pittance granted in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, they find in Germany comparative prosperity, and a far greater demand for labour than in the Sudetenland.

In the early years after the War the Sudetic Germans probably expected a certain amount of vindictiveness on the part of the Czechs, and were not sorry to escape the miseries of depreciated currencies and alien military occupation which fell upon Austria and Germany. Later, their hopes of better treatment were raised, when the political parties which at that time represented them entered the Czech Government Coalition. Then came the economic crisis, and the industrialised Germans were ruined to a far greater extent than their semi-agricultural Czech fellow-citizens. Geographical accident has placed the German minority in the region which is hardest hit by the depression, and in the district where there is fear of invasion, and consequently strict military administration. Thus, in two respects the Sudetic Germans are at a disadvantage, even without any deliberate discrimination against them by the Czechs; and such discrimination is by no means lacking.

The most ardent defender of the Czechs cannot deny that it exists. Even the ignorant traveller can get personal evidence of the spirit which animates the administration. If he asks the way of a policeman in German, in the German districts, he is frequently answered in Czech. The policeman is supposed to speak both languages, but is unhelpful to those who address him in German. It is, of course, not to be expected that the Czechs will employ Germans as policemen on any

large scale; it would obviously be dangerous to do so, especially near the frontier. The loyalty of a German to the Czech Government could hardly be guaranteed, unless his loyalty as a German were somewhat suspect to the Henlein Party; and in that case his appointment would not be a factor in the fulfilment of the so-called "February Agreement," which promised an equal share to Germans in public employment. The Czech policeman's unwillingness to recognise the German tongue is noticeable rather as an illustration of pettiness than of severity; yet it helps to account for the extraordinary rise of the Henlein Party.

It is generally agreed that the Czech Government compares favourably in regard to the treatment of its minorities with other countries which signed minority treaties; but even if the charge against the Czechs be limited to the statement that they have pursued a policy of pinpricks, rather than of crude brutality, this is a sufficiently serious matter, when the pinpricks are applied to a population at a high level of civilisation, and one which happens to be so placed as to be a possible occasion of war. Government contracts are in the main withheld from the Germans; but, apart from actions of public importance, there are people in all classes of life who have felt the sting of prejudiced authority. To take the higher classes alone, there are many men who held commissions in the Austrian army, and who have since the end of the War been compelled to serve the Czechoslovak State in the ranks. It would have been quite simple to avoid such stupid vindictiveness. A cavalry officer who has served in the War and has after the peace been reduced to the rank of trooper makes a poor propagandist for the new régime.

The Czechs are bound by their Minority Treaty to give to the Germans and other minorities their own schools, and freedom to use their own language. These provisions seem to have been generally carried out; but there are other obligations upon the Czechs, concerning which it is more difficult to be precise. For example, the Treaty provides that the minorities are to have their due share in the benefits of the expenditure of public money, and also that they are not to be excluded from any offices or employment. It is not in accordance with the spirit of this obligation if Germans do not obtain a fair share of administrative posts; or if pressure is brought to bear upon employers to dismiss

German workmen belonging to the Sudeten Deutsch Partei; or if benefits such as free food and clothing are given to the pupils in the Czech schools, but not to those at the German school in the same district. Discrimination in all these respects is alleged against the Czechs; and the concessions made by the Government in February last to meet these complaints do not seem to have been fulfilled.

The professed demand of the Sudeten Deutsch Partei is at present merely for the fulfilment of the letter and spirit of Czechoslovakia's minority obligations; but it is the experience of modern European history that a people whose reasonable and moderate demands are refused is likely to raise those demands and agitate for much more drastic reforms. To take the example of the Czechs themselves, at some period during the Great War, or possibly earlier, men who would have been contented with a generous measure of Home Rule became determined to obtain nothing less than full sovereign independence. So with the Sudeten Deutscher, every denial of equality within Czechoslovakia feeds the desire for regional autonomy. Should the Czechs, led astray by bitterness or by panic, allow themselves to discriminate against their German minority for an indefinite period, they may well be faced with a clamour for self-determination, possibly supported by German diplomatic pressure, which will leave them no alternative to the grant of autonomy. To refuse autonomy in such circumstances might be to risk the loss not only of their German-speaking territories, but of the independence of their whole country.

Other Powers would be greatly concerned to prevent a violent disturbance of the Balance of Power in Central Europe; yet, support of Czechoslovakia in such a case would be support of resistance to the principle of self-determination. This is the very principle which the Allied and Associated Powers themselves proclaimed, and largely but not entirely applied, in 1919; and it is the principle to which Czechoslovakia owes her independent existence. In view of this danger, it is surely incumbent upon England and France, which may become so heavily involved, to exert themselves to secure redress for the Sudeten Deutscher; we should make it clear to the Czechs that our support will not be forthcoming in a cause at variance with the conditions upon which the former Allies facilitated the establishment of the Republic. Should Great Britain and

France fail to secure the due carrying out by Czechoslovakia of her obligations under the Minority Treaty, they may later be faced with the much more formidable problem of implementing in regard to the Sudetenland a demand by Germany for the application of Article XIX of the Covenant, which provides in outline for the revision of treaties.

* * * *

We are more directly concerned with the question of the former German colonies. In this matter, the principal parties are Great Britain and France, *vis-à-vis* Germany. The calmer atmosphere of this country may enable us to come to a realisation of the remedies to be applied more easily than can the French; but it is unfair to say (upon the basis of particular utterances of French politicians) that, however willing we might be to part with some of our mandated territory, the French could never be induced to do the same. Whatever may have been the position in the immediate post-War years, when a strong and confident France had the bit between her teeth, and there was little we could do to restrain her from policies that we disliked, in recent years the French have shown marked moderation, and have acted in much closer accord with ourselves. One has only to remember the German occupation of the demilitarised zone on which France had relied as an additional line of defence, and to recall the restraint with which she refrained from a mobilisation that might have provoked war, to realise that the France of to-day is not the France of the Ruhr occupation. Thus, it is open to us to seek by every means a solution of the colonial problem with Germany, confident that, when it comes to an issue, the French will not exhibit an irrevocable determination to stand aloof from the measures that may be necessary.

The Germans regard the taking away of their colonies at the end of the War as a simple act of robbery, impossible to square with the standards of conduct by which the Allies professed to govern their policy. The justification used for the deprivation is, it must be confessed, untenable. In the first place, many of those who now oppose the return of the colonies to Germany assert the justice of punishing an aggressor. But the question of Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of the War is no more than a matter of opinion. The assertion of guilt is not fortified by the verdict of any

impartial court of justice ; nor even of such a body as the Assembly of the League of Nations, as is the condemnation of the recent aggressors, Japan and Italy. At the end of previous wars countries have been deprived of territory as a consequence of their ill-fortune in being beaten. But the former Allies expressly disclaimed the desire to conquer territory, and acquisition by conquest is no longer a justification that can be put forward with any show of respectability.

The "Colonial guilt lie," as the Germans call it, on which Germany's compulsory cession of her colonies was nominally founded, is to the effect that the Germans had shown themselves incapable of ruling natives. In point of fact, a general exchange of atrocity stories among the past and present colonial Powers is something which none of them can face with equanimity, however good its record may be in general. Moreover, at the time of the Locarno negotiations the former Allies expressly abandoned the thesis that Germany is unfit to administer colonies, and stated that if she could obtain any colonial territory they would not raise objections on the score of her unfitness to administer it. Many people assert that Nazi methods of government unfit the Germans of to-day to rule over non-Germans. But it must not be forgotten that the German treatment of the Jews is directed towards two main objects. The first is to preserve German racial purity from contamination by non-Aryan blood ; the second is to free certain professions from Jewish domination. However strongly we may deplore the methods employed to achieve these ends in a country where the conditions disliked by the Nazis were already well established, it is not to be supposed that similar methods would be used in Africa. The avoidance of a half-caste problem would no doubt be aimed at, and wealth would be exploited. Our own aims are similar.

The basis for the German feeling of injustice is the fact that the colonies were taken away without any impartial inquiry or examination of the facts, in flat contradiction to the published terms upon which the German Army was induced to lay down its arms. It may be that the Allies could have continued the War, and in a few days would have been in a position to extort such terms as they thought fit. The fact remains that, to avert further bloodshed, they granted Germany an armistice upon certain set conditions, namely, that a peace was to be negotiated in accordance with the

famous "Fourteen Points" laid down by the President of the United States in a speech some months earlier. These Points are therefore morally binding upon the Allies; and the fifth of the Points was not carried out. That point provided for "an absolutely impartial examination of all colonial claims." There was no such examination; the Allies confiscated the German colonies as an entirely *ex parte* act.

Such is the German case for believing that the deprivation of her colonies was an act of grave injustice. It is a strong case, and if justice is our aim we cannot lightly dismiss it. Moreover, morality apart, it is fairly generally recognised in this country to-day that the deprivation was, at best, a grave political blunder. It is interesting to compare the passionate hostility to Germany which prevailed at Paris with the statesmanlike moderation with which, after twenty-two years of war with France, much of it entirely due to the aggressive policy of Napoleon, Great Britain handed back to the defeated enemy nearly all of the colonies which she had captured. Wellington summed up the choice: he pointed out that if France were compelled at the peace to cede her colonies, we should have to regard hostilities as merely suspended until the French should see an opportunity to try and regain what they had lost. In accordance with this wise calculation, Castlereagh gave them back. Unfortunately, Wellington and Castlereagh were not in office in 1919.

Remembering the necessity of finding common ground between ourselves and the Germans, it is essential that we should discover whether we can meet the German claim for colonies in any satisfactory manner. The Germans require colonies for a variety of reasons, some of them merely psychological, but not to be ignored or derided on that account. Other reasons are economic; and although the economic benefit of colonies may be small, any relief would be welcome to a nation as hard pressed as is Germany to meet simultaneously the necessities of her population and her need (as she doubtless sees it) for adequate defence. For example, the acquisition of a territory in West Africa in which she could greatly increase the output of vegetable oils would release for the production of food considerable areas of German soil which must now be allocated to the production of oil-bearing crops. But fundamentally, the strongest German reason for desiring colonial territory is not prestige or economic want,

but the simple claim of right—"we had colonies, and they were taken away unjustly; why may every important industrial nation have colonies except us?"

To meet this claim, the holders of the former German colonies require to produce an exceedingly strong case, if they are not ready to hand the colonies back. Resistance to the idea of restoration centres mainly upon strategic considerations and our view of the interests of the natives. The strategic argument refers mainly, though not exclusively, to Tanganyika. This territory is the only one of Germany's African colonies integrally under the administration (save for the separation of Ruanda-Urundi) of the United Kingdom. Since the Statute of Westminster we have no claim in law or in fact to dispose of German South-West Africa, which is administered by the Union of South Africa. Togoland and the Cameroons have been divided in each case between British and French mandates. Thus, if we were anxious to take action, and could not secure the co-operation of the French, Tanganyika is the only country that we could hand over.

It is, however, recognised in Germany that our position in East Africa might be prejudiced by transferring this territory, and it may be (notwithstanding the fulminations of Signor Mussolini) that Germany would not rule out an arrangement by which she received an adequate territory in West Africa, and gave up her claim to Tanganyika. Until such time as the German claim of right is recognised by this country, it must be based upon the transfer of the German colonies as they were before the War; but that does not mean that, once substantial recognition was given to the equitable claim, an arrangement could not be come to over the actual allocation of the territory to be transferred.

Moreover, it is impossible to maintain the thesis that every German settlement anywhere in the world would constitute a menace to the British Empire. One cannot regard the present alignment of Powers in diplomatic camps as a permanent feature of international politics, or suppose that Germany must be, until the end of time, always the potential enemy of Britain. If such a theory were maintained, we should have had to deny to France the colonies that she now holds, because before the *Entente Cordiale* of the present century, France was regarded as our hereditary enemy. To claim that no Power of which we may be nervous at the moment should

ever own colonies in a district in which we have interests or trade routes (that is to say, anywhere in the world) is to put forward a claim to absolute security, based upon world domination. Great Britain is great enough to refrain from so outrageous a demand.

The question of native interests is upon a different footing. It must be recognised that the establishment of the mandates system has conferred upon the natives of the mandated territories certain rights of international protection which cannot justly be taken away. This involves that Germany, upon taking over the administration of any territory now under mandate, ought to be required to accept the same obligations as now bind the mandatory Powers. In other words, the Germans ought to hold their colonial territory, when they get any, under mandates no less strict than those now in force. Thus, the influence of the Mandates Commission of the League (a very weighty body, upon which Germans formerly served) would not be lost to the cause of the natives. Native interests could thus be safeguarded, so far as it is possible to safeguard them at all, by giving Germany colonial territory, not in full sovereignty, but under mandate.

It must be remembered that the German claim of right is for full restitution of the position in Africa which she occupied before the War, when there were no mandates and no League of Nations. If, by reason of historical changes in the world, she is now offered something less than the sovereignty which she then enjoyed, it is only fair that the same changes which it is proposed to operate to her disadvantage should equally be operated to restrict the sovereignty of the other Powers which have colonies in Africa. This applies particularly to Great Britain and France, which have for so many years been administering German colonies under mandate, but are also the owners of enormous colonial territories without any mandate at all. It will only be fair to ask Germany to accept restriction of her sovereignty in her former colonies if we are prepared to submit ourselves to a like restriction of sovereignty in, at any rate, a large part of the African territories now held by us as colonies. Thus, in order to right a wrong done in 1919 without committing a worse wrong against the natives whose interests we profess to value, it will be necessary for us to pay the price of placing some of our African colonies

under mandate. No doubt, in most of our colonies the existence of a mandate would make little actual difference to our administration. If in any instance the mandate should necessitate a change in our treatment of the natives, we, who believe in the doctrine of trusteeship, should be the last to raise objections.

These are some of the directions in which we ought to seek a settlement with Germany. It will be necessary for us to find a basis, and to carry our friends with us in whatever measures seem desirable. Whatever risks we may have to take in the future in order to maintain international order, the path of real lovers of peace is less to organise victory than to avert war, and therefore to labour earnestly for the removal of grievances which are genuine. Those grievances must go; then we may have peace; and even if not, we shall have a clear conscience.

NOEL-BUXTON.

THE FUTURE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY.

WHEN I was honoured with the invitation to deliver the Aneurin Williams Memorial Lecture for 1937, I decided to take a subject which, in principle, would be within the conditions of the Trust, and yet would raise a fundamental issue in the general political situation, not merely in this country or in Europe, but in the world as a whole. I never knew Aneurin Williams personally, to my great loss. From the early days his name and work were familiar to me; he was, as we all know, an unwearied advocate to the end of many great public causes, and particularly of Proportional Representation. One of his latest public utterances in 1923 was a plea for the kind of National Government that came into existence in 1931, but based on Proportional Representation. I am tempted here to observe, as an impartial non-party outsider, that our defective electoral system has deprived the Government in the last six years of a strength that existed in the country but which found no adequate representation in the House of Commons. Be that as it may, Aneurin Williams was one whose record and work in many great causes, besides Proportional Representation, we are all agreed deserve a permanent memorial.

Sir John Marriott in his *Mechanism of the Modern State* (1.502) clearly defines the question that my subject, "The future of Parliamentary Democracy," was deliberately intended to ask: "Has representative government," he writes, "reached its zenith? Was the Reform Act of 1918 the last expiring effort to maintain a system hallowed in this country by long tradition?" and I borrow, for my purposes, earlier from the same treatise (1.162) this sufficient definition: "Parliamentary democracy implies something more than the legislative omnipotence of Parliament; it implies, also, a continuous control, exercised by the legislative Sovereign, over the executive."

Our Parliamentary system has taken centuries to establish; it has been built up by experiment, trial and error, with the result that it has developed a political habit of mind and aptitude which are part of our national genius; after 1689 at any rate the fundamentals have been accepted and Parliament has not been concerned with re-defining or drastically altering

them ; controversies have been over policies and not over first principles ; (up till 1914 the evolution of the Parliamentary system has meant a two-party system and the Cabinet has been the organ developed to harmonise the control of the executive by the legislature through the party system ; the House of Commons, in particular, has developed a Procedure and Standing Orders specifically devised to ensure the responsibility of the Ministers of the Crown to the legislature for every act of the Crown ; the most famous and effective of these is the Standing Order (dating from 1702) that proposals for taxation can only come from a Minister of the Crown, ready to accept responsibility for the proposal ; an unfettered freedom of speech for all members of the legislature was secured early, but with it has come a similar freedom of speech as the right of all citizens ; a strong and efficient Civil Service, outside party politics, has been built up which is at the disposal of whatever government is in power ; and, lastly, equally deep rooted in the past and developed step by step with the central Parliamentary organ is the system of local government, based on the same principles and aiming at ensuring the same ascertainable responsibility for finance and administration, whether the unit be a parish or the powerful administrative corporations in London, Glasgow or Birmingham.

Many of the conditions here set out were not to be found in most of the countries which in the nineteenth century copied the British Parliamentary system and provided themselves with written constitutions to ensure a form of Parliamentary Democracy ; but in the British Dominions they largely prevailed. Is it surprising then that Parliamentary Democracy has not been an unqualified success everywhere that it has been tried ? What constantly surprises me, when I reflect, is that it should have succeeded as well as it has done, if I analyse the difficulties of language, tradition, national or racial mentality and ignorance of the real essentials to success, not to speak of the obvious truth that "party" to us has a very different meaning from "party" in many foreign countries.

The success, qualified as it may be, of Parliamentary Democracy in many countries outside Great Britain, the Dominions and the United States, proves that it does provide a system of government which can satisfy different national

mentalities, tradition and interpretation of life ; and that it is not necessary to have a British mind nor the British tradition so deeply rooted in the past, to make Parliamentary Democracy both a successful and an efficient system of government. But it is necessary to ensure certain conditions for its development and working, without which it is bound to fail. I wish, therefore, to emphasise three of those conditions—the character of the Civil Service ; the freedom of the Press ; and the type of the local government.

All States require for administration a strong and efficient executive. But if an executive staff is to be efficient, its members must not only be technically competent, but properly paid to avoid corruption, enjoy security of tenure in their post, and not be subjected to the arbitrary action of their chief, nor, as a whole, to party and political jobbery. Competence and loyalty can only be secured by a virtual freehold tenure and by removing the Civil Service from interference by Parliament and from all public part in controversial party politics. And this is as true of the municipal and local service as of the central and national. To-day we recognise more accurately than thirty years ago, how much the strength of the executive depends on the competence, loyalty and impartiality of the Civil Service, national and local. A Home Secretary to-day who tried to “make elections” national or local by decrees from Whitehall or by manipulation of the officials ; a Minister of War who promoted or dismissed officers either because they had no religion or their religion was not of the right type ; a Chancellor of the Exchequer who used the confidential information of the Inland Revenue to bleed his political opponents or relieve his political supporters, would before long reduce Great Britain to civil war or bankruptcy. We take it for granted that our Civil Service will serve conservatives, liberals or socialists with the same fidelity and, perhaps, with the same pity for their ignorance, or their incapacity. But in how many democratic countries in Europe, outside Great Britain, is there a Civil Service competent, loyal, impartial, secure of its tenure and free from all political pressure and outside the party arena ?

Bagehot's famous description of the English Constitution as “government by public meeting” is as true of 1937 as it was of 1850. The representative system means that, unless you have a free choice determined by freedom to meet, to

debate, to criticise by speech and writing all over the country, those chosen will not be representative. Tamper with the freedom of the Press, limit the right to say in print what you please on the issues of the day, forbid this meeting or allow that in accordance with a particular political creed, and Parliamentary Democracy will wither at the roots and presently will be a ghost, sitting, in all the trappings of freedom, on the grave of self-government.

Of the essential place that the principles of local government have in Parliamentary Democracy I will only say that you cannot have one system at the centre and a different system in the counties; a people that cannot manage their local affairs will make a mess of a central parliament, and an uncontrolled bureaucracy, however competent in local government, is absolutely incompatible with the control of the executive by a free and representative legislature. It is both in theory and practice impossible to admit that the representatives of the electors must have the right to approve the expenditure of three hundred millions on re-armament, but that representatives of ratepayers can neither approve nor refuse a hundred thousand pounds out of their own pockets for a town-planning scheme. In short, we often too easily forget that an invasion of liberty at the centre will react on liberty in local government, and that a diminution of liberty in local affairs will very soon impair freedom at the centre. If our citizens from indifference or laziness allow their control of local government to pass to expert administrators, it will not be long before they are governed from Whitehall by an irresponsible Civil Service.

We are all aware that the changes that have followed the end of the Great War, most of which would have happened had there been no war, have made Parliamentary Democracy a more difficult system to work. The Franchise Act of 1918 and the supplementary Act of 1929 have not only enormously increased the electorate but altered its whole character. The admission of women to the franchise was and still remains a revolutionary experiment. Constituencies have grown to dimensions which would have staggered the most robust of Victorian radicals. The difficulty and expense of working these huge constituencies, even with the help of an efficient party machine, are notorious and deter, only too frequently, good candidates from standing. (The complexity of modern

administration consequent upon the advance of science and the claims of an educated electorate which demands a standard of living and a technical equipment for life undreamed of in my youth, make the work of Parliament more and more congested. Legislation has either to be swallowed whole, or indefinitely retarded. The Government is driven to control the Parliamentary time-table and to use the closure; and unless the Government provides time a private Bill dies after a first reading. The theoretic control of policy by the legislature becomes weaker and weaker in practice once a government has obtained a so-called "mandate" at a General Election; the power to modify or reverse it is postponed for five years, when probably the electorate will be required to decide a new and very different issue.

It is not surprising that the critics who want certain large things accomplished "here and now" should indict Parliamentary Democracy as inefficient and intolerably slow, and demand "direct action," which, as far as I can understand it, means power in a Minister or a government to legislate by decree, with an efficient Civil Service to administer the decree—and provided that the Minister and the decree comply with the political creed of the critics. Direct action by decree of your opponents against yourself is, of course, sheer tyranny and a violation of the fundamental and natural rights of man. Government of a majority by a minority in the alleged interests of the majority may be a reasonable system, but even if imposed and maintained by adequate force, cannot be fitted into the principles or practice of Parliamentary Democracy.

The antithesis to "direct action" comes from the critics who would place a true democratic system not on a representative but on a vocational and functional basis. The House of Commons fails, on this argument, because its members do not really represent the life of the nation. In the modern community every adult man or woman belongs to a distinguishable category—industrial, commercial, agricultural, professional and so forth. According to the category to which I belong I have a right to see that my functional or vocational interests, whether I am a plumber or a professor, are given their true value in the organised life of the community as a whole, and a member of Parliament cannot adequately discharge this duty both for professors and plumbers at the same time, particularly if he is neither, and probably is a lawyer,

for a stockbroker, or the secretary to a trade union of grocers or miners.

I cannot argue here the whole case for or against what is known as Guild Socialism ; I must content myself, therefore, with two observations. Parliamentary Democracy, the fundamental corner stone of which is a central representative legislature controlling the executive, cannot be placed on a vocational or functional basis of representation without destroying the principle which it enshrines. The House of Commons cannot be made a tessellated mosaic of competing vocations and functions. It would cease to be an organ for expressing the national will and for controlling the executive as a whole : and it would be a parody of the functional categories whose interests it was intended to promote and safeguard. Secondly, the categories of the functional vocations are not easily defined and penned up in watertight compartments. If only professors or plumbers would be nothing but professors or plumbers, and have no interest in anything but professing or plumbing ; but, both professors and plumbers will claim not only to profess or to plumb but to have their say about lawyers, stockbrokers, engineers, cooks, dustmen, art, literature and politics. And generally, the man who knows least about the true interests of his trade, profession or function, is the functional technician in that job. The judgment of a Guild of Tailors would often be far more valuable on sanctions against Italy or Japan than on the technicalities of their trade. In short, if democracy must be functional, it cannot be parliamentary. A new system must be devised from top to bottom to express the functional principle. But the sketches of the new functional constitutions that I have studied in authoritative expositions seem to me to be lamentably deficient in the historic sense, and to assume that a constitution, scientifically worked out on paper, with every organ carefully clogged and geared into a unified system, will work because the constitution will be there to tell you how it must work. A woman in a Soviet factory in Moscow when asked, "What do you do when there is a breakdown?" replied, "We consult that," pointing to a well-thumbed copy of Marx's *Capital* chained to the wall, "it inspires us." And when asked, "Is the machine then mended?" "No," she answered with perfect seriousness, "we go on reading until they (the Government) give us a new machine."

Is the future, then, of Parliamentary Democracy, particularly in Great Britain and the British Dominions, this: that either we must just struggle on with the system that we have, or recognise that it must go and be replaced by some other type of government, very difficult to devise and still more difficult to work? Such a drastic reconstruction is revolution, in the strict sense of the word; and revolution means a clean cut with the past and a determination to turn your back on it and to find a brave new world in a future that has finished with the past. But can our people dismiss their past, even if they think they have done so? I agree that to-day we must reckon with a profound change in the mentality of the voter. Up to 1914 he accepted the two-party system as the fixed and natural order of the British political universe. He certainly does not so accept the two-party system to-day. It is also a profound mistake to underrate the intelligence of even the youngest elector of either sex. Ignorance of facts or details is too often wrongly identified with incapacity of judgment. We are really, or have made ourselves, a politically capable people. We can grasp an issue and penetrate to the essentials of a problem, even if we would be hopelessly ploughed in an examination on the facts. It is very remarkable that in two university constituencies, Oxford and the Provincial Universities, recently the electors with good party candidates, backed by a good party organisation, have chosen four Independents—a result unthinkable when I went to Birmingham seventeen years ago. I am convinced that good Independent candidates, if they had an equally good organisation behind them, would poll many more thousands of votes than the official organisers of the old parties would admit.

Yes, it may be said, but they would not get in. I agree; probably not. But why? The obvious answer is that our system of voting and our distribution of constituencies are avowedly based on a two-party theory, inherited from a past when it was true, but is no longer true to-day. I will not drench you with figures, nor do I hold any brief for any party, but in every general election since 1922 it is demonstrable that the number of the members of the three parties returned do not correspond with the real voting power in favour of the parties they represent. That is not, therefore, a true representative system. I am convinced it is a real political danger, which may increase and not diminish. If powerful sections in

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total voting power fail to secure a proportionate share of representation, there is a strong impulse given to securing what they demand by "direct action."

Two other points are all I propose to mention. First, it is literally an astonishing fact that the representative Speaker's committee unanimously recommended Proportional Representation for the great electoral law of 1918, and that this was rejected by the House of Commons. I am sure that was a grave mistake. It is not too late to repair it, even now. And I believe it would be in the true interests of all parties to do so. It is not politically sound to impose on tens of thousands of voters this dilemma: I must vote for A because I dislike B, and would like C, but I cannot vote for him without probably letting B in, and A whom I dislike is better than B whom I hate. Voters evade such dilemmas by not voting at all.

Secondly, it is always urged that Proportional Representation will mean a House of Commons stuffed full of "cranks," with the consequent result that in ten years we should have more ministries even than they have in France in any decade. That argument implies that our electors are fools who love "cranks," because they are really "cranks" themselves. If you honestly believe that, your duty is obviously to abolish Parliamentary Democracy straight away—as Public Enemy No. 1—because it is simply preposterous to maintain that Proportional Representation will by a statutory enactment reduce the average elector from intelligence to a maundering imbecility. I maintain on the contrary that the average elector is anything but a fool or a crank and that he has an infallible but unanalysable capacity for detecting the true "crank" from the real Independent; and, when I am told that the electorate could not master "the intricacies of Proportional Representation," I say that is pure nonsense. To a nation that daily masters the intricacies of our insurance cards or the forms of return for income-tax, the so-called intricacies of Proportional Representation would be agreeable child's play.

The real challenge to the future of Parliamentary Democracy does not come from critics or reformers who accept democracy as a form of government, but urge various reforms in the electoral system which, rightly or wrongly, they hold will strengthen it, but from the systems which are avowedly based upon a repudiation both of the principles and of the

efficacy of democratic government. In this respect the period since 1920 constitutes a new epoch in the history of institutions. Prior to 1914 the main antithesis to Parliamentary Democracy was monarchical absolutism or autocracy, and the struggle to establish Parliamentary Democracy, particularly since 1789, was a struggle with absolutism as such. But, since 1920 the battlefield has been completely altered by the rise of the Totalitarian State.

I can only point out here, first, that the Totalitarian philosophy represents a theory of the State which obviously rejects the fundamental principles on which Parliamentary Democracy must stand. Power or force which is the basis of the Totalitarian State—the *Macht Staat*—cannot be made, in any circumstances, to harmonise with the principle of government by consent—freely granted and freely exercised. Whether the Totalitarian theory takes the form that it does in Russia, or in Germany, or in Italy is irrelevant to the main point I am considering in this lecture. Each one of those Totalitarian systems, though for different reasons, is an explicit challenge. It is directly relevant to the main issue that, in each of the three countries mentioned, a party has seized power by force and that the government of the State remains in the hands of that party; but it is openly admitted that the members of the party itself are only a minority and not even a large minority of the nation as a whole. Their power and their control are maintained simply by force, and without that force their Totalitarian State would crumble into pieces. It is invariably justified as the natural evolution from, and an efficient substitute for, a bankrupt and discredited system that preceded. Signor Mussolini has stated over and over again that, while the nineteenth-century constitutional movement did much for Italy, its mandate and its efficacy were exhausted by 1914 and that Fascism replaces the “dead and rotting corpse of liberalism” by a new and virile theory of the State and the inexorable efficiency of its machinery. Similar arguments have been put forward on behalf of the Soviet Government in Russia and the National Socialist Government in Germany.

When I go into those Totalitarian countries I am free to admit that they have achieved for themselves certain administrative results of considerable importance, particularly in countries such as Italy and Russia where, on the material

side of life, they were at least twenty or fifty years behind Great Britain or the United States : but, what I do not find is that, even by the strictest materialist tests, the Totalitarian Government is more efficient than the Government of my own country. Their railways or their roads, their motor cars or their wireless, their post office, telephones and so forth, may be excellent, but they are not better than what I get in Great Britain. In some respects they are not so good. In our social services, organised by a free democracy, we are not behind, and in many respects we are far ahead of, the Totalitarian States. I am not, therefore, prepared to admit that Parliamentary Democracy is less efficient in the administrative spheres of government than Russia, Germany or Italy.

But Parliamentary Democracy rests on rights and privileges incomparably of far greater importance than good roads or scientific sewerage. Twenty-four hours in a Totalitarian State leaves me, on the spiritual and intellectual side, almost asphyxiated. There is no free Press : there are no free meetings ; there is no liberty to speak, or challenge, or criticise ; neither the universities nor the schools nor the Churches are free ; and, as I have put it elsewhere, knowledge consists in knowing what a government allows you to know and ignorance is not knowing what a government has decided you must not know.

If the highest life of a great community or nation means spiritual, intellectual and moral freedom and the uplifting of the whole nation by the free working and inspiration of its highest and best minds, for whom the breath of life is the sweeping air on the mountain tops blowing whence the spirit knows not and where it listeth ; if all human effort is to be first measured by half a dozen party leaders obsessed by a very limited creed and then imposed on tens of millions by force ; if all criticism of what the leader of the party declares is the will of the nation, because he claims to be the will of the nation in a single human form, is to be crushed because it is treason to himself and the State that he has made by force ; if the arts and sciences are to be cut, squared and modelled to a single arbitrary type, their exercise to be endorsed at every point by an obedient and often ignorant State functionary and their utterance to be tuned to a single and uniform key, then the challenge of the Totalitarian State is not merely to

Parliamentary Democracy, but to the whole principles of freedom and to the charter of civilisation. The good life much more than good government is in peril from the challenge.

In a word, if Parliamentary Democracy succumbs to the Totalitarian State, the free mind will have been vanquished with it. There is, therefore, a sacred trusteeship imposed to-day particularly on the British people. In the seventeenth century civilised Europe turned steadily from free government to absolutism. Great Britain, a small island of five million inhabitants, alone refused to surrender and not without blood and sweat, peril from without and dissension within, continued to consolidate the principles of government by consent; it preserved its monarchy as well as the basis of Parliamentary Democracy and it defeated in turn monarchical absolutism and military autocracy: from the lamps it had kept burning Europe relit in the nineteenth century the extinguished lights of free government; later, it was not our constitutional monarchy nor Parliamentary Democracy that crashed in and after the Great War.

It is my firm conviction that if the present tidal wave of intolerance sweeping over the world is to be turned back, if the philosophy of violence which is the basis of the Totalitarian and Power State is to be refuted and expelled from international relations, and if the civilised world is to be made safe for and by free spirits and free minds—the centre of resistance in duty bound to take up the challenge is here in Great Britain. As I have endeavoured to show, representative parliamentary government is dependent on buttresses of freedom which may have their foundations in the government of a parish or the maintenance of an uncensored Press and of universities independent of the control of Whitehall. A “free” House of Commons nominated by a party executive but claiming to represent a gagged or dragooned nation would not even be a useful tool to a dictator. Once the issue is really clear to the British people, I have no fear either of the ultimate result or of the future of Parliamentary Democracy.

C. GRANT ROBERTSON.

IMPRESSIONS OF MODERN TURKEY.

WHEN I reached the harbour of Istanbul on board one of the exceedingly comfortable Rumanian passenger steamboats coming from Constanza, the beauty of the silhouetted panorama made me completely forget the purpose of my journey. That purpose was of a thoroughly prosaic nature, namely to study, as carefully as would be possible within a limited space of time, the features of modern Turkey. The town, or rather towns of Stamboul, Galata and Pera spread out before me under a red late afternoon sun seemed to be the very image of all conventional and romantic ideas of the land of mighty Sultans, wise Caliphs and the immortal Haroun-al-Rashid. As I was to find out much later, there are indeed two Turkeys; or, to express it more accurately, there are still many remnants of the old Ottoman Empire. The town of Stamboul, once the centre of Turkish power and of a colourful cosmopolitan life, survives to-day as a slowly decaying monument of old times. Since the Republican Government decided to build its own capital in the heart of the Anatolian highlands, Stamboul has been deliberately neglected and is, in the eyes of modern Turks, regarded as a symbol not of Turkey's greatness but of her degradation at the hands of foreign exploiters.

The things which interested me more than anything about Turkey were the character and achievements of the dictatorship of Kemal Atatürk. Before I left England a Turkish diplomat told me that, although there was no democracy in Turkey in the customary sense of the word, I should not expect to see "just another dictatorship." He was at great pains to explain to me the exact difference between Kemalism and the Fascist brand of totalitarian dictatorship. His formula that Turkey was ruled by soldiers who had taken off their field boots and put on civilian clothes had amused me at the time, though it sounded too nice a *bon mot* to be very convincing. Later, however, I found that his statement was a good deal nearer the truth than I had expected.

Outwardly, there are few, if any, signs pointing to the existence of the dictatorial régime of the country. Although Turkey is a one-party state, the official Republican People's Party is hardly anywhere in prominence. It requires rather an intimate acquaintance with the life of the people to find

out that the political and cultural centres of the Republican Party, the so-called People's Houses which exist in practically every locality, are the real centres of what political and social life there is. Providing for lectures, film and theatre shows, physical training and games as well as evening classes for adult education, they combine in themselves a multitude of functions and seem most popular, especially among the younger generation. Their appearance and general lay-out vary, of course, enormously; and among the many People's Houses I visited there were some—particularly in Ankara—of truly palatial elegance, whereas others were most neglected. By comparison with other one-party states, however, these centres of state power ("*Stützpunkte*" as the Germans would undoubtedly call it) seemed to remain very much in the background. Many casual tourists might travel through the country without ever noticing their existence at all or at least failing to realise their great importance in the political life of modern Turkey. Much the same applies to other outward signs of the unlimited power of the Government which are so common in other dictatorial countries. There are no political uniforms, no mass-processions, no uniformed school children and no political badges in the button-holes. In short, even in the few urban centres, where alone it might conceivably exist, there is hardly anything that may be compared with the dictatorial regimentation of the people's life so predominant in most of Europe's dictatorships.

This difference seemed to me of the greatest importance. No doubt, it has its reasons both in the history of the country and, perhaps to a smaller extent, in the history of the Turkish republican movement. What features there are of authoritarian rule—and there are indeed many important ones—remain within the rather select circles of an ever more centralised bureaucratic administration. Dictatorship and authoritarian discipline have come to the country as a means of introducing new modes of living in every sphere, not for the suppression, merely for uniformity's sake, of a matured civilisation. That does not, however, mean that either the history or the present-day life of the Turkish Republic are entirely free from suppression. The violently anti-clerical (not anti-religious) principles and practice of the Kemalist régime are well known. Indeed, the most energetic policy of secularisation has been pursued by Kemal Atatürk and his

administrators ever since in 1922 the last Sultan Mohammed VI fled the country on board the British battleship *Malaya*. In this struggle suppression and persecution have played an important part. Although I did not myself travel in every part of the vast country, I had the impression that there is to-day virtually no opposition left to the anti-clerical policy. Foreign observers living in Turkey permanently confirmed that more recently the régime tended to deal much more leniently with cases of individual offences against the laws forbidding the wearing of religious costumes, Fez or veils. This policy has, of course, long outgrown the purely negative and aggressive character which it had at the time of the abolition of the Caliphate (1924) and similar decrees passed subsequently. To call it anti-clericalism, pure and simple, would be very misleading. Secularisation is no longer a merely destructive policy but a most interesting and, no doubt, highly constructive practical attempt at national and mass education.

But before I deal with the educational efforts it should be understood that 'Secularity' is but one, though the first-named, of the famous Six Principles of the Kemalist movement. The other five are, in their official order : Nationalism, Revolution, Popularism, Democracy and Etatism. By a decree passed by the Grand National Assembly in February of this year, these Six Principles of the People's Party were solemnly declared to be the "Principles of State"—which they had, in fact, been for a very long time already. To the more sceptical mind of the ordinary Western European this collection will appear slightly incoherent, or even as expression of a merely propagandist desire "to have a bit of everything." That would be a highly unfair judgment. As everyone with the slightest notion of Turkish history will be able to imagine, mass propaganda played no, or a totally insignificant part in the formation of modern Turkey. And incoherent as such assortment of principles may appear, my personal impressions were that they are reflecting exactly those elements which are to-day dominating the entire life of the state and the people. "Dominate" is indeed the word, for in all discussions I had with teachers, doctors, students, officials high and low, the State Principles played the most important rôle. Not only are they apparently universally accepted, but for every educated individual they seemed to have become the chief guide in life.

Many Turks, especially the younger ones, developed a most elaborate if somewhat primitive *Weltanschauung* based on these principles. While I was busy with sightseeing and inspection tours my Turkish companions would often point to this or that and, after a short explanation, immediately classify it as the realisation of one of the Six Principles. I particularly remember one little incident which is perhaps worth telling. A very hard-working young lady employed at the Ministry of Interior used to accompany me on several of my tours as an interpreter. One evening when we returned very tired to Ankara I asked her what she did with her spare time. She replied: "You know there is not much of that. We are all working late. But I have a nice little flat with my mother, and my recreations are to listen to some Bach or Schubert or to read a good book, preferably a French novel." She really had an astounding knowledge of modern literature. Although what she said was only true, it was primarily a little demonstration, subconscious perhaps, to show the foreigner that young Turkey was just as civilised as the West.

Since the fighting days have long passed and the country has settled down to more constructive tasks, secularity has rather ceased to be the predominating element. To-day the chief features of Kemalist ideology, if that word is permitted, are undoubtedly a very virile nationalism, an equally strong depreciation of the Ottoman past, a hunger for education and a veritable craze for "Westernisation." This nationalism is all the more amazing if one remembers that until a few years ago (and very largely even to-day) there existed no nation or national consciousness in the ordinary sense of the word. There are not even national traditions comparable with those of European nations which could inspire or rouse any substantial proportion of the Turkish peasant population. Only a minute section of the people has any knowledge of the Turkish past and is able to remember the glory of the Ottoman Empire. And precisely that section, forming to-day 90 per cent. of the new régime's bureaucratic hierarchy, hates nothing more than the memory of the "unhappy old Ottoman days."

Thus it is perhaps not at all surprising that I found no traces of aggressiveness against other nations in modern Turkey's nationalism but rather an immense childlike pride in the achievements of the Republican era. All remaining aggressiveness and hatred is still concentrated on the remnants

of the Armenian, Greek and Jewish minorities left in the country. The complete lack of tolerance and, very often, the cruel brutality and petty persecution which still characterise the official as well as general attitude towards them is the ugliest side of Turkish politics. After the barbaric massacres of the Armenians in the early days of the Republic, and after the majority of Greeks living in Turkey had forcibly been exchanged with Turks living in Western Thrace, the number of remaining foreign nationals is to-day insignificant. It must be remembered that Turkey deported about three times as many Greeks as Greece deported Turks, roughly $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions.

To describe the exact character of modern Turkish nationalism is no easy task. Bearing in mind that the following applies only to a fairly thin, though steadily growing upper stratum, one might define it as a kind of democratic educationalism put into practice by a benevolent dictatorship. The avowed ultimate aim of the Kemalist régime is the transformation of Turkey into a modern civilised state, economically as well as spiritually self-sufficient. To reach that far-away goal the leaders realise that the transformation of the people and the creation of "the responsible and enlightened citizen" is perhaps of greater importance than even technical and industrial progress. Their determination cannot be called anything less than passionate, and it is this attitude which so favourably distinguishes the Turkish régime from all outwardly similar ones in Central and Southern Europe.

It is, of course, true that comparisons with other authoritarian régimes have to be made with the utmost caution. Historic, geographic, ethnic, economic and political conditions of Turkey are so vastly different that they almost forbid such comparison, except perhaps the earlier phases of the Russian revolution which was faced with many similar problems. It is, therefore, also impossible to say exactly how much of the essentially humanitarian "educationalism" is caused by the country's unique conditions, and how much of it may be due to the genius and idealism of Kemal Atatürk and his collaborators.

Educational efforts of one type or another are apparent everywhere. I should perhaps make it clear that education has here to be understood in the broadest possible sense. Every undertaking of the state—be it changes in administration

agricultural reforms, modernisation of the old ways of peasant production, the erection of new industries or only of one industrial plant in a new era—creates at once a multitude of educational problems. For the new industrial centres, often situated in remote parts of the country, such as Karabük (Iron and Steel), Kayseri (Textiles), and Zonguldak (Coal-mining), to name the most important ones, tens of thousands of illiterate peasant sons have to be educated and trained to be able to operate these ultra-modern plants. The difficulties of such a process are obvious. The result, however, will be that the Republic will soon have a nucleus of a native skilled working class.

The ordinary school education alone presents a terrific problem in a country where before the revolution not more than 5 per cent. of the people had learned to read and write, and where even to-day well over 50 per cent. are still illiterate. Schools, universities, colleges, and vocational training centres are in existence everywhere and their number increases steadily. Their present number is, of course, far below the requirements, if measured by European standards, and is likely to remain so for probably a very long time. I visited many of these institutes and found the typical contrast between a very poor and primitive average and some outstanding model schools. Some of the latter were remarkable in every respect, and I doubt whether one could find anything so perfect in Britain, France or Germany.

One of the model schools I have particularly in mind is a training centre for the building trade. As in every industry Turkey has, of course, a great lack of skilled building workers. This training centre, located in the country not far from Ankara, has some two hundred pupils who work and learn as well as live in the school. They are accepted at the age of 14 or 15, and are without exception sons of small peasants and shepherds. They have had either a very short and elementary village school education or none at all. During their three, or in some cases four years of training they are taught reading, writing and some elementary science. Their main education is practical, i.e. housebuilding in brick, wood and concrete and lessons in technical drawing. The younger ones work in a large field-like yard attached to the centre, building small houses which are afterwards demolished. The older ones are divided into groups, each group under the supervision of a

highly skilled mason. They do a more constructive work and go into the villages to build such houses as may be required or repair old ones. The greater part of the Centre which started with only a few boys many years ago was built by the pupils themselves, who proved that they have learnt to do a very fine job. The whole organisation of the Centre and, in particular, its dormitories and recreation rooms were perfect and, indeed, luxurious even by European standards. No visitor can fail to be impressed by these model schools. Since most are in or near the towns and places usually visited by foreigners, it is only natural that many a visitor takes with him very exaggerated ideas about the actual progress of educational work. Yet I too was deeply impressed. If one has travelled a long way through the deserts and grass plains of Anatolia to find sons and daughters of illiterate nomads working in ultra-modern laboratories, with a brand new Zeiss microscope for every one of them, one cannot help being taken aback.

The number enjoying these opportunities is, of course, exceedingly small, it could hardly be otherwise. The training of doctors and scientists, who are so badly needed in the interior, may illustrate the prevailing difficulties. There are now roughly 15,000 students at the University of Istanbul. Almost a third of them are students of medicine and they are all "Government Students," i.e. their studies are paid for by the State. Being a "Government Student" means furthermore that after their final examination the young doctors are pledged to work for five years wherever the authorities may choose to send them. Although students can enter the University only after having passed an official Entrance Examination, their general knowledge and education is infinitely inferior to Western standards. On the other hand the Turkish Government have engaged scores of foreign university teachers of the highest standing, thus making up for the lack of native teachers.

These scientists, officially engaged to do research work, have to devote a good deal of their energy and time to instructing their new students in the most elementary things, even elementary arithmetic and grammar. The average standard of young doctors leaving the University is therefore very low. The foreign Professors are consequently in a permanent quarrel with the State authorities, which demand that, like a

modern factory, they "turn out" so many physicians per year, while the scientists keep on protesting that their "products" do not deserve to bear the title of a doctor of medicine and are, in fact, a danger to the country. No doubt the Turkish authorities are fully aware of this state of affairs and also of its inevitability. Nevertheless they do, of course, prefer to boast of quantity rather than quality. For those who are actively engaged in the not always enviable task of making good scientists, doctors, teachers, and chemists out of the Turkish students (as they are at present), it seems only too natural to lose sight of the greater perspectives. Yet, if one has seen the variety and energy of the drive for national education it does not require much imagination to see that considerable progress has been made already and that, even within our generation, these efforts will produce quite remarkable results.

The only other sphere where the Turkish Government are actively engaged in constructive work on an equally large scale is that of national economy. At present, and in more recent years, all energy has been concentrated on building up new industries, reforming agriculture on lines of agricultural co-operatives and collectivism, creating new markets at home and abroad, and generally laying the foundations for economic self-sufficiency. The policy of "planned economy" and of the "Five Year Industrialisation Plan" of 1933 is vastly different from similar economic policies in other authoritarian states. In Turkey economic planning is to create a functioning national economy which did not previously exist, not to limit and restrict, by means of State control, the work of an existing economic machinery. All important industries now growing up are State monopolies. Foreign trade and exchange and the national credit institutes, both agricultural and industrial, are State controlled. While the present "Five Year Plan" is responsible for the foundation of coalmining and textile industries, the creation of a Turkish chemical industry and the electrification of the country are to be the main features of the second "Five Year Plan."

Although essentially differing from Russia in so far as private property is protected and private business often encouraged, there are yet many striking similarities to the history of Soviet industrialisation. Foreign technical, financial, and economic experts are as important and numerous in Turkey

to-day as in Russia during her first years of industrialisation. Let me stress one fact which seems of great importance for any judgment of Turkey's development as a whole, namely the intimate connection between the drive for national education and that for economic independence. In both fields the Turkish leaders had (and still have) the immense advantage of being able to begin at the beginning. Turkey is in transition and new problems arise every day. Yet, at the outset, her present leaders had to deal with a country that was like a shapeless stone in the sculptor's hand. There were no deep-rooted social and economic class distinctions splitting the nation into a number of sharply antagonistic sections. Nor was there, in consequence, any substantial number of political parties, each claiming to "save" the country in its own peculiar fashion. Finally, modern capitalism and all that it implies had gained but little foothold before the Republican revolution.

In October 1938 the Turkish Republic will celebrate its fifteenth anniversary. Its leaders will have every reason to be proud of their achievements. Although Turkey has still a long way to go until she can claim to have completed her transition into a modern "Western State," there is even to-day not the faintest sign that her steady progress will be disturbed or interrupted by an adverse interior development. I found no other signs of opposition than a few casual remarks criticising Turkish foreign policy as not sufficiently anti-Italian. The dangers that may one day threaten Turkey's progress are the dangers of war, and these anxieties she shares with all other nations of the world.

PAUL ANDERSON.

MAHATMA GANDHI'S BIRTHPLACE.

MANY years ago I wrote out my own impressions of a visit paid to the birthplace of Mahatma Gandhi at Porebunder in Kathiawar. The present time has seemed to me to be opportune to publish them, for they throw light upon a singular personality that has always been difficult for the West to understand. I had gone to Kathiawar, in Western India, in the year 1924, with two special objects in view. One was to visit the birthplace of Swami Dayananda, the great religious reformer and founder of the Arya Samaj, who had been born on the northern edge of the same peninsula of Kathiawar, while Gandhi had been born on the southern coast. No greater prophetic and puritan figure than Dayananda's had shaken the northern provinces of India during the second half of last century. The social and religious reform in the North, which did much to lead on to the political movement, really dates back to him. My second object was to spend some time quietly in Porebunder, where on October 2nd, 1869, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was born ; and it was my good fortune to find the very house that was his birthplace, close to one of the old massive city gates of this ancient town. I was shown the very room where he was born and could picture his babyhood there. Anyone who knows India will be sure that in the years to come this room will become a shrine in the heart of the devotees who will flock to visit it.

It had always appeared to me a significant fact that two of the greatest Hindu social and religious reformers should have been born in this small and remote peninsula of Kathiawar, where the ancient civilisation still lingers on almost untouched by the modern age. For the Arya Samaj, which Dayananda founded, broke entirely new ground in the North of India. In many ways he sowed the seed which Mahatma Gandhi afterwards reaped ; though as this article will show their temperaments differed. At Porebunder I was met with the greatest kindness and courtesy by the members of the Gandhi family, who were still living in the old house in the centre of the town. They took me over it and also into the courtyard, and in this way I was able to spend many hours on the spot picturing the past. Again and again, during my visit, I returned to the family in order to hear from the oldest

members what they were able to tell me about the young boy whom they remembered.

The time of my visit was opportune. The Kathiawar Conference had just been held, over which Mahatma Gandhi himself had presided. On no occasion is he in a happier mood, or in a more humorous vein, than when he thus returns and lives for a while among his own people. In the train the people recognised me and were eager to talk with me about him. His chief demand at the Conference had been that "untouchability" must be removed without a moment's delay. The whole countryside was buzzing with the news of this.

"How can we give it up?" one sturdy farmer said to me. "Our women folk would never let us do so."

"They will follow Mahatma Gandhi," I replied. In the end this has proved true: for the greatest reformers in these new revolutionary movements have been the faithful women whom Gandhi has brought over to his side.

It was noticeable in the trains and on the railway platforms that these villagers of Kathiawar are a sturdy folk. They have a massive strength of independence and at the same time a rugged adherence to all that their fathers did before them, which makes them conservative by nature. I have often traced these two traits of conservatism combined with independence in Mahatma Gandhi himself. He is true to type. The further talk of the country people was concerning the centenary of the birth of Dayananda, which was drawing near. His home in childhood had been on the northern coast of the peninsula, where the climate and atmosphere distinctly differ from the South, though the distance across the promontory is not great.

Porebunder has a character of its own that cannot possibly be mistaken, when one has spent some time there and has sought its inner secret. Here, on the south sea coast of Kathiawar, the air is fresh with the salt spray of the Indian Ocean, which is driven along the beach from great combing breakers as they burst with white foam. To drink in this air night and day makes it easy to realise how the child, Mohandas, gained from his very infancy his amazing powers of physical endurance. Still further, he received spiritually, as if by a natural instinct, his faith in the unseen. Throughout half the year, during the monsoon, strong gales from the sea blow so hard upon the shore that it is impossible for any steamer to

anchor in the open roadstead. The smaller boats are laid up until the calmer weather comes. But though the land is thus beaten by the tremendous waves of the south-west monsoon, the rainfall is not excessive. The soil has to be tilled with the greatest care in order to preserve its moisture. Nature is stern towards man. Man has responded to Nature by producing a strong and vigorous race. Cold and heat, sea-fog and sunshine, have each alike to be borne in turn. Exposure to the violent winds becomes as common as exposure to the burning sun. None but a very hardy people could survive and flourish.

Porebunder has received from Nature an unimaginable splendour of sea and sky. These make it a city of enchantment. It looks out from a jutting headland into the infinite expanse of ocean, like some radiant human spirit preparing to set forth and leave the solid earth on its upward flight. It was in this fashion that I saw it at early dawn appearing out of the mist, while the first rays of the sun touched its pinnacles and towers with lucent gold. At sunset, again, as I watched it, the city seemed to rise above the incoming tide with all the magic beauty of some fairy palace described in the *Arabian Nights*. Once more, in the stillness of midday and throughout the calm afternoon, when the wind had dropped, the blue of the water was no less pure than the ultramarine of the Mediterranean as it is seen from the coast above the Bay of Naples. In the night time I have also watched its beauty under the full moon, while the dim shadowy outline of the city becomes softened into a silvery whiteness, with here and there a yellow light reflected on the ripples of the tide. Truly the place seems set in a land of dreams. This same haunting beauty must have stirred the soul of Mohandas Gandhi more than sixty years ago, when he wandered along the seashore watching the breakers, or went out beneath the sky at night. He has often mentioned in his writings what a powerful appeal the glory of the stars has always made upon his mind. He loves to sleep in the open whenever possible, with nothing between himself and the sky. It is only with great reluctance that he will allow a mosquito net to intervene. At Phoenix, in Natal, I remember how he pointed out to me the glory of the evening sky in South Africa and spoke of the nights he had spent upon the veldt during the memorable march of the passive resisters into the Transvaal. In his

own personality there is something of the same blending—softness mingled with strength and sternness touched with gentleness—which makes one of its chief attractions.

There is also a mystical vein which runs deepest of all in his complex character. It is interwoven in a very striking manner with his strong practical common sense, just as the warp and woof unite on the weaver's loom to make a single piece of cloth. Into the midst of the hardest questions that have to be faced—such as the quelling of a religious feud, the removal of untouchability, the starting of non-co-operation—he brings this faith in the unseen and practical wisdom, woven together. To some persons the mystical vein in him, finally guiding his actions, is a source of confusion. They fail to understand him. With others, who know him intimately, it forms the master-key that unlocks his inner life.

An example of what I have just described may be taken from his own account of the passive resistance struggle in South Africa. "Only the general," he writes, "who conducts the campaign can know the objective of each particular move. The beauty of the *Satyagraha* (soul-force) method is this, that it comes up to oneself: one has not to go in search for it. A Struggle of Righteousness, in which there are no secrets to be guarded, no scope for cunning, and no place for untruth comes unsought: and a man of religion is ever ready for it. A struggle which has to be planned beforehand is not a righteous struggle (*dharmayudda*). In the latter, God Himself plans the campaign and conducts battles. It can be waged only in the name of God. Only when the combatant feels quite helpless—only when he has come to the extreme point of weakness and finds utter darkness all around him, only then God comes to the rescue. God helps when a man feels himself humbler than the very dust under his feet. Only to the weak and helpless is the divine succour vouchsafed." The same mystical experience is present in that practical dreamer, St. Paul. He tells us how he prayed that the thorn in the flesh that buffeted him and prevented his activities might depart from him. But God said, "My grace is sufficient for thee: for My power is made perfect in weakness." "Most gladly therefore," St. Paul continues, "will I glory in my weaknesses. . . . For when I am weak, then am I strong."

At Morvi a disappointment awaited me, because I found that very little was known concerning the home and early

days of Swami Dayananda. Nevertheless, it was not difficult to picture the general environment of his birth and upbringing. For there is a barren, solitary sameness about the whole country, which, on this side of Kathiawar, is very rocky with only occasional patches of green verdure. Morvi looks out towards the Rajputana Desert. Porebunder faces the Indian Ocean. Morvi is stern and bleak in its rocky soil. Porebunder has always something of the tenderness of Mother Nature. It has the air of mystery about it—its haze continually rising, in calm seasons, from the ever-changing sea.

My knowledge of Swami Dayananda, who had died long before I came to India, has been derived from those few who knew him when he was still alive. Therefore I can only speak of his personality at second hand. He seems to me, in modern Indian history, to be the supreme exemplar of the great Puritan. He came forth from the desert, like a John the Baptist, to do the work of purging Reformation within Hinduism. He did it with a giant's strength and an unerring logic of his own, which never failed him as he met face to face in open conflict the leaders of orthodox religion. Mohandas Gandhi, on the other hand, has become known to me owing to the closest personal friendship. We have lived together, in all kinds of difficulties and trials, and have learnt to know each other intimately. Thus I have come to realise the varied sides of his unique character—his utter tenderness to all living creatures : his attractive and persuasive love for every little child he meets : his bearing on his own back the burden of the poorest of the poor : his extraordinary sympathetic pain, which becomes a torture to him when anyone is hurt and he seeks to be their nurse. All these are qualities in him that are quite fundamental, and it is this side that I would emphasise more than any other, because, at times like these, such things may be forgotten amid the wear and tear of modern politics.

Once upon a time Romain Rolland wrote in a letter to me that Tagore was the Plato of our modern age and Gandhi was its St. Paul. This comparison greatly impressed me at the time, and I have often acknowledged its truth. The comparison, of Tagore, with his breadth of human wisdom and his poetic soul, to Plato is almost perfect. Gandhi, too, is like St. Paul in many ways, as the quotation I have just given

shows. His conversion after he had grown up ; his profound conviction of evil in the world which has to be overcome : his passion for righteousness : his moral fervour : his faith in God—all these are shared, in singularly distinct ways, by Mahatma Gandhi and St. Paul. But whenever I have tried to draw out the analogy, certain later thoughts have told me that St. Francis of Assisi comes nearer to him even than St. Paul. For St. Francis has that touch of tenderness for God's animate creation which St. Paul partly lacked. He also comes to us from the Middle Ages, and carries with him in everything he does that medieval background, which is so singularly akin to what we find in rural India. It was that environment, in remote Kathiawar, wherein Mohandas Gandhi was nurtured, that made him what he is to-day.

Ahimsa Parama Dharma—"The highest religion is harmlessness"—this is the conclusion of the whole matter with Mahatma Gandhi. He translates the word *Ahimsa* by "Non-Violence,"—a negative word which lacks colour and is unsatisfactory ; for the Sanskrit word implies a positive quality. He balances it with Satya—Truth. "God is Truth," he says at all times and at all seasons. Gentleness and Truth must ever be intermingled. This blend of characteristics in him goes through all his life. He is essentially medieval in a great part of his thinking, yet he lives and moves and acts in the modern world. He is able to touch in this manner the humblest Hindu peasant, and yet make his appeal to one so ultra-modern in his views as Jawaharlal Nehru. He will launch out with intrepidity against "untouchability," and yet express at the same time a deep reverence for the caste system. He believes in idol worship, and yet his belief in God has a remarkable kinship with Islam. He wishes India to go back to hand-spinning and hand-weaving, and yet he is in favour of modern scientific improvements—especially in sanitation—provided they are simple. He has startled and shocked orthodox Hinduism by putting out of its pain with his own hand a poor maimed calf, whose suffering had become unendurable. In this he is essentially "modern." What a revolution this has implied in India can hardly be imagined in the West. Yet even when doing such a deed of mercy, he acknowledges that his action has a touch of Violence behind it, and he feels that it is difficult to reconcile it with absolute Truth. Those who have followed Albert Schweitzer's ethical philosophy will find

here something strikingly akin to that which Mahatma Gandhi has set out to practise.

One last paradox of his singular personality is this : Mahatma Gandhi's own faith, while sensitive to the solitary grandeur of the bare desert of Arabia, has also sympathy with the mysticism of Hindu India in the South and East. It is this double appeal, at one and the same time, which makes his extraordinary attractiveness to all sorts and conditions of men—on one side inclining him towards the orthodoxy of Islam ; on the other side to the orthodoxy of Hinduism. His most devoted friends come from both these spheres of the religious life, and he is able by the alchemy of his own personality to blend them into one. Therefore he remains the centre of unity in India to-day, who draws the hearts of those in north and south and east and west together. Surely India is fortunate in having, at such a time as this, a great spirit so unique and so attractive.

One evening I sat for a long while in meditation at Morvi beneath the cloudless sky of western Asia bordering on the desert. The sunset was like that which one sees in Egypt or Arabia. The country to the North was altogether different from Southern India, or the alluvial plains of Bengal. Yet only on the previous night I had spent many hours at Porebunder looking out over the moonlit sea with all its enchantment. Thus I realised instinctively that this promontory of Kathiawar, with its sea border on the South, contains blended within its narrow compass in a remarkable manner the two aspects of two vast areas of Asia—the barren desert of Western Asia and the luxuriant South East—the awe-inspiring, solitary majesty of Arabia and the teeming, tropical beauty of Ceylon.

While Dayananda, who was born in barren Morvi, had thrown aside idol-worship, Gandhi had never done so, though scarcely feeling the need of it in his own religious life and holding it lightly. While Dayananda had been the destroyer of the myths of medieval Hinduism, with his cry "Back to the Vedas," Gandhi had been a preserver of old legends, filling them with a new meaning. Yet Gandhi had been one with Dayananda in laying the axe at the root of some of the evil growths of the past, such as untouchability, child marriage, and temple prostitution. He had also been the first entirely to succeed, in India, in welding religion and

politics together with indissoluble bonds. He has proved himself to be a modern and a medievalist at the same time.

My visit to Kathiawar was ended when I had thus been able to see at leisure and in solitude both these places, Porebunder and Morvi, wherein two of the very greatest Indians, during the rise and fulfilment of British rule in India, had been born. Neither of them had become uprooted from his own native soil. Both had spent their early childhood, when impressions are deepest, far remote from the direct influence of foreign ways and customs. Even though, in after life in South Africa, Mohandas Gandhi for a time tried to live the life of the west, he did not succeed. His inner nature drove him back to the customs of his forefathers and their ways of living. Yet neither Dayananda, nor Gandhi could have done what they have done, or taught what they have taught, if there had been no touch at all between Britain and India. Humanity is one, and its component parts in East and West cannot possibly be kept asunder. Who knows whether, in the distant future, the debt will not be the greatest on the Western side?

C. F. ANDREWS.

JAPAN AND MANCHUKUO.

A MAN who rose at three in the morning to write poetry must have a soul. So I reflected as I waited to see the "father" of Manchukuo, Cheng Hsiao-hsu. He had been the venerable tutor of the Emperor, and the first premier of the new state. I tried to visualise him on the basis of things read and heard. He would be courtly, bearing his three-quarters of a century with charm. He would seem young in comparison with the forty centuries of Chinese culture which I should see keeping him ghostly company. Doubtless he would discourse philosophic abstractions on the beauties of Wang Tao, the Kingly Way. He had held the portfolio of education—he would champion culture, scorn pragmatism. He would be in accord with Mencius, who when asked by the Prince, "What have you of profit to tell me?" replied, "Why speak you of profit? There are only two things: righteousness and benevolence."

The son of the sage, an up-to-the-minute young man in grey flannels, tan shoes, clocked hose, wearing a Manchukuo button in his coat lapel, ushered in a figure from another world and another day, brown-gowned, ascetic, ethereal. I prepared myself for Wang Tao. What I heard was,

"Cultural emphasis in education? That must wait. Manchukuo has embarked upon one of the greatest Empire-building programmes in history. The extension of communications, the development of agriculture, trade, industry—these are the tasks before us. Our education programme must be shaped accordingly. It will be two-fold: agricultural, industrial. We shall turn out trained mechanics in six years, engineers in twelve. After graduation they will all have jobs. That must be the goal of our education system: occupation for every man and the man trained for the occupation."

Industry paramount. A pioneer state that must be tilled, mined, built, needs men who can use their hands. If that was the creed of this gentle old scholar, poet, graceful calligrapher, philosopher for philosophy's sake, how much more certainly must it be the creed of the dynamic young advisers from across the Japan Sea. And so I found it was.

"Foreigners may criticise us," said the chief Japanese adviser to the Manchukuo Department of Education, "for centering upon primary and technical schools to the apparent neglect of

university education. They may say that we aim to create a 'coolie class' because 'the ignorant are easy to govern.' The explanation is more simple than that. Peace and order are but recent in this country—to maintain them a large budget is still necessary. Since our education appropriation is too small to cover everything, we must be careful to put first things first. The people are 90 per cent. illiterate. Therefore the obvious first need is, not universities, but primary schools. . . . And since Manchukuo is now entering a phase of great material development, this education must be largely technical—even in the primary and junior middle schools. Senior middle schools will be sharply specialised as agricultural, technical, commercial and normal schools."

No mention of the "higher school" (which in the Japanese system follows the middle school) nor of the university; an interesting phenomenon this—one of the most literate peoples in the world approaching the problem of the education of one of the most illiterate.

They are choosing a diametrically opposite course to that pursued by Great Britain in India. There the mass is barely touched and a proportionately large few are highly trained. A backward society cannot make use of so many forward-looking young men. Jobless B.A.s foment trouble. In Manchukuo there are to be few B.A.s and no jobless. India has raised up gentlemen, cultured, delightful, who prefer no employment to work that is not fitting. They were taught by Englishmen who had had the "Greek bath," as Hegel termed it. The Japanese have not had the "Greek bath." "That general enlargement of the mind," says Charles F. Thwing, "that enrichment of the intellect, that cultivation of the whole man, which Greek has given for hundreds of years to the leaders of the progressive peoples, the Japanese mind has lacked and lacks still." In Manchukuo the immediate design for education is not the cultivation of the whole man, but the training of his hands. As to which policy is better, or whether they are both at fault, time can tell better than I.

But our view of the situation is not complete until we have, along with the statements of officials, the fulminations of a malcontent Chinese teacher. An intelligent and conscientious objector is John Lu (and that is not his name). Not that he voices his objections to the authorities. He uses the expression, "*Mei yiu fa tzu*" (There is no help for it), the byword of dissatisfied Chinese in Manchuria. But while they usually

continue their work under silent protest, his convictions have led him to resign his position as principal of a large school in Mukden. When his resignation takes effect he will go to China. Never will he return, he says, until and unless China recognises Manchukuo. "Japan wants to make us a race of robots," he protested, and placed copies of the old and new curricula in my hands.

The new curriculum is eminently "practical." In the six years of primary, just twice as much time as previously is given to arithmetic. Reading and writing (in Chinese) get thirty per cent. more emphasis than formerly. Japanese language is injected for two hours a week during the fifth and sixth years. Formerly some schools had a rather desultory course called "Labour Work." Now every primary school must supply a rigorous course in "Hand Work," either agricultural or industrial, depending upon the location of the school. Stiffening up the pragmatic programme has made it necessary to drop some things. Hygiene is out. Nature study, which began in the first year, now waits until the fifth. Drawing is cut to half time. Music gets less attention. The study of history and geography, which used to begin on the first day of school, now waits until the fifth year.

So much for primary, covering six years. In the three-year junior middle school the six hours a week formerly given to English are reduced to three, and Japanese is put in for three hours. During my visit a student who dreamed of going to a university inside the Great Wall was told, as gently as possible, by Mr. Lu, that his dream could not be realised—because his training in English would not be sufficient to enable him to read the foreign textbooks used in the university. However, because of the affinity between the Chinese and Japanese languages, he would have enough Japanese to attend a university in Japan. Botany and zoology are dropped from the new junior middle schedule, but "General Science," which includes physics and chemistry, is greatly strengthened. Drawing and music suffer, but hand work grows in proportion. Civics vanishes, its place to be taken by morals and classics. Classics dips into ancient Chinese lore to bring up lessons in fundamental morality, "particularly," said Mr. Lu, "loyalty to a monarchical form of government."

All academic encumbrances are abandoned in senior middle school and full time is given to stiff vocational training. One

type of school turns out scientific farmers, another factory foremen, another business men. Also normal schools are mushrooming, for there is desperate need for trained teachers in the swiftly expanding education programme of Manchukuo. These normal schools often look more like truck gardens or factories than halls of learning—for the man who is going to teach agriculture, industry or commerce must get his own hands into his subject.

Mr. Lu heartily disliked the changes which had been made in the textbooks.

“In the former readers,” he pointed out, “there were many lessons on patriotic subjects: China’s humiliation (due to the Twenty-one Demands, unfair treaties and so forth), changing social customs, the spirit of equality, Chinese heroes, the life and principles of Sun Yat Sen, the use of native goods rather than foreign, the struggle for progress. All this is out of the new books. The old books advanced revolutionary ideas. A distinction was drawn between revolution and rebellion—the first was good, the second was not. There were stories of ancient revolutionists. The history of the Chinese revolution and republic was given. There are no revolutionary ideas in the new books. That is not surprising. But it is a pity, just the same.”

No, that is hardly surprising. Japan has no use for revolution. Nor does she care to have youth drilled in a “national humiliation” charged to her, Japan’s, misdeeds. There is no doubt that the Nanking Government’s schoolbooks, preaching from the text of “recovery of national rights,” were bitterly anti-foreign and particularly anti-Japanese. It did not go down well, for example, to have the South Manchuria Railway described as “the military staff invading Manchuria.” In a railway report as far back as 1930 we read, “Unless the Chinese authorities alter their attitude and abolish such a process of instilling harmful anti-foreign sentiment in the susceptible minds of the younger generation, not only international peace but China’s own welfare will be threatened.” And after the fishplate cracked on September 18th, 1931, the new régime lost no time in sending to all schools, pending the publication of new books, a list of changes to be made in ink in the old ones. (Sun Yat Sen and all things pertaining to him and his principles were inked out.) Teachers who persisted in reading under the ink were dismissed. And the new text-books, when published, pointed the way clearly to a mechanical future.

Drastic, and sometimes ruthless, is the preparation for technical conquest. The great North-Eastern University at Mukden, one of the foremost institutions of learning in Asia, was closed. Its professors and students were dismissed and their books sold by weight in the streets of Mukden. The building was reopened as a railway training institute. Other institutes have abandoned art for artifice. Engineering, mining and agricultural colleges have been opened.

There could be nothing much more practical than the village in the back yard of the Hygienic Institute in Dairen. Here are perhaps twenty miniature houses. Each is built of a different material—cement, wood, hollow tile, red brick, Chinese grey brick and so on. One roof is sheet iron, another tile, another rice thatch, others are made of synthetic materials. No house is occupied—except by instruments which record the effect of the weather upon the inside atmosphere. Research experts trained in the technical schools keep graphs showing how the various materials withstand moisture, wind, heat, cold. The most sanitary, comfortable and economical house for use in Manchukuo is here being evolved.

There is an air of feverish intensity in every research and educational institution in the pioneer state. Schedules are heavy. Students are loaded to the extreme point of endurance. Manchuria must burst from the head of Jove, and that quickly. When she does come forth will she be a goddess of wisdom or only a goddess of deft fingers? Or are we too cynical; is it possible, after all, that deft fingers make deft minds? Culture may come in by the back door. Whether they are right or wrong, the Japanese educators must be given credit for going at their task with zeal. The first of the great new government buildings to be erected at Hsinking was the education building. Even Army Headquarters came later. The education budget is very small but growing rapidly. And the money spent is no measure of the energy spent. It does not cost the government any more to assign the student twice as much homework. The high-pressure education of Japan is being carried over and given a fresh intensity by a new purpose: the industrial conquest of Manchuria.

WILLARD PRICE.

HISTORY AS ETHICS.

THE English are not much given to discussing abstract questions. Children, in particular, are not expected to be philosophical: they are naturally conservative and dutiful and learn their lessons without question. Occasionally, however, it occurs to some child, perhaps rather oftener to an older person, to ask, why do we study history?

A normal answer to such a question is that any citizen, any educated person, should know the story of his own country, his own people. This, however, is not a very satisfactory answer. For many hundreds of years national history was not a part of education. Down to the middle of the eighteenth century boys were taught Roman and Greek history, chiefly Roman, because Livy and Vergil were good schoolbooks. Gustavus Adolphus and Louis XIV, Cromwell and Chatham, Mirabeau and Danton, for instance, grew up with the examples of Roman history in their minds; their imagination was impressed by the grandeur of Rome; and they, too, when they had the opportunity of realising their ambitions, regarded themselves almost as Romans—senators, orators, *imperators*, “old Romans” of one kind or another. Evidently classical history was taught not only because Livy and Vergil were convenient text-books. It was considered the sort of thing that a gentleman ought to know. There was no demand for national history, and there were no text-books of it, except chronicles and seventeenth-century compilations of chronicles. To-day, however, some acquaintance with the outline and the main trends of all history—world-history in addition to national history—is considered to be a necessary part of education. National history is taught and emphasised, partly at any rate for political reasons; it is a good medium for propaganda, and teachers of history have everywhere proved themselves to be rather facile propagandists. In no country, however, is national history the sole kind taught. The instinct which induced educators of the eighteenth century and earlier to teach classical history, and which induces modern educators to teach world history as well as national, is sound. Even in ancient times when the only kind of history known or taught was mythology or Homer’s *Iliad*, the instinct of the educators was sound. They were trying to give their pupils something: that something was more than knowledge

of their own country and people. They were giving to their pupils—and history teachers who are working honestly are still giving to their pupils—an ethical content, a moral world and sphere of action, the means for a philosophy of life.

Ethics explains how and why men act, and how they ought to act. Aristotle's *Ethics*, the first scientific treatise on the subject, itself has a good deal of history in it; undoubtedly had more history been known, he would have put more into the *Ethics*. For history is a complete ethic or at any rate is the material for a complete ethic. It has an answer to all our moral problems and a solvent for all our spiritual doubts.

The historian deals with the actions of peoples and individuals. He is concerned all the time with conduct. His work goes much further than ascertaining facts and designating cause and effect. He is judging; all his creative work is judgment—of character, of motive, of aim, of effect. History is one long tremendous essay in criticism, the historian never ceasing to use his moral and intellectual judgment, his tireless power of moral and intellectual criticism.

It is this function, criticism, which keeps the mind and soul of man fresh and strong; or, as Croce calls it in *Antistorismo*, "the golden custom of criticism, cultivated in years of peace with so much strictness and delicate care." The faculty of judging, valuing, analysing, correcting, advising—and of doing all this in a detached, "objective," fashion—is a condition of human progress; the critics are the great barrier to a mechanistic society, or to a philosophy of mere self-interest, national or individual. And while, obviously, criticism can exercise itself upon any of the aspects of life or thought, it has at any rate one of the most promising fields for objective study in history—the more or less remote past of society. For there is no such thing as "contemporary" history—it is all in the past, either in the very recent, the less recent or the remote past. It is all detached by time from the observer who, if he applies his mind and uses sufficient industry, can study his subject matter, as Tacitus said, "without anger, without bias," *sine ira, sine studio quorum causas procul habeo*.

Viewed in this light, the subject matter of history is conduct and the problems of conduct. Thus the study of history becomes:

1. The study of the large groups or units, the tribe, the state, the people. Here causes and results of action can be

discerned with something approaching certainty. The state or people is seen in action, in growth, in decline. It is impossible, in retrospect, to overlook the great issues which are at stake. Mere chronicle attracts little interest. The reader or student of the story of the Babylonians, Egyptians, Jews, Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Chinese, takes part in a great drama of real life. He sees how and why their society expanded, remained still or diminished. He sees their statesmen leading them or misleading them. He hears the counsellors persuading, warning, judging. Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* is description and criticism, drama and judgment, in every chapter.

2. The study of progress or of the failure or loss of progress. In fact, the concept of progress itself is purely historical. It is because people looked back upon past ages and saw what to them was advance, progress from lower to higher forms of social life, that they conceived the idea of progress. This idea has been for two hundred or three hundred years a challenge to men to effect ever greater improvements. The loss of the idea of progress, the disbelief in progress, would probably lead to universal irresponsibility and the collapse of morality. The study of history, however, itself contains the corrective for this tendency towards pessimism. It shows that progress has no steady rhythm. The last volumes of Gibbon are a study in regress. Society in the sixth or seventh centuries was a poor substitute for the magnificent civilisation of the Roman-Hellenistic Age. In no age can the historian find moral progress continuing steadily for a whole century; material progress has continued for longer periods. The lesson of history is that mankind is capable of great revivals, or renaissances; and that the moral concepts—belief in duty, goodness, beauty, liberty—have often been obscured but never extinguished.

3. Individual action, its motives, its results. All history is the history of people, but it is less satisfactory in its judgments on individuals than it is in regard to the great collectivities called states or nations. The lives of most individuals escape the historian. Only the lives of great or at any rate prominent people, emerge; and even in regard to these the judgments of the historian can, at best, be only tentative. The springs of individual action are numerous and complicated, and are seldom, if ever, completely disclosed. The

judgments of historians upon individuals—for instance on Charles I and Cromwell, on Napoleon, Metternich, Queen Victoria, Bismarck—have been, are being, continually revised. It may be that Tolstoi's view, expressed in *War and Peace*, is correct: that the "great men" have relatively little effect, and that it is the silent mass who make and move and direct the course of events. Whether Tolstoi be right or Carlyle with his belief in the "canning-man," the king or hero, be right, this is certain: that historians are on their surest ground when judging the conduct of states or peoples, and are most liable to error when judging the conduct of individuals. This fact, however, only emphasises the ethical character of history whether dealing with groups or individuals; in the case of individuals it must be more modest in its judgments, more charitable.

4. It is probably true to say that most people are idealists. Practically all young people are; they have the faculty for admiration—people, aims, principles, characters that they admire. Every ardent young man or young woman regards life as something noble—as a noble activity, the expression of the things that we admire; truth, goodness, beauty, freedom, justice. They know, or they learn by experience, that there is also frustration and disappointment and suffering in life, but they believe that the ideal qualities—truth, beauty, goodness, freedom, justice—predominate; or if they cannot convince themselves of this, they believe that the ideals should predominate. For the young are naturally idealist, and those people who remain idealist to the end of their life are young. Falling in love is idealism, the realisation that truth, beauty and goodness are, for you, in one person and character. This realisation or conviction is perfectly justified, for it is those qualities—which exist (along with others) in the person beloved—that the young man genuinely in love sees. Jack and Jill are not fools; they are not unalloyed goodness, but they have goodness in them, and being in love they discern this quality and this only.

This idealism, the admiration of beauty, truth and goodness, is ceaselessly sought for in persons. Everybody, to a greater or less extent, is on the look-out for these qualities all through his life. He finds them in the woman he falls in love with; and the men that he has or would like to have for friends, are men in whom he sees and feels these qualities.

That everybody is on the look-out for these qualities, expressed and lived in a particular person, is proved by the astounding influence of the life of Christ in the society of the ancient world and since.

In history are the springs and wells of idealism. If it is a record of the errors and follies of mankind, it is also a record of striving after better things. I do not say that the study of history leads to the conclusion that ideals triumph over baseness, that they have always done so or will do so. Such a philosophy of history is over-simplified; an unwavering conviction that ideals will ultimately triumph is only made possible as an article of faith. But whether history proves that ideals are triumphing or not is unimportant; what is important is that the ideals are there, in the life of mankind as revealed in mankind's history through the ages.

The student, the reader, of history sees the ceaseless struggle or—to be more accurate—the ceaseless choosing between right and wrong; the ceaseless though unsteady aiming at what are instinctively felt to be high things; the regretting, and the failing to regret, what is instinctively felt to be base.

Man's capacity for admiration, and his desire to emulate the people and the qualities that he admires—that is, mankind's idealism—is the secret of his interest in history. Novels are a kind of history, an imaginative, fictitious record or picture of life, by means of which the reader can admire and judge characters and episodes. But because they are fictitious, or in so far as they are fictitious, novels, as reading, tend to become an amusement, an escape from present life, a relaxation of the mind. The reader does not accept them as real life; and if he finds ideals in the novel, it is idealism of fairyland: it does not convince him that such things are or have been. History is idealism really lived and living.

5. *Personality.* Life is a noble thing, capable of activity on a lofty plane, difficult to go through without self-reproach, beset with choices at every step. Yet everybody, though realising the difficulties and problems of life, realises also that it is a noble thing, a social, intellectual, moral activity. A man's or woman's society are a large element in their personality. A man's family, friends, business or profession, politics, interests and other activities, are his living circle, his society, his life; by reading, by travelling, by observation,

he extends his social circle, his personality. New peoples, new countries, new interests, if he is lucky a new friend or two, enrich his life and enrich the lives of others. In history his living circle, his society, is indefinitely extended. He has all the ages, all the peoples, all their experiences and interest, all social life itself as it has been on this planet, as the sphere in which he moves.

For the historian and the sympathetic student knows that history, as he reads it, is, if not life itself, yet something springing from life. As Croce has pointed out, the distinction between past and present in historical literature is false: everything in history is past. What we call the present has, as soon as mentioned, flowed on into the past. History thus deals only with the past, recent and remote. The recent past, the so-called present, seems more real to us only because it is recent and we have seen or felt it, that is, because we have the authentic documents—our sight and hearing of it. The more documents we have, authentic documents of this past—recent or remote—the more vividly do the facts vibrate in our hearts. This vibration in the heart is the sense of the reality of the life of the past; and so to the genuine historian, to the sympathetic student and reader, the past becomes real—not a “was” but an “is.”

Thus the reader of history finds his great society, his ideals and interests, the exercise of his powers of criticism and judgment; he finds men and women, movement, thought, action—in John Bunyan's phrase, life, life, eternal life.

History and religion, though quite different things, are closely connected, for they are both concerned with the attainment of truth. The eternal verities which are the subject-matter of religion are to be discerned in the recent and remote past. Religion is man's most elusive yet most constant support. Its essence is faith. How faith arises it is impossible to say; but in every land and among every people it is enshrined in history; even though in some cases it is history in the form of myths and legends. The finest of the pre-Christian religions, the Jewish, was expressed and handed down in the historical books of the Jewish people: even their later religious books, the psalms and prophetic works, are partly historical in form and content. The Christian religion itself was, almost from the first, that is from the death of

Christ, taught in the form of history. St. Peter and St. Paul did not themselves possess the Gospels, but (as can be read in the Acts of the Apostles) they cast their preaching frequently in the form of narrative. When, a little later, a literature of the Christian religion came into existence, its essential part was four brief biographies of Christ and the book called Acts, which is one of the best pieces of historical composition of the Hellenistic Age.

Every religion is history. Ethics—the rules and explanation of conduct—is in all historical composition which is not mere chronology. Religion is faith. Ethics is moral judgment. The study and understanding of history is all this. History is man in action, man in thought. It is the expression of the eternal verities, of truth, beauty, goodness (and of the reverse of all this). It is the disclosing, the discovery, of creative evolution through the ages, the manifestation of Being, the Jahveh—I am—first discovered to mankind in Jewish historical literature.

R. B. MOWAT.

THOUGHTS ON AUSTRIA.

[These extracts are from the author's latest work, *Austria in the Prism of Thought: A Catechism of Austrian Leaders*, dedicated to the memory of his friend Hugo von Hofmannsthal. The book, published by Schmidt-Dengler of Graz, takes the form of a dialogue between a Jesuit Father, a Nobleman, a Poet, and an Officer of the Heimwehr in the year 1935. The conversations take place on three evenings. On the first, a philosophical one, the idea of culture is traced amongst the other formative influences of an epoch. The second conversation follows out the line of evolution of European culture from the time of the great racial migrations down to the present day. On the third, the Austrian evening, the insight gained on the previous evenings is used to depict the position of Austria in our time. In so doing the author—poet, philosopher, diplomatist, Austrian patriot—proves the inter-dependence of the three entities: Political Nation, Culture and Patriotism.]

FOREWORD.—In the deepening autumn of a life whose days in youth were devoted to poetry, in early manhood to politics and in its late summer to learning, but all of them wholly imbued with love for my country, I have attempted scientifically to deduce from philosophical and historical reasonings the position of Austria in the framework of the present epoch. My labours I dedicate to the younger generation which, undeterred by any doubts of its summons, has undertaken the shaping of Austria's destiny to the pattern of its own intuitions. This book is no Apologia. It is addressed not to unbelievers, but to Austrian patriots who instinctively apprehend that inexpressible something which constitutes the fragrant charm of their country and people, yet whose intellectual grasp of the two is not so strong as their spontaneous feeling. To evoke for them the image of the Austrian type, the essence of which they carry in themselves, would have been superfluous. But it was necessary to set out for them the present condition of the Austrian national organism, what ails it, and how it can be restored to health and guided towards the full development of its capacities. It is not pictures, but knowledge, that fundamental knowledge from which flows right action, that this work seeks to offer to those who wish to learn.

Readers who grasp the line of thought will, we trust, be saved from that trivial conception which bases the mission of the Austrian people upon its qualities of suppleness and amiability and consequent suitability for acting as a kind of

broker between Germany and the East. They will also appreciate that its mission is no mere task imposed upon it, but a deeply rooted organic function. By the very quality of his nature and soul the Austrian transmutes the German spirituality into a specifically Austrian culture. This he radiates (the capacity to do so is one of his most marked characteristics) amongst the other nations of Europe; and with it go some of the essentials of the German intellect, for only from the hand of culture can they be speedily and willingly accepted. This Austrian mission will endure as long as culture in Austria survives, despite the unpropitiousness of the times.

It is of irreplaceable value to Germany that an Austrian commonwealth should continue to exist, should live in the fullest individuality, and should spin from within itself the gossamer web of its own culture. Only such a commonwealth can transmit not only its own spiritual values, but also—and this to a world from which it would otherwise remain hidden—all that is finest in the German spirit. Thus Austria immeasurably increases the sphere of action of German spirituality. In olden days barbarian kings had the columns of ancient palaces burnt into lime for their crude buildings. With them should be ranked any German statesman who in his greed for power were to seek to rob Austria of her separate existence, whether politically or even in the cultural sphere. An Austria resplendent in all the attributes of total independence is as essential for all the loftier aims of Germany as Germany is for Austria and as both are for Europe.

THE POET.—The Austrian State derives its strength from the Austrian Idea. Just as the consecrated Host is shielded by the Monstrance, so is the Idea protected by the State against external harm; rob it of this protection and it crumbles, collapses and is crushed under foot. For this Idea is as delicate as it is precious and sacred. The Polish Idea was able to survive three partitions of the Republic, twelve decades of alien rule, because the Polish nation, whose expression that Idea is, had already crystallised to diamond hardness when the political catastrophe came. The Austrian nation is still in a state of becoming and of flux; not until this process is completed will it be secure. To bring about this completion is the task of the Austrian State. If the State is smashed, the Austrian Idea will perish too. And so indissolubly

inter-connected are the destinies of the Ideas and of the political structures of Europe that this event, however baneful to Austria, would equally be a catastrophe for the world as a whole. The entire Western world would become dislocated, and if Austria perished the liberty and individuality of the Continental nations would be shaken to their foundations. Thus the Austrian drama is also a European one, and upon its *dénouement*, be it happy or tragic, depends not merely our fate but that of Europe. I do not use the word Drama in a metaphorical sense, like a literary pedant who can understand life only through comparisons taken from his art : it would be in the worst possible taste to try to explain this vital question, with all its implications, by ringing the changes on one metaphor. The drama (I speak both of tragedy and its counterpart with a happy ending, for which the theory of poetry has no name) and its laws are ideal beings, complexes deep-rooted in the texture of human life, "quasi-substances," to use the words of Father Gabriel, that existed before there was a poet. The Genius of poetry bows down over life and lifts them out of it, filters them to ideal purity, compresses them into essence, and raises them, in the pellucid shape of a work of art, to the level of every human eye. Incidentally this explains the predominance of dramatic poetry, and tells us why a drama represented on the stage, if it be truly dramatic, irresistibly carries away with it even inartistic persons, if only they be gifted with emotion, as it does with people of poetic sensibility even when it is not a true work of art. All people respond in the same way to an acted drama, because it is but the inevitable unrolling of human destiny shown in the lives of human beings.

THE HEIMWEHR OFFICER.—What you say about our Austria of to-day is true and sounds to me like beautiful music, not sad, but inspiring. It is true that we are at the climax of the drama, in the middle of a battle, the result of which with all its tremendous consequences depends on our courage and our ability. What good fortune to be young in such times! No other age could have been more to my taste. Do not worry about the victory ; we shall win.

THE NOBLEMAN.—You talk as a young man should, and indeed, humanly speaking, the decision rests with you young Austrians. But the saying, "If youth but knew, if age but could," still holds good, and your vigorous confidence should

be complemented by our understanding. How can one act when one does not know what it is all about? Nothing worries me more than the fatuous idea that the young generation is of itself going to bring about the incarnation, which we all desire, of the Austrian Idea into reality. "Totality," one of the fundamental concepts of our time, demands the co-operation not only of all classes but also of all ages, if the great tasks of history are to be fulfilled. We all agree that the battle has not been decided yet. Let me say where I see the greatest danger. Not in the numbers of the enemy, for where ideals are at stake numbers are a secondary factor. In this connection I will not point out how a mere handful of Christians altered the face of the world, for there divine action came directly into play. But I will remind you that a small but resolute and united body of men in a decade moulded and reformed the whole of Germany to the shape of their ideas. It would be faint-hearted to despair because in our country the Austrian Idea and an un-Austrian ideology are still in conflict, and because this ideology has the backing of the ambitious and powerful politicians of a great state, thirsty for conquest. The renascence of Austrian patriotism has been as significant as it was unexpected. Feeling has understood and Will has affirmed our own individuality, the Austrian Idea. Here lie all the possibilities of its triumph, however powerful the opposition. The greatest danger may come from within, from the adulteration of patriotism within the soul of the patriot. To achieve this adulteration every effort of the enemy, disappointed by earlier failures, is now directed. How Austrian patriotism, though it be subjectively genuine and objectively based upon fact, and therefore seemingly incorruptible, yet may be undermined, I shall try to show. Remember what we said yesterday and this evening about the special difficulties of the Austrian position.

We have endeavoured to grasp the true and integral sense of the word "nation" and its relation to the entities of culture and patriotism. Of all the great processes of history, hardly one is more important than the growth and formation of a nation. Sometimes this process is successful, sometimes it is a failure; it always takes centuries and involves struggles and hardships of every kind. The Austrian process began, if we reckon historical terms, not so very long ago—a few centuries back. When the process was nearly finished, when

the Austrian Idea was near to crystallising in firm, definite form, it came to a halt or rather, since there are no halts in history, it retrogressed and grew ever more inconsistent and tremulous. In the sphere of actual existence the retrogression began with culture, and therefore in the sphere of reflective self-consciousness with cultural patriotism. But events in the more mobile sphere of consciousness moved much faster. Patriotism in all its manifestations, not excluding the political ones, gradually disappeared. This evolution was completed in the post-war years. Because of the peculiar destinies of the Austrian people, the natural basis of its culture diverged more and more from that of the Germans of the Reich. And when later in the collision between existence and self-consciousness, between Idea and Ideology, Austrian patriotism caught fire again, it was, like every true patriotism, essentially integral, a loving belief in the Austrian Idea in all its content and possibilities. But what first became actual, corresponding to the historical situation, was political patriotism, the will to maintain the country independent and free to work out its destiny. As of all the flowers of patriotism the political had withered last, so it was the first to bloom again. This event, forever linked with the name of Engelbert Dollfuss, a poor peasant's child, was for the life of the community, in all its forms of activity, as important as is for the individual his conversion to God, which as it were implies a complete shifting of the centre of the soul. Yet the effects were, and indeed had to be, political. They had to be because in the years of decline the political menace had grown to the highest degree of intensity. The State, the body of this earth-bound Idea, was hovering between life and death. Every effort, every thought was needed to save it. When the most imminent danger had been overcome, life went on as before and (as is usually the case with an individual who has experienced the miracle of conversion) under the same external conditions and influences. The inner emotional knowledge of oneself and the world is new, but the external world is the same; even one's own thoughts and aspirations are not so much changed in detail as one had perhaps imagined at the moment of the great change. Conversion often only starts the long struggle for rebirth. Thus in springtime trees first thrust out a single leaf from a hard and colourless bud; only gradually do foliage and blossoms come to birth.

Into the hearts of those who had already answered the summons in 1933, the grace of patriotism, the happiness of faithful love and affirmation of their country had sunk. The effects and counter-effects in the political sphere were vast. The cultural sphere, however, was at first hardly touched; there the conditions which had arisen during the decades of the eclipse of the Austrian sun continued with no more than petty changes. Though the German frontiers were closed, yet borne on the gigantic wings of modern technique thousands of elements of culture (or of pseudo-culture) continued unhindered to penetrate the country; by their very weight they crushed the germs of culture active in the diminished soil of Austria. Culture has not directly to do with art or science or *Weltanschauung*, but with ever-changing forms of everyday life, with customs and habits, crafts and industries, with the literary language of the day that reflects all the other forms of cultural existence: it comprises and influences them all. All cultural entities are even more exposed to the power of alien forces than the world of the spirit, for they offer numberless points for attack. It is not only through books and newspapers, as it used to be, but also through the cinema and the broadcast that an alien mode of life, whether formless or formed to some foreign pattern, penetrates the imaginations of simple men, because made universally intelligible by a common language. Soon it emerges from the sphere of imagination into their words and actions. Hostile propaganda and incitement to high treason were suppressed as far as possible, but political influences are but a final emanation from the innumerable rays that play, without cessation or hindrance, upon the imagination and heart of the Austrian people. The unconverted ideologists, deaf to the voice of Grace, who were no longer able to transform their political aspirations into deeds, could now dig themselves into that sphere where they were unassailable. In their eyes cultural matters were not ends in themselves but political instruments. Political instinct told them that without the formation of Austrian culture the formation of an Austrian nation must be impossible, and that if the first failed, the Austrian State would perish sooner or later. It was their aim, secure in their stronghold, to hold up the full victory of the Austrian Idea until under some more favourable constellation they would once again be able openly to confess their

ideology. Then they would undertake the decisive attack, the political attack, on the country which they no longer regarded as their fatherland.

Their views and aspirations were and are marked with the stamp of simple, uniform and unambiguous construction. Error does not know the numberless tones and shades that characterise Truth in the world of phenomena. But the other side, that of the Austrian patriots, does not share the advantages of a life of obedience to primitive and unreasoning phantasies. Their patriotism, their emotional apprehension of the Austrian soul, is a truly homogeneous force, aspiring towards Totality, and potentially containing within itself all the components of "Austria." Only political patriotism, however, the extract and complement of all other patriotism, has so far achieved full self-consciousness and power of action. Political action was the order of the day. That function which was immediately required to save Austria, created for itself, one may say, the appropriate instrument, and that with miraculous instantaneousness.

THE POET.—Without the will to build a culture, without the planned creation of a style of life, grown out of the nature of Austrians and in harmony with the Austrian Idea, the Austrian nation cannot come to growth. Without that creative deed both these inseparable entities will never develop from the flux of "becoming" into solid "being" as the visible and crystallised forms of the Idea. As the skin cannot form smooth and complete while there is alien matter present in the flesh, so the shield of culture can completely protect a country only if its growth is not permanently disturbed by foreign bodies. The living force which expels all extraneous matter from the organism, if the fate of an individual is in question, is called self-love. If the fate of a great community is concerned, we call it patriotism. Its burgeoning into the ultimate immanent and essential form, that of cultural patriotism, depends upon the Austrian soul seeing its culture, as it were, with its own eyes. Here one must bear in mind the special circumstances of the Austrian problem and the special qualities of the collective soul of Austria, which is childlike and close to nature, more gifted for vivid apperception than reflective thought. In brief, culture and cultural patriotism are each the cause of the other.

LEOPOLD FREIHERR VON ANDRIAN-WERBURG.

DANTE AND THE HOLY GRAAL.

THERE was in Dante a romantic strain, a thread of perennial youth, that led him, in revolt against the merchant civilisation of his own city and time, to look back yearningly to the days of chivalry as to a golden age. As in his *Purgatorio** he makes Guido del Duca weep for the days of

“Ladies and knights, labours and solaces
inspired in us by love and courtesy . . .”

so those lords he honoured as his friends were those in whom he could discern the knightly virtues, and especially the pre-eminently knightly virtues of prowess and liberality. Old Moroello Malaspina he praises as one whose house still holds “the honour of the purse and of the sword . . .”† and the excellencies of young Can Grande della Scala will be early shown “in recking not of gold or toil of war.”‡

In the *Convivio*, where Dante analyses the true nature of nobility or “gentlehood”§ denying vehemently a contemporary definition, that it sprang from “ancient wealth,” the influence of the ideals of chivalry is plain. True nobility is implanted by God in the soul, manifesting itself by the virtues appropriate to each of the four ages of man. In boyhood it shows itself as reverence, gentleness and shamefastness, in “sweet and courteous speech, sweet and courteous service” that will sow the seeds of friendship without which life remains incomplete, in awe at all that is wonderful and shrinking from all that is unclean—nor will any “noble man ever so speak that his words would not be fair-sounding to a lady.” And with these qualities go bodily grace and beauty, as the soul shapes the outward person to its likeness, a harmony reflecting the harmony within.

In the young man, from his twenty-fifth to his fortieth year, nobility means temperance, strength, love, and loyal obedience to law, till, in the maturity of life, “his right judgment and the law are one, and he can justly direct himself almost without law at all.” In this third period, he will most gladly hear and speak of all that is to the praise of others, bearing fruit that will profit others, “opening as a rose that

* *Purg.* XIV, 109-10.

† *Par.* XVII, 84.

‡ *Ibid.*, VIII, 129.

§ *Convivio*, Bk. IV.

can no longer stay closed, but must spread its fragrance abroad," a wise counsellor, just, generous, protector of the widow and orphan. And at last, in old age, the noble soul "returns to God as to the port from which it came when it entered upon the sea of life." Woe unto those, says Dante, who would enter this port with all sails set. "Assuredly the *knight Lancelot* would not enter with hoisted sails, nor our most noble Latin Guido da Montefeltro. Truly these noble men furled the sails of worldly activities, for in their old age they gave themselves to religion, setting aside all earthly works and delights."

The *knight Lancelot*—here is the key to Dante's dream of a bygone age of chivalry, an ideal attained but rarely even in its hey-day, but which found full expression in a great legend, the legend of Arthur. That Dante loved the legend is proved directly by a reference in his *De Vulgare Eloquentia* to "the most beautiful romances of King Arthur." They existed in many versions which derived from three distinct cycles: that of Tristan, that of Perceval, and that of Lancelot. The Tristan cycle was the most popular in Italy, but while Dante shows himself well acquainted with it, Tristan meant little to him and Lancelot much. The book he cherished was the prose Lancelot, written in French by an unknown author of the beginning of the thirteenth century (the attribution to Walter Map cannot stand); much of it is familiar to us through Malory. This is the book of which Francesca tells, where in the *Inferno* she and her lover are swept on the pitiless wind as once on the winds of passion:*

"We read one day for pastime what befell
to Lancelot, when love laid hold of him . . . "†

"*Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse*—The book was Galehaut and he who wrote it"—a play on words, in which the reference is to the section known as the Book of Galehaut in the prose Lancelot and to the part played by Galehaut the Haut Prince in bringing Lancelot to the Queen and bidding her "kiss him as the beginning of true love." So the book led Paolo to kiss Francesca for the first time, the beginning of their passion that would bring damnation. But as though to

* The scene itself is modelled on an episode in the prose *Tristan*. See Gardner: "The Arthurian Legend in Italian Literature," p. 141.

† *Inf. V*, 121-138.

redeem a beloved story from what would appear a slur on it, in the *Paradiso* Dante recalls the same scene, under another aspect, when in gentle reproof of his momentary pride in his crusading ancestor, Cacciaguida, knighted for his prowess by the Emperor Conrad, Beatrice, standing a little apart

“seemed in her smile as she whose cough was heard
at the first fault recorded of Guinevere . . .”*

the Lady of Malehaut, who coughed meaningly when Guinevere first encouraged Lancelot to declare his love.

For Dante the Arthurian legends seem to have been among those books of foundation which, first read in youth, so shape the imagination that figures from them rise unbidden when occasion offers. Such reminiscences are scattered throughout his works.†

The passage in the *Convivio*, where Lancelot and Guido da Montefeltro are mentioned in the same breath, shows, as Professor Gardner has noted, “that, for Dante, the knight of Arthur was as real and historical a figure as one of his contemporaries.” It is not so surprising. In the whole of medieval literature there is no character so wholly alive, of such human complexity. The best knight of the world, with his magnanimity and humility, peerless in courtesy and prowess, is yet a figure of pathos, torn between divided allegiance to his earthly, sinful love and heavenly, and only through grief and ruin reaching ultimate peace. Malory would sum him up truly in the famous lament of Sir Ector: “Thou were the courtiest knight that ever bare shield; and thou were the truest friend to thy lover that ever bestrode horse; and thou were the truest lover of a sinful man that ever loved woman; and thou were the goodliest person ever came among press of knights; and thou was the meekest man and the gentlest that ever ate in hall among ladies; and thou were the sternest knight to thy mortal foe that ever put spear in the rest.” But in the thirteenth-century version there are flashes of detail that make him still more living—as when we are told that “none ever so seldom made joy without good reason, but when he had reason to make joy none

* *Par.* XVI, 13-15.

† They are enumerated by Edmund Gardner, “The Arthurian Legend in Italian Literature,” Ch. VIII.

might be so gay or merry,"* or his words that none of gentle birth should weep save for a friend lost or a dishonour that might not be avenged, and his first reception of the news of the death of his beloved friend Galehaut, when "he knew that he would grieve thereat, but now was not the place or time." There are many such touches of psychological surety, the work of a writer more concerned with the strife of souls than the clash of arms, and as a result of which the figure of Lancelot has a haunting reality for us to-day, at a distance of centuries from the age that conceived him, so real, that setting aside the trappings of romance we can compare him with men who lived, we can compare him with Dante himself, and find a kinship between the two. And it would seem that of this kinship Dante was aware, finding in Lancelot his own dream and something of his own image.

It is perhaps fanciful, though in no wise improbable—knowing the tale as he did in every detail—that this awareness may have been heightened or confirmed by situations that offer curious parallels with those of his own life: Lancelot knowing that the death of Galehaut was partly through his own deed, as Dante must have blamed himself for the death of Guido Cavalcanti, his "first friend"; Lancelot, forced to fight against his king as Dante against his own city; above all, the poignant scene when Lancelot on the ship bearing him to exile, bids farewell to his country, "so low that no man that was on the ship heard him save Bors alone: 'Ah, sweet realm, pleasant and delectable, joyous and beauteous, and full of all blessings, wherein all my spirit and all my life ever abide . . .'" It may well have sung itself in Dante's memory when he, in like case, writes of the city that had banished him in words that move to the same measure: "Since it was the pleasure of the citizens of the most beautiful and famous daughter of Rome, Florence, to cast me out of her sweet bosom—in which I was born and nourished to the apex of my life, and in which, with her good peace, I long with all my heart to rest my weary soul and end the time appointed to me."†

It is a coincidence, but a mysterious one, that in the same

* See the abridged English version, "Sir Lancelot of the Lake," translated from MS. in the Bibliothèque Nationale (Fonds français 344) by Lucy Allen Paton, M.A., Ph.D. Routledge, 1929.

† *Convivio*, Bk. I.

passage he speaks of himself as a "ship without sails and without rudder." In such a ship, bearing the body of Galahad's mystical bride, Lancelot came to the Graal Castle, to the vision of "great part" of that for which he yearned. The Book of the Quest in the prose Lancelot is the heart of the whole story, to which its mazy digressions lead unerringly. Here the character of Lancelot attains its fullest humanity and its profoundest symbolism. Lancelot, Galahad-Lancelot, doomed to lose his first name of messianic promise which, with the achievement that should have been his, will be the heritage of his perfect son, while under one aspect he is the symbol of humanity as a whole, must strike a resonance in the hearts of all those acquainted with aspiration and knowing the perennial nostalgia for the unfulfilled promise of youth, the dream of the son to be what the father might have been. But more particularly he stands for the sinner to whom is yet granted some share of the mystical apprehensions of the saint. Something of the Quest he achieves, and of his twenty-four days' swoon in Corbenic, "'I have seen,' said he, 'so great marvels and so great blessedness that my tongue could never reveal it nor even my heart conceive thereof, so great a matter is this. For it was nothing earthly but spiritual.' " * Yet after such a vision, which has all the characteristics of mystical ecstasy,† he falls and is caught again in the toils of earth, though it retains his inmost allegiance and he will die in holiness. It is Dante's own story, for whom the mystical experience that gave birth to the *Divine Comedy* was something the rest of his life would be a quest to reattain.

"And that I may return to see the blest
triumph of heaven, for whose sake I oft
weep for my sinful life and strike my breast . . ."‡

The Graal is the "grace of the Holy Spirit" in the fullness of divine contemplation;§ the inner content of the *Queste* and the *Divine Comedy* are one.

Of all this Dante was conscious, and more than once there

* Sir Lancelot of the Lake, Ch. LXXIII, *Queste del Saint Graal* (Ed. A. Pauphilet, p. 258).

† See E. Gilson, *La Mystique de la Grace dans la Queste del Saint Graal*, in *Romania*, T.LI, 1925.

‡ *Par. XXII*, 106-109.

§ "*Li sains Graaus, ce est la grace del Saint Espirit.*" See Gilson, *l.c.* and Pauphilet, *Etudes sur la Quête du Saint Graal*, Paris, 1921.

are indications in the *Divine Comedy* that he identified himself with Lancelot. The very opening of the poem recalls the *Queste*, the pathless forest, symbol of evil in both works (a symbolism not found elsewhere), and Dante's words :

"But how I came therein I cannot say,
So heavy was I with sleep when it befell
that from the road of truth I went astray . . ."

words to which those of the first hermit to Lancelot come as a gloss :

"But even as ye see that a man at times misseth his path when he is heavy with sleep, and he returneth thereto when he hath awaked; so is it with the sinner that sleepeth in mortal sin. He wandereth from the right way and afterward he returneth into his path, that is, to his Creator."*

There is, again, a resemblance between Dante's plight between the forest from which he has emerged, so dark and overpowering "that thought of it brings reawakened fear," and the mountain he cannot climb because of the three beasts that force him back, and that of Lancelot by the Water of Marcoise, when he "saw himself enclosed by three things that brought him small comfort. For on the one side was the forest, which was great and pathless, and on the other were two rocks that were high and ancient, and on the other the water, that was very deep and black."† Dante has no mention of water, save in metaphor (which might indicate that the picture of it was in the back of his mind : he looks back, he says, as a man who has struggled to shore will "turn to gaze upon the perilous water"), but we almost look for it. The second Canto opens with the inscription above the gates of Hell. We are not told how he came there, but commentators have suggested that a ship entered into his original conception. In both cases, here is the moment of passage from a natural to a supernatural order.

The sea appears in the *Divine Comedy* as surrounding the Mount of Purgatory, which bears as its crown the Earthly Paradise. There is a connection between the Graal and the Earthly Paradise, and the song of the birds in the "divine forest" recalls the bird-song that accompanied Lancelot and Galahad before their final parting, and the frequent use of

* Sir Lancelot of the Lake, Ch. LXIX. *Queste*, p. 65.

† *Queste*, p. 246.

the song of birds in the *Queste* as an image of the presence of God.*

These are fugitive gleams of the older story.

But when Beatrice appears in splendour, her reproaches to Dante echo the very words that Lancelot heard by the wayside chapel.

“How wast thou worthy to scale the holy Mount?

Knewest thou not that here is blessedness?”

“Lancelot . . . how wast thou so bold that thou durst enter the place whither the Holy Graal repaired?”†

First one hermit, then another, reminds him of all the gifts he received, the perfect promise of his youth. “Before thou wast knight, there lodged in thee all virtues so naturally that I know of no young man that could have been thy peer.”‡ So does Beatrice speak of Dante’s youth:

“When life was new in him, potentially

such was he then, that every virtuous power

in him had shown itself most wondrously . . .”§

By a like path of purification, the traditional way of the mystics, Dante as Lancelot came to apprehension of “such great blessedness that tongue could never unfold nor even heart conceive”—of

. . . things which to repeat

he who comes thence hath neither wit nor might.||

It is because of the very closeness of their inner relationship that the outward imprint of the Quest on the *Divine Comedy* is fugitive. Dante was treating the same theme with a different order of symbols. It is a case, too, less of direct influence than of his recognition of affinity with what he purposed, but this affinity goes very deep. The *Queste*, like the *Divine Comedy*, holds a twofold allegory. Besides the mystical sense, the quest “not of earthly things but of the great secrets of Our Lord,” there is a collective, apocalyptic sense, in which Galahad, *le chevalier désiré*, stands for a new era of humanity, the full establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth.

Pauphilet has shown how such messianic ideas “fill the whole story with their mysterious poetry,” and how “all

* Pauphilet, *l.c.*, p. 109.

† *Queste*, p. 124.

‡ *Par.* I, 5-7.

§ *Purg.* XXX, 74-5. *Queste*, p. 61.

§ *Purg.* XXX, 115-18.

contributes to give the impression of a new world about to come into being." * "Galahad," Madame Lot-Borodine wrote in 1919, "is the child of grace, the golden dream of a transfigured humanity, freed from original sin, living on this shadowy earth as in a heaven of glory." † It remained for M. Anichikov‡ to show that the author of the prose Lancelot drew inspiration from Joachim de Flora and his prophecy of a new age, the age of the Holy Spirit, of "fuller grace, perfect freedom and spiritual understanding." The very name of Galahad, hitherto obscure, becomes clear in the light of Joachim's writings. Galahad—Galaad or Gilead—in the *Interpretation of the Prophet Jeremiah* is defined as meaning those "spiritual men" who have kept the doctrine of "wholesome counsel," and again as the spirit of the Greek church, "that spirit shown in Elias and which shall shortly be revealed in a new order in the Latin church" when the mission of St. Peter will be subsumed in that of St. John. Galahad, *le chevalier désiré*, becomes the type of Joachim's "spiritual men whose coming the world awaits."

The association of the Graal with the era of the Holy Spirit is constantly made plain. We are told it symbolises the grace of the Holy Spirit; it is on the day of Pentecost that it appears, when the doors are shut and a mighty wind is heard, as when the Holy Ghost first descended upon the Apostles. For Joachim the Second Kingdom, the Age of the Son (as the period from Creation to the Incarnation was the Kingdom of the Father) was inaugurated by three: St. John the Baptist, Zachary and Christ as man. So would the Third Kingdom have its three founders and be preached by twelve apostles. In the *Queste* the coming of the Graal is traced to a triad: Christ, Joseph of Arimathea and his son Josephé. Galahad—under one aspect, the new humanity, under another at once a figure of Christ and a vehicle of the Holy Ghost—has his two companions, Bors and Percival, *chevaliers espriteux*, whose adventures will be "not of killing men or slaying knights but celestial and spiritual things."§ At Corbenic they are joined by nine unnamed knights, who with them assist at the Mass of the Graal, and see Christ Himself

* *L.c.*, pp. 142 and 17.

† *Trois Essais sur le Roman de Lancelot du Lac et la Quête du Saint Graal*, Honoré Champion, 1919.

‡ E. V. Anichikov, *Joachim de Flore et les Milieux Courtois*, Paris, 1931.

§ Hermit to Gawain, *Queste*, p. 161.

rise from the holy chalice and speak: "Now, are ye twelve as there were twelve apostles. . . . And as I sent them forth and made them go through the whole world to preach the true law, so I send you, some here, some there. And ye shall all die in this service save one." Galahad will die in Sarraś, symbol of the heavenly Jerusalem, and after his death the Graal is carried up into heaven and is seen no more. In the Third Age the time of symbols and figures ceases. The "adventures of the land of Logres" have been achieved, and the old order of Arthur's court falls into ruin. Joachim had spoken of such times of cataclysm, associating them with the reign of an anti-christ, during which a scattered few, and especially hermits, would keep faith. Lancelot, ending his days as a hermit, appears thus as a forerunner of the new dispensation.

Yet again we are led from Lancelot to Dante. Recent research has shown the potency of Joachim's influence on Dante's thought, and in the *Divine Comedy* we find the same apocalyptic hope of an imminent renewal of the world. In the very first canto of the *Inferno* comes his prophecy of one who shall set the world to rights, seeking neither lands nor gold, but nourished by the Wisdom, Love and Power of the Trinity—the *Veltro* or Greyhound, born between "felt and felt," who shall drive the wolf of rapacity back to Hell. The symbol remained obscure till now, when Mgr. Tondelli has discovered Joachim's *Liber Figurarum*,* which must have inspired Dante in many of his figurations (the Holy Trinity, for instance, is pictured as in the end of the *Paradiso*) and in which the Greyhound appears, overshadowed by the Dove of the Holy Spirit, between two groups—laymen and priests—of the ascending hierarchy of the Third Kingdom.

Again, there is Beatrice's prophecy when she appears in the Earthly Paradise, the centre of an allegorical pageant in which Joachimist inspiration is manifest,† of divine vengeance for the corruption of the Church

When numbering five hundred ten and five
God's envoy comes, who shall the harlot slay
and slay the giant who sinned with her alive . . . ‡

* Mgr. Tondelli is preparing a book on the subject. He communicated his discoveries to a meeting of the *Arcadia*, reported in the *Osservatore Romano* of January 31st, 1937. The *Liber Figurarum*, in the library of the Seminary of Reggio Emilia, consists of contemporary pictures illustrating Joachim's doctrine.

† See Dempf, *Sacrum Imperium*, Part II, Ch. III.

‡ *Purg.* XXXIII, 43-6.

Throughout the *Divine Comedy*, this expectation of a new order to arise out of cataclysm is reiterated; this is the "true fruit" that shall "follow from the flower" foretold by Beatrice in the Ninth Heaven, when mankind shall be turned back upon its rightful path.* There is, as we have noted elsewhere, what may well be a direct reference to the Third Kingdom in the third starry circle that appears to Dante as he leaves the heaven of the sun—that "very sparkling of the Holy Ghost," before which his gaze falls dazzled, and which is lost to him in the beauty of Beatrice.†

The *Divine Comedy* has been described as a "Joachimist apocalypse."‡ It is thus that M. Anichikov sees the Quest of the Holy Graal. There is yet another point of contact between them, in the influence of St. Bernard, in both apparent. It is small wonder that Dante should have loved a book of inspiration thus cognate to his own, a Quest that was his own quest, his own dream. It is strange and interesting to find that the two greatest creations of medieval literature, so wholly different in form, have the same content, but in this lies something of the secret of their immortality, for they treat of an eternal reality and a hope that assuming different form in different ages (it haunted Shakespeare in *The Tempest*, and its nostalgia underlies the Arcadia myth, so prevalent in the Renaissance, when it seemed that "the world grows old and growing old grows sad"§) is perennial in man, though its fulfilment can only be in "the new heaven and new earth."

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER.

* *Par.* XXVII, 142-48.

† *Par.* XIV, 40-54. Since under one aspect Beatrice stands for the Church, this would imply Dante's willingness to leave the Third Kingdom a mystery, rather than let speculation on it lead him into the heresies that had tainted the Joachimism of his time.

‡ Aloys Dempf, *Sacrum Imeprium*.

§ Tasso, *Aminta*.

THE NATIONAL PORTRAIT GALLERY:

THE reader who looks up Baedeker or a similar guide to the sights of London will find that the National Portrait Gallery is mentioned in a rather casual way. The National Gallery is awarded the two famous asterisks to characterise it as a first-class sight, whereas its neighbour is usually dealt with as a kind of appendix to it which may be visited or omitted as the sightseer feels inclined. This is hardly fair to an institution which should enjoy the greatest popularity, all the more as it offers a unique opportunity of studying English history and English mentality from the best and most impressive authorities. The National Gallery has—and that may be said without under-rating its value—more than its equivalent in many Continental galleries: the Louvre, the Uffizi, the Rijksmuseum at Amsterdam, the Prado, and the Imperial Collections at Vienna are superior to it in one way or other. The Portrait Gallery on the other hand is quite unique in its kind, there being, except at Edinburgh and Dublin, no similar institution in any other country.

The reason why it has not yet attracted the attention it deserves is probably that it has too often been approached from the artistic point of view. It is very significant that an author who wanted to make it more popular published a guide to “what is æsthetically most important” in it. Such an attempt is bound to fail. The Portrait Gallery includes only a few dozen works of art which may safely be called masterpieces; and even among these there is, from Holbein to Sargent, hardly any artist who is not represented by a work of at least equal merit in some other collection.

What really makes it one of the most important and fascinating galleries in Europe is not its artistic, but its historical, value. It was founded not to show examples of the Fine Arts, but to illustrate the history of the English nation; and it is from the point of view of the student of British history and character that it should be approached. The idea originated with the fifth Earl Stanhope, who first mentioned the plan in the House of Commons in 1845. This “devoted servant of the cause of Art and Letters” (as he is called in the catalogue) was appointed first Chairman of the Board of Trustees. Disraeli, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, favoured the scheme, and it was under the Premiership of Palmerston that,

in 1856, the House of Lords asked the Queen for her support, which was graciously granted.

Two years before, in 1854, Carlyle had eagerly advocated a similar plan for a "National Exhibition of Scottish Portraits", and a few sentences of his paper on this subject may be quoted.

"First of all, then, I have to tell you, as a fact of personal experience, that in all my poor historical investigations it has been, and always is, one of the most primary wants to procure a bodily likeness of the personage inquired after; a good portrait, if such exists; failing that, even an indifferent if sincere one. In short, any representation made by a faithful human creature, of that face and figure, which he saw with his eyes, and which I can never see with mine, is now valuable to me, and much better than none at all. This, which is my own deep experience, I believe to be, in a deeper or less deep degree, the universal one; and that every student and reader of history, who strives earnestly to conceive for himself what manner of Fact and Man this or the other vague historical name can have been, will, as the first and directest indication of all, search eagerly for a portrait. . . . Often I have found a portrait superior in real instruction to half a dozen written Biographies."

The original Board of Trustees have outlined the principles on which the 4,000 portraits of the gallery have been collected:

"The first standing rule . . . is to look to the celebrity of the person represented rather than to the merit of the artist; to attempt to estimate that celebrity without any bias to any political or religious party, and not to consider great faults and errors, even though admitted on all sides, as any sufficient ground for excluding any portrait which may be valuable as illustrating the civil, ecclesiastical, or literary history of the country."

Few, fortunately very few, examples show the danger of deviating from the sound principle of including only persons who are no longer amongst the living. Three groups of sea officers, general officers, and statesmen of the Great War impair the sedate flow of history as it is only too obvious that they were put there chiefly for patriotic reasons.

The collection begins with some casts of royal tombs from the thirteenth century, whilst from the Tudor period onwards it contains only original works of art. So it is a comprehensive "handbook" of British history through five or six hundred

years. What does this mirror reflect of the development of the British race? It shows the gradual alienation of Britain and the British from Europe. Britain, so to speak, is drifting away from the Continent, exactly as these islands, in pre-historic periods, drifted away from the shores of Denmark and Hanover with which they originally formed one Continent. Walking through the pre-Tudor and Tudor rooms, one feels as if one were in the presence of European princes and nobility. These Englishmen could have lived at any Continental court, and their portraits might hang in any Italian, French, or German gallery. The same attitude and bearing are common to French kings or Burgundian knights; a Lancaster might be taken for a Valois, or an Orléans for a Yorkist. There are, however, already traits which may be interpreted as typically English. William Cecil Lord Burghley, though his portly attitude seems at a first glance to bear some resemblance to the portraits of the younger Cranach, on closer inspection lacks the self-satisfied complacency of the German petty princes as well as the passionate brutality of his Italian or the sophisticated refinement of his French contemporaries. Whereas Sir Philip Sidney, though in deportment and attire a representative of European civilisation in general, has the long narrow face which has been a characteristic of the Southern English type down to this day.

On the whole, the difference between English, French, Bohemian, or Rhenish people in the time of the Renaissance, is not greater than would be expected from cousins of the same family; and you need not even think of a Scots kinship twenty-four times removed. This is not surprising, considering the very close connection of this country with the Continental powers. There was permanent intercourse between England and the Continent which affected every sphere of life, from the religious community of the European *Res Publica Christiana* down to the needs of every day. While the King and his Privy Council were concerned with the Holy See at Rome or Avignon, the London citizens were worried about the herring off Scane, the fur of Novgorod, the linen of Ypres, or the paper of Bergamo. All of them had to regard Continental affairs as their own concerns. Thus, the Continental appearance of Englishmen of those days is the very expression of their Continental attitude.

The portraits of the last centuries give quite a different

impression. Among the pictures of the early nineteenth century, two tableaux of Wellington's officers during the Peninsular War in 1813-14 are characteristic of the change which the English mentality had undergone in the last two centuries. These sketches were drawn after a period of twenty years of incessant wars when the English had been engaged on land and by sea more than ever before. The Napoleonic wars had raised the military spirit of every European nation from Madrid to Moscow and from Sweden to Sicily, so that we have plenty of material for comparing the different types of officers. The Continental officers are, so to speak, still cousins, though, at this time, of a family fallen out with each other. We may look at the martial French marshals or the prosy Prussian generals, at the fanatical Spaniards or the elegant Austrians—all these officers are in the first place or even exclusively soldiers; men bred to military service and unswervingly devoted to the battlefield and the parade-ground. How different are the officers of the Iron Duke! Torres Vedras, Vittoria, Waterloo prove that the English army and its leaders were not inferior to any of their allies or enemies. Yet they are, so to speak, officers in disguise, and they seem to feel uneasy in the uniform which suits so well any Prussian or Frenchman. The English officers have remained what they actually were: landed proprietors, justices of the peace, and officials who, in spite of the aristocratic class-rule in eighteenth century England, never ceased to feel themselves and, virtually, to be, representatives of the whole nation.

The gradual differentiation of the English from the Continental type may be traced back from century to century. Two main factors have caused this development: the building of the British Empire, and the forming of the Gentleman ideal. It is not surprising to the connoisseur of historical portraits that their traces are visibly marked in the portraits. The first English discoverers and explorers, in the Elizabethan and early Stuart times, still represent the common European type of adventurer, in full accordance with the fact that, for two centuries, it was by no means certain whether Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, or England would be paramount in the field of colonisation. Where, then, did that remarkable differentiation originate which clearly distinguishes Warren Hastings or James Cook from their contemporary Continental rivals, and which is not to be found with

Drake, Raleigh, and their contemporaries? This difference is chiefly to be attributed to the educational ideal of the Gentleman who in the meantime had become one of the most outstanding features of English life. Thus, versatility and adaptability which do not permit any specialisation, combined with a reluctance to "make a show of oneself," are expressed in these portraits. Even attributes chosen by the sitter himself or thought fit for him by the painter, rarely exceed a vague allusion to the individual profession. Mostly second-rate men would, as a rule, allow themselves to be painted in the powder-smoke of a battle or in front of their advancing troops. Clive is not represented in the attitude of the victor of Plassey, nor Nelson aboard the *Victory* off Abukir. On the other hand, we often find bookshelves, classical statues, and similar attributes of learning in the background of statesmen and soldiers. Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Reich, connoisseur of Shakespeare, Goethe and Heine, and a great lover of music, was nearly always represented as a Major of the Territorials, the highest military rank he ever reached, owing to the magic charm the military uniform exerted upon his countrymen. To have himself painted when reading, as Gladstone did, or wearing the robes of a learned society, as Lord Salisbury when Chancellor of Oxford University, would have made a Prussian Secretary of State ridiculous in the eyes of the vast majority of Germans. Remembering this, who would suspect, for example, that gentleman, placid-looking in his ugly Victorian clothes and playing a violoncello, to be the distinguished General Sir James Hope Grant who, from 1841 to 1860 gained glory and laurels in five or more campaigns in India and China?

This reluctance to display one's profession is not confined to military men. Such a distinguished architect as Sir Christopher Wren, for instance, is not painted before one of his fine buildings, but sitting at a desk in the attitude of a man of the world who might be a Governor of a Crown Colony or the Lord Chief Justice, did not the design of St. Paul's give an unobtrusive hint as to his work. Perhaps still more striking is the fact that the Earl of Liverpool, who was Prime Minister during a period of the most violent international struggles and entanglements from 1812 to 1827, chose as the one outward sign of his achievements the paper containing the Act of Parliament by which the National Gallery was established.

This charming balance of mind which makes the profession a serious hobby, and gives the hobby a touch of seriousness is scarcely to be overlooked in any of the portraits. Their arrangement, fortunately, lacks any definite specialisation. Writers, statesmen, soldiers, and scholars are hung in the same room in accordance with the fact that in many cases politicians are at the same time poets or scientists. Bacon, philosopher and Lord Chancellor; Addison, essayist and Secretary of State; Sheridan, statesman and dramatist; Disraeli, novelist and Prime Minister—to mention only a few names of that long series of versatile personalities.

The different development of the English and Continental types of colonisers can be observed from the beginning of the eighteenth century. The French and Spanish colonial officers remained, to a greater or lesser degree, courtiers of Versailles or the Escorial, though undoubtedly they wore a more daring expression than their colleagues at home who were entangled in the petty intrigues of the Bourbons or the Dutch States-General. As to the French in particular, they loved and still love to transplant as much as possible of their native customs, even of the Paris fashion of life, wherever they go. The British, on the contrary, have shaped a quite unique community throughout the world, the British Commonwealth of Nations. The task of building the Empire could not be carried out in any "European," i.e. Continental, fashion. Thus, these men had gradually to develop new qualities, the effect of which was the type of men which strikes us so impressively in the portraits from Warren Hastings to Cecil Rhodes.

All these men look down unperturbed, though a little shy, from their plain frames on the spectator. How strongly the British character as described above has formed the whole nation is shown by the fact that it does not manifest itself only in those rather limited circles whose members were educated at Eton and Harrow, but that it has come to light also in those who worked their way up. How intrinsically English they are is made clear by contrast with a portrait which looks as foreign in the nineteenth-century rooms as was its original among his contemporaries. It shows a tall man squeezed into a tightly fitting uniform, who exhibits an extremely theatrical and, at the same time, remarkably rigid attitude, wholly devoid of the unconstrained ease which is so characteristic even of English military men. It is Prince

Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha; and this portrait suggests that the Prince Consort remained, in fact, a foreigner to the English style of life despite his good will and the many useful services he rendered to the country of his adoption.

The Gallery illustrates not only political history but, to an equal degree, the development of civilisation. It is fascinating to observe the English mentality unveiling itself in these various spheres of life. Thus, to pick out an example at random, the stage occupies a comparatively large space, as from Shakespeare downward it does in real English life; so that the great proportion of portraits of theatrical people of every kind—playwrights, actors, managers, composers, and so on—give a true impression of its social importance. Moreover, it is not without significance that most of these portraits have been done by well-known and well-paid artists, who were usually employed by the upper classes, such as Gilbert Stuart, Gainsborough, and Lawrence. As to the early Stuart period of theatrical life, the Dulwich Gallery, little known, though a jewel among the smaller London collections, is provided with more and better specimens of this side of public life, owing to the personality of its founder, Edward Alleyn, himself a theatrical manager and actor. But for the later periods the Portrait Gallery is rivalled only by the Garrick Club. It is by no means a mere accident that the stage played such a conspicuous rôle in English life, and that people such as the male and female members of the Kemble family, the Keans, David Garrick and others were admitted to the best society in London and enjoyed a world-wide fame. Dramatic art corresponds to the English sense of action and accordingly was favoured by every social class. What people were longing for they found performed on the stage in a straightforwardness which tradition and convention prevented them from exhibiting in the natural course of life. The theatre met their wishes for action and eventful life without committing the spectators to exceed the limits of self-restraint.

Singling out the portraits of representatives of a certain profession, through several centuries, affords another source of information. Looking, for instance, at the portraits of clergymen, one becomes aware of the peculiar importance of the Established Church for the history of the nation. The bishops and curates of the Church of England, not being confined to the rôle of shepherds of souls, lack the fanaticism as

well as the intimidated bashfulness characteristic of many portraits of Protestant preachers in Continental countries. Even the ministers of Nonconformist denominations have derived great profit from the conditions of their brethren in the Established Church. Though, for instance, the portrait of John Wesley shows the father of Methodism in the attitude of actual preaching, it is full of a gentlemanly dignity which is caused not only by religious enthusiasm, but equally by the high social position clergymen hold in this country. An amusing contrast is a portrait which bears some resemblance to the bleak paintings of humble ministers of the Dutch or Swiss Reformed Churches: the label, however, informs us that this modest-looking and poorly-dressed man is the author of *Leviathan* and one of the fathers of the science of government, Thomas Hobbes.

Turning back to the point from which we started, we may ask once more for the reasons which have made the Gallery a unique institution. With greater certainty than before we are now enabled to explain why it is just this country that can boast of such a fine collection. English history, above the history of other nations, has been made by individuals, not by ideas. There is nothing in it to be compared with the stirring impulse which emanated from the slogans of *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, ever since the French Revolution; it was the idea of *Risorgimento* rather than the personal achievements of Cavour, Mazzini, Garibaldi, which united Italy; it was the idea of Panslavism which buoyed up the spirits of Czechs, Serbs, and other Slav peoples during the centuries of suppression. Everyone knows the importance that Germans have attributed to almost mystical ideas, from the Holy Empire of the Middle Ages down to the National Socialist *Weltanschauung* of present days. There is nothing corresponding to it in English history! The Italian Renaissance has its English equivalent in the Elizabethan Era, or the Age of Shakespeare—no Italian historian would speak of an Age of Michelangelo. The English historian of literature would speak of an Age of Milton, or Dryden, while the German scholar speaks of Baroque Poetry, and so on. “Men not Measures”—the National Portrait Gallery proves that it is not a mere accident that this proverb is typically English and has no equivalent on the Continent.

S. H. STEINBERG.

RUTHENIA'S WAY TO AUTONOMY.

SUB-CARPATHIAN Ruthenia is a region of 12,600 square kilometres, a little less than a tenth of the area of Czechoslovakia, and, according to the last Census, containing 727,000 people ; it forms one of the most interesting and important problems in South-Eastern Europe. It is not only of especial strategic importance, forming as it does the geographical link between the thickly populated and far more highly cultivated provinces of Czechoslovakia and their ally Roumania, but it is at the same time a unique meeting-point of eastern and western culture, which are here brought to a compromise with each other. This region was entrusted to Czechoslovakia by the Peace Conference with the express task of raising the culture and standard of living of its population, and to grant it the highest degree of autonomy possible within the limits of the Czechoslovak Republic, according as the development and maturing of its people should permit of it. Czechoslovakia thus had to fulfil a cultural task of the first order, for circumstances in Ruthenia were extraordinarily difficult.

The solution here sketched was arrived at during the peace treaty negotiations, partly on account of there being almost no other alternative, and partly because a delegation of Ruthenians, which people forms the majority of the population, themselves asked for it. Union with the Ukrainians, a related race of people living in Poland and Russia, the Ruthenians wished to avoid. The treatment of the Ukrainians in Poland has shown them that their standpoint was justified ; while a union with the Soviet was obviously not favoured by the Great Powers, for at that time there was fear of a Communist attack on the other side of the Carpathians and in the Danube basin. Nevertheless it must be said that the Ruthenians of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia feel themselves a smaller part of the Ukrainian nation, which lives in separate settlements of many millions in Poland and Soviet Russia, and in smaller numbers in Roumania and Czechoslovakia. Apart from the Soviet-Ukraine in Russia, the largest number of Ukrainians (or Ruthenians) are living in Poland, where, according to official statistics, they form the largest minority, being more than 4,000,000. It may here be remarked that the Ukrainians themselves declare their number in Poland to be

7,000,000. In Roumania they number about 500,000, and in Czechoslovakia the last official Census in 1930 gave their number as 447,000.

The difficulties of the problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia are best shown by the figures of the last Census. These were, of "Russians and Ruthenians" 63 per cent, Hungarians 15½ per cent., those registered as of Jewish nationality 13 per cent., and Czechs and Slovaks 5 per cent. From the religious standpoint also the situation is exceedingly complicated, for of Greek Catholics there are 49½ per cent., the Orthodox Church has about 15½ per cent., Jews are about 14 per cent., and Roman Catholics about 9½ per cent. The exceptionally low cultural condition of the Ruthenians, and of the people of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia in general, which was the heritage of Hungary—this whole region, formerly of the Kingdom of Hungary, was for Budapest almost exclusively a reservoir of working-power for the Hungarian landlord in the Danube basin—seemed to defy all efforts at colonisation. The robber element was extremely common, and the deep primeval forests afforded criminals a constant refuge from the hand of an orderly administration. In addition, there was an almost incredible amount of superstition, not only of the Ruthenians themselves but also of many Jewish sects; terrible poverty, for the natural products of the country consisted almost entirely of wood, always difficult of transport; illness and diseases of all kinds, and a widespread illiteracy.

On the other hand, Prague was conscious not only of the strategic significance of this region, but also of the fact that the latter's birth-rate was exceedingly high, so that the proportion of its population to that of the total population of the Republic must steadily increase. Between the Census of 1921 and that of 1930 the population of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia increased from 604,000 to 727,000, i.e. by almost 20 per cent. in ten years. In other parts of Czechoslovakia the population increased by scarcely 8 per cent. Above all, however, it was recognised that the trust placed by the Peace Conference in the colonising abilities of this young state must not be disappointed. Thus Czechoslovakia took on a great responsibility, and so were begun the first efforts methodically to overcome the foregoing difficulties, later to give this region its autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic.

President Benesh, in an audience which the writer had with

him and in which the conversation turned¹ on the further development of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, said that the realisation of its autonomy could now be begun. "Broadly speaking," he said, "there will always be in this State only two important minorities, the German and the Hungarian. I have no interest in Czechoslovakia's being saddled with a Ruthenian minority, and if only for this reason no one must suppose that Prague will delay Ruthenia's progress to autonomy."

During the years 1919 to 1933 Prague spent more than 1,600,000,000 crowns (about £12,000,000) on the special needs of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, such as the building of schools, agriculture, public works and hygiene. Nevertheless, it is generally admitted in Prague, as every impartial observer says also, that the standard of the western part of the Republic has by no means yet been attained in this district. For some time Prague will have to make considerable financial sacrifices in order to continue and complete its cultural task. For Ruthenia to rely on her own financial resources is by no means yet possible, but she is obviously approaching this condition more and more from year to year. Thus the reason why the way to autonomy can be trodden only step by step is seen in the fact of Ruthenia's present incapability of supporting herself. Had autonomy been realised ten or fifteen years ago, absolutely without any method or planning, there would have arisen in Czechoslovakia, considering the striking significance of the Communist Party in Ruthenia at that time, a picture of Communism economically and culturally helpless, which would most probably have entailed new and even international difficulties. By the careful and methodical colonisation of Ruthenia, this work has so far advanced that now, where formerly there were no schools whatever, a young and intelligent generation is growing up and becoming more and more capable of taking the destiny of its country into its own hands. To-day even the smallest village has its teacher, who teaches the people in their own language. Financial grants from Prague amounted last year to 100,000,000 crowns (about £700,000). But the yield of agriculture, particularly of stock-farming, is beginning to increase; Ruthenia, famous as an almost unique European hunting-ground for deer, bears, wolves and lynxes, is developing its tourist traffic more and more; trade in wood is

improving by reason of better transport facilities, and, what is perhaps most important, hygienic and cultural conditions are improving. Czechoslovakia, having as far as possible fulfilled her first and foremost obligation of raising the standard of living of the people of Ruthenia, is now applying herself the more to her political tasks there.

According to a new law intended to serve as a further stimulus to the development of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the power of the Governor there is now limited, and a so-called "Council of Ruthenia" has been formed. This Council will gradually take on the character of a Parliament. Having regard to the efforts for autonomy of individual minorities, such as the Germans of the Sudetendeutsch districts, it must be emphasised that the Ruthenian autonomy is of a quite different character. It is one of a region containing several different nationalities and bounded by historical and geographical frontiers. There can thus be no question of a national autonomy, forming new, artificial frontiers inside a uniform region.

The new law provides for a Governor at the head of Ruthenia, who is to be nominated and recalled by the President of Czechoslovakia on the suggestion of the Government. The Governor will be responsible only to the Prague Government; but as soon as the Ruthenian Parliament is formed, the Governor will be answerable to this. He will have the special privilege of being present at sittings of the Government whenever he may have any suggestions or opinions to put before the Czechoslovak Cabinet. All personal matters in the political administration of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia are to be dealt with by the Governor, as well as questions of language, religion, education and local administration. In this way the definitions of the Czechoslovak constitution are met, which demand unity in the political administration of the Republic. Yet at the same time there has been an important step forward towards the autonomy of Ruthenia without either internal or external coercion being exerted upon the Prague Government. This progress towards autonomy has been made possible by the work of consolidation in the east of this state; and when the debate on the new law took place in Parliament, it was quite clearly recognised on all sides that in the east of the Republic the seeds of a better political and cultural future had been sown. There must be

no external political pressure whatever, since this only complicates all these problems instead of facilitating their solution.

All elementary schools in Ruthenia have passed under the control of the State, and all children must attend them. A special school was made for the children of *tsiganys* (gypsies), the only one of its kind in all Europe. The obligatory school period was raised from six to eight years. The number of grammar schools, secondary schools and technical schools has been more than doubled, so that the whole standard of schooling in Ruthenia is immeasurably higher. It is true that there is still a certain amount of illiteracy to be found there ; but one must consider that when this region passed out of the control of Hungary it might well have been the most culturally backward in Europe. Even to-day superstition is widely spread among the people, particularly the older generation ; and only the new generation, educated in the schools and universities of this young state, will give Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia a new aspect.

Dr. Benesh, in 1934, referred to the fact that Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia has a two-thirds majority of the Slav element compared with a one-third minority of Hungarians and Jews. He declared :

Economically, socially and politically, both these minorities have been better equipped since the time of the old régime. To give Ruthenia autonomy immediately on the conclusion of peace would have meant opening the door to an undemocratic government and thus giving rise to still new difficulties. The minority would have ruled the majority. I frequently say that it was the duty of the Prague Government in this situation to make a political, economic and cultural preparation over many years for the building-up of a really democratic autonomy. It was necessary to found elementary schools, and thus to pave the way for educating the people politically. It was necessary to prepare the political organisation of the various political parties, and this had not yet been done. It was necessary to organise public administration and hygiene. It must not be forgotten that it is a matter of grave responsibility to lay the administration of a country in the hands of a people that, for the first time in its history, is taking over that administration.

With all due regard to the cultural work done by Czechoslovakia in Ruthenia, it must be admitted that this region is

still far behind the western part of the Republic in so far as its economic, political and cultural standard is concerned. It is another question, however, whether this is traceable to the insufficient colonising abilities of the Czechs and Slovaks, or to the whole nature of the district itself. A careful weighing-up of all the circumstances will bring one to the second conclusion. Just after the War it took nearly forty hours to go by railway from Prague to Užhorod, the capital of Ruthenia; one can get there to-day by using the State Air Line in little more than two hours, for about £2, and can travel about this erstwhile mysterious and not undangerous country in all directions on good roads with excellent means of transport. The poverty of the people is still an undeniable fact; but the price of agricultural products, especially in the case of wood, wine, and so on, is already going up, goods transport being much improved and cheaper. The industrialisation of Ruthenia will probably be begun by erecting papermills there, in order to utilise the plentiful supplies of wood on the spot. It is noteworthy that it is chiefly a question of beech forests; and beech-wood, apart from the manufacture of railway sleepers and so on, has not nearly the value of oak-wood. Therefore the beech forests already cut down will be replaced by oak. At the same time, much will depend on whether it will be possible successfully to promote agriculture and stock-farming more rationally, to provide better markets for the Ruthenian wines, which are very good and cheap but comparatively little known, and finally to make the great beauty of the mountain valleys of this country accessible to foreign visitors.

Every effort is being made to raise the standard of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia high enough to enable it to administer itself. Up to the present one is struck by the fact that for some years past the people have shown a certain leaning away from Communism, especially after the wholesale shooting of Ukrainian nationalists in Russia. On the other hand a certain National-Socialist and especially anti-Semitic propaganda emanating from Berlin is noticeable there; but this will not take root in Ruthenia, for the Jewish population, consisting mostly of artisans and farmers, are subject socially and economically to almost exactly the same conditions as the Ruthenian and Hungarian population. All three peoples, Ruthenians, Jews and Hungarians, feel definitely that the

prudent and gradual path to autonomy indicated to them by the Czechoslovak democracy is the only possible way to conquer the great economic difficulties arising from the poverty of the land.

The people of Ruthenia had, up to the time of the Great War, practically no political or national rights, nor had they political or administrative experience. The War caused the country to become free, and, by its inclusion in Czechoslovakia, it suddenly acquired all the rights of a free political existence. It was thus not especially remarkable that certain circles of a Ruthenian, Hungarian and Jewish semi-intelligentsia, a very thin stratum of people who had gained their knowledge in foreign universities, constantly tried to disturb constructive work by means of demagoguery. They demanded either immediate autonomy or union with Russia or Hungary, and tried in all ways to obstruct the work of colonisation. It was and is interesting to observe how this opposition has become smaller and smaller as the democratically schooled youth has grown up. For the first time in their history the Ruthenians can develop freely, arrange their own schools and newspapers, and study the economic possibilities of their own home. The Jewish nationals have in Munkačevo, the most important town after Užhorod, their own Hebrew Grammar School. The struggle between separate peoples and races has become more and more changed into one for the progressive cultivation of Ruthenia and its economic possibilities.

The difficulties still to be overcome should not be underrated. There is as yet almost no industry there. Cash has an extraordinarily high value. The fighting of malaria is a quite considerable task. Marshes are to be drained, river-beds to be regulated, hospitals to be built, and the superstitions of the older generations, who still people the forests, mountains and valleys with witches and goblins, to be allayed. The young generation is already beginning to help, and it is the young people who will reap the success sown by two decades of the work done in Ruthenia by Czechoslovak democracy. It will probably be only a few years before the promise given to the Peace Conference is fulfilled, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia is brought, by means of a gradual building-up of the strength of the country and its people, to a complete autonomy within the Republic of Masaryk and Benesh.

GERHARD SCHACHER.

•HAMPTON COURT AND ITS MAKERS.

THE foundation of Hampton Court is associated in the mind of every Londoner and indeed of every Englishman with the name of Cardinal Wolsey, the celebrated minister of Henry VIII during the earlier years of his reign. But as a matter of fact Hampton Court dates back centuries before the times of the great and magnificent Cardinal. The Manor of Hamntone in the County of Middlesex and hundred of Spelthorne is first mentioned in Domesday Book. In Saxon times it is stated to have belonged to Earl Algar but, like many other Saxon estates, it was doubtless confiscated by the Conqueror and is there entered as held by Walter de St. Valerie in the hands of whose family it remained for upwards of a century, thence passing to a certain Henry de St. Albans who transferred it early in the thirteenth century to the Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem. The house was still held by this wealthy order in the year 1503 when Elizabeth of York, wife of Henry VII, went there from the Royal Palace at Richmond (or Sheen), where she died in childbirth a month later. Six years after this her husband followed her to the grave and was succeeded at the age of eighteen by his second surviving son Henry.

The next date of note in the history of Hampton Court—as it was already styled—was a visit paid there on March 20th, 1514, by the Eighth Henry and his Queen Katherine of Aragon. Presumably Thomas Wolsey already had his eye on the place, for in the following winter (the date of the indenture is January 11th, 1515) the Manor of Hampton Court, with all its appurtenances, was leased by the prior Sir Thomas Docwra and his brethren, the Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem, to “the most Reverend Father in God Thomas Wolsey, Archbishop of York,” for a term of ninety-nine years at a rental of £50 per annum.

Needless to say, the ancient manor house was deemed quite inadequate to the grandiose conceptions of the ambitious Chancellor. Wolsey, never too robust in health, had consulted the medical profession of his day as to the salubrity of the spot where he was to take up his abode, stipulating that it must be within twenty miles of London so as to be convenient for his duties as Chancellor. Its gravel soil was doubtless a recommendation and the river was of importance in those

days as a thoroughfare when roads were far from adequate as means of transit in bad weather. The king at this period was never tired of heaping honours upon his favourite minister who saved him during the years of his pleasure-loving youth from so many of the irksome cares of state and whose industry was as insatiable as his love of display. In addition to holding the office of Grand Almoner he had now been successively appointed Bishop of Lincoln, of Tournay in France, and Archbishop of York. Subsequently the bishoprics of Winchester, Bath, Worcester and Hereford also fell into his hands, "in farm," as it was termed. Presumably in the case of these Wolsey took the bulk of the revenues while his suffragan discharged the most onerous of the duties attaching to the sees. In the year 1515 to these many dignities was added the coveted honour of Cardinal bestowed by the Pope and also the Lord Chancellorship of England.

The fact that he was engaged in carrying on the government of the country, and controlling its policy both at home and abroad, in addition to his many minor activities, did not prevent his supervising the erection of a sumptuous palace at Hampton Court in its minutest details, in addition to which he was engaged in founding what was originally called Cardinal College at Oxford (and subsequently Christ Church) and a school in connection with it at Ipswich. In fact we may say of him, without any attempt at exaggeration, that he most effectually burnt the candle at both ends. The secret of long life is hardly to be discovered in conjunction with such multifarious and arduous activities.

The domain of Hampton Court when Wolsey took possession of it consisted of some 2,000 acres with the old manor house in its midst. It was no wonder that, with the revenues of all these bishoprics, Wolsey was in a position to build himself a magnificent palace worthy of an ecclesiastical potentate of the highest rank. No expense was spared to render it not only befitting the Cardinal's dignity, but also, as we should say nowadays, up to date according to the latest ideas of sanitation.

The building was made thoroughly weather-proof and the drainage was carried away by brick sewers 3 feet wide by 5 feet in height into the River Thames. In order to ensure a plentiful supply of pure drinking water the springs at Coombe Hill, at a distance of some three miles from Hampton Court,

were collected in conduits and conveyed in a double set of leaden pipes from Coombe to Surbiton and thence under the Thames above Kingston Bridge and through the home park to the Palace. The leaden pipes were in lengths of 25 feet each, the diameter of each pipe being about $2\frac{1}{2}$ in., and the amount of lead employed in this undertaking has been calculated at some 250 tons. In several parts of the palace baths and other such conveniences were installed after the manner of a modern twentieth-century mansion. A moat was dug round the entire building, some small part of which is still in existence at the front entrance. This has been re-excavated and restored to its original form in recent years.

It is a matter of regret that no record survives of the name of the architect under whose supervision the whole ambitious scheme was carried out. Who, one wonders, selected the very unique rich red brick of which the palace was built? Who was responsible for the graceful and fantastic chimneys, the picturesque turrets, the gables and pinnacles which form so effective a feature of the whole design? History is silent on the point, but we know that it was in the month of May 1516 that Wolsey first received the King and Queen at his new home, so that by this time the palace must have been some way advanced towards completion.

The place found favour with King Henry and his first visit was followed by many others.

“When it pleased the King’s Majesty to repair unto the Cardinal’s house for his recreation” (records Cavendish his biographer) “as he did divers times in the year, there wanted no preparation or goodly furniture with viands of the finest sort that could be gotten for money or friendship,”

for Wolsey was no man to do such things by halves, as all the records we have of him bear witness.

“Banquets” (says Cavendish) “were set forth, masques and mummeries in so gorgeous a sort and costly manner that it was a heaven to behold. There wanted no dames nor demoiselles, meet or apt to dance with the masquers or to garnish the place for that time with other goodly disports.”

The king himself was by no means loath to take his part in the revelry.

“I have seen him” (narrates our chronicler) “come suddenly thither in a masque with a dozen masquers all in garments like

shepherds, made of fine cloth of gold and fine satin paned, and caps of the same with visors of good proportion and phisiognomy ; their hair and beards either of fine gold or silver, or else of black silk, having sixteen torchbearers besides three drums and other persons attending them with visors, clothed all in satin, of the same colour."

One wonders at these masquers being described as "like shepherds," but anyhow they were so completely disguised that the Cardinal mistook the wrong person for the King, and went up to one of the gentlemen of the Court hat in hand, to bluff King Hal's great amusement.

Those were merry days before the clouds gathered and the King's determination to divorce Queen Katherine, through her failure to provide him with a male heir to the throne, after many unfortunate miscarriages, placed Wolsey in an impossible position, divided between his obligations as Cardinal to the Pope and his desire to do the King's behest. These times were still far off and Wolsey, when he gave splendid banquets to the foreign ambassadors or entertained King Henry as his special guest, was always seated in the centre of the high table, the most envied of all present. The magnificence of these entertainments was indeed the talk of the whole Continent, and the Venetian ambassador, writing home—there was something to write home about in those days—declared that "the like of it was never given either by Cleopatra or Caligula, the whole banqueting hall being decorated with huge vases of gold and silver that I fancied myself in the town of Chosroes when that monarch caused divine honours to be paid to him."

The luxuries of the table, however, were not for Wolsey, for even as early as 1517 we learn that his digestion was so impaired that he could only eat "tender food" and was compelled to procure dispensations from the Pope during Lent on this account. "Hay's diet" was then a thing of the far distant future, but the Cardinal's complaint was doubtless due in great part to his inability to take needed rest after meal times. His duty to his king always came first in his mind and could never be neglected or suffer delay, and in these early years of the reign the relations between King and Cardinal were of the utmost cordiality and easy familiarity. So little in this case did "coming events cast their shadows before." In his office of Lord Chancellor Wolsey showed the same

energy and capacity as distinguished his conduct in other spheres. Sir Thomas More states that "his regularity, decision and despatch could not be gainsayed," and that his impartiality to all classes was beyond dispute. "The lawyers," he says, "hated him for his strict adherence to justice and the nobles because riches and position were no recommendation to his favour." The Venetian ambassador speaks of his consideration for the poorer classes, "hearing their suits and seeking to despatch them instantly. He also" (he adds) "makes the lawyers plead gratis for all paupers." His foreign policy, however, with its subservience to the interests of the Papal See and the exactions it involved eventually brought disaster in its train.

Hampton Court underwent many changes after Wolsey's time, Henry subsequently making numerous alterations as well as additions to the original building. At a much later date more far-reaching modifications of the original structure were carried out to the orders of William of Orange and his Queen Mary. Much, however, still remains of Wolsey's original design, notably the West front, the first Green Court and the Clock Court, but the latter underwent considerable alterations under Henry VIII, the Great Hall on the left-hand side of this quadrangle having been erected according to the instructions of that monarch. The Chapel was also remodelled by Henry, and probably partially rebuilt.

The interior decorations of Wolsey's palace were of unsurpassed magnificence in his own day. The Cardinal had a special weakness for tapestries with which the walls and chambers were hung regardless of expense. His audience chamber, we are told, was hung with tapestries which were changed once a week. Du Bellay, who came to England on a diplomatic mission, takes note of the sumptuous adornments of the palace. "The very bedchambers," he says, "had hangings of wonderful value and every place did glitter with innumerable vessels of gold and silver. There were two hundred and four score beds, the furniture of most of them being silk, and all for the entertainment of strangers only."

Henry was one of the keenest sportsmen of his day and after he had taken possession of Hampton Court he had the park well stocked with deer and other game and had a large rabbit warren made in Bushey Park, while he also reared pheasants and partridges. Alternatively he would angle for

fish in the Thames or in the ponds at Hampton Court. The Tilt Yard which still retains its ancient name, though it serves very different purposes to-day, was used for jousts and tournaments. It was surrounded, we are told, with the pavilions of the champions and adorned with their arms and banners. Henry himself was a horseman of no mean skill and loved to engage in these mimic feats of arms. Tennis—not, of course, the lawn tennis of the present day—was a favourite game of the King's. He was extremely fond of it, we are told, "it was the prettiest thing in the world to see him play, the fair skin glowing through a shirt of the finest texture." In winter he loved playing at games of chance, backgammon, dice and shove-board being specially favoured. He must, however, have found it, in modern phraseology, "a mug's game," for in one year only his losses, we are informed, amounted to no less than £3,500. This versatile monarch was also extremely fond of music, playing for preference on the organ, harpsichord or lute, and having himself a fine and very powerful voice, so that Hampton Court in his day was a far from dull abode, either in winter or summer.

Henry had little liking for the details of his daily life appearing in the Court Circular. By one of the regulations issued to gentlemen and grooms of the privy chamber they are enjoined "not to hearken or enquire where the King is or goeth, be it early or late, without grudging, mumbling or talking of the King's pastime, late or early going to bed, nor to repeat any Court gossip."

A very different type of monarch, dour, moody, morose and austere, was in later days to remodel the ancient palace and gardens in accordance with his own Dutch taste, but in the meantime Oliver Cromwell and his puritanical roundheads had sold the large majority of the priceless artistic treasures which it contained at auction prices, though Cromwell himself ended by taking up his abode here as Lord Protector of the Commonwealth. Little, however, had been done to make any extensive alterations in the building itself after the time of Henry VIII. A new era set in with the accession to the throne of William of Orange and Mary his Queen. In their reign the major part of the old Tudor state apartments were demolished, new buildings erected in their stead, and the gardens laid out in the form which they retain to the present day. William, on his arrival in England, was immediately

captivated with Hampton Court, but as Barnet observes, "the palace was so very old and so irregular that a design was formed of raising new buildings there for the King and Queen's apartments." The designing of the new apartments was entrusted to Sir Christopher Wren, but his task was a somewhat difficult one as he had to endeavour to meet the views of the Dutch King and at the same time to keep the new buildings, for the sake of which Henry VIII's old state rooms were pulled down, in harmony as far as possible with the original building. In view of the architectural style adopted in accordance with the ideas of the period it must be admitted that Sir Christopher discharged a well-nigh impossible task with something more or less approaching to success. Only a part, however, of the original scheme was carried out, and perhaps we need not altogether regret this, but rather the loss of some considerable portion of the old palace of Henry VIII with its many historical, if sometimes painful, associations.

Henry VIII's manners at meal times have been exhibited in a modern film with perhaps something less than justice. It may be questioned if in reality the Tudor monarch showed at his banquets as much boorishness as his Dutch successor, of whom it is related that his behaviour to his sister-in-law, afterwards Queen Anne, was considerably less than might be expected of a gentleman. When the first plate of green peas of the season was put on the table it is stated that the King, without offering the Princess any share of them, took the plate and devoured its entire contents himself, the Princess Anne remarking afterwards that she had so much mind for the peas that she was afraid to look at them. She was, it may be remarked, at this period shortly expecting her accouchement. The Duke of Gloucester, who was born some weeks later, did not indeed live to become King, but his birth set at rest for the time being the anxious discussions that were proceeding as to the provision to be made for the succession to the throne after the decease of Princess Anne.

Sir Christopher Wren's scheme for the restoration of Hampton Court was, as already observed, never completed. Queen Mary's death led to its postponement and later on the death of William of Orange himself caused its final abandonment, but much had already been effected for better or worse. The Fountain Court had been rebuilt in its entirety and also

the frontage to the palace gardens. It had been originally intended to make the main entrance at the north side facing Bushey Park, and this portion of the plan was not even initiated. William's fall from his horse due to its stumbling on a molehill brought to an end a life already none too secure from the ravages of disease, which the pharmacopœia of those days and the King's own over-exertions did nothing to counteract, and his ambitious schemes for the entire reconstruction of the Palace died with him. Neither Queen Anne nor the two first Georges made any material modifications in the Palace itself, and George III finally abandoned Hampton Court for Windsor Castle and other residences that were more to his taste. Thenceforward with the exception of the state rooms, the Palace was divided up into suites of apartments allocated to private families in connection with the Court or, for one reason or another, claimants to royal favour and consideration. After the accession of Queen Victoria the state rooms and gardens were thrown open to the public without restriction, and have so remained to the present day.

RALPH SHIRLEY.

BIRD LIFE IN SPAIN.

AMONGST the many problems arising out of the complexities of the Spanish situation is the future of the bird life of the Iberian Peninsula. Spain has always proved of unusual interest to the bird-lover, for not only is the country wild and sparsely inhabited by humans, thus allowing for a very rich and varied bird life, where such species rare with us as the kite, spoonbill, hoopoe and golden oriole, are abundant, but there has been a proven connection between the bird life of Spain and that of the British Isles. Bird-ringing has shown how the bulk of British migrants, including warblers, swallows, and sea-coast birds, use the western route to and from Africa via France and Spain, or Portugal; but for years there has been indiscriminate slaughter of bird life by the peasant gunners and netters who catch the song birds for their food. The Spaniard is not naturally a bird lover, although caged birds are one of the commonest features of his land. His life is hard, the standard of living very low, and a race's sympathies towards wild life are always in relation to its own poverty line. Thus the most important prospects of protecting bird life in Spain lay in British and American influence, for no other countries take such pains over their bird life as do the Anglo-Saxons.

There is another connection between the bird life of the two countries. The kite in Britain has this century been reduced from a once generally abundant bird of prey to one of the rarest British nesters, its nesting haunts now being confined to about half a dozen pairs in the wooded cwms of Radnor and Brecon in mid-Wales. This reduction has been largely due to the change of our British countryside from a Middle Ages condition something similar to Spain to-day, with poor sanitation and vast tracts of uncultivated common-land infested with vermin, to a modern well-kept, game-preserved or urbanised land. Old birds, in-breeding and the lack of fresh blood (for our kites are not migratory) have cast the shadow of extermination over our little British kite colony in mid-Wales. To circumvent this danger, a friend of mine, well known in ornithological circles and very familiar with the Welsh and the Spanish countrysides, talked over with me a few years ago a scheme he had planned in which the

eggs of kites from Spain could be brought to Wales and there hatched out in the hope that the new blood would revive our dwindling colony.

A small group of naturalists joined the scheme in 1933, with Mr. C. H. Gowland organising it. A naturalist who had business in Seville got into touch with peasant egg-collectors in the Coria district who knew the difference between "Milano real," as the Spaniards call the common red kite, and "Milano nigra," the black kite, and instructed them to collect eggs immediately they were laid, before the birds had commenced to incubate them, and to bring them to Seville. This naturally meant constant observation of a number of nests until the birds started laying, and the collectors, through their syndicate, argued much about terms, which they altered frequently. In all, the charges of the men and their syndicate amounted to 950 pesetas, without any guarantee as to eggs; and they got it! In the old days the average peasant collector charged one peseta for each kite's egg. However, in April 1934 thirteen kite eggs reached Seville and were put on the German air service to Barcelona via Madrid, and eventually reached England via Air France, being turned regularly to keep them fresh. Unfortunately upon arriving at Liverpool these eggs proved unsuitable for the experiment, for after all the months of correspondence and instruction they had inadvertently been packed on end, and had been four days in the same position without being turned by the collectors. A second batch, however, was arranged for and eventually arrived in good condition. Meanwhile a close watch had been kept on buzzards' nests in the Garth (Breconshire) estates of Wales, and the eggs of the Spanish kites were substituted for those of the buzzards where birds were commencing to sit, and eventually a portion of the introduced eggs hatched out. A further batch was introduced in 1935.

It was naturally with much enthusiasm that those taking part looked forward to a continuance of the experiment, but the civil war in Spain severed all communication with the collectors there, and as the disturbance lasted longer than was expected, the future of this most interesting experiment is but another of those many problems connected with the future of Spain. However, all the correspondence, customs and air service papers, etc., are being preserved as a record of the

experiment, unique in its kind, so far as it has been conducted.

The marking of birds with numbered aluminium identity rings in the British Isles has abundantly proved how many of our thrushes, plovers, pipits and wagtails winter in the Iberian peninsula, as well as showing that our migrants pass through. And off the coasts of Spain British-born gannets, lesser black-backed gulls, Manx shearwaters and cormorants also spend the winter months. A song-thrush nestling ringed in Lancashire in April was found at Teruel, Spain, the following November, while a young woodcock marked at Stirling in May was found in Spain in the following November, and one marked in Moray in April was found the following December in Portugal. Perthshire woodcock have also been traced to Spain. Lancashire and Cumberland pied wagtails have been found in Portugal and at the foot of the Pyrenees, while a Westmorland yellow wagtail was recovered in Morocco. Amongst our wild duck there is the interesting record of a teal, smallest of our duck, ringed as an adult bird in Cumberland and recovered at Santander in North Spain.

Meadow-pipits or titlarks caught and ringed when on autumn migration passing through the Skokholm (South Wales) bird observatory, have later been recovered in Spain, while a wheatear ringed in Shetland in June was found in Morocco the following October. Many British-born lapwings have been recovered in winter in Spain, Portugal and Morocco, and lesser black-backed gulls from the Lancashire coast and gannets from Wales (Grassholme) have been found numerous in autumn and winter along those coasts. A Cheshire-born black-headed gull and an Orkney arctic tern have been recovered in Portugal. Numerous British cormorants have also been found wintering in Spain, as have shearwaters ringed on the Pembrokeshire isles. These are merely odd examples of some of the records of British birds wintering in Spain, and any attempt to make the list of ringing results complete would produce a catalogue of records. Suffice it to say that the migration is in no way casual, although some of these birds, like the lapwing, cormorant, gannet, pipit and pied wagtail, may not have been considered migrants at all by the layman.

Regarding the subject of bird sanctuaries in Spain, Sir Lionel Earle, K.C.B., in his recent volume of reminiscences,
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describes a suitable sanctuary in the sports ground just outside Madrid, presented by ex-King Alfonso for polo, tennis, etc.

"Lunching there one day with some Spanish friends," writes Sir Lionel, "I spoke about the folly of the farmer and peasant in trapping and netting the migratory birds in masses, and said that, in consequence of this stupid policy, the country was losing millions of pesetas a year in agriculture, through pests which the birds kept under. I told them they had an ideal place on this sports property to create bird sanctuaries, and that if they and other landed proprietors did the same on their private estates they would confer great and lasting benefits on Spanish agriculture. The German and Austro-Hungarian Governments before the war actually subsidised landowners to create bird sanctuaries in the interest of agriculture."

When he returned to England, Sir Lionel sent all the information he could to Count Cueva de Vera, who had shown keen interest in his suggestion for a Spanish bird sanctuary, and who then went directly to Germany to learn more details about Baron von Berlepsch's famous experience in protecting and encouraging bird life.

Many an English bird photographer in recent years has visited Spain to study and photograph birds very rare in Britain, but very common there. R. Atkinson, J. M. Naish, E. F. Allen and J. Armitage are some examples of British bird photographers who have "worked" the birds of Spain in recent years. Probably the last great achievement of British bird photographers in Spain before the civil war was the photography, for the first time, of the griffon vulture. This was accomplished in south Spain, where in some districts flocks of these wheeling vultures (commonly termed "eagles" by tourists) are as familiar as rooks in an English landscape. And this bird is on the British list as a very rare straggler with a couple of visits to its credit. The first photographing of the life history of the griffon vulture took place from a "hide" on the Andalusian sierra, with Messrs. Atkinson, Naish and Allen responsible. A colony of about fifteen nests is in this district. From the first "hide" it was found lighting was suitable for photography only for an hour or two each day, but the bird was noticed to perform the curious feat of bringing a spray of palm leaves to line the nest, and when unduly frightened away, to knock its single white egg out of the nest. The "hide" was finally abandoned as the bird was not incubating her egg at all

regularly, and another nest was chosen for study with successful results. One infuriated bird, at another nest in which the egg had hatched, made determined and threatening dashes at the photographer who was attempting to film the young bird. This was the only time the griffon vulture was heard to utter any sound, this being a low wheezy noise.

Bird life in central Spain is varied, but perhaps not so rich as in some other parts. It has interested many naturalists, and the specimens collected by Mr. and Mrs. H. F. Witherby in 1922, 1925 and 1927 were sold to the British Museum for a donation to the British Trust for Ornithology. Lord Lilford in 1866, Dr. H. Weigold in 1913, the Rev. F. C. R. Jourdain, and amongst Spanish naturalists Senor Castellarnan in 1877, and recently Señor Don A. Gil Lletgel, whose estate of Rincon, near Candeleda (Avila), is the home of woodchats, orphean warblers, quail, Spanish wheatears, red-necked nightjars, Dartford warblers, Cetti's warblers, red and black kites, serpent eagles and marsh-harriers, and the autumn haunt of visiting bee-eaters and fire-crests; have studied the birds of this area. There are birds distinctive of the country, as the Spanish nuthatch, the Spanish wheatear, Spanish jays which inhabit the pinewoods and some of the parklands of Madrid, and Spanish sparrows. In this region ravens are common, and flocks of the beautiful azure-winged magpie can usually be seen consorting with flocks of the spotless starling. Several common starlings ringed in Germany have been found wintering here, in Navarro, Cordoba, Sevilla and Cadiz, and in winter many are caught at the roosts for human food. Señor Gil Lletgel has known 22,000 dozen, or over a quarter of a million, taken in a season near Cadiz and sold for eating at three pesetas a dozen.

Yellow and red-billed choughs and tawny pipits nest in the mountains, but the serin finch is one of the few birds found pretty well everywhere. Water-pipits inhabit parts of the Sierra de Gredos, especially near springs and grassy slopes. Crested tits are fairly common in the pine forests of the Sierra de Guadarrama, where also may be found booted eagles, kites, citril finches, rock-buntings, fire crests, rock-thrushes, ortolans and the black redstart. Some of the other bird-haunts of central Spain include the Sierra de Gredos, mentioned above, which is the home of many griffon vultures, especially near the ex-king's shooting lodge at a height of

6,500 feet above sea level, alpine-accentors, red-billed choughs, water-pipits, white spotted blue-throats, rock-buntings, hoopoes, the little Scops owl, and in the valleys golden orioles, subalpine and other warblers. Many storks and lesser kestrels nest on the famous Monasterio de los Jeronimos at Guadalupe. At Aranjuez, a famous beauty spot near Madrid, there are rollers, stone-curlews, Scops owls, little ringed plovers nesting by the river, black-bellied sand-grouse, and the great spotted cuckoo. Daimiel, in La Mancha, provides the home of stilts, bearded tits and harriers on the preserved lagoons of the river Guadiana.

One of the pioneers of bird study in Spain was Willoughby Verner, who in Victorian times took the first bird photographs in that country, where he had resided since the age of fourteen. His knowledge was chiefly of the birds of south Spain, and he dedicated to Queen Victoria his book, *My Life Among the Birds of Spain*. He divided the country into its three main types, and with his sketchbook and camera illustrated as well as described the birds of the Lagunas—the cranes, the white storks, the purple herons and the marsh harriers; the birds of the plains—the great and lesser bustards; the birds of the cork woods—the goshawks, white-shouldered, booted and snake eagles, and the black vultures; the birds of the Sierras—golden and Bonelli's eagles, eagle-owls, bearded, griffon and Egyptian vultures; and the birds of the sea cliffs—the ospreys and ravens.

To Britishers, however, the birds of the Gibraltar region are most familiar, as beyond pigeon-racing from San Sebastian in the north, there has been little other regular communication with the countryside. Lt.-Col. Irby in 1875, and long before him the Rev. John White, brother of the famous Gilbert White, were the historians of the birds of "Gib." Here migration is so interesting, with the coming of spring of the wheatears, nightingales, night-herons and bee-eaters across the Straits; and the passing over of peewits, golden plovers, terns and seagulls, with at times remarkable flights of cranes and quail, are of profound interest in the Gibraltar district of Spain, with its abundance of Barbary partridge and snipe, the wild duck in early winter before the lagoons and lakes fill up with the rains, and the great numbers of wild geese which in winter visit the Laguna de la Jande and below Seville in the marshes of the Guadalquivir.

ERIC HARDY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"FREE AND PEACEFUL" TALKS

1. *Lord Halifax in Germany.*

LORD HALIFAX'S visit to Germany in November 1937 did not fail to excite a lively and general recollection of Lord Haldane's visit to the same country in February 1912. The analogy between the circumstances and even the technique employed on those two occasions holds good almost in detail. The humour, even irony, of the comparison is as good as one would normally expect from such repetitions in diplomatic history. In the first place both Lord Halifax and Lord Haldane were given a background severely non-committal for fear lest subsequent disappointment should do more harm than a successful mission could do good. On November 12th last Sir John Simon made this statement in the House of Commons: "... The Lord President of the Council recently received an invitation to pay a visit to Berlin for the purpose of seeing the Hunting Exhibition. Lord Halifax has accepted the invitation. . . . Though his visit will be entirely private and unofficial, Herr Hitler has intimated after inquiry that he would be glad to see the Lord President of the Council during the course of his visit to Germany, and Lord Halifax has accepted the invitation."

Did his hearers fail to recall the statement made in the same House of Commons in comparable circumstances a quarter of a century earlier? On February 14th, 1912, Mr. Asquith, Prime Minister, made a statement about Lord Haldane's projected visit to Germany. He began by explaining that Lord Haldane had had the intention sooner or later of visiting Germany on matters concerning the Royal Commission on the University of London; that he doubted if anyone would regard the Government as ill-advised in having hastened the time of that visit so that Lord Haldane could take the opportunity of engaging in "friendly and confidential" conversations with those who controlled and directed German policy. He recognised that the project departed from the conventional diplomatic method, but it was felt on both sides that it would be easier to be frank if the talks were unofficial and did not commit anyone, than if the method were adopted of "official diplomatic negotiations."

Mr. Neville Chamberlain, who now held the office of Prime Minister, added to the parallel already established by Sir John Simon. He spoke at the Guildhall on November 9th, and at Edinburgh on November 12th, in an exactly Asquithian strain about Lord Halifax's projected adventure. He expressed a "sincere desire" to see British relations with Germany (and Italy) "established upon a basis of mutual friendship and understanding," and made the comment that such an end would be better achieved by "informal discussion" than by "public declamation." He therefore foreshadowed a new attempt to remove the "fears and suspicions by a closer examination of their origin and substance." It was on the day following Mr. Chamberlain's speech of November 9th that Lord Halifax's impending visit to Germany first became known. Just as in 1912 it was not the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, who undertook the mission to Germany, so in 1937 it was not Mr. Eden who undertook it. The dictates of informality in the technique produced the like effect in each case. There is little need to sketch the similarity of circumstance that led to the two visits. There were those who in 1937 diagnosed the danger of war with Germany to be as urgent as it was proved to have been in 1912. There was a similar conflict of opinion in 1912 and in 1937 about the expediency of the journeys to Berlin. It is revealed in *Documents diplomatiques français* (Third Series, second volume, number 30), that M. Paul Cambon on February 13th, 1912, wrote to M. Poincaré: "Sir Arthur Nicolson, qui s'est toujours élevé contre le projet de visite à Berlin par la raison que, s'il en sortait un arrangement ce serait au détriment de l'Angleterre, et que, s'il n'en sortait rien, la tension serait pire qu'avant, m'a dit qu'il augurait mal de ces pourparlers et que, sur aucun point, il ne voyait aucune possibilité d'accord."

In 1937, though of course it was not possible to prove it on documentary evidence, it was believed by those who were informed enough to be entitled to form a belief, that the Foreign Office as a whole regarded the Halifax visit at any rate as wrongly timed, even if not wrongly conceived, by the Cabinet, especially as the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan had only just been signed and the Halifax mission might therefore be construed abroad as a sign of weakness. The Tripartite Pact was signed in Rome on November 6th.

Lord Halifax duly arrived in Berlin on November 17th. Four days earlier (November 13th) the *Evening Standard*, on the anonymous authority of "A Diplomatic Correspondent" (understood to be Mr. Poliakov), announced that Germany's intention was to suggest to Lord Halifax that she should renounce all colonial claims for ten years in return for a British approval of a free hand for Germany in Central Europe. There followed a violent press controversy in both countries. In Germany the official "Korrespondenz" of the National-Socialist party published on November 14th a quite violent attack on the British Press and even suggested that Lord Halifax's visit might better be postponed. It stigmatised the *Evening Standard* allegation as "a journalistic swindle," and went on: "Germany has repeatedly communicated her colonial claims through the mouth of the Führer. She has nothing to add to that. And she has settled her Central European relations by treaties. She needs no foreign help, instruction, or permission for their interpretation or their extension. . . . We should also like to correct the bold assumption that Germany is seeking a *rapprochement* with the Western Powers by instigating the Four-Power Conference so long desired. The Reich has no particular reason for desiring such a conference." The article ended with this warning: "If Lord Halifax's visit is to be made in such an atmosphere, then the serious question arises whether it would not be useful in the interests of political progress to postpone it at this moment and let it take place later, when, particularly in the British Press, there has been a general calming down."

Even the storm of controversy that surrounded Lord Halifax's arrival in Berlin on November 17th, 1937, had its parallel in 1912. Lord Haldane arrived in Berlin on February 8th, 1912. On the following day Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty (who himself on the preceding January 7th had refused an invitation, transmitted by Sir Ernest Cassel, to visit Berlin), made a speech which Dr. Gooch (for example) in the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* has described as lacking both in tact and in opportuneness and as having appreciably increased German mistrust. Mr. Churchill in that speech violently combated Germany's naval pretensions with the result that a bad atmosphere was in fact produced in Berlin. Count Wolff-Metternich, German Ambassador in London, in a dispatch addressed to the

Wilhelmstrasse on February 5th, 1912, declared that the mission to Germany and the choice of Lord Haldane as the agent had caused a real crisis in the British Cabinet (*Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, XXXI, 107) although Mr. Winston Churchill in his memoirs denies the fact (*The World Crisis, 1911-1914*). In its issue of November 14th last, the *Kölnische Zeitung* wrote: "Recently there has been let loose almost a volley of goodwill on the part of England towards Germany, and in each instance it has been the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain—in contrast to the Foreign Minister—who has struck a genial, warm, and sometimes almost hearty tone."

By the time (November 17th) however that Lord Halifax reached Berlin the storm had subsided. Indeed Lord Halifax was greeted in the German press under the name Lord Halalifax (Lord "Tally-ho-fax") to forge a pleasant link with the Hunting Exhibition. On November 18th he left for Berchtesgaden, where on November 19th he discussed with Herr Hitler in the presence of Baron von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, what the later official announcement described as "the problems of international politics of interest to Germany and Great Britain." He left Berlin on November 21st after spending five days in conversation with Herr Hitler, Baron von Neurath, General Goering, Dr. Goebbels and other leading persons both of the Government and of the Nazi party. On November 20th it had been made known (not officially) that Lord Halifax had invited Baron von Neurath to visit London. The report was denied on the following day. On that day the *Völkischer Beobachter* explained the matter thus: "In Germany the visit cannot result in disappointment nor can it raise any untimely hopes. This for the simple reason that in Germany there could be no intention of linking with the visit, which sprang from English initiative, any immediate political result whatever. The announcements about a visit by Baron von Neurath to London are therefore only speculations. There is no urgent necessity at present for such a journey. For that reason, as we have reason to believe, it has not even been proposed."

What had the visit accomplished? Had Baron von Neurath been invited to London or not? Had the German Government refused the invitation and had the invitation thereupon been withdrawn? The truth probably was neither

more nor less than was disclosed by Mr. Chamberlain to the House of Commons on November 24th, when he said: "As my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the House on November 12th, the visit of the Lord President of the Council was entirely private and unofficial. It had, however, as the House is aware, been arranged that Lord Halifax should see Herr Hitler, which he accordingly did on November 19th at Berchtesgaden, being accompanied by Baron von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister. During his visit the Lord President also had the opportunity of meeting General Goering, Dr. Goebbels, and other prominent leaders in Germany. These conversations were of a confidential character and the House will not, I am sure, expect me to make any further statement in regard to them at this stage. I am satisfied, however, that the visit has been valuable in furthering the desire, which I believe to be generally felt in both countries, for the establishment of closer mutual understanding." Mr. Chamberlain took the occasion also to describe the press speculations about an Anglo-German bargain over colonies and Central Europe that had preceded the visit and to which reference has been made above, as "not only irresponsible, but highly inaccurate." What was more interesting was that on the same day Mr. Chamberlain made to the House the following announcement: "The French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs have accepted an invitation from His Majesty's Government to visit London on November 30th for an exchange of views on the international situation with myself and my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."

2. *King Leopold in England.*

The King of the Belgians arrived in London on November 16th, the very day when Lord Halifax left London for Berlin. The Belgian visit was a formal affair, a "State visit." It lasted three days, and was crowded with ceremony, at Buckingham Palace, in the City, at the Foreign Office. King George took a prominent part in the ceremony. In this case the detail of what took place is of little interest. Its general purpose was a ritualistic demonstration of British friendship for Belgium, a purpose which was achieved with all the flair for pomp, ceremony and easy harmony which is one of the characteristics of British public life. But it was not a

disconnected episode of regal courtesies. It was an integral part of the same European manœuvring which sent Lord Halifax to Berlin. Belgium is immensely important to the peace of Europe. It was King Leopold himself who, on October 14th, 1936, announced to the world the new Belgian policy of independent neutrality. Belgium is now in form wholly independent of the three Great Powers—Germany, France and Britain—who in 1914 made of her their battleground. Before the war she had been “guaranteed” her neutrality. The guarantee of course was valueless, as are all guarantees given by Governments in international diplomacy. After the war, in 1925, Belgium was given another guarantee, that of the Locarno Treaty, which in its turn proved to be valueless to her. It was destroyed before its efficacy could be tested, although no serious person ever had any illusion about its efficiency in an emergency. Last October King Leopold unanswerably exposed the logic of Belgium’s position as standing victim of the Great Powers. In effect the Locarno guarantee for Belgium was destroyed by Germany because France had a pact with Russia. But Belgium herself had no pact with Russia. What King Leopold therefore announced last October was that Belgium for the future must be free of alliances with any other State, must see to her own military defence, must not lend her territory as a means of military action by any State against another, must therefore refuse any “guarantor” status such as was exemplified in the Locarno Treaty, must in short be as independent and as neutral as Switzerland. The immediate outcry in the French press (though it was as promptly suppressed by the Quai d’Orsay) eloquently illustrated the importance of the Leopold declaration. The post-war fertility of the Fleming population, the rise in influence of the Flemish Nationalists and “Rexist” have played their part in imposing upon Belgium the necessity of an even balance between Germany, France and Britain.

During the past twelve months the new Belgian policy has been the focus of some highly concentrated diplomacy on the part of Belgium’s powerful, dangerous neighbours. To be a Belgian is indeed one of Nature’s unkindest cuts. In November 1936, six weeks after King Leopold’s announcement, M. van Zeeland, Belgian Prime Minister, was in London. Diplomatic Notes and informal exchanges began to pass from capital to

capital about "a new Locarno." In March 1937 King Leopold was in London. In the following month Mr. Eden was in Brussels. Simultaneously with his visit the French and British Governments issued a joint declaration of which the effect was that they recognised Belgium's new status of independent neutrality. But her neutrality is a matter of her own choice. She has no obligations, even to remain neutral in any given emergency. She has therefore become an object of cultivation on the part of her great neighbours. She is being sedulously wooed. Before the war her "neutrality" was guaranteed, and that implied from the Belgian point of view that she had to be neutral. Now, she is merely assured that she shall be independent and free to act as she may choose: quite a different thing. King Leopold's visit to England in November 1937 had for its setting, therefore, the simple desire on the part of the British Government to cultivate Belgian goodwill to its maximum.

3. *M. Chautemps in England.*

The French Ministers came to London quick on the heels of Lord Halifax's return from Germany. Lord Halifax reached London on his return on November 22nd. Mr. Chamberlain made his announcement about the French visit on November 24th. M. Chautemps, Prime Minister, and his Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, reached London on November 28th. M. Chautemps arrived in a blaze of glory, for two days before he had scored in the Chamber the striking triumph of a Government majority of 521 votes to 4 for his public salaries proposals. He had been helped no doubt by the lucky revelations of *l'affaire Cagoulard*. "The Hooded Ones" ("*Les Cagouleurs*") were one of the typically comic manifestations of the extreme French Right. The manifestation appeared suddenly on November 16th, when a contractor and a plumber were arrested at Dieppe for illegal possession of arms. The charge was expanded into one of plotting against the State, and led to the discovery in Paris of fortified cellars and stores of arms. It was the sort of childish unpractical thing that the French Right would do, a muddled caricature of what might be expected of Mosley, Hitler and Mussolini rolled into one. M. Chautemps, however, saw its immediate value to himself. In the Chamber on November 19th, with a solemn tongue in his cheek, he referred to the Cagoulard affair as

"terribly serious." Apart, however, from the spurious help of the Hooded Ones, M. Chautemps has proved himself to be a skilful parliamentarian, skill in the *Chambre des Députés* being a more difficult quality than in the House of Commons.

In London he made a deeply favourable impression upon Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Eden. The talks were a miracle of stamina. They began in the Cabinet Room at No. 10 Downing Street at 11 a.m. on November 29th, went on through a Downing Street luncheon and a dinner at Mr. Eden's house (the guests being instructed not to dress to save time), and ended on the morning of November 30th. The French visitors left Victoria Station for Paris that afternoon. M. Chautemps' irrepressible gaiety was a measure of the French satisfaction over the result. After the first day's talk, he said: "I am delighted at the warmth of the reception we have had from the British Government. . . . In our conversations we have touched on all subjects. It is not a *tour d'horizon* we have made, but a real tour of the world that we have accomplished, and everywhere we have met the English. . . . I am very happy to tell you that on all subjects we were in complete agreement with our British colleagues. It has been a pleasure to us—though we were certain of it beforehand—to have noted the complete solidarity of the two Governments, and we are more and more convinced that this solidarity is an essential factor of world peace and of our own security. The conference will prove the perfect harmony and agreement of our viewpoints."

His optimism was well justified. At the end of the talks on November 30th a carefully drafted official statement was issued. It was understood to have been drafted by Mr. Chamberlain. It was so skilfully done that it satisfied the French delegates at sight. Though it apparently said little of substance, it allowed a great deal to be read between the lines, and deserves to be remembered as a clue to what is likely to develop in European high diplomacy in the near future. The communiqué contained these sentences: ". . . The French Ministers heard from Lord Halifax a statement of his recent conversations in Germany. They were glad to recognise that, while Lord Halifax's visit, being of a private and unofficial character, was not expected to lead to any immediate results, it had helped to remove causes of international misunderstanding and was well calculated to improve the atmosphere."

The problems of Europe as a whole and the future prospects of appeasement and disarmament came under review. On this important subject the French and British Ministers found fresh evidence of that community of attitude and outlook which so happily characterises the relations between France and the United Kingdom. A preliminary examination was made of the colonial question in all its aspects. It was recognised that this question was not one that could be considered in isolation and, moreover, would involve a number of other countries. It was agreed that the subject would require much more extended study. The French Ministers in their turn spoke of the forthcoming visit of M. Delbos to certain countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They were happy to note the common interests of the two Governments in the maintenance of peaceful conditions in those parts of Europe. The situation arising out of the Spanish conflict and Mediterranean questions came under review. It was agreed that, despite all difficulties, the policy of non-intervention in Spain had been fully justified, and had contributed materially to diminish the international repercussions of the conflict. It was resolved to continue to pursue the efforts of the two Governments in this direction in order to give full effect to this policy. The French and British Ministers examined the Far Eastern situation, the gravity of which they fully recognised. They were agreed as to their readiness to co-operate with other countries similarly placed, to protect the rights and interests and meet the obligations arising from international treaties relating to that part of the world. The British and French Ministers went on to review in a spirit of mutual confidence other aspects of international affairs of common interest to the two countries. While in no way departing from the previously expressed conception of international collaboration, they reaffirmed the desire of their Governments to co-operate with all countries in the common task of promoting international appeasement by methods of free and peaceful negotiation."

What lay behind that careful phraseology was the accomplished fact of an Anglo-French agreement on two important principles, namely, (1) that Germany should not be given any colonies, and (2) that Germany should not be allowed to disturb the existing status of Central Europe. It was not the case that the Halifax mission to Germany had been insincerely

undertaken. Both the British and the French Governments were sincerely anxious to reach a pacific understanding with Germany. But the increasing military strength of Great Britain was regarded as a reason for expecting that a pacific understanding with Germany could be achieved without any precipitate policy of concession to German claims. In the matter of colonies for example, Mr. Chamberlain was understood to have expressed the view that in the first place he did not recognise any German right to the possession of her former colonies, and in the second place that he regarded the German case for any colonies, considered on its merits and not as a matter of principle, as a bad case. What was agreed between the British and French Ministers was that (1) the two Governments together should forthwith consider what measure of colonial satisfaction, either territorial or other, might be available as an offer to Germany—an inquiry which according to French estimates would take many months; and (2) if they were able to discover any possible offer in that sense, that the two Governments should submit the possibility to all the other interested parties (The League of Nations, Belgium, Portugal, Japan, etc.) to be considered as one element of a "general settlement." It was not concealed in French quarters that if the matter ever thus came to the issue of a general conference, the German claim would not be the only claim on the agenda. France would have something to claim of Germany. The League of Nations, disarmament, security, Central Europe, for example, were matters that exercised the French mind.

In regard to Central Europe it was agreed that M. Delbos, when he reached Prague in the course of his projected round tour of Poland, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, should drop a hint on a joint and equal British and French authority to President Beneš, Mr. Hodža, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Krofta, the Foreign Minister, that as a means of destroying any German pretext for action in Central Europe, they should go to the full limit of concession in their treatment of the Sudetendeutschen.

The question of Russia and of the Franco-Soviet Pact was touched on in a secondary sense. M. Chautemps was understood to have made the observation that French opinion was under no illusion about the military weakness of Russia, especially in view of the apparent fact that Comrade Stalin's

army policy was to shoot all the generals, but that in the diplomatic sense there was no alternative to the Franco-Soviet Pact. Germany, Italy and Japan, he said, had just signed their anti-Komintern, i.e. their anti-Russian, Pact. Was it a practical policy, he asked, with his characteristic humour, to drive Russia into the anti-Russian group? But M. Chautemps agreed that as little emphasis as possible should be placed upon the Franco-Soviet Pact. Germany should be allowed to deduce that Russia was not a major factor in Anglo-French policy. When the arrangements were being made, for example, for the visit of M. Delbos to Central Europe, the Russian Ambassadors in Paris and in London were understood to have raised the question of M. Delbos extending his itinerary to include Moscow. The answer given was that such an invitation could not be entertained. It was indeed with one eye on Germany that M. Delbos ostentatiously arranged to visit Warsaw, Bucharest, Belgrade and Prague, and not Moscow.

4. *M. Delbos in Central Europe.*

M. Delbos left Paris on December 2nd to visit the four small Powers who constitute Central Europe proper: Poland, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. His programme was based upon that order of going. His train stopped *en route* in the Schlesischer station in Berlin, where he had fifteen minutes' conversation with Baron von Neurath (December 3rd). He reached Warsaw on the same day and stayed in Poland till December 6th. His formal contact with Marshal Smigly-Rydz, the military leader, and President Moscicki, was no doubt easy enough. His business with Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister, must have been nearly heart-breaking. Colonel Beck is the very resurrection of the Delphic Oracle. He has no choice. The devil and the deep sea have a remarkably neutralising influence on the victim between them. Colonel Beck therefore has spent his long period as Poland's Foreign Minister in blowing hot and blowing cold with grim regularity. He said to M. Delbos: "Each country of course fulfils its own responsibilities within the framework of its aims and historical traditions." M. Delbos had to be content with that sort of thing, and himself took refuge in generalities about "universal appeasement." The Delbos tour had been described in advance as nothing more precise

or less grand than a "tour of friendship." The Czechoslovak aspect of it has been referred to above. The Yugoslav was as difficult as the Polish. On December 6th Mr. Stoyadinović, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, began a series of talks in Rome with Signor Mussolini and Count Ciano. In Berlin the next day it was announced that Mr. Stoyadinović would visit Germany in the following month. That will be the first visit paid to Germany by any Yugoslav Prime Minister.

In short we have had a month's spectacle of German, French, British, Belgian, Italian, Polish, Roumanian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak politicians talking hard to each other about the advisability of their not destroying each other. The reason why they have been thus engaged is that they are all afraid that they may in fact proceed to destroy each other. Diplomacy works on raw and primitive lines.

ITALY LEAVES THE LEAGUE

On December 11th Signor Starace, Secretary of the Fascist Party, announced from the balcony of the Piazza Venezia that Italy had decided to leave the League of Nations. Signor Mussolini then appeared on the balcony and to the frenzy of a rain-sodden crowd gave his reasons why. These extracts from what he said were typical of the scene that was enacted: "The historical decision which the Grand Council has acclaimed and which you have received with your most enthusiastic shouts could not be longer postponed. . . . We have not forgotten, and shall not forget, the opprobrious attempt at economic strangulation of the Italian people perpetrated at Geneva. But some people had thought that at a certain moment the League of Nations would have made a gesture of dutiful reparation. It has not done so. It has not wished to do so. The good intentions of certain Governments vanish as soon as their delegates come into contact with that destructive environment represented by the Geneva Council of fools, manœuvred by turbid occult forces, enemies of our Italy and of our revolution. . . ."

There are now three of the Great Powers, Britain, France and Russia, in the League, and the other four are out: Germany, Japan, Italy and the United States.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

December 14th, 1937.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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LORD HALDANE.*

Sir Frederick Maurice is to be congratulated on his performance of a difficult task. Haldane was so many-sided in his interests and achievements that no biographer could describe them all with the authority of a specialist. But the present volume, which carries us down to his eviction from office in 1915, presents a living picture which will be recognised and welcomed by his friends. Readers of his Autobiography discovered how human he was, and the copious extracts from his daily letters to his wonderful old mother reveal anew the depth of his family affections. He was indeed one of the kindest of men. General Maurice naturally writes with peculiar authority on his creative work at the War Office, but he does justice to the other aspects of a crowded life. Himself a thoughtful Liberal and the head of a great London College, he sympathises both with the statesman and the educational pioneer. "His chief interests throughout his life were his philosophy, higher education, and the law. He provides one of those rare examples of a philosopher who ventured into public life to apply his principles to public affairs." Here is the key to the story of forty years in Parliament. Politics were never envisaged as a career by a man who was primarily a scholar and a thinker, but rather as a means of carrying out far-reaching changes in the organisation of our national life.

* *Haldane, 1856-1915*. By Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice. Faber & Faber. 18s.
VOL. CLIII. 8

Starting with the Scottish background and the initiation into philosophy by the veteran Lotze at Göttingen, we pass to the young lawyer who rapidly made his way at the English bar and entered Parliament at the age of twenty-nine. While co-operating with Asquith, Grey and other young Liberals who looked to Rosebery as their leader after the retirement of Gladstone, he displayed from the outset an independence of party ties which won more recognition in the Unionist camp than gratitude in his own. Though offered the Speakership in 1895 and recognised as one of the ablest men in the House of Commons, he only became a national figure during the troubled period of the Boer War, for he was neither an orator nor a debater of the first rank. It is curious to think of the future ornament of the first Labour Cabinet as the stoutest Liberal champion of the Imperialism of Chamberlain and Milner, and indeed as the supporter of the deplorable experiment of Chinese labour in the Transvaal, which was too much for his closest political friends. Rosebery was the darling of the gods, but he was neither a reliable leader nor fundamentally a Liberal, and those who tried to bring him back after his retirement in 1896 lived to realise that they had put their money on the wrong horse. Haldane's unlimited confidence in Milner, which led to an invitation to go and help him in 1900, proved equally misplaced. The Balliol highbrow was the last man in the world to deal with the slow-moving and suspicious Kruger; and his lack of the higher statesmanship, in which patience in negotiation and magnanimity in victory are essential elements, ended by disenchanting his few Liberal admirers.

If Haldane over-valued Rosebery and Milner, he underestimated the solid worth and native shrewdness of Campbell-Bannerman until he became his colleague in the Cabinet formed at the end of 1905. The Liberal leader, himself an old Minister of War who retained his interest in the army to the end, quickly discovered that Haldane's work at the War Office was of cardinal importance. Though both were Scotsmen, the lover of French literature had little in common with the student of Hegel, the biographer of Schopenhauer and the Gifford lecturer. Yet the old animosity completely disappeared. "Both Haldane and Grey admitted that they had been wrong, and they served him with a loyalty which in the end turned to affection."

If anybody still doubts that, in the words of Lord Haig, Haldane was the greatest Secretary of War that England ever had, he should read General Maurice's expert account of his reforms. He won not only the confidence but the affection of the soldiers, who stood by him when ignorant civilians during the World War hunted him out of public life on account of his alleged pro-German sympathies. "I am enjoying myself hugely," he wrote to Alfred Spender at the beginning of his course. "The work of thinking out and executing organisation delights me. My Generals are like angels." Such different men as Lord Morley and H. G. Wells have complained that his mind lacked clarity, and no one would deny his subtlety. But during his six years at the War Office everything was thought out in advance, and every change fitted neatly into his comprehensive scheme of national defence. It is pleasant to learn of his friendly private relations with Lord Roberts, whose scheme for conscription he rejected as impracticable and dangerous. The steady support of Edward VII was known to us all at the time, but it is only now that we realise how much affection and gratitude the King felt for his Minister of War.

Our knowledge of the Haldane Mission in 1912 is enlarged by the long and vivid letter to his mother written in the train on the way home from Berlin. What two men could do to bridge the gulf was done by Bethmann Hollweg and Haldane, but they could not work miracles. Though Germany was indeed his spiritual home, as he remarked to a German professor in 1913, he had no illusions as to her growing strength and as to the need of preparation, not only on land and sea but in the offices of Whitehall, for the struggle which he strove in vain to avoid. He unhesitatingly supported Grey's policy in 1914; it was he who set in motion the military machine he had created; and it was he who advised the appointment of Kitchener to the War Office on the ground that no other man commanded such public confidence. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and General Maurice is not sparing in praise. Haldane's supreme service was to create an Expeditionary Force which was able to concentrate in France in fifteen days. "Our presence at Mons saved the French armies from envelopment. Within three weeks the same Expeditionary Force decided the issue in the first battle of the Marne, and foiled the long-prepared

German plan of campaign in the West. Haldane's organisation of the Expeditionary Force had saved us." No wonder that his biographer declares on the last page of the book that his dismissal from office was far more than a personal injustice and that it was a national tragedy. Happily his services to the nation were to be renewed when the war was over.

Miss Haldane's delightful *Reminiscences*,* published at the same time as the official biography of her brother, should be read as a pendant; for many of the scenes, events and actors described in the larger work reappear in the smaller, seen through the spectacles of a clever and warm-hearted woman. There is not an ill-natured word in the record of a busy and useful life, broadening out from its Scottish background till it embraces many aspects of England, the Empire and the world. Miss Haldane, like her brothers, is a practical idealist, equally at home in writing the biography of Descartes, in work for women, in political elections, in entertaining thinkers and statesmen. Her affectionate pride in Lord Haldane, her devotion to her mother, her snapshots of Asquith, Grey, Morley, Churchill, Rosebery and many other celebrities, her capacity to move with the times without shedding the fundamental pieties: these and other topics and qualities go to the making of a book which contains a good deal of history and wisdom in a very readable form. The closing pages, entitled *Looking Backward*, summarise the debit and credit side of the balance-sheet. That tradition and authority count for so much less than half a century ago means at once wider opportunities for self-realisation and increased risks of shipwreck for the young and inexperienced. G. P. G.

"CIVITAS DEI."

Mr. Lionel Curtis, having surveyed the history of human civilisation in his first two volumes, has now published the third and concluding volume of his *Civitas Dei*.† In this last book he makes confession of his own personal faith and applies it to the present position of the world and to its future security and progress. For this twofold reason, therefore, the book merits careful attention and its contribution to the most important problem of our times is both welcome and important.

* *From One Century to Another*. Maclehose. 12s. 6d.

† *Civitas Dei*, Vol. iii. By Lionel Curtis. Macmillan. 5s. net.

In presence of the existing confusion, Mr. Curtis believes "that a path through the thickets of life can always be found by first deciding what is the ultimate goal we are trying to reach." The answer to this question can only be found by apprehending "the ultimate reality of the universe." Hence the author makes at the outset a confession of faith. For him the distinction between right and wrong is fundamental and men are endowed with the reason that can distinguish between them and the freedom that can choose between them. This leads to the conclusion that men are the creation "of God as goodness personified, as personality on the infinite scale" (p. 19). Goodness, however, is "something creative," and this implies that God is creative, that men are creative and that the world is in process of creation under the supremacy of God and through the co-operation of men, both with Him and with one another. What then is the divine purpose with which men are to co-operate? Mr. Curtis finds the answer in Jesus of Nazareth and in His command "Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect"—a command, which is "in substance a promise" (p. 24). Hence Love is the key-note struck for human life and this comes to mean such overcoming of selfishness, both in individuals and in nations, as will ultimately lead to the establishment of a Commonwealth of Mankind. This being, in brief, the author's faith he proceeds to apply it to the existing state of the world. The excessive cult of nationalism is obviously hostile to the establishment of a universal commonwealth, and the weakness of the League of Nations is due to the fact that it rests upon the basis of nationalism, instead of transcending it. Thus Mr. Curtis is led on to propound the following two questions.

Can the progress of civilisation continue beyond the level it has now reached, or indeed maintain that level unless or until the ultimate allegiance of all human beings is rendered to one sovereignty?

The second and more practical question is :

Is the realisation of a world commonwealth conceivable unless or until two or more national commonwealths have succeeded in merging their national commonwealths into one international sovereignty? (p. 102).

Having answered both these questions in the sense of his main contention, Mr. Curtis suggests that only the British Commonwealth of Nations can lead the way, that Australia and New Zealand are best fitted to take the initiative, and

that this, once achieved, will draw to itself the adhesion of other nations until the final goal is reached.

Whatever may be thought of the details, the ideal thus presented is noble, and, in the judgment of the present reviewer, is essentially sound. It presents the objective towards which the hopes and efforts of men shall be directed, though the way be long and arduous. The book should, therefore, be studied by all those who are concerned for the maintenance of the League of Nations and for the well-being, as well as the security, of mankind.

In commending this study, a concluding comment should be made in regard to the author's confession of faith. Mr. Curtis declares his disbelief of any "supernatural revelation," and insists that human freedom and rationality involve fruitful "guesses" at the meaning of Reality. He also emphatically protests against the view that "miracles" can furnish any attestation of truth. Yet again and again he treats the guesses of faith as due to some kind of divine revelation (e.g. p. 21). This being so, it is apparently only against the word "supernatural" that he protests, and this becomes a matter rather for philosophic discussion than for practical concern. Yet, if any such revelation as Mr. Curtis acknowledges has been given, intuition must lie beneath mere guessing, and give a firmer assurance of truth than guesswork can supply. The crude view that miracles can give certification of truth has long been abandoned by Christian thinkers. This, however, does not mean the hard-and-fastness of a materialist conception of the nature and order of the universe, nor does it shut out the belief that the power of spirit over matter exceeds that of our ordinary experience and that this power may be and has been manifested in the lives of the greatest spiritual personalities of history; above all, in the life of our Lord Jesus Christ.

J. S. L.

THE JEWS IN PALESTINE.*

Great Britain and Palestine is a candid and vigorous book by Mr. Herbert Sidebotham, who is more widely known as "Scrutator" and "A Student of Politics" in the *Sunday Times*. He has taken an active interest in the question since the war, when in 1916 as a member of the British-Palestine

* *Great Britain and Palestine*. By Herbert Sidebotham. Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

Committee he urged the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine as a vital safeguard to British security in the Mediterranean and the Near East. This view recurs in his book, which is thus "Zionist in its sentiment" though "not written from the Jewish point of view." Since, however, in the author's opinion the aims of Zionism and the needs of Imperial policy coincide, his work becomes in effect a strong statement of the Jewish case. Incidentally he acknowledges much assistance from the well-known Zionist leader, Mr. J. L. Cohen, who has written the chapters upon the post-war Jewish achievement in Palestine.

Much of the early argument is devoted to the nature of the British pledges and in particular to the events culminating in the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent creation of the Mandate. Mr. Sidebotham takes the view, recently endorsed by the Royal Commission, that the Promise actually contemplated the eventual emergence of a Jewish commonwealth. That this was repudiated in the Churchill Memorandum was due, in the author's opinion, not only to Arab opposition but largely to British war-weariness and anti-imperialist sentiment. In stressing the Jewish claims, he treats as of less importance the rights assured to the Arabs under the Mandate than the positive obligation of creating the National Home. He would appear to ground Jewish priority upon the huge existing areas of Arab independence and in particular upon the Jews' greater economic capacity. There is, of course, no doubt as to the immense economic achievement of the Jews in Palestine during the past fifteen years. The principal facts and claims, which are well known, are set out concisely with force and lucidity by Mr. Cohen. The country's economic absorptive capacity, the existing test for immigration, is being increased with great rapidity and Mr. Cohen envisages a potential increase of 8,000,000 over the total existing population of 1,300,000. Admittedly the Arabs themselves benefit economically from such expansion, though it is noticeable that their wages for unskilled labour remain half those of Jewish workers. In Mr. Sidebotham's opinion, the Mandatory should primarily promote the "keen progress that should exhibit the practical benefits of Zionism for all the races of Palestine." He declares it "a false view of democratic or liberal principle which holds that because a race or a nation happens to occupy a certain territory, that

territory is its own for all time to make or mar as it will." No race has an absolute right to decide its future at the expense of another with more to give the world.

Thus upon grounds that are not altogether dissimilar from those which have been the excuse for Japanese and Italian aggression, the author attacks the record of the Palestine administration. If the Arab fears of Jewish domination are not to be reasonably safeguarded then there is substance in the view that the Mandatory's duties are not inherently contradictory. Two further arguments are advanced. "An honest and complete fulfilment of the promise" will serve liberty and peace without the risk of war by freeing millions of Jews from persecution. Secondly a Jewish Palestine, allied to Great Britain, may effectively secure the safety of the Suez Canal and provide a base for the British fleet; both of even greater importance since the Abyssinian campaign and the potential hostility of Italy. Is then partition compatible with these twin and complementary needs of Jewry and British policy?

While the Arabs are unalterably opposed to partition, Mr. Sidebotham considers that the Jews may be reconciled to a modified scheme. The fact that the existence of a Jewish State, however small, will raise the international standing of Jewry as a whole is undoubtedly attractive. But "the main argument from the Jewish point of view reduces itself to a question of sentiment and of boundaries." How many Jews, and within what period, will the new State be able to absorb? The Royal Commission has recommended for the whole of Palestine a total immigration during the next five years of 60,000 which is less than that for 1936 alone. Under the partition, of course, the Jews will be the sole judges of their absorptive capacity, and Mr. Sidebotham considers possible an annual immigration of 50,000, if the new frontiers can be "so drawn as to support ultimately a Jewish population of 2,000,000." In discussing a modification of the proposed boundaries, he urges, for example, that the Jews be allowed at least a part of Zion, if only rights in the new Jewish area of Jerusalem. Between the Sea of Galilee and Baisan the suggested frontier runs slightly to the west of the Jordan excluding the huge hydro-electric works, which serve all Palestine, and also some of the most notable Jewish colonies. The author urges rectification of the boundary right up to the Jordan not only in fairness to Jewish enterprise but also as a

strategic necessity against invasion from the east. In his view, Arab Palestine is likely to be absorbed into a general, and possibly hostile, Arab Federation which itself may become a target for Turkish expansion. Britain should reduce her Arab commitments to a minimum and make of the proposed Jewish State a strong well-protected entity which could safeguard our Imperial communications. Under such conditions partition may be justified. The author's arguments are forcibly put if they do not always compel assent.

CHURCH AND STATE.

The problem of Church and State is eternal, and Don Luigi Sturzo presents us with a singularly well-proportioned view of their relationship from the days of the Roman Empire to our own.* Of the quantity given in his 647 pages for fifty francs, there cannot be the slightest doubt. Of the quality there is just as little. The bibliography is good, the index adequate, the table of contents thorough, and the translation of Mlle Juliette Bertrand flows from first page to last. There is, however, hardly a footnote to direct one to the sources of the author's abundant learning, a matter which might be remedied in the second edition. He founded and led the Partito Popolare which played an important part till Mussolini suppressed it and all other parties but his own. Thus his book possesses the merits of the man of action as well as those of the man of thought. It is a usual combination in our own land, unusual abroad. For this reason among others, this fine volume deserves ample consideration at the hands of all who care for the future of a free civilisation.

Apart from our own private beliefs we support the claims of the Church against all forms of State of the type of Hitler, Stalin, or even Mussolini, on the ground that the competition between Church and State, which is a feature of our generation, affords the stronger chance for ultimate truth to emerge. If the world is divided into circles, covering between them the whole ground with the Church and State both in existence, it does not matter greatly whether the former gain or lose here and there to the latter. As long as there is an alternative circle, tyranny, whether black or red, will be an impossibility. What we should resist to the death is any attempt to make

**L'Église et L'État*. By Luigi Sturzo. Paris, Les éditions Internationales. 50 francs.

either circle cover all the ground, for if it does liberty will sooner or later die. With ideas like these we began to peruse this illuminating volume. We saw much to confirm, much to modify, and much to deepen them. There is a thorough critical examination of the Cæsaro-papalism of the Roman Empire, and the survey of this dyarchy of Church and State is worth careful study.

The author brings out anew with fresh power the medieval view that every citizen was a Churchman and every Churchman a citizen, an angle of approach quite evident in Hooker in the sixteenth century and even in Dr. Arnold in the nineteenth. With insight he unfolds the work of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation in altering the medieval view. Incidentally there is a thoughtful account of the rise of intolerance to be followed by its decline and then the very gradual rise of tolerance. The man of thought like John Milton and the man of action like William of Orange appear. He makes us feel that we are travelling along an old road, yet a road from which we are continually seeing new scenery. The last part of the book is concerned with the growth of the lay State, and here too we feel conscious that old names are being seen from a new and true angle. In the closing chapter there is a summary not so much of results as of points of view, and this is one of the most pregnant portions of a volume that will demand many readings before its full value is extracted. Does one wish to grasp the attitude of Jacques Maritain that the Church should purify and penetrate the State? Does one wish to grasp the view of Étienne Gilson that the Church should stand apart for the present in order to conquer in the future? Does one wish to grasp the attitude of Maurice Blondel in the orientation of modern culture? It is all here. Does one, above all, wish to grasp the view of so sincere and noble a spirit as that of Don Luigi Sturzo himself? It too is here, and it is the finest thing in a fine book.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA.

Readers of Professor Bernadotte Schmitt's well-known volumes *The Coming of the War* are aware that he is one of the

* *The Annexation of Bosnia*, 1908-9. By Bernadotte E. Schmitt. Cambridge University Press, 1937. 12s. 6d.

greatest authorities on the history of Europe at the opening of the present century. His latest work provides the first complete and authoritative account of the Bosnian crisis. He uses the whole mass of published evidence, official and unofficial, and weaves it into an intelligible narrative. The opening chapter sketches the background of the story from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to the Young Turk revolution of 1908, which decided the Ballplatz to act. The brief chapter on the historic conversations of Aehrenthal and Iswolsky on September 15th-16th summarises the conflicting evidence without reaching final conclusions. For while Aehrenthal's full report was published in 1930, Iswolsky's version lies unpublished in the Moscow archives. Whether Aehrenthal intentionally deceived him, as he always asserted, or whether Iswolsky, realising the failure of his plans, lied to the world, we cannot be sure. If the latter had fully realised that the Delegations would be informed in the following month, he would hardly have gone for a leisurely tour through Europe before opening his mind to his friends in Paris and London.

The complicated story of the six months' crisis inaugurated by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of October is told in detail, and it is not altogether edifying. In the words of our author, two ambitious and unscrupulous men planned to take advantage of the Young Turk revolution to carry out their far-reaching plans. Aehrenthal reached his goal, the bloodless annexation of the two Turkish provinces which had been *de facto* Austrian for a generation, and the recognition of the juridical change by the Powers. Iswolsky failed to secure his *quid pro quo*, the opening of the Turkish Straits to Russian warships; for England, at that time the champion of the Young Turks, stood in the way. Henceforth he was a broken man, nursing his grievance and dreaming of revenge. Aehrenthal was clearly the more skilful diplomatist, and for the moment Austria's prestige rose as much as that of Russia declined. But it was a Pyrrhic victory, for the struggle sowed seeds of animosity in Russia and Serbia which ripened to harvest in 1914.

Austria's settlement with Turkey and Turkey's settlement with Bulgaria are fully described, but no part of the story is related in such detail as the Austro-Serb crisis in the spring of 1909. When Iswolsky reluctantly informed Belgrade that Russia was still too exhausted by the Japanese war to fight,

it was widely believed that the danger was over. Serbia's feelings, however, were far too deeply wounded to surrender at once, and for the first time during the long crisis Europe was brought to the verge of war. Grey's efforts to build a bridge over which Serbia could retreat are justly praised, though Russia's inability to fight gave Aehrenthal final control of the situation. In a final chapter Professor Schmitt shows how much Iswolsky had lost and how little on balance Aehrenthal had gained. Both made bad miscalculations. The former let Russia down, the latter unwittingly tightened the bonds both of the Triple Entente and the Russo-Serb partnership. The German sword, confessed Bülow, had been thrown into the scale, and just for that reason other swords were sharpened. Aehrenthal died too soon to realise that his efforts to rejuvenate the Monarchy were in vain. The European structure was too fragile to bear such shocks. The annexation of Bosnia was not a crime, but it was a great mistake.

G. P. G.

THE CREATOR OF "LITTLE ARTHUR."*

/ Mrs. Gotch, whose charming *Mendelssohn and his Friends in Kensington* embodied letters of the Horsley family, now publishes an equally attractive study of a relative by marriage of theirs and of herself, whose latter days were also spent in Kensington, in intimacy with Caroline Fox and the Holland House circle. Born in 1785, Maria Dundas had been an intrepid traveller for the greater part of her life, visiting India, South Africa and South America, as well as several European countries. She loved being at sea, and her first husband, Captain Graham, was an officer in the Royal Navy. Few Englishwomen of that day can have had such experiences—fording rivers, facing revolutions, disregarding a severe earthquake in Chile while ministering to a consumptive cousin, acting as instructress to a little Brazilian princess, enduring the endless discomforts of travel—all with cheerful equanimity, in spite of constant and at times serious ill-health. She records her first banana at Funchal; "it is agreeable, but wants the lightness and spirit one wishes for in fruit."

Maria's tastes and interests were many and varied—

* *Maria, Lady Callcott*. By Rosamund Brunel Gotch. Murray. 12s. 1937.

botany, painting (some of her sketches are reproduced here), reading and authorship, languages (she studied Persian, Icelandic, and Chinese, besides speaking the usual European tongues), while from childhood history was evidently a passion with her. If her *History of Spain* and sundry other works are now forgotten, her autobiography, reminiscences and journals, upon which Mrs. Gotch draws, make fascinating reading, while *Little Arthur*, "the little book on which her fame rests," is evergreen, and has recently appeared in revised and extended form. But Maria was no mere pedant, she was a lively observer, and a warm-hearted woman. She showed a motherly care for the midshipmen aboard and for poor children at home, and a real concern for slaves. All her life she was in contact with interesting people; as a child, with French *émigrés*, and with elders who retailed anecdotes of Walpole, Johnson and the Burneys; as a young woman, she admits enjoying a chat with the formidable Jeffrey of the *Edinburgh Review*. In Rome, she was intimate with the artist group—Eastlake, Joseph Severn, Gibson, and Thorwaldsen, and her second marriage, to Augustus Callcott, R.A., brought her other such friendships as they travelled and studied art together. Readers of this book will feel grateful to Mrs. Gotch for admitting them too to her acquaintance.

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

For lovers of the East there could hardly be a more fascinating book than Miss Freya Stark's *Baghdad Sketches*.* She has such a happy appreciation of all the beauties and the virtues, the atmosphere and the religious emotions of the Arabs, and of the Persians; such a happy way of looking past drawbacks which would make most men and women shrink; indeed, she has genius for friendship with great and small in Eastern lands, so that she gets down beside them in a way impossible and unthought of by English governors and administrators. The sketches in this book have been written at different times, the earlier ones when the author lived in the native quarter of Baghdad, "which is past being improved," so that "what was written as gossip can soon be read as history." "Baghdad is filled now with streets of small villas that take all the zest out of one's life while one looks at them."

Murray. 12s. 6d.

There are accounts of visits to ancient ruins buried in sand far up in the north of Iraq, and to old, old shrines where pilgrims still throng, Kahdimain in the month of Ramadhan, where she was taken disguised as an Arab woman. One of the most vivid experiences is of an evening during the Ten Days of 'Ashure when the Shi'as in Islam mourn for the death of Husain. The whole tragedy is presented realistically. In Kuwait the wailing gatherings are held in private. This occasion was a meeting of women (there is a photograph of this) conducted by "four ladies" who stood beating their breasts, the congregation thumping with them; real weeping shook the crowd as they told the story. The end was not seen, as the visitors left to escape observation.

One of the most interesting sketches is of a journey to Kuwait, the stay in the town, then in a tent on the edge of the desert, and finally in the island of Failichah. Delightful descriptions of the sea, of the boats and the coast traffic on the Persian Gulf are of last year's visit, where little is yet changed, in spite of the aerodrome close to the city wall. "In Kuwait you are still at leisure to notice what a charming thing good manners are." But oil will come and "a jaunty imitation of the West may take the place of its desert refinement." The book has fifty-seven excellent photographs besides some drawings by E. N. Prescott. One of the buildings *not* photographed is the new British Agency in Kuwait where "everything about it is just a little wrong." Why? when everything is ready to the architect's hand, "the delicate use of windows, the simple turrets that hold the corners of the palaces, where shafts of wind are caught for summer coolness; the inner courts and carved wooden porticoes, the mud-built, pointed archways, whose recesses fill the town with patterns of lovely shade. All is there: it needs only the seeing eye." All who have read Miss Stark's earlier books and know her bright and humorous writing will turn to these sketches with eagerness and will not be disappointed.

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The illustrations are without doubt the most striking feature of Mr. Peter Quennell's new book, *Victorian Panorama*.^{*} He has brought together more than 150 early photographs which depict in a remarkable manner the outward semblance of many aspects of Victorian life. The daguerrotype and photograph first came into widespread and effective use in the 'forties and Mr. Quennell reproduces a selection by such pioneers as Fox Talbot, Nadir and in particular Octavius Hill. If these Victorian photographs frequently lack the clarity of modern work they impart a vivid sense of reality to their period and form an appropriate background to Mr. Quennell's commentary on Victorian life. His sketches are lightly written in an arresting style which recaptures some of the outstanding features of, *inter alia*, Victorian

^{*} Batsford. 7s. 6d.

London, family life, the stage, fashion and taste. The last is largely based upon the exhibits at the Great Exhibition of 1851.

* * * * *

In *Science and Music** Sir James Jeans has provided us with a fascinating study of the science of sound which is understandable to a large extent by the ordinary reader. The vibrations of air, the sound-curves of the human voice, of the tuning fork and of pianoforte tone, of flutes and oboes as compared with saxophones are all illustrated by photographs which largely tell the story of the book. Other diagrams are of eddies of air, and a very curious series shows the eddies formed at the lip of a flue organ-pipe, the motion of the air being made visible by mixing fine smoke with it. In an inquiry into Conditions for Good Hearing it has been found "that there is a certain 'optimum' period of reverberation at which practically all cultivated listeners agree that music sounds at its best." This leads on to a discussion of the Music Room and the Ideal Concert Hall, and the factors for calculating the sound absorption of the walls. A final chapter deals with hearing and the "tones created by the ear."

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A new and extensive illustrated work on *Suffolk Churches and Their Treasures*† has been produced by that well-known authority, Mr. H. Munro Cautley, who has been for more than twenty-six years Surveyor to the Diocese of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich. Suffolk, of course, is renowned for the wealth of her parish churches, which represent a remarkable variety and mixture of architectural styles, apart from features of a definitely regional character. Mr. Cautley's book should thus make a more than local appeal. He has drawn up a complete list of every Suffolk church, describing briefly what is to be found of ecclesiological interest.

In addition, and of great interest, are the careful and instructive sections dealing with church structure and the materials used, particularly woodwork, and with the ancient fittings and furnishings; all of which are illustrated by more than four hundred photographs taken by the author. It is a merit of this work that Mr. Cautley has seen personally every place and thing in existence which he describes. Mention may be made of his brief historical sketch of church building in Suffolk and the destruction of Church fittings with the Reformation. He points out that "the terrible record" of the Puritans "doesn't compare with the earlier period of destruction" initiated by Thomas Cromwell, upon whom the greater blame is laid. Incidentally he is not slow to condemn the "perfect cyclone of destruction" by misguided enthusiasts in the nineteenth century.

* Cambridge University Press. 8s. 6d.

† Batsford. £1 1s. net.

The Dragonflies of the British Isles,* by Cynthia Longfield, is of outstanding interest, because it is the first book to appear on British dragonflies for thirty-six years. Moreover, it contains an excellent key to the identification of species, and for the first time suggests English names for all our species in the hope of popularising this little-known group of insects. The author points out in what directions information is lacking and appeals for the protection of rare species. There are life-sized photographs of the forty-two British dragonflies together with photographs of the larval stage, and many drawings of wings, heads and bodies. Habits, time of appearance and distribution (in counties and abroad) are fully treated in a little book crammed with information that is presented in an easily accessible manner.

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Mr. C. B. Ford has written a delightful book on *The Coloured Counties. A Short Survey of the English Landscape and its Antiquities*.† It is with the actual scenery of England that he is concerned so that cities, towns and villages receive but passing attention. The result is a true picture of the English landscape with its infinite variety, into which man has fitted his architecture. Now in recent years comes the threat of general spoliation of the countryside with ribbon development and villa building. In this book the author has drawn for some material on his earlier work, *The Landscape of England*, now out of print. An important feature of the present volume lies in its ninety-two illustrations. For it is believed to be the first work of its kind to be entirely illustrated with colour photographs. In each case Dufay colour photography has been used, and was chosen as likely to be "the most truthful and artistic in its effects, and the most suitable for photogravure reproduction." There is no doubt as to the success of these illustrations; in fact many of them give the impression of being water-colours rather than photographs. Mr. Ford devotes a short final chapter to "The colour of English landscape and its photography."

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Sir Stephen Gaselee has contributed an introduction to an interesting collection of forty *Early English Recipes*.‡ They have been selected from the fifteenth-century Harleian MSS. by Miss Margaret Webb, who has illustrated them with a series of delightful woodcuts. Miss Webb has retained, with few exceptions, the original spelling and has added notes to explain difficult words, such as "eyroun" for eggs and "cofyn" for pie-crust, and the names of spices. As Sir Stephen points out, the recipes contain a profusion of spices, but they are not confined to meat dishes. "Störion in Brothe," a sturgeon delicacy, contains no less than seven varieties. The preparations are all described with care and detail and, says Sir Stephen, are "not above the intelligence of the ordinary housewife." Some of them might well be tasted and enjoyed at this festive season.

* Warne. 7s. 6d. net.

† Batsford. 8s. 6d. net.

‡ Cambridge University Press. 2s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

FEBRUARY 1938.

TOWARDS CHANGE IN FRANCE.

FOR more than twenty months the French have lived under the menace of grave social upheavals and of war. There have been, almost without respite, strikes which have a revolutionary tinge, and the first two governments of the Front Populaire completely failed to suppress a multitude of audacious illegalities. The Blum-Chautemps Government was in a hurry to apply social reforms which, for want of technical skill and political acumen, seriously upset French economy; and the Chautemps-Blum Government, though ostensibly practising the "pause," has not fundamentally changed the unhappy *équivoque* of a country which has, even now, an overwhelming majority in favour of bourgeois traditions, but is nevertheless dominated by a Communist and Socialist minority.

The two Governments remained virtually unchanged since those hectic days of June 1936, when the Socialists, supported by the Radicals, and impelled by the Communists, took office. Vincent Auriol, the Finance Minister, who alternately threatened and cajoled, frightened capital out of France; he devaluated once and made a second devaluation inevitable before he was compelled to make way for a more orthodox and reassuring financier, Georges Bonnet; whereupon he was sent to try his hand in the Ministry of Justice. Such a key post as the Ministry of the Interior was left to Marx Dormoy, who has shown himself to be a Socialist who does not mean to spare the "enemies" of the proletariat. Paul Faure, who is the real leader of the Socialists, kept his position in the Government, and made declarations altogether at variance with its "official" policy. The Confédération Générale du Travail admitted the Communists into its ranks, and its chief, Léon Jouhaux, went to Moscow to make terms with the Profintern. When the vital public services, on the eve of the holiday season, struck without warning, M. Chautemps, feeling that the public was ready to revolt, took up a firm attitude, and affirmed he would not negotiate until work was resumed. But three of his Socialist Ministers nevertheless

negotiated, with the result that the strikers returned to work, stating that they had received Ministerial promises that all their demands would be granted. It may well be asked where exactly was to be found the Government. Was it represented by MM. Chautemps, Bonnet, Daladier? Or was it represented by MM. Blum, Faure, Dormoy? Or was it in the C.G.T.? Or in the Communist Party? There is a strange and perilous ambiguity that must be cleared up before many more months have passed. It is an ambiguity that has cost France dear from the social and the economic viewpoints, and that has doubtless lost France valuable friendships in the foreign field.

The question has never been plainly asked or answered: What is the ultimate purpose of the Front Populaire? To what does its policy tend? Does it mean to preserve existing institutions? Does it intend to create a better order of society, to remove abuses, to improve the lot of the masses, within the framework of the capitalist system? Or does it intend to undermine that system and eventually to replace it by Marxist conceptions? Does it hope to employ democratic methods? Or, as some members of the Left have repeatedly threatened, does it favour such dictatorial and "totalitarian" methods as the control of the press and of currency and the suppression of rival parties? Obviously one section of the Parliamentary majority would have to answer in one sense, and another section in an entirely different sense. Indeed, one section of the Cabinet would have to answer in one sense, and the other section in the other. Although there are in the Radical Party, and even among the Radical Ministers, men who are quite as extreme in their sympathies as the Communists, the Radicals, on the whole, represent the conservative element; and are—in theory at least—opposed to the many illegalities which have marked the past year or two. The Socialists, too, or at least some of them, despite their demagogic tendencies, appear to have developed a consciousness of their responsibilities, and would prefer order and prosperity. But the Communists are equally members of the Front Populaire, and it is agreed that if the Communists oppose the Government the Front Populaire will be irretrievably ruptured. It follows that those who are not prepared to break up the Front Populaire must surrender to the Communists whenever the Communists think it good tactics to insist on a particular measure. On the other hand,

the Communists derive too many advantages from the present situation lightly to force the Government into a position in which it would be obliged to say No. In the meantime there is little doubt that the Communists are taking up points of vantage, and that the Government is unable to check their preparations, under pain of a general collapse of the electoral and Parliamentary combination.

It has been freely alleged—though on the truth of these allegations I do not pronounce—that there exists a well-considered scheme, imposed by Dimitrov, by which the Communists expect to secure a predominant place in France. Details have been printed in various French publications, and a deputy endeavoured—though without success—to bring these activities to the notice of the Chamber. Nobody wants to listen to these allegations: they are too embarrassing. One of the accused Cagoulards supplied the Juge d’Instruction with particulars of a contemplated *putsch* which had, he said, been communicated to the authorities before his own arrest—and, indeed, had precipitated his own arrest. The defence of the Cagoulards is that their object in acquiring arms was merely to oppose such a *putsch* in conjunction with the authorities; and they express surprise that while the police have fallen upon them, they have left the Communists who have, they pretend, accumulated stocks of arms in France instead of forwarding them to Spain, severely alone.* Certainly it is not for the onlooker to take sides in such a controversy, which will, it is to be presumed, be judged sooner or later by the Courts; but it may properly be observed that the Front Populaire Governments, in accepting the Communists as an essential part of their organisation, necessarily tied their own hands. They could not logically denounce or molest their own allies. To politics everything had to be sacrificed. It is certainly hard to believe that the Communists have not made the most of a situation which is so favourable to their enterprise immediate or remote. The number of professing Communists

* Far graver, and indeed sensational, charges of terrorism have, since this article was written, been made against certain imprisoned persons, and although it is necessary to discriminate between those of the accused who had, perhaps, only the intention of helping the authorities, and those who, misguided, have committed veritable outrages, it is impossible to refrain from pointing out the moral: which is that the opposition should always oppose, and be encouraged to oppose, in Parliament, and in public meetings, instead of abdicating, and thus provoking the organisation of occult associations which may easily fall into crime.

in France is, perhaps, not great, but the influence of a few determined agitators on the masses should never be underrated, and the Spanish Civil War stirred up much Communist feeling. Unquestionably, in many cases, the strikes had a political rather than a professional character; often they were not wanted by the workers, who were, however, obliged meekly to obey instructions from invisible sources. It has been remarked that in all these labour troubles the proportion of foreigners—notably Russians—who have taken a leading part has been remarkably high. M. Chautemps himself qualified the general strike of public services as “suspect.”

To exaggerate the probable consequences of these months of aberration would be to render a disservice to France that is far from my thoughts. On the contrary, I am persuaded that the moment is at hand when a reaction will declare itself against the unhappy conditions which have been imposed upon the country by a union *contre nature*. There are plenty of signs that Frenchmen are becoming aware of the perils which face them at home and abroad. The whole spirit of the Front Populaire was well expressed in its mode of salutation—the clenched fist. The workers were ranged against the rest of the community—though the rest of the community was also in large part composed of workers. That it was time to give a “new deal” to the worker in France cannot be denied by anyone of good faith; nor can it be denied that many employers had been singularly selfish. As for the parties of the Right they were hopelessly at loggerheads, and lamentably inferior to their task of moderation. Their internecine quarrels were notorious. They had no homogeneity. Whatever may be thought of M. Tardieu, he is by far the most able and intelligent man that the Right has thrown up; and he was so disgusted with the groups of which he was the Chief, and which made him Prime Minister on a number of occasions, that he—a fact probably unprecedented in French political annals—voluntarily went out of politics. Even to-day the Centre and the Right offer a most unedifying spectacle of rivalries and disputes. A formation of the Left was, then, altogether legitimate and indeed necessary. The mistake was to extend this formation to include the Communists, who would simply be stultifying themselves if they abandoned their subversive and destructive purpose.

The introduction of the forty-hour week—or rather the

five-day week—however desirable in some respects—was ill-timed and badly effected. There is, of course, much to be said for the principle of reduced hours of labour. But there was no preliminary inquiry into the possibility of the application of a five-day week, without grave inconvenience, in the different branches of industry and commerce. It would seem to be elementary that conditions are not the same in all trades. There are seasonal occupations; a waiter whose work is intermittent and relatively light can hardly be put on the same footing as a miner whose work is heavy and continuous. The confusion that resulted from indiscriminate and hasty legislation was most detrimental to French interests. Together with increases of wages, which have failed to benefit the workers because of the vicious circle of rising prices and falling currency, and many other disabilities placed on the employers, the new laws handicapped French industry. Nobody is really better off, and many people are much worse off; while France has lost something of her substance. There is here an object-lesson in the danger of generous or angry sentiments in politics, uncorrected by careful calculations; the result of legislation of an emotional kind may well be ultimately harmful to those whom it was sought to help. An incredible psychological blunder was likewise made; for whereas in America everybody understands that increased production is, paradoxically, the aim and justification of reduced hours, in France, where the workers have been accustomed to more leisurely methods, reduced hours were taken to mean decreased production. There was no re-education of the workers—or, rather, such re-education as there was consisted in representing work as the enemy, and the employer an unnecessary evil, existing only on sufferance.

Add to these distressing social and economic conditions, which actually, to take one conspicuous instance, permitted the workers on the Paris Exhibition to hold up the Government and to obtain bribes of an exorbitant character, and yet to retard this international manifestation, thus injuring French prestige, add to these things the extravagant expenditure, resulting in the rapid decline of the franc, which already was worth only four sous instead of twenty sous, to the low value of two sous, and it will be appreciated that Frenchmen are beginning to wonder how the Front Populaire can now be converted into the Front National. The "totalitarian"

countries have clearly an enormous advantage over a France which is at enmity with herself. It is plain that France is no longer a centre of diplomatic attraction. Germany and Italy make a strong appeal to Rumania and Yugo-Slavia, as well as to Austria and Hungary. Belgium has denounced her military alliance with France and returned to neutrality. Poland is at best neutral: she is unmistakably opposed to Russia-engendered Communism. It would easily be possible to argue that France has never been less sure of support on the Continent than she is to-day. She has lost Italy, though she has regained Russia whose military value is exceedingly doubtful. Apart from Czecho-Slovakia, it would be difficult to name a reliable Continental ally of France to-day; whereas a few years ago France could have counted on most of the European countries for moral or material help against German aggression. The friendship of Great Britain is, of course, extremely precious, as is the presumed common aim of the United States; but these are not clearly defined in practical terms. Is it not apparent that if Frenchmen could agree in 1938 to their own reconciliation they would be far better able to confront with equanimity the dangers that daily grow darker?

It is certain that political changes are overdue. It is impossible for France to recover unless there is a new alignment of parties, from which, in the opinion of some politicians, the Communists will not necessarily be excluded, and in which the Socialists should certainly figure—on condition that they will extend their hand (not their clenched fist) to those Frenchmen who still hold to traditional French virtues. I have seen France in many difficulties, and I have learned that she is capable of the most surprising efforts when everything appears lost. Such an effort she will, I believe, make once more in 1938. The Front Populaire experiment encountered practically no resistance; the French politicians decided, as I think foolishly, to refrain from direct opposition, and to let it run until its failure was glaring; and, by a curious conspiracy of international circumstances, the real character of the French Front Populaire was almost totally concealed from readers of the popular press in England and the United States, where such a combination, giving exaggerated advantages to the Communists, and operating with amazing crudeness, would never have been tolerated for a moment.

At last eyes begin to open. It is realised, even on the Left,

that French divisions, so disastrous, must be healed. There has been a good deal of plain speaking lately. Pierre-Etienne Flandin recommends concessions all round—concessions not from party to party, but concessions to France.

The French must understand that as they number only forty millions in Europe, they can only maintain their place by their individual worth. The French soil is generous, the French mines are rich, large sums of productive capital are invested in France. What is lacking is good will. It is lamentable that some of the French should be turning towards Communism and others towards an unknown Dictatorship. . . . Discipline is necessary for success, and I hope that 1938 will bring to the French a new ideal of national grandeur, and a government strong enough to serve that ideal alone.

Paul Reynaud also calls attention to the huge block of "totalitarian" states which face a comparatively small France in fermentation. He believes that the French will soon forget their quarrels and become "unanimous." But when? In time to prevent war, or only when the very life of the country is in peril? For it must not be overlooked that the issues of war and peace depend in part on the solidity of France. If France gives the impression of irremediable feebleness, Europe may easily be plunged into war—as indeed, it would sometimes seem, the forces of revolution desire. If, on the contrary, France regains her equilibrium, and a class struggle from which nobody derives the smallest benefit is abandoned, then the prospects of peace will be strengthened.

It is always an ungrateful task to utter salutary truths; but to indicate the prevailing sentiment in France I will quote M. L.-O. Frossard, a politician who has oscillated from the Centre to the Left—or, perhaps I should say, from the Left to the Centre—and who is universally regarded as one of the soundest judges of the political situation:

There are again signs of fever among the working classes which the high cost of living only partly explains. French economy is not restored. Unemployment increases. Small and medium size enterprises are in difficulties. Big industries, like the building trade, seem to be mortally hit. The confusion of international relations adds to the general insecurity. Anything is expected—and particularly the worst. The catastrophe is believed inevitable: a fall of the currency, or European conflagration, or both at the same time. The year 1938 will be a year of liquidation. Will it bring a formation of the Front Populaire intensified by the entry of the Communists in the Government? Shall we see succeeding each other

ephemeral cabinets ? Shall we see a homogeneous Radical cabinet or a homogeneous Socialist cabinet ? Will the Van Zeeland formula be tried, or the formula of Paul Reynaud of national unanimity ? Will the experiences of 1926 and of 1934 be repeated ? Everything is possible. Nothing is certain—except that events do not authorise us to sleep on the uncomfortable pillow of the pause.

It would be possible for me to quote from newspapers of almost every section of French opinion, and to show that there is inquietude, and a demand for other methods than those which have led France, since the last election, to her present position. Take, for example, Gaston Jèze, who is a very well-known Radical authority. Writing in the *Ere Nouvelle*, which is purely Radical, and often expresses the thought of Edouard Herriot, he declares : “ Every discourse in the Senate has been a pitiless denunciation of the policy imposed by the Socialists and the Communists. Never in the last hundred years has France suffered financial, economic and social disaster like that which was inflicted by the Front Populaire, directed by the Socialists and the Communists, in a few months. There are some who even ask, in view of the demoralisation of the masses, how France can rise again. The wave of idleness flows on ; the economic and social disorganisation progresses ; the financial consequences are inevitable. Misery is assured for many years.”

Georges Bonnet, in the course of the budget debates, did not attempt to hide the difficulty and the length of the task before the Finance Minister. “ If we only know how to multiply our claims, we are going to ruin,” he warned. Financial demagoguery, as he called it, has always been a favourite weapon of the extreme parties in France. Some of the Socialists are still clamouring for exchange control—they would break the thermometer which has plainly revealed the fallacies of the policy of the Front Populaire. M. Bonnet will have none of it. If only the French now consent to the drastic remedies of labour and retrenchment, which M. Caillaux advocates, the budget, which has been fixed at under fifty-five milliard francs, would, apart from Treasury needs, be balanced in reality as well as on paper. But the meritorious efforts of M. Bonnet will be nullified if there are strikes and more strikes, if there is continued under-production, if there is unceasing apprehension and unmitigated agitation. The Public Debt has jumped to over five hundred milliard francs.

This year there will have to be large borrowings on the total of which the experts are not in agreement. M. Caillaux put his finger on the malady from which France suffers, when he said that France has come to prefer methods of "facility." She spends more than she earns. Since 1914, he asserted, France has lost half of her patrimony, and it is still dwindling. If one takes the $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Government bonds, one will find that they stood at the terribly low figure of 77.70 in December 1936, and despite the big devaluation of 1937, they had fallen to 73.65 at the end of last December. Or take a typical leading French share—the *Crédit Lyonnais*. Two years ago it stood at 1,695 francs. To-day, when the franc has only half its value of two years ago, the quotation is 1,370 francs!

Unquestionably, after nearly two-years of political passion, France is worse off than she was when the people voted for a new broom, wielded by the Socialists or even the Communists. There had previously been a period of conservatism, of egotism, of incomprehension, and of impotence; the needs of the new industrial order, of the simple workers, had been misunderstood. The *Front Populaire* promised, by some magic method, to bring happiness and prosperity to the neglected workers, and the workers believed the *Front Populaire*. Those who knew better, deliberately chose to stand aside from politics; the education of the masses, they considered, could be effected only by experience. It is now time that the lesson were understood. For, as an able political writer, Marcel Lucain, points out: "The trouble is that the experiment has not taken place in a closed vessel, but in a world which watches us. The trouble is that not merely classes and parties are concerned, but above all the fate of France." He might have added—the destiny of Europe.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

Addendum.—The inevitable has happened since I wrote the above article. The *Front Populaire*, after inflicting the most grievous injury on France, by setting the workers against the community in a spirit of hate, has been broken. It is impossible for me to comment on the vital events which may occur before the month of February. As I write, M. Chautemps is endeavouring to set up a Cabinet more to the Right, and whether he succeeds or not, public opinion, as distinct from Socialist and Communist agitation, is anxiously awaiting an

overdue reconciliation of good Frenchmen. It should be noted that the Radical Prime Minister deliberately and voluntarily affronted the Communists in the course of a night debate, well knowing that the Socialists were bound to take the part of their allies the Communists. M. Chautemps had previously shown patience, not to say weakness, but the Communists once too often employed their favourite tactics of ostentatiously permitting the Government to live, while criticising and discrediting it. "Vote against us and be damned!" was, in effect, the response of M. Chautemps, though he was far too polite to put it so brutally. Thereupon M. Léon Blum and his fellow Socialists resigned. In dudgeon, they opposed their veto to M. Georges Bonnet, the able Radical Finance Minister, when he was called upon to form a Cabinet to save the remaining two sous of the sadly diminished franc. All kinds of committees and clubs, inside and outside Parliament, including various sections of the Confédération Générale du Travail, passed resolutions, and in some cases issued threats of a general strike if the Extremists were not put in the Government. M. Blum, himself apparently alarmed at the ravages of the Front Populaire, offered to become the MacDonald of France, and to extricate the country from the mess in which inconsiderate and incompetent legislation, permitted illegalities, and unchecked demagoguery, had landed it. He was actually willing to form a National Front! He would accept the Communists, but also the men of the Centre, in his Cabinet! He appealed to M. Paul Reynaud to conduct finances, although M. Reynaud has expressed himself pessimistically and severely condemned the Front Populaire. Naturally, M. Reynaud pointed out that if Communists were admitted, there must also be admitted men of the Right, good patriots like M. Louis Marin; otherwise the scales would be grossly tipped to the Left. M. Blum failed. The Socialists by this time were openly for the control of exchange—that is to say, for the beginning of a Dictatorship and the violation of their monetary pact with Great Britain and the United States. . . . M. Chautemps was then called back. What will now happen? The wizard's apprentice could release an evil spirit from the bottle, but he could not put it back. The Front Populaire has stirred up forces of violence which may be hard to dominate. Yet France must choose between unity and disaster. As I write, I can only hope for the best.—S. H.

ENGLAND AND GERMANY.

LAST July, at the time of the mutual long-range Press bombardment on the Spanish issue, I received a rather sad letter from a German friend containing this passage : " It is simply incomprehensible to me and certainly to all my countrymen that the British Government and its Press should have adopted such an amazing attitude towards the *Deutschland* incident and the torpedo attack on the *Leipzig*. One way and another our rather sentimental longing for a friendly, a sort of cousinly relationship with England looks like being turned into a bitterness which will be very difficult to get rid of."

I don't suppose that any Englishman with personal knowledge of post-war Germany will fail to understand what my friend meant. As Lord Noel-Buxton pointed out here last month, an indefinable but none the less real sentiment of friendship towards England and the English has persisted among all classes of the German people since the War and made holidays or residence in Germany a very pleasant experience. Politically, this sentiment generally expressed itself as a feeling that the great mistake of William II's régime had been to antagonise Great Britain, and as a wish for some sort of Anglo-German " understanding." A stay in Germany is little if any less pleasant than before—for after getting that letter I went to see for myself. But there is no doubt that the political atmosphere is changing. The diatribes of that section of the Press most directly influenced by Dr. Goebbels are not without effect. Anglophile Germans are getting, or at any rate have been getting until lately, steadily more and more pessimistic. While nobody thinks in terms of a war in the near future, another friend summed up a fairly general feeling when he said, at the end of a long evening of convivial discussion : " Well, British and Germans get along well together ; we are related, there is plenty of room in the world for both of us, and we haven't recovered from our last war. And yet we are such damned idiots that if things go on as they are going we shall have another."

" If things go on as they are going." In international affairs as in business and other human relations there are times when things can safely be allowed to drift and other times when they cannot. When, between 1899 and 1902, the

British alliance was three times offered to Germany, the Kaiser and his advisers preferred drift. The enigmatic and sinister Holstein sat in his dingy room at the back of the Wilhelmstrasse and asked why, since England could never settle with France and Russia, Germany should "pull the British chestnuts out of the fire." While one would hardly suggest that Downing Street harbours a British Holstein, until the Halifax visit its attitude to the various German suggestions has not been so very different from that of the Wilhelmstrasse nearly forty years ago. And the spirit in which Hitler is turning to his geometrical line-up with Rome and Tokio has certainly some affinity with the spirit in which Joseph Chamberlain and the Balfour Cabinet turned their thoughts to the Entente.

The parallel should not be pushed too far, of course. The complications arising out of our relations with France were not present in the earlier German case. Nor do I wish to suggest that there was no justification for our attitude. The main point I want to make is that we have reached a stage in Anglo-German relations when their trend is likely to be definitely in one direction or in another. They will get better or they will get worse. And they will get worse if the Halifax talks fail to lead within a reasonable period to a more or less definite understanding. Is such an understanding possible?

The first question which arises is whether it is already too late. It is sometimes urged, for example, that with the Nazi revolution all prospect of fitting Germany peacefully into the European structure disappeared, at least for the duration of the Nazi régime, and that above all no concessions should be made to Hitler, which were not offered to his predecessors. Advocates of this policy meet the objection that theirs is a counsel of despair by saying that the régime will not last indefinitely. While the Nazi régime is no more likely than any other political system to last for ever it is certainly very firmly rooted to-day. The grumbling and criticism which is so widespread, particularly among the educated classes, is not really a sign of weakness. The Nazi leaders are perfectly well aware of it, and it troubles them very little. It is directed much more against various aspects of the system than against the system itself. It cannot organise itself and thus cannot make itself effective. Nobody believes that it constitutes a serious threat to the régime. In fact if there is one thing

about which there is virtual unanimity of opinion among Germans, and especially among foreign observers in Germany, it is that in the foreseeable future only a defeat in war could shake the system. Thus if our object is to maintain peace we have to deal with Hitler's Germany. There is no alternative.

In any event, is Hitler's foreign policy so fundamentally different from that of previous German governments? He has unilaterally denounced the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles on German sovereignty. But would not Papen or Brüning or Stresemann or even despised Social Democrats like Hermann Müller or Scheidemann have done the same had they had the power? He refuses to tie his hands in Eastern Europe; he wants some form of union or association with Austria; he demands the return of lost colonies. But Stresemann's recently published papers show very similar aims. He has made a religion of patriotism. But in the past patriotism could be taken for granted, and the German people could hardly show more devotion and self-sacrifice in the next war than they did in the last.

The foreign policy of Germany, like that of most other great nations, is in the main the resultant of forces deeply rooted in the national history and character. It is difficult to deny a certain justification for the contention of Germans that they are, compared with other great peoples, such as the British, the Americans or the Russians, a *Volk ohne Raum*, a people without space. For various reasons, partly geographical, partly historical, and certainly not wholly due to their own faults, they arrived upon the field of world politics too late to obtain much out of the general game of grab which other nations, after playing it for centuries, now like to declare at an end. As the result of the War they lost the comparatively insignificant fruits of their belated expansion and millions were placed under alien domination. The nation which for centuries was the principal battleground of Europe has had a hard lesson in the value of military strength and of the unity which alone can give it. History has taught Hitler to write that "just as in the past our ancestors did not receive the soil on which we now dwell as a gift from Heaven, but had to conquer it, so also in future the soil, and therefore the life of a people, will be secured by the strength of a victorious sword."

Some years ago, before the Nazis came to power, I suggested

to a high German official that one of the main difficulties foreign statesmen felt in dealing with Germany lay in the long list of German demands. When the reparation problem was settled, the armament *dossier* came out of the drawer; when that was dealt with, Austria, frontier revision and colonies were all waiting. His reply was that after all not Germany but the Allies had made the Treaty of Versailles. But I was not quite satisfied. Supposing, I asked, the German grievances arising out of Versailles were all redressed. Would that be the end? Would Germany be a "satisfied Power"? My friend was an honest man and he replied that he did not know. After all, he said, the world does not stay still. And he finally asked me whether an Englishman, say in the Victorian age, could have predicted the moment when the British Empire would decide that its energies needed to be concentrated on keeping what it had got.

Whatever the course of events after the War, whatever the political complexion of German governments, the vague ambitions, the sense of undeveloped possibilities, of restricted energies and capacity, which characterise German nationalism, would have made themselves felt. But National Socialism has brought two new factors into German foreign policy which are of considerable importance. The first is the doctrine of race or "folk" nationalism. If you tell a Nazi that all Europe is frightened of German ambitions he will reply that such fears are absurd, since the racial basis of the Nazi State necessarily confines its aims to the incorporation of Germans by race and language. Minorities of other races could only weaken the State. And he will add that this is the distinction between National Socialism and pre-War German Imperialism. This contention is the more convincing since it is obviously true. History shows that States which aspire to govern heterogeneous and politically conscious peoples must develop corresponding political principles. "The Austrian Empire," writes Fisher in his *History of Europe*, "was based on the negation of nationality." But National Socialism is the apotheosis of nationality. No great empire of the past could have lasted for more than a few years with the principles of Hitler. And what was true in the past is doubly true to-day, when nationalism is so clearly the strongest force in world affairs.

The second new factor in German policy may be held to

conflict to some extent with the first. It is a certain sense of solidarity with "Fascist," that is to say similarly constituted nationalist, authoritarian and anti-communist régimes elsewhere. I heard from a reliable source that when Hitler decided to intervene in Spain he remarked: "*Ich kann den Fascismus nicht versacken lassen*" (I cannot let Fascism go by the board). But the remark betrays rather a nervousness lest a victory of the Left should have awkward repercussions in Germany—as in fact it might—than any imperialistic purpose. Intervention on such grounds has been common in history—from the religious wars to the Allied support of the White Russians—but even when successful it has scarcely ever proclaimed a solid or permanent advantage to the intervening country. To take an example of another kind, the official jubilation in Berlin over M. Goga and his authoritarian anti-Semitism is tempered by the realisation that his policy of Roumania for the Roumanians may not prove an unmixed blessing for the large German minority. And when it comes to applauding the Japanese success with a policy obviously directed against Western including German commercial interests, there can be no doubt that the bulk of German opinion has serious misgivings.

The anti-Comintern triangle, based largely on this aspect of German policy, has not yet taken deep root. The obvious emphasis in Mussolini's speech on the Berlin *Maifeld* on his intention to stick to his friends was hardly sufficient to wipe out the memory of Italy's defection in the war—nearly every German I met at the time had some joke on the subject—and the military estimate of Italian fighting power is not flattering. As for Japan, the yellow peril is still a frequent subject of conversation in spite of the Japanese official status as "Aryans." It is very significant that according to the well-informed Berlin correspondent of *The Times* what the Germans feel to be a new sense of realities in the attitude of "Chamberlain's England" towards Germany is universally counted among the greatest gains of a year of successes for the triangle. There can in fact be little doubt that the new German policy is in part an attempt to stir the British lion into paying attention to German aims. It is not yet too late to arrive at an understanding with Germany, though of course the game may ultimately be held to be not worth the candle.

I do not pretend to any inside knowledge of the Halifax conversations. In any event it is improbable that definite terms were discussed. But German aims at the present juncture are becoming sufficiently clear to make a reasonable guess at the prospective basis of an understanding. The first question, in fact apart from general economic problems the only question directly at issue between Germany and Great Britain, is that of colonies. It is futile to point to the passages in *Mein Kampf* declaring that Germany should "finally break with the colonial and trading policy of the past and go over to the [Eastern] land policy of the future" and to say that Hitler does not really want colonies. It may be that he would be prepared to make a bargain on these lines if Great Britain were to declare her complete detachment from Eastern European affairs, but that can surely be ruled out. Moreover the colonial question is so bound up with the Treaty of Versailles and the stigma of "colonial guilt," and colonial propaganda in Germany has now progressed so far, that a withdrawal of the demand is scarcely conceivable. But equally there is little doubt that Hitler was sincere at the time and that his principal aims even to-day lie in Europe. The Naval Agreement, which obviously cannot be torn up without bringing the resolute hostility of the British Empire, is surely a sign that Nazi Germany is not consciously aiming at extensive expansion overseas on pre-War lines, and it is highly probable that she would be satisfied with a transfer of territory—though not with mere economic concessions—within the bounds of practical politics, for example in West Africa.

The corollary to that view is of course that colonial concessions by themselves will never satisfy Germany. What are the German aims in Europe? Fundamentally I believe they involve to-day rather a change in the balance of power and the bringing of Central and Eastern European nations within the German instead of the Franco-Russian orbits than actual transfers of territory. A revision of frontiers would help little towards solving the German economic problem, whereas the economic penetration of Eastern and particularly Danubian Europe would be exceedingly valuable, especially if guaranteed by a political preponderance which would at the same time secure the position of German minorities.

It is in this light that we should examine German terms for a European settlement when the time comes for them to be put forward. They will probably prove to be approximately as follows: Firstly that the method of direct negotiation between Germany and other nations as exemplified in the Polish Pact and the Lithuanian and Belgian agreements should not be interfered with from Geneva or elsewhere by collective support of the countries concerned. Particularly significant in this connection is an address given by Herr von Neurath to the Academy of German Law in Munich, and subsequently published in the *Europäische Revue*. In such arrangements Germany will no doubt expect that her interest in minorities of her own race and language should be recognised (as Poland has done in a recent agreement). Secondly, a direct understanding on this basis with Czechoslovakia under which the Sudeten Germans are recognised as a *Staatsvolk* with equal rights with Czechs and Slovaks, and the Russian alliance is abandoned. Thirdly, the withdrawal of any formal limitation of Austria's right of self-determination, and the recognition by the Western Powers of Germany's special interest in Austria as a Germanic country and in particular of her right to object to any solution of the Austrian and Danubian problems of which she does not approve. Finally, as a *quid pro quo*, Germany would probably agree to some form of limitation of armaments, though it is very unlikely that she would return to Geneva or sign collective Pacts except in the West. It will be seen that a settlement on these lines would not be "final." It would open doors rather than make definitive arrangements. It would leave room for the "dynamics of historical development," to use a phrase much heard in Germany.

But after all that phrase does express a reality. No settlement in history has ever been "final." Certainly no arrangement in Central and Eastern Europe politically conceivable in present circumstances is likely to be the end of the story. There is something to be said for allowing the eighty odd millions of Germans in the heart of Europe to find their own level unhampered by an outside diplomatic pressure which they regard as "encircling," as an attempt to prevent their attaining to the political power and economic development due to their numbers, energy and ability. Moreover, as has already been emphasised, the nationalism of the Slav and

other races of Central and Eastern Europe has come to stay, and even if she had the power Nazi Germany, whose main political principle is nationalism, could scarcely fail to recognise this.

These matters, it is true, are not a direct concern of Great Britain. The principal obstacle to a settlement on such lines lies in the Eastern policy of France. But German policy is showing an increasing realisation of the fact that France and Great Britain cannot be separated—as witness the tacit approval in the German Press of the recent visit of French Ministers to London after the Halifax talks. The German aim is a parallel understanding with both Western Powers.

It may be urged that this would mean “selling our friends.” But French Eastern policy is already cracking. Poland has left the French orbit; Roumania and Yugoslavia look like following suit. What the French are really being asked to do is not to abandon their friends by withdrawing all diplomatic support but to advise them to take long spoons and sup with the devil. It is not always bad advice. Had it been tendered to the unfortunate Haile Selassie he might still have been on his throne and have preserved a certain independence for his people.

The greatest threat to the independence of the Danubian and Eastern European nations, the real fear in the capitals from Prague to the Black Sea is that Nazi Germany should make a *coup* and get away with it. Once armies start marching everything is in the melting pot. If France and Great Britain stood aside from an Eastern struggle there is no telling what would happen. The attitude of France is likely to depend mainly upon that of Great Britain. It is worth while frankly to face the question of what our attitude would be in the event of a move by Germany say in Czechoslovakia or Austria where she has undoubtedly genuine grievances. Would it be possible to obtain that national unanimity with which a great modern war cannot be prosecuted? Would not a very powerful body of opinion, supported by the uneasy conscience over Versailles which is so noticeable in the attitude of most Englishmen towards Germany, maintain that Germany had a good deal of right on her side, that she was not threatening us, and that the quarrel was not our concern?

That attitude, that uneasy feeling, has paralysed us at

every crisis since Hitler came to power, at first over rearmament, then when the demilitarised zone was reoccupied. It is likely to paralyse us until the great mass of the British people see that a whole-hearted attempt has been made to reach an understanding with their former enemies. Such an understanding may in the long run prove impossible of attainment. The Germans may, as many people urge, merely go on asking for more. But clear proof of this is needed before the British Empire, after so short an interval, is willing to face Germany again on the lines of 1914. This is not a cowardly policy of mere *dane-geld*. It involves taking the risk of strengthening a potential enemy. But is not that risk worth taking? For there could be no more stabilising factor in world politics than an understanding between the British Empire and Germany.

H. P. GREENWOOD.

WHITHER STALIN?

WHAT is happening in Russia? Not even those whose interest in foreign affairs is negligible, or who have become immune to tales of cruelty and hardship, can possibly remain entirely unimpressed by what is now taking place in the Soviet Union. Both the fact that Stalin has once again plunged the country into a bloodbath of unprecedented ferocity and also the very nature of the present wave of terrorism that is sweeping over Russia must give friends and enemies of the Soviets alike something to ponder about. What is the reason of it all and how is it working out?

So far Hitler has had one Leipzig trial and one June 30th. In Soviet Russia events similar to those two manifestations of Nazism, which deservedly provoked indignation throughout the civilised world, have now become daily occurrences. There is hardly a day without fresh news of further "trials" and of more assassinations. In the beginning Stalin apparently felt constrained to stage public performances of his so-called tribunals, but now this does not even appear necessary. Every announcement of new executions is accompanied by the declaration that "all the culprits confessed their guilt"; this has become a melancholy Greek chorus of Soviet justice. It is not for Hitler, of course, whose methods of government are so strikingly similar to those of his alleged enemy and actually his spiritual brother, to shed crocodile tears on these Russian atrocities. But to those who condemn terrorism irrespective of the colour of the shirt into which it is dressed, Stalin's recent activities legitimately appear as something of a nightmare.

The Soviet Government has just celebrated its twentieth jubilee. During those twenty years—fateful to Russia and fateful to the world—blood has never stopped flowing in Russia. First there was the civil war, the fight against the Whites and foreign Interventionists; even before that struggle began, there was already the fiercest kind of terrorism against the "class enemy," i.e. the former ruling classes; the bourgeoisie and even the radical and socialist intelligentsia. Then there came the most cruel conflict of all—between the Soviet Government and the peasants, culminating in the "liquidation of the Kulaks" in the villages and the introduction of communal and state farming. That fight against the

huge, amorphous and unorganised body of Russia's peasantry (which is lingering on to the present day) cost the country millions of lives. It was followed by the worst kind of starvation, this time not caused by drought but definitely by government action.

There have been various attempts to compute death's harvest coming as a direct result of the Soviet system during all these years. Without counting bolshevism's indirect victims, i.e. those who died of starvation or hardship, all the available estimates amount to many millions. But such statistics are thoroughly unimpressive. Millions of dead mean nothing to us, because we cannot visualise them. Individual casualties always attract more attention than wholesale calamities. Moreover, in the case of Soviet Russia, these atrocities have lasted too long and have been on altogether too big a scale to command anybody's attention. And finally, according to the British radical intelligentsia, it is all part of "an interesting social experiment," which presumably justifies terrorism of a kind the world has never known.

It is essential to set the present situation in Russia against this gruesome background, for otherwise Stalin's new "purge" would be even less comprehensible than it is. There is nothing new in what is going on to-day; the only novelty is the quality or the character of the most recent victims. We have Stalin's own authority for the following statements: (1) that socialism—not communism—has been created in Russia, (2) that the object of this new socialist society is not to restrict personal liberty, but to make the human individual feel really free, and (3) that in its victorious march towards socialism the Soviet Government has liquidated all the exploiting classes, but that the Communist Party remains in a privileged position. These statements have been made time and again, and those who wish to check up on them might read—as typical examples—Stalin's speech on the draft of the New Constitution made on November 14th, 1936, and his famous interview with Roy Howard, the American journalist, on March 1st, 1936. The text of both is available in English.

In his speech he said, among other things:

"the complete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of national economy is now a fact. . . . We have already achieved the first phase of communism, socialism . . . for the U.S.S.R. socialism is something already achieved and won."

Surely, nothing could be more definite than that. To Mr. Roy Howard he explained how the Soviets had built a socialist society and then went on :

“ But we did not build this society in order to restrict personal liberty, but in order that the human individual may feel really free. We built it for the sake of real personal liberty, liberty without quotation marks.”

That too is pretty emphatic. Finally, while dealing with Russia's present social structure, he declared in his speech on the New Constitution :

“ All exploiting classes have now been liquidated. . . . I must admit that the draft of the New Constitution really does preserve the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.”

So much for Stalin's own definition of Russia's political and economic system. But here we come upon a most striking paradox. Curiously enough, the socialist parties are proscribed in Soviet Russia and the “ building of socialism,” whose completion Stalin so proudly and emphatically proclaims, was left to the communists. But what did the very same Stalin do with these admittedly privileged people ? In 1921 a “ purge ” of the communist party took place when 175,000 people or 30 per cent. of its then membership were ignominiously ejected. In 1929 there was another “ purge ” when 300,000 members were thrown out. Between those two dates the so-called “ control commissions ” excluded another 260,000 members from the communist party. In 1921, there were 732,000 officially registered members of the communist party and in 1930 there were 1,200,000 of them. But between 1921 and 1929 no less than 735,000 were forcibly removed from its ranks, so that it is permissible to ask who did build Stalin's socialism, if he felt constrained to kick out more than one half of these “ builders ” ?

In 1933-4, a new “ general purge ” took place, which has become a permanent institution. It is then, however, that for the first time those ejected were labelled not merely as “ ideologically ” unsuitable, but as definitely criminal—coming under such headings as “ wreckers,” “ spies,” “ diversionists ” or just simply “ bandits.” This process went on for several years and revealed that in Stalin's own

opinion some of the "builders of socialism" deserved prison or death rather than this proud appellation and an admittedly privileged position in his "multi-national socialist state, which had stood all tests, and the stability of which might well be envied by any national state in any part of the world." But as yet the merciless purge was confined to the rank and file, to comparatively unimportant people; it was conducted, so to speak, from above, by those in charge.

In 1936 a very different process set in: the decapitation of the whole system, the removal of hitherto omnipotent leaders of the communist party, of the very people who had made the original bolshevik revolution in 1917, or of those who had since risen to occupy some of the key positions in the Soviet state. After triumphing over Trotsky and banishing him abroad, Stalin had been repeatedly venting his hatred on the other members of Lenin's original group of collaborators: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rakovsky and many prominent old bolsheviks were one by one deprived of their offices, imprisoned, banished, compelled to make periodical public recantations of their views—genuine or alleged—and were finally altogether crushed. But as yet their physical destruction did not appear either necessary or desirable to Stalin. Moreover, being busily engaged on gaining the admittance of Soviet Russia among the comity of nations, perhaps he did not wish to give the world a picture of the revolution devouring its own parents.

Then, all of a sudden and for no discoverable reason, the first batch of Lenin's old collaborators were publicly tried and killed off after making fantastic self-accusing confessions. Some of their closest friends were made to write abusive articles in the press, calling their old communist comrades "mad dogs of fascism," "filthy bandits" and saying that even death was too good for these depraved monsters. Despite this outburst of indignation and invective, before long these very people were in their turn destroyed, not without having made their own "confessions," however. Now that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Piatakov, Serebriakov, Smirnov and other pillars of bolshevism were gone and Radek, Sokolnikov and innumerable others in prison, the "purge" took a new turn. Yagoda, the formidable head of the G.P.U., who ever since 1920 had been bumping off millions of alleged "wreckers" and had only just completed

the destruction of those who made the bolshevik revolution, was himself proclaimed a wrecker and locked up as a criminal. His disgrace was of particular interest because he was not one of Lenin's men, but one of Stalin's own creations. Moreover, in his case it was difficult to put forward any political accusation and he went down just as an embezzling gangster. The step that followed—in early June 1937—was even more fantastic: eight of the Red Army's most famous leaders, including the picturesque newly created Soviet Field-Marshal Toukhatchevsky, were summarily executed on a charge of espionage and high treason. Thousands of further less spectacular arrests and executions were daily taking place accompanied by a wave of "suicides," like that of Tomsky, the Trade Union leader, or Gamarnik, the deputy-commissar of war.

The U.S.S.R. boasts eleven "National" and twenty-two "Autonomous" republics. In all of them the local presidents or premiers or other outstanding personalities were removed and executed, and in some of these republics several times in rapid succession. The few remaining old bolsheviks, who had already lost their position and freedom a long time before, were now also put on trial as "spies" or "wreckers" or "bandits," or all these things simultaneously: Rykov (Lenin's "Premier"), Bukharin, Bubnov (the Commissar of Education—a very old bolshevik) and innumerable others, in fact practically all those holding key positions fell from Stalin's grace, which means death or exile or imprisonment. With one exception, there was hardly a facet of Russian national life that was not affected: the administration, the army, industry, finance, commerce, education, literature, the theatre and the arts, science (even astronomy) were all declared to have been in the hands of criminals against whom both political and ordinary criminal charges were now proffered, and were drastically "purged."

The only exception so far was the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov's department. For years Litvinov had withdrawn from all internal politics, concentrating entirely on his diplomatic work and being more of a "civil servant" or permanent Under-Secretary than political head of this important Commissariat. And now suddenly Stalin has swooped on the Foreign Commissariat top: apart from Litvinov and Maisky, hardly a single man of importance

remains. All the leading Soviet ambassadors and ministers have been recalled or shot. The most recent batch of prominent communists executed at Stalin's orders included Karakhan, a foremost exponent of Soviet diplomacy since the inception of the Soviet revolution, and Eñukidze, Stalin's fellow-Georgian, who for eighteen years without interruption held a post equivalent to that of Secretary to the Cabinet and only a year or two ago was rewarded with the order of Lenin.

If a list were to be drawn up of those who have recently been destroyed by Stalin, it would include such a galaxy of names as no White Russian general or militant anti-communist could have possibly envisaged in his wildest dreams. In October 1937 alone about 500 prominent bolsheviks were executed according to the Soviet press, and during the first fortnight in November, 150. Since then they have been killed off in batches, varying from eight to seventy-three almost every other day. No one is spared, no one can fathom whose turn for the firing squad comes next. In Moscow's foreign diplomatic circles heavy betting is purported to be taking place whether it will be Molotov, Kalinin or Voroshilov who falls first. But this grim humour has a good reason and is more than justified by the sordid facts. The French paper *Le Temps* of January 7th, 1938, published a long letter from its Moscow correspondent giving the names of the latest victims and describing the circumstances of their tragic end; the unusually well-informed correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* frequently deals with the same almost unbelievable subject.

Quite naturally the question is being asked, why Stalin is indulging in this orgy of assassination and how long it can continue. After all, there are only two possibilities: either all these men are guilty, in which case twenty years of "revolutionary triumphs" and the "successful building of socialism" are entirely the work of gangsters, and the Soviet *élite* which is now being exterminated by its chief is the worst kind of scum the world has yet produced, or else the allegations are not true, and then the indictment of this régime which is compelled to invent such ghastly charges is even more devastating. Whichever it is, the Soviet system can hardly claim to derive any enhanced prestige from this wave of abuse and extermination of its chosen leaders of yesterday.

Two books have recently appeared which give the reader a

better insight into Soviet mentality and a better chance of understanding how all this is possible than anything that has been available for a long time. *Soviet Tempo* by Violet Conolly* and *Assignment in Utopia* by Eugene Lyons,† should be studied from the first page to the last, because they offer evidence of a kind that cannot be contradicted—not even by all the ignorant or crazy sycophants who in all these years have constituted a vociferous and international chorus of Stalin's—surprisingly unthanked—admirers throughout the world; indeed the ingratitude towards these people shown by Stalin, whose actions continually disregard or deny their words, is something that in itself deserves enquiry and study. But to revert to these two books; Miss Conolly is a trained student of Russian economics and knows the language perfectly; Mr. Lyons, a brilliant American journalist, went to Soviet Russia as a pro-communist enthusiast and with the additional record of having worked for the Soviets in America before he was sent to Moscow. Miss Conolly's conclusions are practically identical with those of André Gide, that great French writer and convinced communist, who has also had the moral courage to tell the world that Stalin's Russia is the very opposite of either democracy or socialism or communism. Mr. Lyons expresses his feelings thus:

“Above all, I had the sense of leaving behind me ‘a nation trapped.’ Trapped physically, with bloodhounds and machine guns and death sentences guarding the frontiers to prevent people from escaping, with a passport system to prevent them from moving freely inside the frontiers, with endless ‘ukases’ and threats to regulate their existence. Trapped intellectually, with every thought prescribed and mental curiosity punished as heresy; the new literacy seemed an additional taunt, sharpening the appetite while denying it sustenance. Trapped spiritually, through the need of pretending enthusiasm for the knout, genuflecting to hateful images and practising hypocrisy as the first law of survival. In the past, the word freedom had been whispered in secret caves, but now punishment was too swift and too deadly. There was no longer even the solace of martyrdom for the defiant; a technique had been evolved for breaking their spirit and dragging them into the limelight for slobbering confessions of guilt.

“The fact that these things had come to pass under the banners of ‘socialism’ only made them more ghastly. The word socialism, the eternal dream of equality and justice, was also trapped.”

* Sheed & Ward Ltd.

† George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd.

This misnomer does not merely apply to the word "Socialism." One of the reasons why it is so difficult to appraise Russia's economic situation, which has a direct bearing on the present wave of terrorism, is that the existing terminology is most misleading. Though in the U.S.S.R. the same technical expressions are used as in the capitalist world outside, their meaning is something quite different. A "bank" or a "trust" or "production costs" in Soviet Russia do not signify the same thing as in other countries. Moreover, the bolsheviks are fond of calculating their economic achievements not in absolute figures, but in percentages; it is very impressive, but thoroughly unreliable. What Mr. Lyons has to say on the "success" of the Five-Year Plan in that respect is of particular interest, and the extent to which Soviet figures can be accepted as a comparatively objective measurement of data to which they relate can be gathered from the great population census in 1937. Announced with a tremendous flourish of trumpets, it was scrapped no sooner completed, because there was a miscalculation of . . . ten million souls!

There can be no doubt that Russia is once again passing through an acute economic crisis. The huge industrial apparatus put up without any regard for the country's needs or possibilities, without any consideration of cost or the extent of sacrifice it implied, is refusing to work. Somebody must be made responsible. Since the only man who originated and directed it all will not face up to it, responsibility and punishment falls on the others. The same applies to the political and administrative, or in fact all other aspects of Russian life: the system is no longer there to achieve certain objectives, but solely to maintain Stalin's power and to demonstrate that he can do no wrong. If it fails in that, those in charge have got to pay the penalty. It has been repeatedly stated that Stalin is contemplating the official assumption of a title, like "First Citizen" or "Leader" or something else equivalent to "Führer" or "Duce." Meanwhile, however, he has modestly preferred to be proclaimed God, and the deification of Stalin in the Soviet press and wireless is now an established feature. This is how Mr. Lyons puts it:

"When I left Russia, I was sure that the exaltation of a mortal creature could not be carried any further. I was mistaken. The

Soviet press bulges with proofs that the human animal's capacity for grovelling sycophancy is literally boundless.

"Powerful beyond any medieval Tsar in his own domain, the 'great and beloved' is also acknowledged pretender to an international throne as dictator of the Comintern. . . .

"Stalin is without the cool genius of a Lenin, without the flamboyant talents of a Mussolini, without the hysterical fervour of a Hitler. An uninspired practical politician, this slow-moving, slow-thinking but implacable Caucasian has hoarded and organised power slowly through his years and made himself the strongest person on the face of the earth. Reckoned by the numbers who willingly or under coercion bring him allegiance, Stalin's temporal empire dwarfs Cæsar's and Napoleon's, and it has a spiritual content theirs did not possess."

Surprise has been expressed that possessing that power Stalin should still find it necessary to stage his mock "elections" which gave him more than 100 per cent. of the votes. But then it must be remembered that Hitler, too, finds it useful from time to time to convene a "Reichstag" "elected" in similar circumstances and that Mussolini "consults" his Grand Council on vital issues. Creating "democratic" illusions is one of the most powerful instruments of dictatorship as long as absolute control is maintained.

It is difficult to see how having reached the present juncture Stalin could behave in a different way. What Lenin did with the N.E.P., when he restored a certain amount of economic freedom and then, scared lest a healed and strengthened Russia should sweep him out of office, had to re-impose terrorism, Stalin has done with the army. He put the Red Army and its chiefs in a privileged position, and little by little these serfs began to feel like human beings again. But the moment they had regained a sense of human dignity and a modicum of individualism, they became dangerous and had to be stamped out. The dictator cannot suffer any potential or embryonic rivals around him. We have seen Mussolini repeatedly re-shuffling his closest collaborators or Hitler shooting them down. In the case of Stalin this process is more violent, because his dictatorship is more violent and exercised in more difficult circumstances. Is he mad? Is it a question of "*Cæsarenwahnsinn*"? This explanation is often being suggested.

In his famous satire *L'Ile des Pingouins*, Anatole France describes Hyppolite Cérès, a statesman, as follows :

"From time to time, he developed fits of pain and fury which made him mad whole days long. His reason would abandon him. If he had been working in a private firm, this would have been noticed at once, but it is much more difficult to recognise insanity and delirium in the administration of a State's affairs."

That *might* be the explanation of Stalin's activities, but none of the evidence we possess about him has the faintest suggestion that Stalin is mentally deranged. Unless, of course, one argues that all dictators must be mad, and that is outside the scope of the present article. It is much more likely that having gone so far he is compelled to go on, lest one day he should himself fall a victim of this ghastly terrorism.

In days gone by the various autocracies of Europe were wittily described in the following way : The Austro-Hungarian empire was "autocracy tempered by inefficiency." The old French monarchy was "autocracy tempered by epigram" and Tsarism was "autocracy tempered by assassination." It can now be said that Stalinism, or *the new Russian autocracy*, is not tempered by—but *based on assassination*.

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

THE CHURCH CONFLICT IN GERMANY.

IF anyone had prophesied in March 1933 that at Christmas-time 1937 the strife between Church and State in Germany, of which the first signs had already appeared, would still be in full blast, most foreign observers would have regarded it as the utterance of a disordered brain. Yet such is the case. The extent of the controversy and its seriousness can be gauged by the fact that during these four and a half years there have been no less than 7,000 cases in which representatives of the Churches have been charged by the police with an offence against the Government. There may actually have been far more than that. But this is the number officially given. In many instances, no doubt, all that happened was a day in prison, or a long examination. But those who have experienced three or four hours' hostile questioning or twenty-four hours of solitary confinement bear witness to their serious effect on the nerves. The number in prison has varied from time to time. At the end of August 1937 it was 120; at the end of October there were fifty. At Christmas a number were released. But Dr. Niemöller, the intrepid submarine commander, was still in prison and has been for more than five months. If the object was to break the morale of the clergy and their faithful followers—as it must be presumed it was—the attempt has failed completely. Dr. Niemöller could obtain release at any time, if he would sign a document agreeing to abstain from any utterance that might be interpreted as an attack on the Government. There is not the slightest chance that he will do so. When the profound disturbance of the public conscience in England caused by the imprisonment of a tiny handful of ritualists in the last century is recalled, some faint idea may be gained of the wound inflicted on the spiritual life of Germany by a persecution on this scale.

The year 1937 began with an event which marked a turning-point in the conflict. When Herr Kerrl was appointed Reich Minister for Church Affairs in the autumn of 1935 he was given by Herr Hitler power to issue ordinances which had binding force. Armed with this weapon, he set up a machinery for establishing Church committees in the different local churches with the declared purpose of bringing order and unity into the Evangelical Church in Germany. At the head

of them he put Dr. Zoellner, a much-respected Lutheran General-Superintendent, an office that corresponds roughly to an Anglican bishop. Dr. Zoellner was well known outside Germany, because he had taken a leading part in the Faith and Order Conference at Lausanne in 1927. In England his appointment was welcomed by the Bishop of Gloucester, also a leading figure at that conference, who pleaded with English opinion to give the committees a chance. Many representative German Churchmen rallied to the committees, such as Dr. Marahrens, the Bishop of Hanover, and the Bishops of Bavaria and Württemberg. The Confessional leaders from the first were suspicious of the committees, on the ground that they were ultimately under the complete control of Dr. Kerrl, who was an official of the State—and a State that could not be considered Christian or even neutral, in view of the encouragement that it gave to the anti-Christian teaching of Rosenberg. Moreover “German Christians” sat on the committees. “German Christians,” it should be noted, are a small group of Protestant pastors and laymen whose aim is to adapt the Church to the tenets of the National Socialist Movement and to harness it to the chariot wheels of Herr Hitler.

Events proved that it was the Confessionals who had judged the situation correctly. The Confessionals are the group who have steadily maintained that the Church must, in its relations with the State, stand firm on the Confession of Faith (*Bekennntnis*) and on the freedom of the Church to proclaim the Gospel. From the first any attempt at conciliation was frustrated by Herr Kerrl’s constant interferences. The most violent measures were taken against the Confessionals. Their lectures were forbidden; their circular letters were suppressed; their theological college was closed; and they were forbidden to make collections of money. At the same time every possible encouragement was given to the “German Christian” minority. The crisis was reached in January of last year. At Lübeck difficulties had arisen because the German Christian bishop had placed nine Confessional pastors under house arrest. When Dr. Zoellner wished to go to Lübeck to put matters right, he was forbidden by Herr Kerrl himself to do so.

This was the last straw. On February 12th, 1937, Dr. Zoellner and his committee resigned. In a dignified letter the

committee revealed how impossible had been Dr. Zoellner's task. His official gazette had often been confiscated by the police. The Church press had been forbidden even to publish his statement of loyalty to the Führer, and his solemn assurance of readiness to co-operate in the struggle against Bolshevism. Now he himself had been hindered in the performance of his spiritual duties. Though President of the governing body, established by Herr Kerrl himself, he was not allowed to exercise the right of free and unhindered preaching of God's word, a right based on Article I of the Constitution. "We deliberately refrain," the committee significantly added, "from mentioning in this connection what the *methods* have been, whereby the official measures against our President were brought to bear." As Churchmen they could no longer go on.

Herr Kerrl was furious, and threatened to issue a decree assuming dictatorial powers. Then Herr Hitler intervened. As a result it was announced that elections for a new synod would take place on April 11th. When the time drew near the date was postponed. They have in fact never taken place, and probably never will. The proposal would seem to be one of those impulsive and irresponsible actions, in which Herr Hitler from time to time indulges. The holding of genuine free elections in the Third Reich is inconceivable.

The upshot is to show that there is no possibility of an honourable arrangement between a National Socialist Government and a self-respecting Christian Church, unless that Church be so small as to be negligible politically. Herr Kerrl made this abundantly clear in a speech in which he said that the Catholic Bishop von Galen and Dr. Zoellner wanted to bring home to him what Christianity really is, namely that it is a question of the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Son of God. That, he said, is absurd. "There has now arisen a new authority concerning what Christ and Christianity really is. This new authority is Adolf Hitler." Dr. Otto Dibelius replied in a trenchant open letter, in which he affirmed that the whole of Christianity is involved in the faith that Jesus Christ, who was crucified and rose again, is the Son of the living God. When the State—in the person of Herr Kerrl—claims to have power over the souls of men and the preaching of the Church, Churchmen are bound to resist. Dr. Dibelius was formerly General Superintendent of the Mark of

Brandenburg, and the pastor chosen to speak in the Church of Potsdam in 1933, when the Third Reich was solemnly inaugurated in the presence of President Hindenburg and Chancellor Hitler.

The consequence of these events has been that all sections of the Church—other than the “German Christians”—have drawn together. The Confessionals and the Lutheran Council stand side by side once more in defence of the Gospel against the doctrines of blood and soil and the strange attempt to make of the Nazi movement itself the final revelation of God. This unity was revealed very clearly during the summer in connection with the two œcumenical Church conferences, that on “Life and Work” at Oxford in July, and that on “Faith and Order” at Edinburgh in August. It had been agreed to send a united delegation representing the different sections of the Evangelical Church of Germany, including even Bishop Heckel, the head of the Evangelical Church Foreign Office, who was in close touch with Herr Kerrl. At the last moment their passports were taken away, and no delegates of the German Evangelical Church appeared at either conference. Violent articles, however, were published in the Nazi press, in which these œcumenical gatherings were denounced as infected with the vice of internationalism. This aroused an interest in them in Germany that otherwise might have been lacking. Both from Oxford and from Edinburgh dignified messages were sent sympathising with the struggle that the Evangelical Churches were putting up in defence of the Gospel and the right to proclaim it freely.

Meanwhile the pressure has continued. Pastors have been imprisoned for publishing the names of those who have left the Church, for taking collections for the work of the Confessional Church, and finally, when all other excuses failed, for preaching against the Government in their sermons—a charge capable of wide interpretation. The most severe blow has been the closure of the theological seminaries created by the Confessional Movement, because this act threatens to cut off the supply of properly trained orthodox ministers.

Finally the financial question has been raised. For many months Herr Kerrl hinted that he would cut off supplies. Towards the end of last year the threat became somewhat more explicit. Herr Kerrl said that it was not the task of the

National Socialist State to maintain the Church through subsidies and taxes. Its maintenance is the task of believers themselves, who must support the Church to which they belong. In fact this is what happens already. The State gathers a Church tax from all who acknowledge to belonging to a Church, and hands it over to the denomination to which the taxpayer belongs. The Churches also possess real property of their own. The fear of losing the support of the State as an efficient tax-gatherer has undoubtedly influenced some sections of Evangelical opinion and prevented them from lining up with the Confessionals. But the feeling is growing that complete independence of the State is the only way whereby loyalty to the Gospel can be preserved.

The exact meaning of Herr Kerrl's latest move is still obscure at the time of writing. Herr Kerrl has professed that complete religious liberty is the aim of the State, which has no wish to put one Church in a position of special association with the State. He recognised that the "German Christian" section held views congenial to the National Socialist outlook. All the same, he did not intend to make any Confession a State Church, not even the German Faith Movement (Dr. Hauer's movement, which is non-Christian). The signs are that the Party (which is the mainspring of the Government) have come to the conclusion that it is useless to try to control the Church and annex it to the State, by supporting the "German Christian" Movement. The time is fast approaching, they think, when they will be able to cut the painter, and reduce the Church to insignificance. The ideas that rule in Party circles have been clearly stated in the *Schwarze Korps*, the organ of Herr Himmler's Black Guards. Separation of Church and State will be effected in such a way as to leave every individual free to choose to what Church he will belong; but at the same time the Churches "will be limited to piety, to the care of souls and to the promotion of fundamentals of belief," while the ethical training of the young will be taken away from them. A future is envisaged in which National Socialism will itself be established as the religion of the State. "The State is the living expression of the divine order experienced by the community of the nation. It draws its moral laws from the divine order, from the revelation of God in nature through the destiny, the life and the death of the nations. The National Socialist State will create the divine

order in all spheres of life. It promotes what is natural, and combats what is contrary to nature." Disendowment of the Church, and its relegation to the background, accompanied by the deification of the State, has for long been the real aim of the most powerful forces of the Nazi party, though for a time it was necessary to conceal it.

This is a truth that leading minds in the Catholic Church have from the first recognised as clearly as have done the Confessional champions. It was easier for Catholics to do so, because their international philosophy made them an object of suspicion to the fanatics of nationalism. The campaign against Catholics has sharpened during 1937. In March the Pope intervened in telling and unique fashion. He wrote a vigorous encyclical which was published in Germany and in the German language before it had appeared in Rome. It opened with the words "*Mit brennender Sorge*." In burning language Pius XI denounced the infractions of the concordat, and dealt powerfully with the "ideology" of National Socialism. "Whoever," he said, "detaches race, or the nation, or the State, or the form of State, or the Government from the temporal scale of values and raises them to be the supreme model and deifies them with idolatrous worship falsifies the divinely created order of things." In language that could not be misunderstood the Pope denounced placing an ordinary mortal on a level with Christ. The encyclical had been smuggled into Germany, and was so efficiently distributed that it was read from every Catholic pulpit in the land on the morning of Palm Sunday as a prelude to the week in which the Passion of Christ is commemorated. The effect was profound.

A counterblow was aimed at the Church by the immorality trials. Some members of religious orders were tried with every element of publicity for sexual offences, and the whole efforts of the Ministry of Propaganda were devoted for months to creating the impression that "abnormal proclivities" were typical of Catholics. The truth was that the cases proved were very few in number, and they had already been dealt with by the Church authorities. The cases were discovered when the Secret Police had raided diocesan offices in order to find evidence of currency smuggling. The effect on public opinion was not quite what the Minister of Propaganda expected. No doubt some of the mud stuck. But decent feeling was revolted by the broadcasting of unpleasant

details, and many Catholics were so outraged that they refused to believe that there was any truth in the accusation, whereas there was a grain. Indignation was particularly strong in well-informed circles because it was known that when similar affairs happened in Nazi quarters, they were slurred over. Some of the camps had a reputation that was none too good.

On the top of the trials came the attack on the schools. In October Count Conrad von Preysing, the Bishop of Berlin, announced that Catholic priests were, with few exceptions, no longer to be allowed to give religious instruction in the schools of Germany. It was true that religious teaching would, in theory, continue to be given by the teachers. But great pressure could be put upon the teachers, who are, after all, Government servants. It was plain, the bishop said, that the de-christianising of life was proceeding step by step. The first was to do away with the monastic educational establishments; the second was to do away with the confessional schools; the third was to drive the priest out of the schools. In the end religious instruction would be dispensed with altogether, and an anti-Christian *Weltanschauung* would be forced upon the children.

The result of this persecution, systematically and steadily pursued, has been to spread throughout Germany a growing and widespread concern among serious-minded and thoughtful people. An American priest who returned from Germany last November recorded impressions which tally closely with those made on many other visitors who penetrate beneath the outward calm of the German contemporary scene. He noted a marked change in the spirit of the Christian Churches; a great depression had fallen upon them. They were full of apprehensions, which became graver week by week. Teachers of Christianity feared for themselves and for their families. People were afraid to talk about the situation, lest they should involve friends and colleagues in arrest and imprisonment. An enormous spy system, in fact, pervades the country. The very walls have ears. Again and again the cry can be heard, "There is no longer any justice in Germany." The secret police (the Gestapo, as it is called in common parlance) rule the situation in a way that can only be paralleled by the G.P.U. in Russia. When even the Prussian Minister of Justice joins in protesting against their arbitrary use of power, it can

no longer be seriously maintained that these charges are the invention of inimical foreigners.

The long story of the efforts of the National Socialist party to bring the Churches into line, as instruments of its political ambitions, has only served to bring into high relief the fundamental obstacle that makes co-operation impossible. It is the fact that National Socialism is not merely a political movement. It is a religion which can brook no rival. It is an orthodoxy that must use every effort to subdue the heretic. What makes it specially dangerous is that it is the religion of a particularly uncultivated section of the community. It finds its most ardent followers in a class which tends to idolise brutality, which is insensitive to the spiritual *imponderabilia* that are the chief elements in human dignity, and which is convinced that there is no ideal that cannot be swept aside by a combination of propaganda and violence. That element is to be found in all nations. It is particularly strong among the Germans, as their best friends have always recognised. The need for asserting German rights against the rest of the world has given men of this kind an opportunity of asserting themselves not only against the foreigner, but against the finer elements in Germany itself.

The resistance of the Churches cannot be understood unless it be seen as a struggle to defend the soul and the conscience of the German people. It is the conviction that all that is precious in the German spirit will be submerged in sheer animalism and materialism unless the Christian basis is preserved in its entirety, that nerves Protestant and Catholic alike to endure whatever may befall. The sense of this common vital inheritance has inspired the two Confessions to fight shoulder to shoulder. It is noteworthy that Herr Kerri coupled the name of the Roman Catholic bishop of Münster, Count von Galen, with that of Dr. Zoellner in his notorious speech. Doubtless he thought to rouse prejudice in Protestant circles by doing so. But Dr. Dibelius accepted the conjunction, where faith in the Divinity of Christ was concerned. Count von Galen has referred to the solidarity of Catholics and Protestants in a sermon in which he said "in loyal comradeship with our German Evangelical brethren—for whom Zoellner and Dibelius have spoken—we must face up to this anti-Christian front and resist it. The front of the *real* German Christians who resolutely stand for a belief in the

divinity of Christ is unbroken. Its supporters and champions are not only the faithful children of the Catholic Church ; there are also countless thousands of Protestant Christians who stand by the Evangelical leaders I have mentioned in the same front." Count Conrad von Preysing, the Catholic Bishop of Berlin, who has played a notable part in calling attention to the fundamental nature of the conflict, used similar language when preaching in his cathedral of St. Hedwig some months ago. Herr Rosenberg has attempted to break this alliance by the pamphlet in which he has described the Confessional pastors as pilgrims on the way to Rome. But opposition from this quarter is unlikely to do much harm, because it is the *Myth of the twentieth century*, and the official position given to it by the Government, that convinces the majority of believing Catholics and Protestants that the struggle is one between the religion of the New Testament and a purely nationalist cult. Catholics and Protestants alike may be filled with the gravest anxiety. But the crowded churches do not suggest surrender. Their deepest concern relates to the effect that is being produced by the religion of Nazi-ism on the young. What this will be no man can yet tell.

A. S. DUNCAN-JONES.

THE ROUMANIAN CRISIS.

IDEOLOGICALLY Roumania is a perplexing enigma. King Carol contrives to act the autocrat while maintaining a semblance of democracy. If there is to be an absolute dictatorship he would prefer to play the leading part himself, and would resent any competition for the rôle from fascist quarters. But from such a human predilection it would be folly to conclude that he is either a champion of dictators or an opponent of fascist ideology. He is not a figurehead—he is the ruler of Roumania; but he desires, at least for the time being, to keep the appearance of constitutionalism and democracy, either because he really fancies that form of government or because he values the friendship of Western democracies.

For the past four years the so-called Liberal party has been in power. A change of government and general elections for Parliament became due this October. But for numerous reasons Carol preferred a Cabinet led by the acquiescent Tatarescu to one of the National Peasants' party; yet constitutional form had to be observed. In November the King asked Mihalache, then leader of the National Peasants' party, to form a government, provided he agreed to give a portfolio to Vaida Voevod, a former Prime Minister, and now leader of the strongly nationalistic, reactionary "Roumanian Front." The National Peasants' party was faced with a bitter choice: to refuse to form a Cabinet, or to assume responsibility for a government which was doomed to constant dissension. The King undoubtedly hoped it would reject his offer, for general elections would then take place under the supervision of Tatarescu's government; but he gave the National Peasants' party the option of playing into his hands with an impossible Cabinet alignment. Mihalache refused to take over the government under conditions which would discredit his party. Tatarescu again formed a Cabinet which differed little in complexion from his previous one, except that a member of Professor Iorga's party was given a portfolio. The renegade Vaida Voevod was overlooked. Evidently the King did not consider him altogether indispensable to the Cabinet; but the government concluded an electoral cartel with him. The former Minister of Communications, Franasovici, became Minister of Interior—a position of prime importance for supervising the general elections.

Early last autumn I found much speculation in Bucharest as to whether these elections would ever be held. The National Peasants' party insisted that legally they must take place in November, and was prepared to wage a constitutional struggle if the King did not call them. In such an event Mihalache was to resign as president of the party, and the beloved Maniu was to lead his country on the constitutional issue. The King was reported determined that elections should not be held before February. But shortly after the change in Cabinet the old Parliament was dissolved, and voting was scheduled for December 20th and 22nd, for deputies and senators respectively. Immediately Mihalache resigned his post to Maniu, who then undertook the organisation of a common front opposition to prevent illegal government pressure in the elections.

Only an extremely serious situation could have persuaded Maniu to resume leadership of the National Peasants' party and to confer with Cădeanu, the leader of the Iron Guard fascist organisation. Maniu, widely considered the finest character in all Roumania, an ardent patriot and determined democrat, evidently concluded that the King intended to use any means to defeat the National Peasants' party, regardless of popular sentiment, and that the continuance of autocratic government manipulated by a mysterious *camarilla* was more dangerous for the country than the conclusion of an electoral bargain with an outright fascist organisation. The common demand for the immediate removal of Mme Lupescu and the court clique is the basis for this strange co-operation of warring factions. On numerous occasions Iron Guardsmen have assaulted and threatened National Peasant leaders, and the Party has unceasingly demanded the suppression of fascist organisations. But last spring Maniu consented to receive a delegation from his bitter enemies, the Iron Guard, which came to propose co-operation against Mme Lupescu on the occasion of Prince Nicholas' exile. Although nothing apparently developed from this visit, in November Maniu sought their aid in the electoral struggle against the so-called "present system." So strong was the appeal of this cause that Maniu was able to persuade the Iron Guard to give up its opposition to the former Foreign Minister Titulescu, who has been living in self-imposed exile because of their threat to murder him for his Francophile policy.

Factions of opposing political philosophies found a common ground in their opposition to Mme Lupescu. It is believed that the King has turned to her for his final advice, and consequently her counsel has been in many respects more important than that of his ministers—an impossible situation for any responsible government. This political influence, combined with the fact that she is half Jewish, enrages the anti-Semitic Iron Guard beyond all measure. Its members have sworn to kill her. But politically Maniu's opposition to her is more significant than the threats of Iron Guardsmen. At first this opposition may have arisen on moral grounds, but it has now taken on a political importance which transcends all other issues. Maniu was Prime Minister when Carol returned from exile; in fact he largely engineered the so-called *coup* of June 1930, after he had been given to understand that Mme Lupescu would remain abroad. He was anxious that a reconciliation between Carol and Queen Helène should precede the proclamation of Carol as King; but his wish was overridden, and within two months Mme Lupescu had returned to Roumania. Shortly after, finding the situation impossible, Maniu resigned, and he has since declared he will never assume public office while she remains at Carol's side.

So great was the rift between Maniu and the King that it threatened to compromise the fortunes of the National Peasants' party. For, knowing Maniu's attitude towards Mme Lupescu and his great popularity, the King was thoroughly averse to entrusting him with the formation of a government. Consequently Maniu resigned as head of the party some time ago. But the recent Cabinet manipulation proved to all observers that the King was determined to defeat the National Peasants' party by any means at his disposal. His insistence that Vaida Voevod should be a member of Mihalache's Cabinet was a ruse. Vaida Voevod should be a member of the National Peasants' party until he broke away to form a faction of the extremeright. He is no longer of sufficient political importance to warrant the command that he should become a minister. But Carol undoubtedly wished to use him for his nuisance value, either to prevent the formation of a National Peasant Cabinet or, if Mihalache reluctantly accepted him as a colleague, to provide an obstruction in the government and a rival to Maniu, should the latter return to public office. Such tactics evidently convinced Maniu that the King could not be

reconciled to acceptance of a real National Peasant government, and that consequently he could best serve his party by becoming again its active leader in a contest where his great popularity and reputation might prove a deciding factor.

In this extraordinarily circuitous fashion Mme Lupescu's presence has become a political issue of prime importance. In fact it is to a marked extent on her account that the King will not entrust the government to a democratic party. Needless to say, there are also other reasons for autocracy in Roumania. The King has wide powers, and his desire to govern is encouraged by Mme Lupescu and the mysterious camarilla. With Tatarescu as Prime Minister he has had a strong influence in the government ; for Tatarescu has been a figurehead. He is not the president of his party, and he has often incurred outspoken criticism from the Liberals for his leniency towards fascist organisations. Carol undoubtedly feared that his influence would be curtailed under a National Peasant government which gives no promise of being so amenable in domestic, foreign or private affairs. While fascist terrorist acts continued, the so-called Liberal government of Tatarescu has been able to claim an excuse for autocratic measures—censorship and martial law. But its laxity in dealing with fascist outrages made the excuse hardly admissible, and aroused suspicion that it countenanced fascist activities in order to embarrass the democratic opposition.

It is extremely difficult to assess the importance of fascist sentiment in Roumania. The great appeal of the Iron Guard lies in its anti-Semitism, its enmity for Mme Lupescu, and its attractiveness to unemployed intellectuals and students. The paroxysm of anti-Semitism in Roumania is no new phenomenon, but it has been greatly aggravated by the economic crisis, when repayments to Jewish moneylenders became an intolerable burden on the peasantry. Anti-Semitism is not, therefore, confined to Iron Guardsmen and partisans of Cuza's and Goga's National Christian party ; it pervades the country and is exploited by them as a rallying programme.

Government efforts to control the principal fascist organisation—the Iron Guard—have been peculiarly ineffectual. Former Prime Minister Duca ordered its dissolution and paid for his boldness with his life in December 1933. Soon after there was a split in the organisation, and Stelescu, who opposed terrorist methods, broke away from Codreanu to form

a rival faction—the Crusaders. But on July 7th, 1936, he was murdered in a hospital cot by Iron Guardsmen, accusing him of treachery to their organisation. During the past few years the Iron Guard has been responsible for numerous assaults on National Peasant leaders, threats to murder Mme Lupescu, Titulescu, and even the King (should “certain circumstances” develop). It espoused the cause of Prince Nicholas last spring in order to exploit the difficulties attending his exile. Its members led riots against Liberal newspaper offices, and yet the government stood aside. The National Peasant Party demanded action and revived the Peasants’ Guard to protect its leaders. Even the Liberal party attacked the leniency of its own Cabinet. The government made a few spasmodic attempts to deal with the situation; but although the Iron Guard was proscribed it masquerades under the name “All for the Fatherland League.” The Ministers of Justice and Interior were blamed for too great leniency and were removed from these offices; but their successors, appointed in August 1936, were removed the next February for the same reason. In March, after the despicable assault by fascist students on M. Bratu, Rector of Jassy University, the government closed the Universities until it had time to adopt a new law on superior education, forbidding students to take part in any political activity. But a method of suppression which punishes all students is never likely to prove efficacious or justifiable. I am told that a more effective antidote to the fascist appeal for young people has been the National Youth Movement—the *Straja Tsarii*—which under the sponsorship of Carol teaches patriotism, loyalty to the King, discipline, and a cult of work and tradition.*

As in other countries of Central Europe, large amounts of German money are being spent on propaganda to stir up popular dissatisfaction, particularly in Transylvania which is extremely vulnerable because of its large minority groups. A number of Roumanian newspapers are supported by Germans, and the swastika is boldly displayed on news sheets and news posters. The Iron Guard denies that it receives Nazi financial support, yet it is difficult to account otherwise for the large sums at its disposal. But the strong evidence of fascist propaganda is not a measure of fascist power; in fact fascist

* Not to be confused with the conscription of young people between 18 and 21 for obligatory work.

groups polled a very meagre vote in the municipal elections at Bucharest last spring. Actually the vitality of Roumanian fascism is as dependent on the foreign situation as on internal issues. It suffered considerable loss of popularity after Mussolini's Milan speech in November 1936. His fiery espousal of territorial revision roused every impulse of nationalism in the Roumanians and caused the fascists no end of embarrassment. Nationalist sentiments were further provoked when the German and Italian Ministers at Bucharest attended the spectacular funeral of Marlin and Motza, two Iron Guardsmen killed under Franco in Spain. Their presence created an impression of meddling in internal affairs which was deeply resented. The King was so incensed that he requested the recall of the two diplomats. Roused by this fascist demonstration eighty-five members of the Liberal party protested to their own government against such occurrences, and appealed to Tatarescu to defend parliamentary democracy. As a result of the Cabinet crisis arising over this manifestation, Tatarescu took over the portfolio of the Interior and promised to take energetic measures against terrorist movements.

The effect of these incidents on Roumanian fascism is essentially less important than the repercussions from the contest in principles and strength between the fascist nations and the democracies of the West. As fascist nations won round after round in these diplomatic encounters, the prestige of democratic powers and of democratic ideology ebbed—a condition which favoured the fascist movement in Roumania and affected the government's foreign policy. The surface weakness of democratic states coupled with the apparent failures of collective security was a deadly blow to small nations. Roumania was in a very different situation from Czechoslovakia, which has no alternative but to rely on her alliances and the last vestige of collective security. Roumania has no fascist neighbour, nor is her territory a primary object of Nazi dreams. Both Italy and Germany have been disposed to be friendly for the sake of Roumanian petrol and in order to break through the obstruction to their influence in Central and South-eastern Europe, established by the ties of the Little Entente and Czechoslovakia's pacts with France and Soviet Russia.

Suspicion that a change was to take place in Roumania's foreign alignments appeared justified by the summary

dismissal of Titulescu in 1936. Under his direction as Minister of Foreign Affairs Roumania's traditional policy reached the peak of its manifestation. In some quarters his dismissal was attributed to the expanding influence of Mussolini, who detested Titulescu because he had openly rebuked Italian journalists who hissed Emperor Haile Selassie at Geneva. Among Titulescu's friends it was rumoured that Hitler was responsible—that he had presented Goga with a *dossier* compiled by the *Gestapo* which was supposed to prove that Titulescu had not worked in Carol's interests abroad. Goga is said to have turned the *dossier* over to the King on his return from Germany. But there are many other more plausible explanations than those involving foreign fascist influence. Tatarescu, no doubt, was piqued by Titulescu's categorical demand for energetic action against Germanophile fascist groups in Roumania, and the King resented his Foreign Minister's great renown abroad, believing it accrued to the prestige of Titulescu and not to the honour of Roumania.

Whatever the reason for the change of Ministers the expected deviation in Roumania's foreign policy has not been as serious as was predicted. Antonescu (Titulescu's successor) declared there could be no change in Roumania's basic policy. The prophecies of a decided reorientation towards Italy and Germany never materialised; in fact last spring Roumania rebuffed Italy by discouraging overtures for an agreement similar to the Italo-Yugoslav Pact. But with Titulescu's fall it was expected that Poland's Foreign Minister would attempt to dissuade Roumania from the tenets of collective security and convert her to those of bilateral agreements. Besides the fundamental difference in the international principles of Titulescu and Beck, there was personal enmity between the two Foreign Ministers. Beck's advances towards Roumania occasioned an epidemic of visits between the statesmen of the two countries, but if any new commitments were made they were kept entirely verbal. Naturally, however, Soviet Russia became wary of Roumania; and considerable uneasiness was felt on Czechoslovakia's account, for Poland has not been friendly towards her neighbour since she concluded her Pact with Germany in 1935. But apparently the Little Entente was not seriously endangered by these advances, regardless of what may have been Beck's original intentions.

Recent events have brought more favour to Roumania's

traditional policy. The British rearmament programme reawakened faith in the vitality of democratic Powers, and the apparent ability of France to deal with her domestic difficulties strengthened this conviction. As long as the spectres of Hungarian revision and German penetration haunt Central and South-eastern Europe, Roumania's true interest will be linked with the Western democracies, not in an anti-fascist alignment to which the Little Entente is unalterably opposed, but in an alignment against every threat of aggressive action. During the last few months there has been a noticeable change in the official attitude of France and England toward Roumania. Heretofore they have taken Roumania's friendship for granted—an assumption which always runs the risk of rousing proud resentment in a smaller nation; while the popular portrayal of Carol as a play-boy king, and the display of moral indignation towards him, have only done harm. Both England and France made a point of sending military emissaries to Sinaia on the occasion of Prince Michael's sixteenth birthday and his appointment as lieutenant in the army; and King Carol has been officially invited to visit London. Such acts of courtesy and recognition have a diplomatic significance far transcending their face value.

Prophecy is a dangerous game of chance in these days of successive crises, and particularly with regard to a country where personal issues play so vital a rôle. The King has held the key to Roumanian politics. His political manipulation last autumn gave ample evidence that he preferred a mis-called Liberal government to the prospect of a National Peasant Cabinet, promising more democratic procedure and a return to the traditional foreign policy, possibly under the direction of Titulescu himself. Although the King may recently have been convinced of the wisdom of closer co-operation with France and his Little Entente allies, he did not wish to give up a malleable government for a more independent Cabinet which would demand the removal of Mme Lupescu and the camarilla. Consequently the clash between the King, the government and the common opposition front marks a crisis in the extraordinary Roumanian struggle between autocracy, democracy and fascism.

MARY N. HAWES.

N.B.—This article was written before the change of Government.—ED. C.R.

ARE VALUES MYTHOLOGICAL?

VISCOUNT SAMUEL stands in the succession of the British statesmen who have devoted their leisure to enriching our literature and, above all, to the serious discussion of the graver problems of thought and life. He has recently added to his previous works a volume entitled *Belief and Action* (Cassell, 7s. 6d. net), by which he seeks to contribute "an everyday philosophy" to ordinary men. A book coming from such a source and directed to such an end demands careful consideration and frank appraisement.

This book shows, as might be expected, the extensive learning and the careful reflection which have given Lord Samuel a recognised place among our philosophical thinkers. The treatment is dominated throughout by the practical concern of a distinguished man of affairs, who is not content to deal with practical problems superficially, but realises that even these should be treated from the standpoint of fundamental principles derived from a reasoned view of Reality as a whole. He seeks, therefore, to make the plain man think and to help him to understand. The range covered by the book is wide, for the author starts from the present confusion of the world, and making his way through Creeds and Science, Religion and Ethics, treats of the Family, Poverty and Property, Liberty, the Nation and the World, and the Conditions of Peace. He concludes by affirming that whereas "hitherto evolution has been unconscious," "Men now may modify their environment, change their culture, with a deliberate purpose." "Conscious evolution becomes the principle of our action" (pp. 24-5).

If this principle is to be observed and its possibilities fulfilled Lord Samuel holds strongly that religion must lead the way, for action must be directed by belief. Yet if religion is to discharge its indispensable office, the religions of the world must come together on the basis of common principles and aims. They must get rid of crystallisation and fixity. Above all, religions must come completely into line with science. In this way, and in this alone, can they bring their united influence effectively to bear upon mankind for the furtherance of peace, and for the attainment of the universal and particular well-being which conscious evolution brings within reach.

With this paramount aim in view, Lord Samuel carries his readers along with him by an exposition which is so continuous and lucid, so constantly enriched from his stores of knowledge that interest never flags from start to finish. His philosophic standpoint is that of what used to be termed Natural Realism. His outlook is characteristically Liberal in regard alike to religion and ethics, to politics and social concerns. It is, indeed, fundamentally individualist, for Lord Samuel insists that Society is an organisation, not an organism. One outstanding limitation must be noted. The book treats of belief, without setting forth the object of belief. Hence the ground of religious belief is not explored, nor is its essential content displayed. Yet belief is a response to supposed reality and therefore requires a substantial basis that can be scrutinised by reason. Only as it conveys a body of doctrine can religion either come into collision with or be made conformable to science. If religions are to come together it can only be upon the common acceptance of truth, and not merely upon common sentiments and aspirations, however these may be informed by growing apprehension of the process of the world.

In order to retain the attention of the ordinary reader Lord Samuel relegates the fundamental problems of philosophy to appendices in which he discusses in succession Reality, Values, Mind and Matter, Causality and Indeterminism, Free Will. These are dealt with, not merely separately, but in isolation from one another. This isolation is, in the judgment of the present reviewer, accounted for by Lord Samuel's conclusion in regard to values. "The doctrine of values," he says, "is the mythology of philosophers." "In the doctrine of values we see poetry seeking again to usurp the seat of philosophy. It is the human imagination at play, lending actuality to fictions" (p. 262). This conclusion is supported by bringing forward the disvalues of Evil, Ugliness and Falsehood as existing side by side with Goodness, Beauty and Truth. Furthermore human opinions vary in regard to the appreciation of values. "The realities are material things, living beings are particular minds. So with values, such as Goodness, Beauty and Truth" (p. 261). These values do not exist in their own right. They are generalisations drawn from the particular judgments and preferences of individual minds.

These objections raise serious demurs precisely on the basis of "Conscious Evolution." Why, it must be asked, should poetry be disparaged and set in opposition to philosophy? Surely the method of conscious evolution is to present ideal visions to mankind for the appropriation of belief, the inspiration of action, and the material of philosophy. Does not "Conscious Evolution" make use of education, thus tending surely, if slowly, to the banishment of Evil, Ugliness and Falsehood and to the enthronement of Truth, Beauty and Goodness by agreement in their place? Does not the eventual unity of mankind, for which future peace is waiting, depend upon this process of supersession and agreement? The progress of science, art, and law counts upon this assumption, which, in their several spheres, they seek to bring about.

The method of evolution, so far as it has become conscious, has been to avail itself, above all and at the first, of prophets and poets. In them revelation has led to inspiration, and inspiration has conferred upon them the leadership of men towards the better being, which reformers have promoted and which philosophy has eventually approved. It has been and is the faith of the higher religions that the values which they come to appreciate and pursue, inhere in and spring from the Eternal Mind, which governs the process of evolution, and so whispers its secrets to the minds of men, that in them evolution may become conscious. Experience assembles the materials and collects the workmen, but the values present the artist's plan.

If there is one lesson to be learnt both from evolution as an objective fact and from conscious evolution as a subjective endeavour it is that of the Wholeness of Reality as an intelligible system. Belief, if it is to secure agreement and to lead to successful action, must attain to wholeness of consistent apprehension, sustained by reason, and confirmed by experience of the process of the Universe. It is submitted that only by recognition of the primacy and authority of values can this wholeness be attained and can evolution become conscious. Towards this end a drawing together of God, Nature and Man must be effected by thought, in which while distinctions are recognised they are subordinated by an organising principle of unity. For example, mind and matter should be distinguished, as Lord Samuel contends, but not treated as in stark otherness from one another. So also of

causality. It is not sufficient to define this simply as meaning that the state of the Universe to-day is the inexorable consequence of its state yesterday and the determining condition of its state to-morrow. The very fact of evolution constrains us to inquire whether causality is purposive ; if so, to what ends it is directed and by what methods does it seek to attain its consummation through conscious co-operation.

It is at this point that the Supreme Values emerge and present themselves as indispensable to the guidance of Man because in them lies the explanation of the process of the Universe and its passage to conscious recognition and purposive direction. It is, of course, true that values are personal or they would not be valued. It is true also that their apprehension and pursuit varies in different ages and in different men, or there would be no evolution. Yet it is also true that *conscious* evolution means a movement towards community of valuation, and it is contended that this very fact implies that values are organic to the universe. These values do actually disclose themselves in the threefold form of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, as distinct objects of pursuit yet as susceptible of unification in and through the spiritual evolution of mankind. These values are gradually revealed to the apprehension of men through its prophets and poets and are passed on to the philosophers, artists and saints for the education of mankind. It is by means of this process of revelation, appreciation and practice that human society is becoming in actuality an organism. Its organisation has been created, upheld, and developed because its organic potentiality has been implicit from the start. Above all, it is by means of these assumptions and this process that such catholicity of religions can be brought about as will lead to their fellowship and fruitful co-operation.

The same conclusions will be reached when we pass from the consideration of Lord Samuel's book to that of theistic faith and the arguments by which it has been supported. In particular, the same need of wholeness will be discovered and the means of its attainment, it will be contended, can be found in the values.

At the dawn of human consciousness the existence of God, or of gods, was assumed. Hence the first argument that has usually been urged in support of Theism is that of the *Consentio Gentium*. The persistence, development, and cementing

influence of this primitive belief cannot altogether be explained as due to the influence of accidental events, however often repeated and however evocative of fear or faith. An element of valuation has been involved. Especially wherever faith became strong enough to banish fear or to drive it to the background, this beneficial result has been due to the dawn of the values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness and to the expulsion of the disvalues, which had awakened fear.

When a higher stage of awareness and reflection was reached men began to discover and to explore the content of their religious beliefs. This was pre-eminently the case with the Hebrew prophets, and to some extent with the Greek philosophers. The former built up the lofty Theism of the Old Testament, the latter began to investigate "the nature of the gods" and their relation to the cosmic order. In both cases the germs and suggestions of the future theistic arguments can be discovered.

The process of formulating the nature and setting forth the grounds of theistic belief was greatly stimulated, if not altogether brought about, by the first activities of Christian missionaries and the attendant apologists of the Christian Faith. In their successive conflicts with Polytheism, Manichæan Dualism, and neo-Platonism, the apologists and doctors of the Church were concerned above all to establish the Unity and Personality of God, His Creatorship, His Spiritual and Ethical perfection, His concern for the Universe and mankind. Hence the theistic arguments began to take shape.

Subsequently, throughout the Scholastic period the lingering influence of neo-Platonic impersonalism, its revival by the Arab philosophers, and the materialist legacy of Lucretius led to the formulation of the classical arguments, ontological, cosmological, and design, which may be said to have received their final formulation from the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas, including the statement, criticism, and rejection of the ontological argument.

These arguments were developed independently of one another, and lay apart for cumulative reasoning directed rather to establishing the existence of God in active relationship primarily to the Universe than to His characterisation. These arguments, therefore, were mainly objective and the values involved were left to religious faith, rather than to philosophical appreciation.

The critical philosophy of Kant attempted to bring about the rejection of these arguments, and the substitution for them of the moral argument deduced from the implications of the categorical imperative of duty. Thus the subjectivity of the practical reason was substituted for the objective arguments, ejected from the pure reason.

When these arguments are carefully examined it becomes manifest that the values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are essentially involved in them and that both their apartness from one another and their imperfection are due to the fact that these values had imperfect effect given to them. The ontological argument in its attempt to bring together perfection and existence obviously turns upon valuation. The cosmological argument aims not merely at reaching the First Cause of the Universe, but at finding the sufficient reason for existence as a whole. The sufficiency of the First Cause, therefore, depends on valuation. The design argument fastens upon particular instances which are held to exhibit purposive activity. It is contended that wisdom and beneficence bring into existence Truth, Beauty and Goodness throughout creation. The moral argument of Kant is defective and unconvincing both because it is developed as standing apart from the cognisable nature of the Cosmos as a whole and, still more, because it neglects to set forth the positive values, which the categorical imperative seeks to promote.

Only the philosophic, as well as the poetic, recognition of the values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness can bring all these arguments to their goal, and effectively unify them. In the first place, the emergence of these values displays the concourse of Mind and Matter, Spirit and Nature, Individuals, Societies and their environments. In the second place, their "Givenness" unifies God, Nature, and Man—God as the home and source, Nature as the occasion and suggestion, Man as the percipient of values. And, thirdly, the values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness when thus recognised for the purpose of world explanation, give confidence, variety, progressiveness, as well as fellowship, to human action, because it rests upon and proceeds from belief in the reality, directiveness and satisfaction of these Supreme Values as giving an adequate explanation of evolution and guidance to the conscious evolution by which our world may be brought to its consummating end.

In what sense then, if at all, are values mythological? In precisely the same sense as Reason, Mind, Matter, Causality and the rest are mythological. All these are real in their wholeness as well as in their manifold particulars. Yet it may well be urged that the values have a higher degree of reality than all the rest. They manifest reason, awaken mind, have their occasions and instruments in matter and are the end of universal causality in evolution. Their source is neither in the material Universe nor in the mind of man, but in the Master Mind, the transcendent and immanent Providence, the wisdom that orders evolution to a satisfying end—in God. This is the Belief of Religion and the spring of its action in the service of mankind.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

“**T**HERE is,” wrote Lord Noel-Buxton in last month’s issue of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, “a solid basis of reason which gives strength to German demands ; this is particularly true with regard to the former German colonies and also to the sufferings of the Sudeten Deutsch minority in Czechoslovakia.” The Sudeten Germans, it must be remembered, have never been German citizens, and the interest of Germany is justified only by the accident of language. It would seem unwarrantable, therefore, to regard the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia as a subject of discussion between ourselves and Germany, except on the basis of two assumptions. The first is that the treatment of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak Government is contrary to the treaty obligations accepted at St. Germain by the Allied Powers and the Czechoslovak Government. The second is that this treatment is so provocative as to constitute a *casus belli* between Germany and Czechoslovakia. As an influential world Power our responsibility is not only to remove the causes of war wheresoever they may occur but, above all, to observe our treaty obligations. Interest in the German minority is no less an obligation than our guarantee of the independence and integrity of the Czechoslovak frontiers. We must, however, examine the assumptions which would justify our intervention and afterwards decide whether our responsibility is best fulfilled by influencing the Czechoslovak Government to meet the German demand.

As members of the League of Nations and signatories of the St. Germain Treaty, we have the right to investigate the grievances of the Sudeten Germans and sponsor before the League Council their petitions to the League of Nations. Those grievances alone are justified which relate to the rights of the Sudeten Germans as guaranteed by treaty. Examination of the clauses of the Treaty of St. Germain shows how delicate in fact are the obligations of the Czechoslovak Government, how difficult our own duty to see that they are fulfilled. “The Czechoslovak Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Czechoslovakia without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. . . . All Czechoslovak citizens shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same

civil and political rights as, for instance, admission to public employments and honours or the exercise of professions and industries. . . ."

It is undoubted that considerable discrimination exists and has existed ever since the war against all minorities. The Sudeten Germans, who represent over 22 per cent. of the total Czechoslovak population, resent more bitterly than others an inferior position in the State and in the administration. This grievance was recognised over a year ago by the Czech Government and an agreement was signed on February 18th which was to redress it. This agreement is important because it has given a measuring rod to phrases like "the same civil and political rights" by introducing the principle of proportionalism. The Germans, it was agreed, should be represented in all spheres of State activity according to their proportion of the total population. Unfortunately the results of this agreement have been disappointing, and bitter attacks were made on the Government not only by the Henlein party, but by the Activists themselves, in the Budget Debates of last November. "Unquestionably an improvement is to be found here and there," said Wenzel Jaksch, "but it falls far short of the proportion corresponding to our share in the population.

. . . The grave consequences of a failure to carry out the policy of February 18th can now no longer be avoided by words, but only by deeds. . . ." The policy of the Government was defended in a long speech by the Prime Minister, Dr. Hodza, which may be found in the *Central European Observer* of November 26th, 1937.

"We do not wish to make a mechanical criterion out of the proportion between the nationalities. In a series of instances in cultural, economic and social life the share apportioned to the Germans exceeds the percentage of their numerical relation to the total population. There are, however, other spheres in which the minority share does not yet answer fully to their national proportion. In some cases this is the natural result of the fact that the Germans do not desire to reconcile themselves to the unalterable reality of Czechoslovakia as a State, and to their direct boycott of the State services."

It would be wrong to assume that it is always the fault of the Sudeten German, though a psychology hostile to collaboration in the State certainly exists. This is partly due to the hope of foreign intervention deliberately encouraged by the

Henlein party, partly to the tragic course of their Czech-German history which over and over again has proved the victory of one to be the defeat of the other.

This year Czechoslovakia celebrates the twentieth anniversary of her foundation. In a New Year's message to a Czech newspaper (*Venkov*) which asked for congratulatory wishes from prominent Czech citizens, Henlein wrote that he looked back on the year 1918 with "bitterness and sorrow." The Czechs look back upon it, of course, with rejoicing and pride, and are strengthened in their idea of a National State by the Sudeten German's lack of enthusiasm for the State of which he is a citizen. The Czechs consider the Germans as a minority element in a National State. To be thus considered is the bitterest grievance of the Sudeten Germans. We must recognise, therefore, that though there are grievances under the Treaty of St. Germain, the main grievance is that treaty itself. The cause of Herr Henlein's electoral success was less the petty discrimination of Czech officials than the rise to power of the Third Reich. German minorities in all parts of Europe have suddenly become aware that a minority position in an alien State is incompatible with membership of the German race. Nowhere is this new development seen more clearly than in Czechoslovakia. On the one hand are the three democratic German Activist parties who co-operate loyally inside the Czechoslovak Government for the redress of their grievances : on the other is the much stronger crypto-nazi party of Herr Henlein who demands that grievances shall be redressed by revolution. The Sudeten German Party will only be satisfied when the Czechoslovak State has been radically altered.

To support the revolutionaries of a foreign country is a dangerous precedent whose logical conclusion we see in Spain. And yet to support the joint efforts of German and Czech moderates, though this is to fulfil our treaty obligations, will not satisfy the German "claim." Moderates of all kinds are distasteful to the present German Government, and none so distasteful as those who speak German and reject National Socialism. Herr Henlein is a great admirer of Herr Hitler and probably has grounds for saying that there is no solution acceptable to Germany which does not satisfy his demands. We should then at least examine these demands, the most important of which is for autonomy. Though Herr Henlein has never defined what he means by autonomy, a

first step towards it is envisaged by the six Bills which were presented to Parliament in April 1937, and which will be discussed in the coming session.* Certain of these Bills may be accepted, for their principle is already acknowledged in the Czechoslovak Constitution (e.g. the Bill against the illegal exercise of public authority). The main Bills, however, which concern the "defence of the national group" (*Volksschutz*) mean nothing more nor less than the total change of the Czechoslovak Constitution. In so far as this project is democratic, it represents the principle of democratic totalitarianism: it gives to the relatively strongest political tendency power to dominate the political, social, cultural and even economic life of the national group.

It is almost out of the question that these Bills will be passed. Should they be, however, the process of nazification of the Sudeten Germans would soon be as complete as it is in the Third Reich. The last spark of legal German democracy would be extinguished and Czechoslovakia would lose control of her frontiers to just that portion of the German minority whose loyalty is most in question, and whose acceptance of the basic principles of her constitution is least assured. A serious danger would, therefore, have been created for the State. In effect, autonomy means nothing more nor less than the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The Sudeten German districts would be no more an autonomous whole than Danzig is to-day. Their progress towards incorporation in the Third Reich would be fraught with far greater danger of war than is the progress toward reconciliation which is being followed to-day by the Czechoslovak Government. To-day no one is fighting for their lives. Then, not only the Czechs, but a large proportion of the Germans themselves, would be fighting for their last chance of a free existence.

This danger to German democracy, to the independence of Czechoslovakia and the peace of Europe is insufficiently realised in this country. "To refuse autonomy," wrote Lord Noel-Buxton, "might be to risk not only the loss of her German-speaking territories, but of the independence of the whole country." In fact, the exact opposite is the case. To

* Details of these Bills may be obtained from two publications of the Karl H. Frank Verlag Karlsbad, Leipzig, 1937 ("Die Gesetzesanträge der Sudetendeutschen Partei" and "Warum Volksschutzgesetze?" by Dr. Ernst Swoboda), and from an article in the *Central European Observer* of Leipzig, June 25th, giving the criticisms of these Bills which are likely to result in their rejection by the Czechoslovak Parliament.

grant autonomy in the present circumstances is virtual suicide. Before, therefore, we support the claims of a foreign revolutionary, let us be clear that by supporting autonomy we are not only signing the death warrant of Czechoslovakia, but even exaggerating the danger of war, for the present Czechoslovak Government would fight rather than accept this disposition of its internal affairs. There is an alternative Government which might do so, but before considering this possibility let us examine the second assumption and consider the international aspect of the problem.

The second assumption was that the plight of the Sudeten Germans constitutes an actual war danger for Europe. This assumption is less than half true. It is true that the psychological tension between German and Czech, arising partly from Czech misgovernment, partly from nationalist propaganda, is so great that the possibility of an incident can never be excluded. It is more doubtful, however, that this incident would provoke the armed intervention of Germany. It did not do so last autumn after the Teplitz affair, even though the description given by the German press was sufficient to arouse a most violent spirit of revenge in Germany. The truth is that, since the Sudeten Germans have never belonged to Germany, and are slightly despised by the average German, it is only the Nazi enthusiast who acclaims the prodigal son.

There is, or at any rate was, however, an undoubted danger of war, and the Sudeten Germans, if not the cause, may at least be the occasion for it. The cause must be sought in the foreign policy of Germany. In so far as this is National Socialist—that is aims at the reunion of all Germans and expansion towards the East—its immediate steps are wholly unaccountable. There is, however, a steady drift of German foreign policy. The German policy is—as must be the policy of every dynamic power—to put herself in a position of superiority over any possible combination against her. The first essential is, as Hitler wrote in 1923, to prevent a situation arising in which Germany must fight on two frontiers at once. For the first few years of the present régime, the German aim was to neutralise the West in the event of a possible clash on her Eastern frontier. This was the meaning of her overtures to England and the Naval Agreement, the plans for a Western Air Pact, for a Western Locarno. It was the reason for her refusal to sign an Eastern Locarno. This

was the period of Czechoslovakia's greatest danger. If German diplomacy had been successful, Czechoslovakia would have been isolated and a lightning attack would have had the effect of enormously increasing German strength in relation to any possible combination against her. Moreover, Czechoslovakia was relatively disarmed at that time, and her resistance would have been only a matter of days.

However, this was before the days of Henlein and before the Sudeten German "sufferings" were considered to give a basis of reason to German claims. At that time it was Poland who was in the direct line of fire. As early as 1934 the policy began to change. The first fruits of this change were the Polish-German Treaty and the weakening of the Polish-French alliance. The French reacted by signing the Soviet Pact in 1935. It was the French insistence on the interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe which caused the Germans to change their policy. The Soviet Pacts confirmed this change and directed the whole force of German propaganda against the weakest link in the Franco-Soviet chain. This is Czechoslovakia.

To-day, the *Rückendeckung* policy of Germany has moved from West to East. This is the meaning of the Berlin-Rome axis, of the Polish Treaty, of the overtures to Beck, Stoyadinovitch and Goga. To-day the most immediate causes of world war lie in the West, in the Mediterranean, in the Far East, therefore the German need is to guarantee on her Eastern frontier, between herself and the Soviet Union, a vast barrier of neutral territory. This is the meaning of Germany's insistent pressure on Czechoslovakia. Paradoxically, though the strain put upon them is greater than ever before, the danger of war has actually diminished for the Czechs. Their own rearmament and the reaffirmed French commitment protect them to-day against a lightning attack. It is possible that Germany, counting on our effort to restrain the French, might risk a lightning attack, but the probability of a local war in the heart of Europe developing into a general conflict is so great that it is improbable that Germany would take the smaller risk without being prepared for the greater event.

Attack on Czechoslovakia is therefore only an ultimate measure which Germany will take when general war is inevitable. Till that time she will use "peaceful" means to force the Czechoslovak Government to accept her policy of

Rückendeckung. It is in this respect that the Sudeten Germans are important, and their importance is enhanced by their appearing to us to give a "solid basis of reason" to the German demand. If the Sudeten German party can once get a commanding influence in the State, either through autonomy or through their participation in a Coalition Government, Herr Henlein can be relied upon to secure the required change in Czechoslovak foreign policy. This eventuality is, as we suggested earlier, not out of the question. Every now and again voices are raised in the Czech press which plead for an understanding with Germany and with Henlein. These voices are all the more significant because they come from responsible leaders of the biggest Czech party—the Agrarians. On January 1st, *Venkov*, the agrarian paper, published an article by Beran, the chairman of the party, in which he advocated agreement both with Henlein and with Germany. Immediately below was the statement by Herr Henlein in which he contrasted the Czech and the German attitude to the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. The two statements aroused a storm in the Czech political world. The calmest criticism was in the *Lidové Noviny*, an independent paper strongly influenced by President Beneš and the views of the Czechoslovak Foreign Office.

"Beran," it wrote, "confines himself to the enunciation of a pious wish which is the fervent desire of us all. He does not say, however, on what terms we should collaborate with Henlein, on what conditions we may reach agreement with Germany." It is obvious from what has gone before that the primary condition is Czechoslovakia's surrender of her foreign alliances: the secondary is the granting of such rights to Henlein as will ensure his decisive influence over Czech foreign policy. In return for these two concessions, Germany would probably guarantee the present frontiers of Czechoslovakia and disinterest herself in the fate of the German minority. She has a positive economic interest not to incorporate in Germany the Distressed Areas of the Sudetenland. Once they are strong enough to influence foreign policy the Sudeten Germans could look after themselves.

Negotiations were started a short time ago between Germany and Czechoslovakia. They chiefly concerned the position of political *émigrés* in the two countries, a press truce and the formation of National Socialist organisations by Reich

Germans living in Czechoslovakia. If the Czechoslovak Government wished to enlarge the scope of the negotiations, they could, as we have seen, obtain satisfactory terms. The loss of independence in foreign policy would be compensated by immediate relief from the perpetual nightmare of foreign invasion. Germany would renounce the Sudetenland and order the covetous eyes of Poland and Hungary to turn aside. The immense strain of rearmament would immediately be relieved, and the country could once more devote itself to a productive economy.

Why, therefore, do the Czechs not agree to these terms? In our age of cynicism and cowardice, the answer is absurd. They do not agree because for three hundred years they were ruled by the German Hapsburgs and have no desire for a new vassalage. Rather than this they are ready to risk being utterly destroyed in return for the hope that by their independence in Central Europe, by their alliance with the Western Powers, war may be averted and their freedom preserved. So long as Germany must reckon with war on two frontiers, she must reckon with defeat. Only when defeat is certain will the dynamic powers relinquish war as an instrument of policy. It is to make this defeat more certain that Czechoslovakia runs the terrible risk of total annihilation.

If we understand this, it is neither honest nor wise to meet German "claims" about the Sudeten Germans and thereby lose the last ally we have in Central Europe. Not only are we betraying a courageous people and assisting a foreign revolutionary, but we are also freeing for action on the West the whole military machine of Germany. We are losing the vital weeks we need for the training of the few hundred thousand recruits whom we lack. It would be impossible to demand of a Power that they take so great a risk for our sakes, yet they are offering it and we are refusing. The offer may not remain open much longer.

If we wish to avoid war, not only must we remove the occasion by supporting the present efforts of moderate German and Czech to come to an understanding, not only must we remove the causes of war by ourselves first paying the price of peace, but we must also prevent conditions arising in which war might seem profitable to the aggressor. The right policy is surely to be as brave as the Czechs in organising a certain defeat for the perpetrators of an unjust war.

S. GRANT DUFF.

THE GROWING REFUGEE PROBLEM.

THE Assembly of the League of Nations in 1937 was again concerned with refugees. What has been hitherto regarded as a purely humanitarian activity of the League became a matter of political controversy, as obstinate as the problem of Manchukuo or Spain. The main issue was the future of the work for refugees who have been under the limited protection of the two international organs of the League: namely the 600,000 Russian and Armenian exiles from the Soviet Union and Turkey, who are still within the scope of the Nansen International Office: and the 100,000 exiles, Jewish and non-Jewish, from Germany, for whom a High Commissioner, originally detached from the League, but since 1936 integrated in the Secretariat, is responsible. The 30,000 Assyrians, still precariously existing in Iraq until an acceptable scheme of settlement is devised, and unnumbered exiles from Italy, Spain and other states have so far been outside the scope of the established League organisation.

In accordance with resolutions of earlier Assemblies the Nansen Office is to be completely liquidated by the end of 1938; and the office of the High Commissioner for the refugees from Germany is to come to an end at the same time. When the decision was taken about the Nansen Office some eight years ago, the Assembly entertained a hopeful prospect that the bulk of the Russians and Armenians would soon be absorbed in the economic life of the countries of the Old and the New Worlds in which they were distributed. A progressive reduction of the work of assistance and settlement seemed practicable; and the juridical status of the refugees, as well as their rights to employment and social aid, were to be defined by an International Convention. A few years later the economic blizzard burst upon Europe, and tore up the slender roots of the alien settlement. Tens of thousands who had been employed were discharged; thousands who had resided undisturbed for years in a country of refuge were thrown into prison because it appeared that they lacked some *permis de séjour*. And while in 1933 an International Convention defining their status was formulated and signed at Geneva by representatives of governments, none of the States were willing to ratify it and so oblige themselves to give a minimum of human rights to the stranger within the gates, at a time

when they were hard put to provide a means of existence for masses of their nationals. So the hopes of an early end of the problem dwindled ; and the Nansen Office was in fact unable to reduce its activity.

A new complication in the position was introduced in 1934, when the U.S.S.R. was admitted into the League of Nations. The State which has created refugees is seldom sympathetic to its creation ; and the Soviet Union was no exception. The Soviet delegates in the Council and Assembly suspected the Nansen Office of being a political instrument of the White Russians ; and whilst they could not attempt forthwith to get rid of the Office, they offered an unbending resistance to any modification of the League's resolution which would prolong its existence after 1938. The proposal for reconsideration was adjourned from year to year ; till at the last Assembly Norway, true to the tradition of Nansen, pressed the issue. The present head of the Nansen Office, Judge Hansen, also a Norwegian, formerly Vice-President of the Mixed Courts in Egypt, has brought to his difficult task the determination and the humanity of his great compatriot who founded the Office ; and while he has secured a substantial reduction of the numbers needing assistance, he has made it abundantly clear to the governments that the problem cannot be disposed of by a fixed time.

Great Britain supported the Norwegian action, influenced, perhaps, by a deputation to the Foreign Office last summer, that represented a large number of philanthropic bodies, and was headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Cecil of Chelwood. The Norwegians urged the establishment of a single League Commission to deal with the whole problem of exiles without distinction of nationality. The Sixth Commission of the Assembly, which by precedent deals with refugees as a political question, was impressed by the need of reconsideration, and adopted with a single dissentient a resolution that could not be charged with excess of definiteness or of liberality, but envisaged continuing action after 1938. After noting the earlier resolutions about liquidation, it recited that the problem nevertheless subsists, and that it was desirable to come to a decision without delay as to the future of the work of international assistance. "Whereas the political and legal protection of refugees has not ceased to be an obligation under the League, and the League cannot dissociate itself

from the co-ordination of the humanitarian efforts pursued on their behalf, the Assembly decides to continue without interruption for a specified period the work carried on hitherto under the auspices of the League." The resolution asserted that the work must be kept free from all political influences, and that League funds must be applied solely to the administrative expenses, and not to relief and settlement of the refugees. Finally, the work should facilitate the adaptation of the refugees to their new national environment.

The rule of unanimity in the Assembly enables one State to nullify action about the humanitarian as well as about the political work of the League. It was hoped that the Soviet opposition in the Commission might be withdrawn in the Plenary Session of the Assembly, or at least converted into that milder abstention from voting which would not prevent action. Lord Cranborne, in introducing the resolution, gave a warning of the blow to the credit and authority of the League which would follow on wrecking tactics. But in face of Soviet intransigence the representatives of four States that are deeply exercised about refugee problems both Russian and German, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, brought forward an amendment to the resolution which simply marks time. Stating that the problems as a whole necessitate a new examination at an early date, their amending and non-committal resolution (for which Soviet abstention was secured), requests the Council to draw up before the next Assembly a plan for international assistance to refugees. The resolution was adopted, though twenty-two States, including Great Britain, abstained. The League, it is said, has touched nothing which it does not adjourn; but the hope is that healing time, or the persuasion of the other States, may bring the Soviet Government to a more reasonable mood by the Assembly of 1938.

Meantime a survey of the refugee problem in all its aspects is to be conducted under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and under the direction of Sir John Hope-Simpson. The survey will take account of the situation and needs of Russians, Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, Germans (Jewish and other), Spaniards and Italians—and also stateless persons—in exile, and will furnish for the consideration of the governments before the next Assembly a fuller knowledge of the dimensions of the problem. It will

deal also with potential refugee problems, e.g. from Poland and Danzig; and indicate how this new and growing category of humanity may be absorbed into the normal society. For the refugee should not, like the poor, be always with us.

While the question of the Russian refugees was uppermost in the Assembly of 1937, because of the Soviet opposition, it was recognised that the question of the refugees from Germany is equally incapable of liquidation by the end of 1938. It is a continuous and growing problem. Though the sustained efforts of philanthropic organisations and the expenditure of some four million pounds have succeeded in directing the greatest part of the Jewish emigration from the Reich to certain destinations, and prevented a panic exodus, the National Socialist Government each year, almost each month, contrives to tighten the screw of oppression against Jews and non-Aryans, and so forces the choice between annihilation and emigration. The Jewish population in the Reich has declined since 1933 from 510,000 to about 360,000. There is an annual emigration of nearly 25,000 men, women and children, mostly young persons; and there is an excess of deaths over births annually of at least 5,000. The age level of those who remain is constantly and rapidly rising, so that to-day the proportion of the Jewish population above the age of 45 is over half, while in England it is under 30 per cent. On the other hand, the birth-rate falls still more steeply. Whereas in 1880 the number of Jewish births in Germany was 16,000, last year it was no more than 2,000. The diminution of the community by natural causes in future years will be still greater: and if the emigration continues at the present rate, the Jewish population will have fallen by 1941 to less than a quarter-million. By far the larger part of the outflow is helped on its way to Palestine and countries overseas. Despite the protracted troubles and rebellion, in 1936 over 8,000 Jews from Germany were settled in the Jewish National Home, and since 1933 the total of those established is 45,000. In 1937 owing to increased Government limitation, the number was not more than half that of the previous year: but the relaxing of restriction in some countries of the New World has compensated. The British Dominions have as yet provided a home for but a small proportion: their need of population, which cannot be met by any outflow of the young from the

Mother country, may make them more receptive of immigrants who bring energy and intelligence and will be loyal citizens.

During the last two years the position of the refugees from Germany in European States has been considerably improved. Following on the original exodus in 1933-4, which found its way principally to France, Holland, Czechoslovakia and other countries adjacent to Germany, and received generous asylum, there was a period of great hardship and repression. The countries of refuge, faced with extreme economic crisis, found it difficult to absorb the alien workers, and the exiles were prohibited even from seeking work, were hounded from place to place and country to country, and, in order to be able to exist, were driven underground. The efforts of the High Commissioner for the German refugees were restricted by circumstances. But in 1936, when the Popular Front won its electoral victory, France regained her traditional mood of generosity to the victims of persecution. The condition of the Germans in France, whose numbers are substantially and steadily reduced by emigration overseas, has sensibly improved: The liberalism of Holland has been manifested by the maintenance of the open frontier; the liberalism of England by sympathetic consideration for the most part of individual cases. But, save in France, the opportunities of employment are narrowly limited.

The aim of the League High Commissioner has been principally to give help in the juridical aspects of the problem, to secure from the governments the acceptance of a convention which will provide for those who have fled from Germany, and are either stateless or deprived of German protection, a minimum of legal status, a right to reside and a right to travel. The foundation of that convention was laid by a Governmental Conference at Geneva in July 1936, which adopted an "Arrangement." This winter a second conference will consider a draft of a more comprehensive convention which will deal also with the right to employment and to social assistance. Representatives of the philanthropic and humanitarian organisations have put forward amendments to the draft project which are radical, but may help to mitigate the excessive caution of the governments. If the Convention is signed and ratified, it will mark a definite forward step to international co-operation on behalf of refugees. Modelled as it is on the

Convention of 1933 concerning Russian and Armenian exiles, it may form the basis of an international statute applicable to any group of exiles deprived of the protection of their former State.

The position of the hapless Assyrians is still more desperate than that of the Russian, Armenian and German refugees. As Lord Hugh Cecil has recently reminded us, the failure to find a home anywhere in the world for the thirty thousand homeless Christians from Iraq, despite repeated efforts and surveys, is a bitter reflection on Christian civilisation, and a signal example of the inadequacy or the imperfection both of public opinion and of the international machinery. A Central League organ would surely be able to secure a little niche somewhere for this remnant of an ancient people. The growing groups, too, of fugitives from Spain in France and in England, the Basque children in their thousands, and the older persons in their tens of thousands, constitute a new refugee problem. Hitherto they have been left entirely to voluntary effort and the action of one or two governments. It cannot be doubted that when the desperate civil war comes to an end, thousands, perhaps myriads, in Spain will have to leave their country or remain away from it; and unless international organisation comes to the aid of private philanthropy, as it did for the Greeks and Russians, there will be disaster. In a world of totalitarian States ruthlessly denationalising citizens, there must be extra-state, pro-consular offices for the stateless.

What has emerged from the experience of the last ten years is the inescapable responsibility of the League for the human victims of vast political upheavals who are thrown on the world. It is the function of the League on the one hand to assure those victims a minimum of human rights, on the other to protect its member States from the grave economic and political embarrassment which the influx of masses of destitute exiles occasions. It has been pointed out that the word "bandits" originally meant those who were banned from their country; and unless the international society shoulders its responsibilities, more and more of the banned again will become desperate Esaus. A striking, yet typical, example of the complexity of the refugee problem of to-day is furnished by an undergraduate at an English university of Greek nationality, Armenian name, a Quaker in religion, who wished

to join the Officers' Training Corps in order to prepare himself to join the Republican Army in Spain.

Experience has shown, too, the mistake of dealing with the problem piecemeal, improvising machinery when a sudden emergency arises. It seems the simplest prudence that, so long as the problem endures, there should be a permanent League Commission formed of expert persons who would be chosen from different countries for their individual qualifications, and exercising continuous functions like the Permanent Mandates Commission. The Council of the League would control its activities, while a Council formed of representatives of philanthropic bodies, advisory to the League Commission, would co-ordinate the manifold private activities of assistance.

If Soviet intransigence is maintained next year, the Powers that are concerned to organise international aid for the refugees may have to circumvent the opposition by entering into an international convention outside the League, that would be signed and adopted by all those States which are willing to participate in an international solution. The Convention might on the one hand lay down a statute defining the status and rights of the refugees, and on the other provide for the establishment of an international bureau to watch over the execution of the statute. The Bureau could be attached to the League in the same manner as the International Postal Bureau. What is certain is that in this world of confusion the international society must, for its own well-being as well as for reasons of humanity, provide some basis of the right to exist for the victims of its own disorders.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

THE CALENDAR AND ITS REFORM.

A QUESTION which has exercised the mind of man for more centuries than we know has come again before the League of Nations this autumn. It is of unique interest because it combines some of the most profound and infinite thoughts of our nature with the necessities of our daily life. In measuring time, which man began to do as soon as he began to be rational, he was in touch from the first with those notions of a continuum and an infinite process which still elude him and will elude to the end of time. And yet, also from the first, he was aware of a regular beat in this infinite process by which he was compelled to order his life. He slept regularly, and his sleep coincided with the regular alternation of light and darkness, which is the most obvious parcelling up of time, imposed on all living things. From the first, therefore, we have those two inextricable elements in the measurement of time, the subjective sense of duration, by which alone time seems to exist, and the objective signals, things happening outside us, without our control, and by which this conscious duration is ordered and divided up. The calendar is the arrangement, gradually arrived at, by which these external happenings are fitted into an agreed scheme by which more and more men arrange their lives. The happenings are external, the arrangement is conscious, deliberate and—within those external limitations—capable of indefinite alteration and improvement. This fact makes the history of the calendar of surpassing interest, as being the best example of the collective good sense of mankind in grappling with a problem imposed from without and common to all the inhabitants of the globe. It should give us courage and fresh hope in facing other problems in which the collective good sense of mankind is not so apparent. They have come to increasing agreement about this most intricate problem, an agreement which overrides all differences of religion or race or country. In other matters, not so intricate and equally common to all, we may reasonably expect a convergent unanimity.

Ultimately the calendar which established itself in the world was a solar one. If one thinks for a moment it is clear that this was bound to be so, because the two chief motions of our earthly home in relation to other celestial bodies both relate

to the sun. By turning round on its axis the earth exposes half its surface to the sun at a time, and the change of this half, and its return to the same position every twenty-four hours, give us the day and the night. By its motion round the sun in about $365\frac{1}{4}$ of these daily revolutions, we have the year, with its changing seasons due to the fact that the earth's axis being inclined to the plane of its orbit of revolution, different parts of the surface receive at different periods of the year different amounts of the direct rays of the sun. The sun is in fact the undisputed sovereign of our earthly life, for by his light and heat distributed to us according to our distance from him and varying according to these two movements, we live and move and have our being. Yet our earliest ancestors on the planet did not reason in this obvious way in framing their first calendar. The calendar is so called from the Roman name for the first day of each month and the month is itself a lunar period. Month is moon-th, or at least comes from the same root, and tells us that when men first began to reckon time, they followed the revolutions of the moon round the earth and not those of the earth round the sun. We know now of course that the influence of the moon upon our lives is insignificant compared with that of the sun, but to our forefathers it was not so apparent. They could study the moon more closely. Her face was more gracious and her phases more interesting. Hence, in early religions and astrology, the moon plays a larger part than the sun, and we shall probably carry down a division of the year into months to the end of time. But the month, as we now speak of it in a calendar sense, has drifted away entirely from its old moorings. The first calendar-makers everywhere started with a month, which meant the period from one new moon to another, and this new moon has still a calendar-value in certain rather eccentric cases, e.g. in fixing Ramadan or Easter. But for the main framework of the calendar it was discarded first by the Egyptians and then by the Romans. The mean value of the moon's revolution round the earth is 29 days 12 hours 44 minutes and 2.7 seconds, a period practically impossible to fit into the solar year of $365\frac{1}{4}$ days. Hence, while keeping the name with its ancient and romantic associations, the Western world, in this and so much else showing the way to the rest of mankind, has been for many centuries content with a month which is an easier quotient

of a year. It happens to be somewhere near the length of the lunar month and it happens also to contain a little more than four of the seven-day weeks of which something must be said in a moment. But for an accurate and useful calendar men have concentrated now for some millenia on fitting the days into the years, i.e. the smaller of our two main periods into the larger. Three great civilising agencies have done most in this work and thereby shown their fitness for leadership in the world—the Egyptians, the Romans and the Catholic Church.

The Egyptians, quite early, rejected the Babylonian attempt to fit the lunar revolutions into the solar year as a basis of their calendar. They adopted the solar year as the basis, dividing it up in what seemed to them the most convenient way. This was twelve equal months of thirty days, leaving them with five extra days each year which were allotted as Holy Days to five Great Gods. Thus Osiris, Horus, Set, Isis and Nephthys each gained a birthday, making up a total of 365 days for the year. It was a capital step, anticipating our own calendar and in one respect superior to ours, for their months were equal. But in one point it was defective, for the exact year is not 365, but 365 days, 5 hours 48 minutes 46 seconds. Hence about every four years a fresh adjustment would be needed, and this is in fact what Julius Cæsar, having taken over the Egyptian calendar, did, on the advice of Sosigenes, an Alexandrian Greek, in the year 45 B.C. By that time the discrepancy had become so great that Julius ordained in 46 B.C. a year of 445 days to work off the surplus which had accumulated. It was known as the year of confusion, being properly the *last* year of a confusion which had long prevailed. The new year of the Julian system was to begin on the first of January, 45 B.C., and the alternate months, January, March, May, July, September and November, were to consist of 31 days, with intervening months of 30. Only February was to have 29, with an extra day every fourth year to make up roughly the discrepancy in hours. This roughness had again to be smoothed out by the Gregorian revision; but, before that came, Augustus had further spoilt the Julian regularity by giving himself a special month—August—which had to have the maximum number of days, viz. 31. So a day was filched from September, and some other irregularities were introduced.

The Julian year was from the first too long, as the Egyptian had been too short. Calling it $365\frac{1}{4}$ days, made it 11 minutes 12 seconds more than the true length, and, as Hipparchus had worked out the length to within 4 minutes of the truth more than a century before, Cæsar, or at any rate Sosigenes, must have known it quite well. They were content to leave the smaller problem for posterity, while they got rid of their own gross irregularity first. The smaller error bound Western Europe for sixteen and Eastern Europe for nearly twenty centuries. In 1582, when Pope Grègory XIII, on the advice of a fresh set of astronomers, made the calendar by which we still live, the error had mounted up to ten days. This time the days were in excess as Julius had reckoned the year too long. Ten days were struck out, in England not till 1752, when there were riots in various places at the loss of the time, and, as the rioters declared, of their wages. This last revision has brought days and years into such an accurate relationship that discrepancy will only be noticeable in some three or four thousand years. As every one knows, we have by Gregorian order an extra or Leap Year day once in every four, except in the last year of each century when there is only a Leap Year once in four centuries. When the last year of the century is exactly divisible by 400, it is a Leap Year ; otherwise not. 1700, 1800, 1900 were not Leap Years, but 2000 will be.

If then the present calendar is so close an approximation to the truth, what need is there of further change ? Why are there several Calendar Reform Associations which are again appearing before the League of Nations this year ? Why does Mr. P. W. Wilson write a fascinating and persuasive book, telling us all about the past, but leading up with special zest to plans for the future ?

Many conservative minds do in fact think like that. Others are more struck with the things that might be reformed than apparently are the reformers themselves. Think of the traditional names of the months and the days of the week ! Are men to be content for all time to go on calling the months and days by names which mean nothing to nine-tenths of those who use them, and to the minority are a quaint amalgam of Roman and Teutonic imperialism and mythology ? The names of the days of the week are planetary, being either Latin or substituted Teutonic or Norse, dating from somewhere

about the beginning of the Christian era. The names of the months are all Latin and show the mixture of imperial vanity, Roman mythology and simple numeration of which an example was given above. Men have often asked themselves whether this was suited to a modern and scientific age and proposed alternatives. The leaders of the French Convention did so, with a ten-day week and months called after the leading notes of the season—Nivose, Pluviose, etc. This disappeared in the reaction under Napoleon. Half a century later, a far more thorough scheme was put forward by August Comte on a historical basis, which still has its supporters, especially in the United States, quite apart from the religious Positivists to whom it primarily appeals. It divides the year equally into thirteen months of twenty-eight days, with four seven-day weeks in each. The months, weeks and days are all named after eminent men who have contributed to build up the civilisation of mankind. They are arranged chronologically and according to the nature of their contribution, the most important being taken for the months and the lesser for the weeks and days. Thus the day on which this article is being written (September 20), is the day of Voltaire, in the week of Corneille, in the month of Shakespeare who stands for "The Modern Drama." For common use of course it would be known simply as the eleventh day of Shakespeare, but the subsidiary names, with their artistic, scientific or political memories, have been found of great educational value ever since by a large number of persons who would by no means subscribe to the religious or philosophical tenets of the calendar-maker. Knowing this, Frederic Harrison, some forty years ago, with the aid of a band of sympathetic scholars, prepared an illustrative volume called the *New Calendar of Great Men* which may still be had and is for many reasons preferable to most biographical dictionaries.

Comte's calendar left over an odd day every year and the usual extra odd day in Leap Year. These he proposed to make, the former a festival called after, and commemorating, "All the Dead," the latter—the Leap Year day—a "Festival of Holy Women." One sees at once the attractiveness and the stimulus of the scheme, but unfortunately it has two grave practical defects which have barred it from acceptance by the calendar reformers who are now pleading the cause in

Geneva. It destroys the even half year of six months and it prevents the attainment of even quarters of three months each. Now these two things, from the business and statistical points of view, are of the first importance and no calendar reform which omitted them—still less one which made them more confused than before—would have a moment's chance of success.

The present calendar reformers take the most modest and conservative position which any reforming body ever took. They retain the twelve months, with all their odd traditional names. In order to gain the maximum of regularity with the minimum of change, the length of the twelve months is rearranged so as to give in each quarter, first a month with 31 days and then two months with 30 each. Thus :

Jan. 31 days	Apr. 31 days	July 31 days	Oct. 31 days
Feb. 30	May 30	Aug. 30	Nov. 30
Mar. 30	June 30	Sept. 30	Dec. 30

It is claimed, and quite truly, that this proposed change would cause less dislocation in men's habits or the business of the world than either the Julian addition of two months or the Gregorian cut of eleven days, and the gain in uniformity and order which would result is beyond comparison greater. The year would become uniform, always beginning with a Sunday. In every year the same day of the month would fall on the same day of the week. Although the months would differ among themselves to the extent of one day, that is the minimum difference compatible with an arrangement into twelve months of our sun-given year. And for many practical purposes—the paying of wages for instance—the months would be equal, for the longer ones would contain five Sundays and the shorter only four. The odd day, which is left over at the end of the year, would become a public holiday—the Year End Day—while those who wished to give it a religious tone, would be at full liberty to persuade their fellow-citizens to do the same. The Leap Year Day might become in its turn an extra holiday at the end or in the middle of the year.

Was ever so small and beneficent a change so long delayed or so much debated ? It will come of course ; and some day, if not a fresh naming of months or days, at least some generally accepted festival-days for all nations, as Comte had in

mind for his calendar. Because it will be observed that, in spite of the immediate delay, there is a growing unanimity of mankind on the subject. The League is distracted by the rival claims of Fascists and Communists and by the present impossibility of rallying sufficient force to repress a gross scandal, such as is now afflicting the Far East. In these matters it does not know how to act. Calendar reform which would increase the unity of mankind only suffers from its being so obvious and comparatively dull. The reform is obvious but the story which leads up to it is the least dull in the world for any one interested—as all must be if their minds are open—in the gradual conquest by the human spirit of the complex difficulties of nature. By this conquest we have grown to man's estate, and no part of the onward march is marked by more interesting milestones than the history of the calendar. Let one significant fact conclude this inadequate review. Of all the features calling for reform none has been more canvassed than the question of a fixed Easter,—not yet mentioned here. This still remains more in the province of his Holiness in Rome than of any other man or body of men, and he has pronounced that the Vatican has no objection to the reform. Four hundred years ago the last reform of the calendar as a whole was carried out for all nations by the Pope. Now he is asked only for his approval of the distinctly religious part of the new programme. The general question, like the assignment of continents or the laws of marriage or of education, has passed to other hands. Are these new hands to prove feebler and less effective than the old hands of a religious body, compact though limited, conservative in the main but ready to move on clear reason given? In this case clear reason has been given, and the Pope for his part has shown that he is willing to move. Is a temporal League of Nations to show less consciousness of the needs of men, and less capacity to meet them, than the ancient Spiritual Power?

F. S. MARVIN.

THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE.

"Barbarus hic ego sum, quia non intelligor ulli."

ONE of the few useful results of the World Crisis of 1914-18 was the subsequent investigation of the many direct and indirect causes of war—an investigation which tended to show that, at bottom, this most calamitous of human ills owes its origin and survival largely to nationalism. For although such other factors as racial antipathies, desire for industrial and territorial expansion, rival ideologies and so on, play their parts also, these all have their roots in what Herbert Spencer called "the patriotic bias"—otherwise that species of self-sufficiency or mass-egotism termed nationalism. It is then towards the abolition of nationalism in the uncompromising and aggressive form in which it exists to-day and to the substitution of less narrow and more enlightened aims and ideals that human effort should be directed.

Many Societies, notably the Rotary International and the World Congress of Faiths, are already striving directly or indirectly to achieve this. But I venture to suggest that there needs yet another, whose operations if carried to success might be more potent for good than any, namely, a world-wide organisation for the promotion and establishment of a single, practical and universally acceptable international language. Nor can I see the slightest reason why if but a fraction of the energy were devoted to the matter which is bestowed at present on the manufacture of international enmities and misunderstandings, this should not be accomplished. That the existing confusion of tongues, begotten of the conditions under which the various human races have evolved, makes inevitably for international misunderstanding and enmity can hardly be gainsaid. For if it be true that *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner* the converse no less surely holds good, and to misunderstand is inevitably to misjudge and condemn. Since, however, there is no getting away from our diversity of tongues the only alternative course to be adopted is sufficiently obvious, namely, to supplement these confusing and almost countless national languages

and dialects by one simple universal speech which can be understood and spoken by all.

As to the advantages which would result from such a universal language little need be added to what has already been said. "*All battle is well said to be misunderstanding,*" wrote Carlyle—an observation more obviously true to-day, perhaps, than ever before. And every traveller, at some time or other, must have echoed Ovid's words quoted below the title of this article, "*I am a barbarian here, because I am not understood by anyone,*" or, conversely, felt repelled by what is to him the disagreeable jargon of some alien tongue. Nor is it necessary to dwell at length on the enormous effect which these linguistic differences and antagonisms have exercised, and are still exercising, in breeding and perpetuating international misunderstanding and ill-will. Would Arab antagonism for Jew be so intense had they a common speech and alphabet? Or England's friendship with America be what it is had the emigrants of 1620 adopted an alien language? Assuredly not. Emerson wrote, "Language is a city to the building of which every human being brought a stone." The fact that it is necessary to translate the Bible into six hundred languages gives some idea of the architectural nightmare which has resulted.

Since 1870 several attempts have been made to remedy this state of things by the introduction of some form of auxiliary language: Esperanto, Volapük, Idiom Neutral, Novial and Interlingua are five early examples. Others for which strong claims have been advanced comprise Occidental and Ido. Yet another one, Anglic, not really an international language but merely a scheme of simplified spelling for English, had but a short-lived existence. More recently, Basic English has come on the scene, with the advantage apparently of a good financial backing. If it is regarded as a simple approach to ordinary English for the foreigner and a means of spreading English influence abroad, there is a good deal to be said for it. As an international language, however, there would appear to be little hope for it in its present form. What is certain is that since the production of these languages, devised for the most part by individuals or small scholastic bodies, rather than under international auspices, is unlimited, the existing babel of tongues may in time become actually

confusion worse confounded by the accretion of international ones. Since its establishment in 1887 Esperanto has made considerable headway in this and other countries. It is taught in classes controlled by the L.C.C. ; the Royal Society of Arts examines in it and there is an Esperanto lectureship at Liverpool University.

As an alternative to the creation of an international tongue, it has been suggested that official recognition might be given to one or other of existing national languages, but this is a suggestion which obviously bristles with difficulties. For one thing, which of these languages is there that hasn't serious defects of one sort or another—that is, in the way of either grammar, idiom or pronunciation? The essential requirements for an international language are that it shall be free from difficult sounds, equally suitable for all nations, phonetic, simple, concise, exact and unambiguous, regular in construction and serviceable for all purposes. Does any national language fulfil these requirements? English certainly does not. Yet, from patriotic motives no doubt, claims are sometimes advanced for its adoption as a *lingua franca*. True, it is already widely taught abroad and its use is increasing, but its adoption—as indeed the international adoption of any *national* tongue to serve as a *lingua franca*—would inevitably create hopeless jealousy.

English moreover does not begin to possess that simplicity and consistency which are indispensable here. Its anomalies of spelling, syntax and grammar would necessitate revolutionary reforms. Owing to the marked absence of inflexion, foreigners studying English always experience great difficulty in knowing what part of speech a word is. Thus, there are hundreds of English words of which either the noun and verb, the noun and adjective or the adjective and verb have the same spelling and pronunciation. Worse still, in scores of others the noun, verb *and* adjective are spelt and pronounced similarly, e.g., “reverse,” “second,” “forward,” “stock,” “dwarf,” “negative,” “signal,” “patent,” “sham,” “manifest,” “calm,” “average” and hosts of others. The word “round” may actually belong to no fewer than *five* parts of speech. Incidentally, and by way of demonstrating how great a stumbling-block English can be to foreigners, I am tempted to reproduce an amusing

advertisement from a Siamese newspaper which recently reached me :

“The news of English, we tell the latest. Writ in perfectly style and most earliest. Do a murder get commit, we tell of it. Do a mighty chief die, we publish it, and in borders of sombre. Staff has each one been college, and write like the Dickens. We circulate every town and extortionate not for advertisements. Buy it.”

In somewhat the same style a Tokio outfitter advertised the facilities which he offered in the following terms : “Ladies furnished in the upper storey. Respectable ladies have fits upstairs.” And these are but two of thousands of examples going to show what heavy weather the average foreigner inevitably makes of English, with its inconsistent spelling and pronunciation, irregular verbs and inflexions, multiple meanings of similarly pronounced words and multiple spellings of the same sounds.

There is another suggestion that has considerable support. It is that Latin, though a dead tongue, should be chosen as the International Auxiliary Language. Latin is lucid, expressive and concise : but there is still some controversy as to how it should be pronounced. It has the further merit moreover of being known already, more or less (though probably more often “less” than “more”), by most educated people in European countries, and it is possible that an abbreviated “working” vocabulary might be obtained from it, similar to those of Esperanto and Ido, which would obviate the necessity of mastering the entire language. But a very large vocabulary of new words and phrases would obviously have to be formed to meet the needs of modern speech, and various other objections have been pointed out, which need not however be entered on here, since there seems little likelihood of Latin ever obtaining general support to warrant serious consideration of its claims.

As regards its modern rivals, so strong are the claims made for the extreme simplicity of both Esperanto and Ido, that their authors assert that the time usually spent by public-schoolboys in acquiring the most rudimentary knowledge of Latin would suffice to enable them to speak one or other of these artificial languages fluently. In this connection the following comparison of Latin, Esperanto and Ido with English may prove of interest :

*From a Critique of a Concert.***English*
The Bach Festival

The second concert of the Bach Festival at the Central Hall, Westminster, on Saturday, was devoted mainly to instrumental music, though there were two songs from church cantatas sung by Miss Dorothy Silk and Mr. Gervase Elwes.

The Suite in B minor for flute and strings played by M. Fleury, with members of the London Symphony Orchestra, made a most genial opening, and was beautifully played.

Esperanto
La Bach Festo

La duan koncerton de la Bach Festo en la Central Hall, Westminster, la laston sabaton, oni dedikis plejparte al instrumenta muziko, krom du arioj el ekleziaj kantatoj kiujn kantis F-ino Dorothy Silk kaj S-ro Gervase Elwes.

La Suite en B minora por fluto kaj kordoj ludita de S-ro Fleury kaj anoj de la Londona Simfonia Orkestro faris tre agrablan malfermon, kaj estis bele ludata.

Latin
De Bachicis Festis

Secunda de commissionibus Musicis quæ nunc Bachis nomine celebrantur, Saturni die habita est Westminsterii in Testudine Centrali. Musica autem plerumque fuit instrumentalis, sed duo carmina e "Cantatis Ecclesiasticis" excerpta cecinerunt voce Domina Dorothea Silk et Dominus Gervase Elwes.

"Sequentia" quæ in B minore est tibie uni fidibusque pluribus accommodata, a Dno. Fleury una cum sociis Orchestræ Symphoniacæ Londoniensis quamvis belle edita est—quod festivissimum fecit initium.

Ido
La Festajo di Bach

La duesma koncerto dil Bach che Central Hall, Westminster, ye Saturdio, dedikesis precipue ad instrumenta muziko, quankam esis du kansoni ek kirkal kantati quin Damzelo Dorothy Silk e Sioro Gervase Elwes kantis.

La Suite (serio) en B minoro por fluto e kord-instrumenti pleita da Sioro Fleury, kun membri dil London Simfoni-Orkestro, facis maxim simpatioza komenco ed esis bele exekutita.

After carrying out experiments to test the ease with which Esperanto could be acquired by secondary school teachers, Professor J. J. Findlay's conclusions, briefly stated, were as follows :

* The author is indebted to the British Association for these translations and also to Mr. M. C. Butler, of the Esperanto Association, for other data.

“A practical knowledge of Esperanto can be acquired in a far shorter time than any natural speech, ancient or modern; three weeks of intensive study under a good instructor would enable a class of teachers to master the essentials and acquire a fluency which is seldom gained in French or German after twelve months’ study abroad.”

In 1921 the British Association appointed a Committee, under the Chairmanship of Dr. H. F. Morley, to enquire into the practicability of an international auxiliary language. The views of this Committee may be summarised, very briefly, as follows :

1. Latin is too difficult to serve as an international auxiliary language.
2. The adoption of any modern national language would confer undue advantages and excite jealousy.
3. Therefore an invented language is best. Esperanto and Ido are suitable but the Committee is not prepared to decide between them.

It continued its consideration of the question and in 1923 “It held—with the Central Committee appointed by the International Research Council—that the final verdict must come from an international, highly expert and authoritative body, which will command general confidence.”

The creation and adoption of a language suitable for international use presupposes then a measure of world-wide co-operation such as, probably, only the League of Nations could enlist. Unfortunately, as all the world knows, this august body has long since fallen from its high estate, and it is to be reckoned perhaps not the least of its shortcomings—since in this case at any rate no obstacles need have been anticipated—that it has never stirred a finger in this matter of establishing an international language, although this might well be regarded as a most important piece of constructive internationalism which it might have been expected to tackle at the outset of its career.

It is inconceivable, however, that the approaching struggle between rival ideologies and sovereignties which bids fair to stagger humanity can fail ultimately to bring renewed power to the League, for such a Supreme Court of Appeal in international affairs must in the end prove indispensable. In the meantime is it too much to hope that, during its period of

temporary eclipse and partial idleness, it will convene that "international, highly expert and authoritative body" recommended by the Committee of the British Association to study this problem of an auxiliary international language with a view to definite action being taken in the matter at the earliest practicable moment? In this connection another passage from the Final Report is worth quoting: "Philological considerations," it is observed, "are of course very important; but they are not all-important, and the problem must also be investigated from the standpoint of psychology, sociology, and what may be termed 'practical politics.'"

The difficulty of obtaining universal agreement in bringing into harmony the characteristics and peculiarities of existing tongues so dissimilar as regards their syntax and alphabetic elements as the Nordic, Semitic, Chinese and Indian, is a very real one, despite the fact that the majority of these tongues were originally derived from a small number of roots. The peoples of the Middle East, India and Eastern Asia outnumber Europeans by at least two to one, and in both political and industrial spheres Asiatic influence is making itself felt to an increasing extent. Moreover, though European languages, from the elements of which all the existing invented or artificial languages have been drawn, bear some relation to each other, they have but little in common with the Asiatic ones. Here therefore is another vital factor of the problem to be borne in mind, since intercourse with Asiatics numbering some 1,000,000,000, as well as with Europeans, must of course be provided for. Yet, in a sense, the difficulty presented is not more formidable than that successfully overcome, upon a domestic and less pretentious scale it is true, by Mustapha Kemal Pasha who, in 1928, decreed that Arabic characters, established by immemorial usage in Turkey, were to give way to Latin ones. What the enterprise and determination of one man has accomplished to better the lot of his own people, might well be achieved by the League of Nations in the interests of humanity at large.

Unfortunately when the question of practical action is approached it is impossible to say that present-day world conditions are as favourable as might be wished. Despite well-meant efforts making in many directions for the encouragement of what might be called the international spirit, the simultaneous development in their most aggressive forms, as

exemplified notably in Germany and Italy, of ultra-nationalistic doctrines has been still more noteworthy, accompanied as it has been by the revival in many instances of local languages previously falling into disuse such as Welsh, Irish, Catalan, Romance and Afrikaans. This recrudescence of national assertiveness has doubtless been stimulated by the post-war creation of many new states, such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Danzig, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand it may certainly be argued that the coming into existence of these new nations and the general state of tension in the world to-day make the provision of a universal means of intercourse not less but the more desirable.

The spheres in which it is needed—science, commerce, education, religion, etc.—and the ways in which it could be utilised if acquired side by side, of course, with the national language, are legion. Looking at the matter for the moment solely from the European point of view, continental road and rail development is such nowadays that tourists often visit a dozen or more states in a single week. In each of them local regulations, worded in the vernacular, must be observed, all of which would of course be printed also in the universal language if one were available. This need of a standardised auxiliary language applies also to ocean and air transport, to banks and post offices, to the hundred and one municipal notices and those in hotels, theatres and shops as well as in a thousand other ways, including daily papers printed in the adopted speech, which would no doubt soon come into being in all countries. For broadcasting on international questions such a language would also be invaluable.

It may be argued by some that, as against the adoption of a universal invented language, the wider cultivation of those already existing would achieve the same result in a better way. Thus one reads: "In the Scandinavian countries, a boy or a girl attending a higher school is bound to learn English, French and German and speak these languages with a facility that makes it possible for them to be understood" (*Journal of International Affairs*, March-April 1936). But obviously this is going only a very small way towards meeting all the requirements of the case. For pupils so trained, however assiduous had been their studies, would be as helpless as ever when it came to communicating with the natives

of China, Japan, Persia, Siam, Malaya, Central and S. America, Russia, Arabia, the Middle East, Egypt or Africa. It is true that in the case of some of these countries makeshift dialects of a more or less grotesque character, such as pidgin-English in China and babu-English in India, have been evolved to meet local needs and help to make things to some extent easier. But it is hardly necessary to say that these makeshift dialects are entirely useless for the purpose of general intercourse, for which one single universal language, capable of being spoken and understood throughout the whole world, is obviously the only thing worthy of serious consideration. Six hours' study of this language per week would surely be more profitable than two hours weekly devoted to each of three languages understood over only a limited area.

Further evidence of the growing desire for freer intercourse, and of the readiness to make sacrifices to obtain it, appeared in *Asia* for February 1937: "It is well known that more than 80 per cent. of the Chinese people are illiterate. During the past two years, however, a latinized system making use of the alphabet and doing away with the old Chinese characters has been introduced and it marks a new day for the education of the mass." If then China and Turkey—countries which we are so little disposed to regard as pioneers—are proving themselves willing, in the interests of progress, to make changes relatively as drastic and revolutionary to them as would be the adoption of Arabic characters in the British Isles, will it not be a grievous reflection upon the more advanced Western nations if they show themselves less ready to put aside national prejudices and co-operate in this matter of a universal language which might prove of such inestimable value in furthering the cause of understanding, goodwill and peace throughout the world?

W. A. POWELL.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF KINGSHIP.

GEORGE IV was the last English monarch at whose Coronation the "fine ceremony" of a challenge to mortal combat by the King's Champion was included. Pepys, who in his day witnessed the scene at the Coronation of Charles II, gives a description of it in his *Diary* under the date April 23rd, 1661, but whittles the herald's declamation down to the dimensions of two lines, and reduces their content to a mere threat. In the following, this deficiency is rectified. ". . . But, above all, was these three Lords, Northumberland, and Suffolk, and the Duke of Ormond, coming before the courses on horseback, and staying so all dinner-time, and at last to bring up (Dymock) the King's Champion, all in armour on horseback, with his spear and targett carried before him. And a Herald proclaims :

If any person of what degree soever, high or low, shall deny or gainsay our Sovereigne Lord King Charles the Second, King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, defender of the faith, Sonne and next heire to our Sovereigne Lord Charles the First, the last King deceased, to be right heire to the Imperiall Crowne of this Realme of England, or that hee ought not to enjoy the same ; here is his champion, who sayeth that he lyeth and is a false Traytor, being ready in person to combate with him, and in this quarrell will venture his life against him, on what day soever hee shall be appointed ;

and with these words, the Champion flings down his gauntlet, and all this he do three times in his going up towards the King's table. At last when he is come, the King drinks to him, and then sends him the cup which is of gold, and he drinks it off, and then rides back again with the cup in his hand."

This picturesque custom seems to lend weight to the belief that the first kings or chiefs were merely the physically strongest men in the community, which they governed by the frequent application of a stone axe to the heads of any of their unwilling subjects who dared to show a mutinous demeanour, or to murmur the first words of that philosophy of social relationship called, to-day, democracy. Content, therefore, with the apparent self-evidence of the usurpation of authority by means of force, it would need the King's Champion himself to shake such thinkers out of their complacent poise. Let us again, however, refer to Samuel Pepys,

who records : "And strange as it is to think, that these two days have held up fair till now that all is done, and the King gone out of the Hall ; and then it fell a-raining and thundering and lightening as I have not seen it do for some years : which people did take great notice of ; God's blessing of the work of these two days" : from this one may conclude that the "people"—the mass of the population—entertaining no theories, but accepting, and living out their cultural heritage, feel that thunder, or a deluge of rain, or even a minor earthquake (a phenomenon that accompanied the Coronation of King Charles I), are items only to be expected on a "royal" occasion, since the Deity is Himself in some measure concerned with the welfare of kings, "Defender of the Faith" being no mere matter of form as was "King of France" in the English king's title. Yet, in this age, when His Majesty fulfils no ecclesiastical function, it would appear that the phrase we have retained is as redundant as was the phrase we have dispensed with ; and to understand why the King, as "Defender of the Faith," functions as the keystone of an otherwise loosely constituted Empire, and further, with a view to detecting the fallacy that kingship is founded upon force, it is necessary to examine the beginnings of the institution, and this, fortunately, it is possible to do at first hand since civilisation is a continuous process. In the words of Sir James Frazer, "The time has gone by when dreamers like Rousseau could reconstruct the history of society out of their own minds, and their dreams could be accepted." To-day the demand is for facts out of which the history of society can be reconstructed ; and in compiling the early chapters of that history it is necessary to collect data from the social life of savages.

Examining first the governmental institutions of the most lowly type of savages known to us, namely, the Australian aborigines, we find no "natural communism" ; on the contrary, an autocratic government by gerontocracy. The strength of this ruling body is by no means physical. Each aged man in the group is the headman of a totem clan, and his power is in his possession of the necessary magic to make the totem animal prolific. On the combined efforts of these public magicians depends the entire welfare of the people ; the old men, by virtue of their proficiency in magical practice, give orders in the tribe, while the young men, in spite of their

superior strength of arm, meekly obey. Another, and perhaps more striking example of the fact that the kingly office is in the power and not in the person, is to be found in the New Hebrides, where the chief's son has no right to the rulership by primogeniture, but is generally elected to the place vacated by his father on the strength of his possessing high qualifications in magic, in the acquirement of which he has served a long apprenticeship : and in southern Celebes this depersonalisation of power goes to the extent of the regal authority being vested in the regalia, which objects are veritable fetishes and the princes but their representatives. This veneration goes so far that a rebel has but to secure the regalia to command the allegiance of the people.

In all parts of the world, and at all periods of history, the success of rebellion, and for that matter of conquest, depends very largely on the reaction of the common people. An implied admission of this is instanced when a conqueror permits the vanquished nation's royal family to continue to occupy the throne, from which they exercise only a priestly function. In 2 Kings xvii, 24-8, it is recorded that Shalmaneser, King of Assyria, removed the conquered Israelites from their land and sent men of his own country to occupy the territory : the strangers, however, being frequently attacked by lions, came to the conclusion that the God of the vanquished was by this means signifying His displeasure, whereupon they supplicated the King to send to them a Hebrew priest, who "came and dwelt in Beth-el, and taught them how they should fear the Lord."

To return, however, to modern primitive peoples : in Melanesia the authority of the chiefs is based upon their ability to commune with the spirits of departed ancestors ; in the Marshall Bennett Islands the head of each clan is an experienced magician, whose incantation of the appropriate spells, together with his performance of certain ceremonies, influences the various food crops to grow. All over Africa we find the root idea of chieftainship both highly developed and very clearly defined, and while there are numerous instances of tyrannical African monarchs, close examination of the actual relationship which exists between these dusky Neros and their multitudinous subjects reveals that they are enabled to wield their temporal power solely on account of the fame they enjoy as wizards. Chaka, the despotic King of

the Zulus, was a renowned rain-maker, who pronounced it illegal for a subject to practise the art, the reason being that anyone more successful than himself would have been in a position to compete for the kingship. No fear of that kind disturbed the chief of the Lendu tribe, domiciled to the west of Lake Albert ; he generously shared his gift of rain-making with persons of lesser rank, thus enabling outlying districts to regulate sunshine and shower to suit local requirements. Lo Bengula, King of the Matabeles, produced rain for his people by magical rites, by sacrifice, and by prayer ; and to enhance his reputation he very impressively left his kraal, " The White Rocks," during the desolate dry season, and so timed his return that it corresponded with the first deluge of rain.

Among the Masai the chieftain is a far less spectacular person ; indeed he does not even govern the people, having himself no administrative function to perform : he rules by virtue of magician-ship alone and commands, not a terrified submission, but rather an awed respect from the people, who owe to his sorcery all the bounties they enjoy. The Etatin folk on the Cross River, Southern Nigeria, possessed a chief who never left his compound lest ill-luck should befall his subjects. This old man explained to an English government-official that by his prayers to, and a close attendance upon, the tribal fetishes he brought game to the hunter, fish to the nets, and great crops of yams to the gardens. His whole time being spent in abstinence and piety, he was obviously anything but a tyrant. Actually he was prisoner in his own quarters where, when the above-mentioned visit was paid him, he had sojourned for ten years. Inconvenience and discomforts are often an integral part of rulership. The holy milkman, priest and chief of the Todas, who dwell in the Neilgherry Hills in Southern India, must live a most abstemious life made strenuous with ritualistic exercise. He is forced to lodge in the dairy with the sacred cattle, and even there occupy an uncomfortable couch, in a position where little or no warmth is conveyed to him from the meagre hearth in the winter time. So arduous is the life of the holy milkman that nowadays, in many Toda villages, the sacred dairies are standing vacant, there being no person sufficiently altruistic to engage in the high calling, notwithstanding the supreme honour, akin to deification, that is conferred with it. Even more harrowing is the life of the king at Shark Point, near

Cape Padron in Lower Guinea. This monarch not only lives alone in a hut situated in the depths of the forest, but he must spend his whole life in a sitting position ; were he to stand, the seas would rise with him, and should he lie down the winds would fail.

Since the people hold the king responsible for their well-being, for the procession of the seasons, for dearth and plenty—in short, regard him as the comptroller-general of all the forces of nature, they conclude that adverse circumstances are the result of the king's culpable negligence or wilful obstinacy ; hence, in many regions, kingship is fraught with grave risks. In some parts of West Africa, when the chief's prayers and burnt offerings have failed to bring an end to drought, the enraged subjects bind their sovereign with ropes, carry him to the graves of his ancestors and there leave him to obtain the aid of the spirits of the departed. The African tribe of Banjars are even less merciful to their monarch when he fails to produce rain, beating him severely till he exerts himself to the uttermost. On a hill at Bommo, near the mouth of the Congo River, the rain-making king is in danger of being ripped up in times of drought, so that the heavy drops of his blood may, by sympathetic magic, induce the necessary rain to fall ; and on the coral Island of Niue (Savage Island) in the South Pacific, the subjects' privilege of killing the priest-king in seasons of dearth has resulted in the total extinction of the royal family, and consequently the throne stands vacant. So fundamental is the belief in the magical powers of the ruler that the Malays often attribute the failure of crops to the ill-will of the European government official in charge of a district ; and the Dyaks of Sarawak depended upon their famous English chief, Rajah Brooke, to make the rice fields fertile by magical conjuration. The Mexican kings were forced to take an oath on ascending the throne, that they would make the sun to shine, the rain to fall, the rivers to flow, and the earth to yield abundant crops. Among the American Indians much the same is expected of the tribal medicine-man, who, though he has no power of temporal government, accepts obeisance from the secular chief.

The hocus-pocus of wizardry is the prime factor of chieftainship in a primitive community ; but as cultural ideas become richer and more varied the status of the ruler advances from that of shaman to that of priest ; and among some of

the great nations of antiquity the king was more than merely a priest, being himself the god incarnate. Notable among these theocracies are the great empires of Egypt, Assyria, China, Mexico and Peru ; and all through cultural history we find that progress is linked up with highly developed ideas of the divinity of kings.

It may be contended, especially by advocates of republican government, that among the nations of antiquity we have also the notable example of Rome which was the pattern on which subsequent constitutions of a democratic nature have been based. In reply to these we would emphasise that in the regal period the king fulfilled an essentially religious office. The Roman Commonwealth was formed of a blended stock : the patrician families, descendants of early conquerors, executed the duties of civil government but, being strangers, permitted the original royal family to continue to occupy the throne. The regal office is exemplified in the person of the priest-king Numa, and the position was parallel to that of the Assyrian conquerors of Israel. It was not until Tarquin the Proud showed signs of demanding secular as well as sacred authority that the civil rulers considered it time for the very limited monarchy to be brought to an end ; but even after the revolution the consuls were, for a time at least, men of royal blood. Lucius Junius Brutus was the son of the expelled king's sister, therefore, under mother-right, he was the legitimate heir to the throne.

Thus far our attention has been focused upon races strange to ourselves—as the Africans and the Pacific Islanders, both peoples notoriously prone to entertain superstitious beliefs ; and upon periods far distant from the present, as the hey-day of Assyria, and the Regal Epoch of Rome, when, in spite of much enlightenment and many admirable achievements, men were still barbarians : nevertheless, among European communities, and in recent times, we can trace the basic idea that national prosperity is dependent upon the occult power possessed by the rightful king. The Swedes in days gone by attributed their blessings, or the lack of them, to their kings ; thus we learn that in the reign of Domalde a famine commenced which could not be brought to an end by sacrifice of either cattle or men ; and as a result of a mass meeting held at Upsala, the king himself was slaughtered and his blood smeared upon the altars of the gods. King Oláf, too, was

sacrificed in a time of famine, his dwelling being burned with him in it. When Waldemar I, King of Denmark, travelled abroad, he was besieged by peasants, the men extending towards him seed, and the women their infants: if he laid his hand on the former a good crop was ensured, and a like treatment of the latter promoted full growth and longevity. The ancient Irish kings were hallowed because of their ability to command nature, and this popular belief was carried out of pagan into Christian times by no less a personage than St Patrick himself, who declared the expected blessings during the reign of a just king to be "fine weather, calm seas, crops abundant, and trees laden with fruit." The magical influence exerted by a bad king was devastating. When the usurper Carbery Kinncat occupied the throne, "evil was the state of Ireland: fruitless her corn, for there used to be only one grain on the stalk; fruitless her rivers; milkless her cattle; plentyless her fruit, for there used to be but one acorn on a stalk." The days of Carbery, however, are remote compared with those of Dr. Johnson, who, travelling in Scotland, learned that the return of the Laird to Dunvegan, Skye, after a prolonged absence, produced an abundance of herrings.

Our English kings inherited from Edward the Confessor a divine grace by virtue of which they were enabled, through the simple laying on of hands, to cure scrofula. This disease, for that reason, was called King's Evil. Queen Elizabeth often exercised the gift, and apparently with phenomenal success. "A right fruitfull and approoved treatise, for the artificiall cure of that malady called in Latin *Struma*, and in English, the *Evill*, cured by Kings and Queens of England [was] written by William Clowes, one of her Majesties Chyrurgions, in the year of our Lord 1602," and printed in black letter by Edward Allde. In this work we learn of "a certayne stranger, borne (as he said) in the land of Gulicke nere unto Cleaueland. This stranger had been in cure a long time . . . with divers skilfull chirurgions," but without result. However, "he was then presented unto our most Sacred and Renowmed Prince the Queen's most excellent Majesty, for the cure of the said Evill: which through the Gift and Power of Almighty God, by her Graces onely means laying of her blessed and happy hands upon him." This being duly performed William Clowes thought no more of the matter until some six months later when, meeting the stranger by chance, he failed to recognise

him, so thoroughly restored to health was he. Queen Anne was evidently not in possession of such blessed and happy hands, for her touching of Dr. Johnson in his infancy had no beneficial effect. Charles II, after the Restoration, most conscientiously touched for the Evil as is recorded by both Evelyn and Pepys. William III refused to perform this holy office, and when on one occasion he was persuaded to do so for an ailing person, he snapped, "God give you better health and more sense!"

It is reasonable for us to suppose that this simple prayer was granted, for the faith of the subject is of more consequence than is the ability of the monarch; but the fact remains that faith cannot be won by force, therefore the origin of kingship can be in no way connected with the use of force. The instances we have adduced of, magicianship being the primal qualification of a ruler support this view, and admittedly leave the implication that to-day kingship is only at best a residue left over from the dark infancy of the race—when fear stalked behind every man and superstition guided his steps; but in spite of all the apparently sound argumentation put forward by republican-minded sociologists, who juggle with the twin monsters, demand and supply, and assure us that their results are based on facts and figures, it must be borne well in mind that seemingly perfect systems of economics prove in the course of cultural evolution to be mere mumbo-jumbo. Time was in England when "to buy in gross and sell in gross" was a heinous crime known as "forestalling," yet this activity, as represented by the formation of industrial and commercial combines, is a part of the avowed politico-economic policy of modern governments.

Civilisation may lend colour and polish but the primitive is eternal, for even in this age of atheism and applied science, the "man in the street" mounted upon his motor-bicycle, speeding homeward to his wireless set, is far more interested in "listening-in" to the King's speech than to some very up-to-date lecture delivered for his own good—and incidentally that of a political party. The ultra-progressive may deem this tendency regrettable, but in the last analysis the instinct of the herd, and not the theory of an individual member of it, will move the mass, and that mass *feels* the divine right vested in the "Defender of the Faith."

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

THE TOWER GARDEN.

WHAT good news it is for the young of every age that the ugly warehouses near the Tower are coming down, and that the longed-for open space, full of flowers and children, is within not too distant sight! In time to come when the Londoners sit and rest in the gardens their minds will wander back across the long centuries that stretch between to-day and the Roman rule. We are apt to associate the Bloody Tower with horror and despair, but it is well to remember that in its precincts in old days there dwelt every class of Londoner, and nobles and rich citizens had lovely houses standing in fragrant gardens.

There are three delightful collections of Camden Society volumes which make us acquainted with the daily lives of these old Londoners: the *Plumpton Correspondence*, the *Cely Papers* and the *Stonor Letters and Papers*. Of these the last is not well known. It was published in 1919 when we were stupefied by the war, from whose deadly effects we are still unhealed. But in the *Stonor Letters* there are friendships we may make with these old Londoners which repay the trouble of reading them. The *Paston Letters* accustomed most of us to fifteenth-century spelling, and the *Stonor Letters* are so very amusing that they soon become quite easy. They supply a want hardly satisfied by the *Cely Papers*. In the *Paston Letters* there was much romance that "broke through." But the Cely wool merchants were hard businessmen. They cared profoundly for hounds and hawks and horses, but sentiment was not their strong point. Their highest tide of personal feeling comes in the passage written in 1482: "Sir, it was telled Roberd Heryke in Calais that howr mother should be married or in the way of marriage and should go in procession on Corpus Christi day in a crimson gown, and her mayny (household) in black, and a my sowll howr mother went on that day but as she went at our father's month's mind, and therefore I would it were tried out the bringer of that to Calais." Richard Cely almost anticipates the dignity of Queen Victoria's "We are not amused" when he winds up with "Syr, we are greatly enoyd, I trust Jhesu we schauull be abbull to withstonde owr enmys." If the trouble has to do with dogs or horses then the brothers are always interested in every detail. Py was a

favourite horse. In October 1480 we read: "Py is well mendyd, and the Thursday after your departyng the grey bitch whelped and had fourteen, and on the Satyrday next after she dyed sodenly and ten of her whelps, and so four be keeped as well as they can be."

There is very little history in the letters because the times were so dangerous. In October 1482, when Richard Crouchback had lately taken Edinburgh, and his brother Edward IV's stormy reign was nearly over, Richard Cely writes: "I hear of none utterance safe." The Celys lived in Mark Lane and worshipped at St. Olave's Church, which they spelt Sent Tolowys scrysshe. In the *Stonor Letters* there is also very little history, because the Stonor family had consisted chiefly of quiet country gentlemen who were not particularly warlike. There is, however, one interesting letter from Richard III. In 1479 as Duke of Gloucester he writes, rather out of character, demanding "the cause why they pay not to our right well-beloved Anne Idley, Maistres of our Nurcery, her annuitee of 5 marcs graunted for term of her life." But all Richard's care of his little son availed him nothing. Not many months after the sudden death of the princes in the Tower "δολιχὴ νόστος" or slow disease laid low the inmate of "our Nurcery." The wicked man does not always flourish like a green bay tree.

The main charm of the *Stonor Letters* lies in their great variety and the intimacy they give us with many out-of-the-way details of medieval English life. By good fortune Sir William Stonor (1449-94) married three times, and the letters connected with all these marriages have in part been preserved. If there was no true love story in the *Cely Papers*, it is far otherwise in the *Stonor Letters*. The story of Thomas Betson's love for his child-wife Kateryne Ryché seems to have touches of the tenderness of Dickens in describing Dora, and the humour and deep feeling of George Eliot in telling of the youth of Maggie Tulliver. As one reads and re-reads the letters one sees how true great fiction is to real life. For somewhere, breathing quietly in the past, the best life of the present always crops up, since God made man in his own image. Thomas Betson and Kateryne Ryché come into the story of the Stonors through the first marriage of Sir William Stonor to Elizabeth Ryché. She was a wealthy city widow, whose riches came from Cotteswold sheep-fells and trade

with the Calais wool-staple. The letters speak constantly of ships plying between Dover and Calais. Thomas Henham writes on July 1478 to Sir W. Stonor : " There is shipped in your name and Thomas Betson's, in the Jhesu of London, John Lolyngton master under God, 2448 Cottles fells." Sir William Stonor had manors all over the country, and was a great sheep grazier, so that his alliance with the wool-trading widow was much to his advantage. She was also related to many city magnates. Her maternal grandfather was the well-known London Lord Mayor, author of *William Gregory's Chronicle of London*. John Croke her father was a London alderman, to whom is ascribed the beautiful canopied altartomb of Purbeck marble in the north aisle of All Hallows, Barking, and there are many curious and human details about her old mother in the letters. Elizabeth's first husband Thomas Ryche was the son of a kind-hearted and wealthy mercer. By Sir William Stonor Elizabeth Ryche had no children, but by the kind-hearted mercer she had three little girls and one son.

When quite a child little Kateryne Ryche, the eldest girl, was betrothed to Thomas Betson. He had become a partner with Sir William Stonor in the wool trade in 1475, and he was a constant visitor at Stonor, the family mansion in Oxfordshire, where he had a chamber of his own in the great house. In 1478 Thomas Betson married his girl love, but in the years before that date the grown man, who is constantly crossing the stormy waters, and watching over his master's interests in Calais and the Low Countries, has always time to think of the child at home. He writes to beg her to be merry, to eat heartily so that she may " grow fast to be a woman," and so make him the gladdest man in the world. After many words of deep affection he lets his fancy go. " I pray you greet well my horse, and pray him to give you four of his years to help you withal, and I will at my coming home give him four of my years and four horses' loaves till amends. Tell him that I prayed him so. And Cousin Kateryne I thank you for him, and my wife shall thank you for him hereafter, for you do great cost upon him as it is told me. Mine own sweet cousin, it was told me but late that ye were at Calais to seek me, but ye could not see me nor find me : for sooth ye might have comen to my counter, and there ye should both find and see me, and not have failed of me : but ye sought me in a wrong

Calais, and that ye should well know if ye were here and saw this Calais, as would God ye were and some of them with you that were with you at your gentil Calais. And I trust you will pray for me : for I shall pray for you, and so it may be, none so well. And Almighty Jhesu make you a good woman.—At Great Calais, the first day of June, when every man was gone to his dinner, and the Clock smote nine, and all our household cried after me and bade me come down : ‘Come down to dinner at once!’ and what answer I gave them ye know it of old—By your faithful lover and cousin Thomas Betson. [The husbands and wives and lovers constantly call each other “cussen” as a kind of pet-name.] I sent you this ring for a token.”

The years went too slowly for Thomas Betson. Busy as he was Kateryne was always in his mind, both for her soul’s and body’s health. “I remember her full oft, God knows,” he writes to her mother : “and good madame, I beseech your good ladyship to remember my cossen Kateryn of all such matters as I spake to your ladyship of at many diverse times. I dreamed once she was 30 winter of age, and when I woke I wished she had been but 20 : and so by likelihood I am sooner like to have my wish than my dream, the which I beseech Almighty Jhesu shall be when it shall please him.” When the lovers were married in 1478 they lived sometimes at Stebenhith or Stepney, and sometimes at Thomas Betson’s Holborn house. Thomas was much away, but Kateryn’s sister Jane seems to have been often with her, and her mother Lady Stonor rode up now and again from the country. Lady Stonor herself writes eagerly about her intercourse with the royal family : she was not always tactful, and it must have rather annoyed her somewhat “near” husband when she wrote of King Edward IV’s sister Elizabeth, “And, sir, my Lady of Suffolk is half-in-dell displeased because that my sister Barantyne is no better arrayed, and likewise my sister Elysabeth. And she seyth without they be otherwise arrayed she may not keep them : and she seyth that my Moder and yours should say that you have enow to find my sister Elysabeth withal.”

The King’s sister Elizabeth had married John de la Pole, the second Duke of Suffolk, who was brother of the half-blood to Sir William Stonor’s mother. This alliance gives a very interesting kinship to our London friends. The first Duke of

Suffolk was a tragic character, i.e. that William de la Pole Duke of Suffolk who was murdered in 1450 on the ship *S. Nicholas of the Tower*, and who cannot have been a rogue, because of the perfect letter of farewell (see *Paston Letters*) which he wrote to his only son. The murdered man had only one wife, and she was the thrice-married granddaughter of Geoffrey Chaucer the poet. The London home of Sir William Stonor's widowed mother (the natural daughter of the first Duke of Suffolk) was La Mote, Westminster, which had belonged to the Stonor's since 1334. No doubt the poet's old home in the Abbey churchyard was then still standing. No wonder then that Sir W. Stonor's city wife was allowed an entrée into the royal circle, and it was not surprising that she became a little overbearing. "And, sir," she writes to her husband in October 1476, "You shall understand that I have been with my Lady of Suffolk as on Thursday last was, and waited upon her to my lady the King's Modyr (the widowed Duchess of York, Cecily Plantagenet born Lady Cecily Neville, the Rose of Raby) and hers, by commandment. And also upon Saturday last I waited upon her thither again, and also from thence she waited upon my lady her Modyr, and brought her to Grenewyche, to the King's good grace and the Queen's: and there I saw the meetyng between the King and my lady his Modyr. And truly me thought it was a very good sight." Sir William's brother Thomas was inclined to treat the city dame as a parvenue, and to blame her extravagance in having so many menservants, or, to quote her words, "It was said to me that I kept you here among a 'meany of boyes' with other language more."

After Thomas Betson and his Kateryne have been married a year he is taken very ill at Stepney and is despaired of by the doctors. But unselfish men like Betson are often good patients, and when death was at the door he got better. Richard Bryan writes to Sir W. Stonor, "On Thursday my lady Croke (courtesy-title) came to Stebenhith and brought with her Master Brinkley to see Betson, and in faith he was a very sick man: and or he departed he gave him plasters on his head, to his stomach, and to his belly, that he all that night was in quiet rest." It seems very drastic treatment, but Betson was cured. We long to hear details of the married life of the lovers, but Lady Elizabeth Stonor herself died in 1479, and then our fount of news runs dry. Thomas Betson

died in 1486, and was buried at the beautiful church of All Hallows, Barking, which is so near the garden of the future. Kateryne and her five children found a protector, in those stormy days, in her second husband, William Welbek. She did not die till 1510, but then she left instructions that she should be buried by her first devoted husband, and their dust lies somewhere within the precincts of All Hallows, Barking.

There is something very nice and honest about Lady Elizabeth Stonor's letters and her love of pretty things and fine company. Thanks to her well-replenished wardrobe we get a delightful draper's bill and letter which show us how a persuasive tradesman was as eloquent a fellow in the time of Edward IV as he is to-day in the reign of George VI. Thomas Bradbury the draper was Lord Mayor of London later on in 1509, and he writes a little letter with his bill. One item had been thirty-eight yards of green sarcenet at 5s. a yard. This was really an immense sum in those days when a lamb cost a shilling. "Madame," he writes, "the sarcenet is very fine. I thynke most profitable and most worshipful for you, and shall last you your lyff and your chylde's after you, whereas harlotry of 40d. or 44d. a yard would not endure two seasons with you : therefore for a little more cost, me thinketh most wisdom to take of the best. In certain I have bought most part of the sarcenet. I win never a penny in that.— Writ in London the 14th day of October 1479."

Sir William Stonor was very businesslike in his rapid marriages, and he has found himself a new and profitable wife, also a widow, in a few months. He was married to Annes Wydeslade, a Devonshire lady of large property, before May 1480. She seems to have had terribly poor health. She writes, with curious spelling, from her own house in Exeter, "The ffesicion wolle do his cunnyng uppon me, but undertake me he woll not, nor never did none in his liff." The letter expresses great affection to Sir William, but it must have been a sudden growth. There is a beautiful letter from one William Harleston, the old husband of Sir William's Aunt Philippa. It contains sweet words about a garden, words of good omen for the garden of the future on Tower Hill. Uncle Harleston wants his nephew to keep within his income, and to try to imitate his good father rather than his fierce-tempered old mother who was probably half French,

and in any case was brought up in France. He writes, "And moreover for God's sake beware now, for now after the decease of my good lady your wife (i.e. Lady Elizabeth Stonor), you may stable your household now sadly and wisely with a convenient fellowship, so as you may keep you within your livelihood. . . . And beware of your moder's heart and take your fader's heart, on whose soul I beseech Almighty God to have mercy. And of certain things I would desire you and pray you in the name of God, that ye will not over wish you, nor over purchase you, nor over build you, for these three things will pluck a young man right low. And sir, of one thing that is told me, that ye do make a fair new garden; in the which I pray you for my sake to set two herbs the which ben Patience and Thyme: and that these two herbs be put in the pottage that ye eat, so that ye may eat them daily."

It is hard to bring the wealth of interest in these old letters and papers into a short compass. Sir William Stonor's old mother, whose temper was so very hot, found paying guests as trying as we do to-day, and thought, like most of us, that servants were not what they were in her young days: "Sir," she writes to her husband in 1470, "please it you to wit I have received a bill from you whereby I understand my Lord Morley desire to sojourn with you, . . . rather break up household than take sojournants, for servants be not so diligent as they were wont to be." The odd country parson is clear in a little Bewick tail-piece when he writes from Devonshire to Sir William after he has been abused by Sir William's fiery old mother of the fierce heart: "I have been with my mistress your mother" writes Sir John Shynner, parson of Modbury, "and there I shall never come more, by the grace of God, for I was false varlet, thief and her traitor, and God give me grace that I never meet her more."

The earlier letters are full of life. One is a Latin scribble in 1380 to a father about his sick son at a preparatory school. It is minute in its sympathetic picture, though the anxiety about the lost and found Donat or Latin Grammar mixes queerly with anxiety for the sick boy. Delightful as are the *Stonor Letters* on every page the chief interest centres round Sir William Stonor and his family. His delicate second wife from Exeter died in 1481 after a year's marriage, and in the autumn of that very year the cold-hearted man made a third

marriage which was the most ambitious of all. His third wife was young and of very noble birth, for her father John Marquis of Montagu was the brother of the King-maker. There is an interesting letter describing her visit to Taunton in 1482 to Elizabeth Woodvyle's son, John Grey, Marquess of Dorset. Lady Anne Stonor stayed in the beautiful castle at Taunton, which still stands as the Castle Museum. Lady Anne brought a son and heir to her husband, but she died in 1486, eight years before her husband. Sir William had never had cordial relations with Richard Crookback, though he was present at his Coronation. In 1483 he joined Buckingham's rebellion, fled to Brittany with Dorset and was attainted. To his attainder we owe the preservation of his papers. For the happy owners of these Camden Society volumes a life-long intimacy is possible with English folk of another age, many of whom lived happy lives in the precincts of the grim old Tower, and laid their bones in All Hallows, Barking, ground, near to the lovely garden of the future.

CLOTILDA MARSON.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"PROPAGANDA."

ONE of the deepening mysteries is the continued reluctance of Lord Perth to meet Count Ciano in fulfilment of the six-months-old understanding that Italian-British relations should be discussed in their general range. The circumstance is so odd that it has acted as a challenge to some of the more lively minds. We are told, for example, that the Italian danger is one of the big things; that Signor Mussolini burns his midnight oil over the strategic problems incidental to the creation of a new and gigantic Roman Empire and to the correlated destruction of the British Empire; that it would be useless to discuss the cause of better relations with a country which does not want better relations. We are told by others that the Italian broadcast propaganda against Great Britain is an asset so valuable to the British Government that Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues could not afford to run the risk of better relations with Italy, or with anybody: at any rate for the remaining four years of the British rearmament programme. The sums needed by the British Government to complete that programme are so vast, it is explained, that a constant incentive will be needed if the British public is to be induced to see it through. What could be better in that sense, it is asked, than Signor Mussolini's ferocity? In other words, the British Government is assumed to be pursuing a tactic rather like that of the Russian Government in the early years of the Five-Year Plan, when the toiling masses were spurred to heights of patriotic self-sacrifice by the cultivated fear of attack from every neighbouring country.

What is probably true is that propaganda is one of the modern weapons indispensable to every government. Yet it is doubtful if any British Government, even the present British Government, would deliberately cultivate bad relations with Italy for an exclusively domestic purpose. Until now British foreign policy throughout its imperialist period has shown a hard core of realism. Prince von Bülow, in his *Memoirs* (Volume I, 1897-1903, page 45), writes about "English policy which with almost infallible instinct does the right thing for England." It may be that such a reputation is

repugnant to those who now direct British foreign policy. What is difficult to understand is that the pendulum should swing, to an apparently total lack of concern on the part of British opinion, to the opposite extreme. At a time when the British Government has only just started to repair the state of defencelessness incurred out of deference to the principles of the League of Nations Covenant, the spectacle abroad reveals a strong and well-armed Japan engaged on the conquest of the Far East, and allied to Italy and Germany. The only factor that need concern them is the British fleet. If the British fleet be needed to deal with a Japanese attempt on Hong Kong or Singapore, it must needs run the gauntlet of the Italian fleet through 3,000 miles of the Mediterranean and must leave its home waters undefended against the German fleet. Germany could be made a friend by the gift of a colony or two. Mr. Chamberlain, having sent Lord Halifax to Germany as a gesture of friendship, and to discover what precisely Germany wanted, has since given it to be understood by one and all that he will not give what Germany wants, even though the cost to Great Britain be negligible. Having agreed with Signor Mussolini as long ago as last July that Anglo-Italian relations should be discussed with a view to improving them, Mr. Chamberlain has ever since refused to begin such conversations. Italy wants Italian East Africa, the former Abyssinia, to be recognised as Italian East Africa. Nothing more. By simply acknowledging present facts to be present facts, the British Government could make a friend of Italy and safeguard her communications through the Mediterranean. By giving to Germany a small measure of colonial satisfaction, such as she is entitled to on any ground of reason or common sense, the British Government could make a friend of Germany and thus safeguard its home waters. The British Government refuses to do either. What makes the conundrum all the harder is the fact that Mr. Chamberlain himself took the initiative for better relations both with Italy and with Germany.

It appears that by broadcast comment and by other means Italian citizens have said, written and thought unpleasant things about Great Britain. That in itself is not surprising. Such propaganda is the symptom of bad relations. When two parties are on bad terms they do tend to repeat, and even add to, whatever evil gossip they may hear about each other. If

they were on good terms, they would refrain from such mischief. Italians can quote the attacks made on Italy and Signor Mussolini in the British newspapers of the Left with as much gusto as the British people can quote Italian newspapers and Italian broadcasts. Heat is thereby engendered. On December 13th, for example, Mr. Eden in the House of Commons was asked about the statement appearing in the Italian Press to the effect that Great Britain "intended to annex" the Azores. Mr. Eden indignantly said: "No significance need be attached to fantastic statements of this kind, which are, of course, entirely devoid of foundation." He added that "fabrications of this kind do most harm to the people who use them," and was sure that "the Portuguese Government give no more credence to them than we do ourselves." It is at least doubtful if such propaganda can do any harm either to its authors or to its victims. The surprising thing is that it should be taken seriously. Neither Portuguese nor Arabian opinion is likely to be impressed in present circumstances by Italian-British recrimination. Moreover, in the case of the Arabs, no one could believe that the chronic difficulties in Palestinè have been made worse by the Italian broadcasts. How many Arabs listen-in? How many wireless sets are there in the whole of Palestine? Yet this boggy propaganda seems to have become a subject of substantial grievance in British official quarters, if the pretended grievance be not a pretext for some other feeling.

The unadorned story of Anglo-Italian relations as they have developed during the past twelve months illustrates in its simplest form the abiding perversities of diplomatic practice. It is only a year since the attempt was begun, by means of the so-called "gentleman's agreement" (January 4th, 1937) between Italy and Great Britain, to liquidate the bad effects of British opposition to Italy's conquest of Abyssinia. The only purpose of that agreement was to improve the relations between the two countries; for as Mr. Eden put it in the House of Commons on November 5th, 1936: "In years gone by, the interests of the two countries in the Mediterranean have been complementary rather than divergent." Yet the initial obstacle to an improvement of relations was never removed. The British Government refused to accept any Italian envoy as the representative of the Italian "King-Emperor"; refused, that is, to recognise Italy's conquest of

Abyssinia. None the less at the end of last July Mr. Chamberlain made another attempt, by an exchange of friendly letters with Signor Mussolini, to loosen the deadlock. It was arranged that Sir Eric Drummond, British Ambassador in Rome, should make contact with Count Ciano in Rome in order frankly to face the difficulties on both sides and explore a means of removing them. But fate intervened in two ways. First, Sir Eric Drummond's half-brother, the Earl of Perth, died, and Sir Eric was the heir to the earldom. The business of assuming the earldom was so apparently protracted that the new Lord Perth did not reach Rome again till the end of September. By that time the relationship between Italy and Great Britain was again so strained that any excuse was taken for postponing the projected Perth-Ciano talks. During August some fifty ships of various nationality were attacked by "pirates" from the air or from under the sea, and British opinion promptly assumed the pirates to be Italian, even though some of the ships attacked were themselves Italian. There followed the Nyon Conference (September 10th), which Italy refused to attend, and the unfortunate Anglo-French scheme for patrolling the Mediterranean. Were the Italian-British talks never to be held at all? Count Grandi, towards the end of the year, called upon Mr. Eden to ask him that question. The answer given was that the "propaganda" against Great Britain must cease before the talks could begin. Mr. Eden was thereupon invited to quote instances of the said propaganda, an invitation which led to the prompt recital, many pages long, of anti-British matter that had been transmitted over the air from Italian-controlled stations. At the end of the year Signor Crolla, Italian Chargé d'Affaires, acting in the absence of Count Grandi, went again to see Mr. Eden, and to suggest that the best method of dealing with the question of propaganda was to hasten the Perth-Ciano talks. He was again met with a refusal in the form of a reiterated condition that the propaganda must cease before the talks could start. It was recalled to Mr. Eden's mind that last August, when the talks were first contemplated, Signor Mussolini, on being invited by Mr. Chamberlain to control the anti-British propaganda so as to give the talks the best chance of success, had given a personal undertaking that such propaganda should cease. He had thereupon every morning made it his business to see that no broadcast programme or newspaper

article contained any hostile reference to Great Britain. He had continued to carry out his undertaking in that way for two months, at the end of which time he made it known to the British Government that inasmuch as the undertaking had been given for the specific purpose of enabling Lord Perth to converse with Count Ciano in an atmosphere of confidence and friendliness, and Lord Perth had made no move towards seeing Count Ciano, he felt no longer bound to respect the undertaking. At the end of the year, Italy refused to repeat the experiment, and instead suggested that the talks be begun forthwith as the best means of putting an end to the propaganda. The result was one of deadlock.

THE RUSSIAN PANTOMIME.

In the general gloom it has become almost a relief to turn to the contemplation of Russia's continuing evolution in her domestic affairs, though the relief be somewhat heartless. It is indeed no joke for the Russian people. After twenty years of steady oppression and exploitation at the hands of the new despotism, the Russian proletariat has had to watch that despotism turn upon itself. The fear let loose from the Kremlin as the instrument of government has at last turned upon the Government itself, with the result that for many months Comrade Stalin has been engaged upon the enterprise of shooting all the colleagues of whom he was afraid. It was in such a circumstance that the new constitution adopted in 1936 fell to be ritually inaugurated in its political practice. On December 12th last a general election was held. It was the first election to be held in Soviet Russia. What precisely was changed by this new constitution? The first enunciation of the principles of Soviet government was made in the Declaration of Rights of November 7th, 1917, and incorporated in the first constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republics in July 1918. It proclaimed a Republic of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, the object being expressed as "the abolition of all exploitations of man by man, the complete abolition of the division of society into classes, the ruthless suppression of the exploiter and the establishment of a society organised on Socialist lines." Those principles continued to be the basis of the constitutions adopted by the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet

Republics on May 12th, 1925, and of the other Constituent Republics after the formation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (December 30th, 1922). The latest constitution was adopted at a special Soviet Congress held on November 25th, 1936, when Comrade Stalin explained that "the class of capitalists has already been abolished, the means and instruments of production have been taken from the capitalists and turned over to the State, of which the leading force is the working class. There is therefore no longer a class of capitalists that could exploit the working class." The purpose of the new constitution was therefore "the further democratisation of the electoral system by the substitution of equal elections for not entirely equal, direct elections for indirect, and secret for open ballots."

To the democrat of other countries the essence of the constitution was its provision for the "election" of the Government. The relevant Article is 134, which reads: "Deputies to all soviets . . . are elected by the electors on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot." Such were the main principles that were translated into practice on December 12th last. The occasion was a general "election." It was certainly "universal." The electors certainly had a purpose, but the purpose was not to elect anybody or anything. The entire manhood and womanhood of Russia voted for a single name that appeared on the ballot paper given to them. The candidates were all nominated by Comrade Stalin. There was never any doubt that they would all be "elected." The 569 members of the Union Council and the 574 members of the Council of Nationalities, chosen in advance, merely waited for the formality of the "election" before they could take their seats. The only theoretic choice given to the toilers at the polls was that the name on the ballot paper might be struck off, though none other might be substituted. Nor was the election any more secret than anything else that takes place in Russia. Striking off a candidate from the ballot paper was a tactic that appealed only to those toilers who had decided to commit suicide. They would be asking to be shot, knowing that their request would be granted. The election was heralded by all the forms of the grotesque crude puppet-show so familiar as the Kremlin method. Bright red banners were displayed throughout the country, written by Stalin, with the device

"Our votes shall go to beloved Stalin" or "Thanks to Stalin, who made our life joyous." The terror in Comrade Stalin's own heart could not be more eloquently measured than by that enforced and regimented chorus from the throats of the oppressed and exploited proletariat. Did it much matter from the toilers' point of view whether the oppressor were so-called "capitalist" or so-called "socialist"?

On December 12th, 90,000,000 men and women in Russia dropped their ballot papers into boxes at the rate of 2,000 a second. The papers were sealed in envelopes by virtue of the prescription of Article 134 of the Constitution that the ballot should be "secret." Comrade Stalin announced in a broadcast talk that history knew no example of such "free, democratic elections." His history was abundantly right. For the rest he thereby coined a phrase to compete with the famous Holy Roman Empire; for the "election" in Russia was not free, nor democratic, nor was it an election. The voting figures showed that no fewer than 91,113,153 people or 96·8 per cent. of the electorate actually voted. From six o'clock in the morning till midnight the toiling masses were rushing incontinently to the polling booths. Why? Their vote made no practical difference to anything. There was no choice between one candidate and another. Every candidate was unopposed. Why then the hysterical, unanimous hurry to be walked over? The answer is only too obvious. They were afraid, if they did not vote, that worse would befall them. The urge in short was the purge.

THE EXUBERANCE OF JAPAN.

The Far Eastern Conference in Brussels adjourned *sine die* on November 24th. It had sat for exactly three weeks with an advertised purpose of vaguely exploring the means of peace between Japan and China. Japan did not attend the Conference, nor Germany. Italy attended, but in a dissentient spirit. Three days after the Conference began an anti-Comintern Pact was signed in Rome by Germany, Japan and Italy. The Brussels Conference was of no consequence except that it provided the foil for the tripartite pact, which itself is of immense consequence. It was after the ostentatious failure of the Brussels Conference and the signature of the tripartite pact that Japan entered upon the most exuberant

phase of her militarist campaign that had yet been manifested.

Towards the end of November, while Japan was massing her forces for the attack on Nanking, General Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo and Prime Minister, twice made public statement of China's determination to resist. On November 25th he said that China was in a position to carry on the war for an indefinite period, and that her Government's policy was to "resist to the end." In the long run it may indeed prove to be the case that Japan has fashioned a new united China, just as Napoleon laid the foundations of Bismarck's united Germany. By the beginning of December, Japan had ceased to conceal her belief that the other Powers were no obstacle to the achievement of her purpose. In the last week of November the Japanese military established control over the Chinese communications and newspapers in Shanghai. Whereupon, as a matter of almost weary routine, the British, French and American Ambassadors made representations in Tokyo. They each declared that their Governments could not be indifferent to any Japanese interference with the Chinese Maritime Customs service. The anomaly—if nowadays it can still be regarded as an anomaly—persisted that although in form there was no war, in fact the Far East was the scene of one of the great wars of history. While the Ambassadors of the Powers were making their representations, the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoe, made a statement on "war" aims, even though "at present" he said "Japan does not intend to declare war." If, he said, General Chiang Kai-shek would undertake to "co-operate" with Japan in China, he would discuss terms with him, but no third party would be "allowed" in the negotiations. If not, Japan would "crush" China by arms. On November 29th the Japanese Foreign Office announced that the Japanese military "considered it necessary" to take control of the Chinese customs as a means to defeating the Chinese military power. The statement added, in the now familiar spirit of Japanese irony, that "the interests of the foreign Powers" would be respected. Thereupon conversations were started in Shanghai and in Tokyo between the several authorities to arrange a provisional customs machinery.

Concurrently the Japanese military advance on Nanking was vigorously prosecuted, British shipping on the Yangtze not escaping damage. On December 1st, General Tang

Seng-chi, defender of Nanking, warned foreigners to leave the town because it would soon become a "battlefield." A typically spirited Chinese counter-attack was launched, and the river forts of Kiangyin continued to hold out against intense bombing. None the less the Japanese advance could not be arrested, and within a few days the Japanese troops were closing in on Tanyang, the centre of the last line of defence before Nanking. On December 3rd one of the ugly "incidents" took place in Shanghai. Three thousand Japanese troops marched through the International Settlement. Heedless of foreign advice the Japanese military persisted in staging their "victory march." There were 2,000,000 embittered Chinese refugees in the Settlement. One of them threw a bomb among the marching troops and was promptly shot dead. Another committed "patriotic suicide" by jumping from a high building in full sight of the parade. Chaos prevailed, but the situation was narrowly saved by a pavement conference between the Japanese and Settlement authorities. On December 5th Chinese troops and civilians began to flee Nanking. Two British-owned river steamers were bombed and seriously damaged in a Japanese air raid at Wuhu. The raids on Nanking itself were relentlessly continued. On December 7th General Chiang Kai-shek (who had only a fortnight before announced China's determination to "resist to the end") fled with his wife from Nanking by air for an unknown destination, his fleeing troops meanwhile setting fire to all the villages on their retreat. By December 8th the invaders were at the gates of Nanking and warned all foreign residents that they remained in the city at their peril. General Matsui, Commander of the Japanese forces, sent an ultimatum, dropped from the air, demanding the surrender of Nanking by noon on December 10th, failing which "the horrors of war will be let loose on Nanking." It was ignored. The Japanese assault was therefore launched, and Nanking fell on December 13th. During the following few days the city was subjected to looting and to various forms of brutality and on December 14th a new "Government of the Chinese Republic" was set up in Peking to supplant Nanking and to "co-operate" with Japan and Manchukuo. Two days later the Government took over the maritime Customs offices at Tientsin and Chinwangtao.

Not content with the conquest of China proper, Japan now

began to advertise her intention of dominating also the foreigners and the foreign interests in China. On December 12th the British gunboat *Ladybird*, at anchor in the Yangtze off Wuhu, was fired on from the shore by Japanese machine-guns. She at once began to steam up-river, and was then shelled by Japanese field-guns. The casualties were one killed and several wounded. H.M.S. *Bee*, *Scarab* and *Cricket* were also fired on, but not hit. Later in the same day the United States gunboat *Panay* and three Standard Oil Company tankers on the Yangtze were bombed and sunk by Japanese aeroplanes. The *Panay* was then machine-gunned by Japanese motor-boats, whose crew boarded the sinking gunboat. Wounded survivors were machine-gunned as they tried to escape ashore. The casualties were three killed and over a hundred wounded, several seriously. H.M.S. *Bee* did most of the rescue work under great difficulty.

The British and United States Governments on December 13th sent separate protests to Tokyo. Mr. Roosevelt requested that the Emperor of Japan be advised that he was "deeply shocked and concerned." The more formal Notes were then sent to Tokyo. America demanded apology, compensation, and guarantee against repetition. The British Note, delivered on December 16th, demanded that measures be taken that would put a "definite stop" to such incidents. The incidents themselves, it said, raised "grave issues." On December 14th, before the British Note was delivered in Tokyo, Mr. Hirota, Japanese Foreign Minister, handed to Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador, a Note that expressed "sincere apologies" for the "mistake" of the attacks, and promised investigation, adequate treatment of those responsible, and compensation. Similarly on December 14th, before the American Note was delivered, a message was transmitted from Tokyo to Washington offering apology, punishment, and indemnity. In the House of Commons on December 21st, Mr. Chamberlain declared that the patience so far shown did not mean indifference to British interests and that Britain would now expect Japan, instead of offering apologies in words, to prove her sincerity by deeds. On December 22nd the British Government telegraphed to Tokyo still another protest coupled with a demand for an assurance about the future. This time the occasion was the infringement of British territory and territorial waters at Hong Kong

perpetrated by a Japanese destroyer a fortnight earlier. The incident took place the day before the attack on the British and American gunboats on the Yangtze, and was thereby somewhat dwarfed. What happened on December 11th was that a Japanese destroyer fired on a Chinese Customs cruiser inside the territorial waters of Hong Kong and also landed a Japanese party in Hong Kong. Britain, on December 22nd, firmly demanded from Tokyo an undertaking for the future to respect British sovereignty in Hong Kong.

On Christmas Eve, Washington received a Note from Japan elaborating the apology given ten days earlier for the sinking of the *Panay*. Tokyo now declared the attack on the *Panay* to have been "entirely due to a mistake" and "entirely unintentional"; and further stated that "rigid orders" had been issued to prevent the recurrence of such mistakes. The United States Government promptly accepted the Japanese Note as "responsive" to the demands made a fortnight earlier; but added the "earnest hope" that the orders issued from Tokyo really would prevent a recurrence of the "unlawful" attacks aforesaid. The Japanese Note to America stated that after Japanese investigation the fact had been "fully established" that the attack on the *Panay* had been unintentional. In answer the American Government said that it "relies on the report of the findings of the Court of Enquiry of the United States Navy." The British protest, delivered in Tokyo simultaneously with the American, was, in its turn, answered in the like spirit.

The text of the Japanese Note to Britain was published on December 13th. It renewed the promise of guarantees against a repetition of the attacks, declared that the offenders had been "dealt with properly according to law," even though "it has been established that the incidents were entirely due to a mistake." In a Note delivered in Tokyo on January 1st, the British Government accepted the Japanese apology, but went on to suggest that "conversations" be forthwith undertaken to the end that Britain be informed "of the actual steps decided upon" by Japan to prevent the repetition of such incidents. On January 3rd it became known that Japan had offered certain "peace terms" to China. They were communicated to General Chiang Kai-shek at Hankow by Dr. Trautmann, the German Ambassador to China, who acted as intermediary. The nature of the terms showed that Japan,

by an inversion of Clausewitz's famous dictum, was attempting to prosecute the war by other means. They demanded that China should join the anti-Russian group, recognise Manchukuo, accept Japanese "advisers," and Japanese military occupation, "co-operate" economically with Japan, demilitarise certain zones round Shanghai and elsewhere, and pay an "indemnity" to Japan. On January 4th the Japanese authorities continued the political tactic by making demands on the Municipal Council at Shanghai. They demanded an increase in the number of the Japanese employed in the police force and other services, and specified that "important administrative appointments" be given to the Japanese. On January 6th, before the British Government had received from the British Consul-General at Shanghai the detailed report of the demands aforesaid, two British members of the Shanghai International Settlement police force were violently assaulted by Japanese troops on the Settlement boundary. Meanwhile in the military campaign a swift advance was made along the Tientsin-Pukow railway, from Tsinan in the north and from Pukow in the south, with the result that the two arms of the scissors came to within 250 miles of each other. Europe now had to face the fact that despite the periodic apologies, Japan was embarked upon the conquest both of the Chinese and of the foreigners in China. She could ignore a divided Europe. It was clearly impossible for British prestige to be maintained in the Far East unless and until a settlement was made with Germany and Italy in Europe.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 12th, 1938.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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HOLLAND HOUSE.

Readers of the first volume of the story of the most interesting private residence in London have looked forward with eagerness to the second,* and their hopes will be fully realised. Here is the same wealth of knowledge, the same crowded stage, the same procession of political, literary and social celebrities of whom we can never hear too much. It is indeed a rare good fortune that Holland House should be in the possession of a man who knows and loves every stone, every picture, every room. The eventful record of three centuries closes appropriately with two chapters on the house itself and the grounds.

The first volume closed with the death of George III in 1820, a date in the history of England but not in the fortunes of the Fox family. For Holland House had long been at its zenith under the sway of the most lovable of hosts and the most imperious of hostesses. The more we know of the third Lord Holland the more we love him for his goodness of heart, his genius for friendship, his breadth of sympathy, his fidelity to his liberal principles. Lord Chalkstone, as the martyr to gout called himself, must have had the temper of an angel to bear his pain with a smiling face. It is good news that there is ample material available for a serious life of Lord Holland, and we may hope that Lord Ilchester may fill the yawning gap. We have biographies of all the Whig

* *Chronicles of Holland House, 1820-1900.* By the Earl of Ilchester. John Murray. 188.
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leaders in the Cabinets which ruled England from 1830 to 1841—Grey, Melbourne, Palmerston, John Russell, Durham, Althorp, Brougham—and there is still a vacant chair.

In taking leave of the formidable hostess who outlived her husband by five years and died in 1845, Lord Ilchester reconstructs her character in detail and pronounces her a mass of inconsistencies. Though her faults were obvious, particularly her increasingly domineering ways, it is satisfactory to learn that "My woman" and "Holly," utterly different as they were in temperament, adored one another to the end. "No happier couple existed, perhaps because he seldom asserted himself." Visitors indeed marvelled at the patience with which he bore inconsiderate treatment from the brilliant, original, indiscreet and exasperating woman who was the unquestioned ruler of the circle. "Domination in later life was the essence of her existence, and all who came under her sway were expected to obey." Yet the combination of types was irresistible, and Greville was fully justified in his comment: "The world has never seen and never will again see anything like Holland House."

The fourth and last Lord Holland, whom we met as a young man in the earlier volume and who constantly appears in the present during the lifetime of his parents, is a rather shadowy figure. Neither loving nor loved by his mother he spent most of his life abroad, and even after his accession to the title he was never very long in England. Though he had plenty of brains and interests, and was the friend of Watts and other artists, he never seems to have taken either his diplomatic career or anything else very seriously. His attractive little wife, who became the owner of Holland House at his death in 1859, survived him for thirty years, wisely bequeathing the glorious old mansion to the father of the present Lord Ilchester, and thus keeping it in the Fox family, which has owned and cherished it for two hundred years.

G. P. G.

THE TREATY OF TRIANON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.*

Mr. Macartney's painstaking work on the subject of Hungarian grievances is already well known. His *National*

* *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences—1919-37.*
By C. A. Macartney. Oxford University Press. 25s. net.

States and National Minorities, published in 1934, established a reputation which will be further enhanced by the volume now before us. It is clearly right in one sense to regard as scholarly a work which takes infinite pains to marshal facts. Mr. Macartney's facts are not only impressive; they are overwhelming. These 500 pages of the present book are crammed with detail and documentation. Whether the marshalling of fact is in itself enough to satisfy the severest criterion of scholarliness is doubtful. Diplomatic propaganda and counter-propaganda is one of the world's most depressing and most futile fields for the operation of scholarship.

The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was split into fragments by politicians who relied on the assurance of historical scholars for their thesis that "nationality" and its kindred ideologies justified the new frontiers. Mr. Macartney in his turn supplies enough fact to justify in the opinion of many people another redrawing of frontiers, although in one passage he confesses that "no frontier could be drawn which did not leave national minorities on at least one side of it." Those who, during the last great war, were determined to take the opportunity of rescuing Czechs from Austria and Slovaks from Hungary on the general ground that it was improper for members of a foreign race to be subject to the government of another race, in their enthusiasm proceeded to create in the liberated, reunited races the very obverse circumstance. Minorities were rescued from one side of a frontier; but the frontier itself was so shifted that the new masters over their own races were given minorities belonging to the other races in too great a measure. "None of the Peace Treaties," writes Mr. Macartney, "was more drastic in its terms than the Treaty of Trianon. By it Hungary was not so much mutilated as dismembered. Even if we exclude Croatia-Slavonia, which had stood only in federal relationship to the other Lands of the Holy Crown—although one of eight hundred years' standing—Hungary proper was reduced to less than one-third (32.6 per cent.) of her pre-War area, and a little over two-fifths (41.6 per cent.) of her population. Territories and peoples formerly Hungarian were distributed among no less than seven states: the remnant which still called itself Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Italy; Roumania alone securing at Hungary's

expense an area (although not a population) larger than that left to Hungary herself. These losses were proportionately far greater than those inflicted on Germany or Bulgaria. The Austria of 1937 was, indeed, an even smaller fraction of the State which had borne that name in 1918; but the old Austria had not been a unitary state, but only a federation of Kingdoms, Duchies, and provinces, the hereditary estates of a super-national dynasty, the composition of which was seldom the same for two successive generations. The Treaty of St. Germain simply divided this federation into its constituent elements. The real losses suffered by the German-Austrian provinces, in the South Tyrol, along the marches of Styria and Carinthia and on the Bohemian border, were painful, but insignificant compared with those of Hungary."

Mr. Macartney's new book will certainly provide grist for the mill of those who are now fighting—as yet fighting only with the weapons of propaganda—over Central Europe. Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was dead when it was drafted in 1919, for frontiers are never redrawn except as the result of war. Mr. Macartney's book abundantly proves the drastic nature of the treatment meted out to Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon and clearly shows the nature of the resentment thereby provoked; but he believes (or hopes) that what he calls "local readjustments, leaving the main position as it stands now," may yet be carried out by peaceful methods. What he suggests as the ideal solution is this: "The only permanent solution of the problem of the Danube basin lies in the adoption of complete national equality among its inhabitants—the transformation of the area into a true 'Eastern Switzerland,' in which every nationality alike can find national liberty and a national home. If this principle once prevails, it may truly be argued that it does not particularly matter where the frontiers are drawn."

G. G.

RUSSIAN POLICY BEFORE THE WAR.

For four busy years, 1906-10, Iswolsky directed the foreign policy of Russia, and for another seven, 1910-17, he represented his country at Paris. Since the great official publication of Russian documents begins in 1914, and will

only deal with earlier periods when the final section (1914-17) is completed, we have to wait for the ultimate revelations. Even so we have a mass of material in many languages on which to form our judgment of Iswolsky's policy and character, including the Memoirs which he began to write after the fall of the Tsar and unfortunately did not live to complete. So frequent were the crises through which pre-war Europe passed, and so important was the part he played, that every scrap of fresh evidence is welcome.

The correspondence, of which the first volume* is now presented to the public, has been arranged and—where the original is in Russian—translated by his widow. Except for some of the letters of Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London, published in the *Revue de France* in 1934, the whole collection is new. In addition to the official despatches and telegrams between a Foreign Minister and his representatives abroad there are always numberless private communications of the highest interest. It is these of which the present valuable and interesting work consists. Though Iswolsky's own letters are relatively few, there are enough of them to indicate his brilliant intellect, his unflagging industry, and the general outlines of his thought. By common consent his settlements with England and Japan in 1907 and with Italy in 1909 were achievements of the first magnitude. It is true that his discomfiture by Aehrenthal in 1908 threw a shadow over the last half of his term of office in St. Petersburg, and darkened the remainder of his life. But a man's public career must be taken and judged as a whole. A carefully written Introduction by Professor Chklaver summarises the story of his eventful life and puts the best construction on his record.

The correspondence is arranged under the headings of the five great Powers, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and England, and the contents of each document are conveniently indicated in the margin. The section on Germany, containing the letters of Count Osten-Sacken, deals mainly with the years 1906-7, and illustrates the slow worsening of Russo-German relations as the outlines of the Triple Entente began to emerge. The section on Austria, containing the letters of Prince Ourussoff, deals almost entirely with the same two

* *Correspondance Diplomatique, 1906-1911*. Vol. 1. By Alexandre Iswolsky. Paris. Les Editions Internationales.

Cochrane there is a useful sketch of Lord Rosebery. An appreciation of Lord Lansdowne has been contributed by the late Marquis, who gives comparatively small attention to his work as Foreign Secretary.

Among other outstanding statesmen there is a valuable estimate of Lord Haldane by his sister, Miss Elizabeth Haldane, who rightly stresses the vital significance of his army reforms and his work for university and adult education in preference to his judicial work. In Sir Claud Schuster's detached account of Lord Birkenhead, recognition is given particularly to his lasting work as judge and law reformer.

The memoir of Earl Haig has been contributed by Sir Frederick Maurice, who traces quite dispassionately and objectively his leadership of the British armies in the War and refrains from a discussion of his relations with the Cabinet. Moreover, Sir Frederick attempts no general estimate of his greatness as a military commander. One of the more definitive articles is a contribution by Mr. Geoffrey Dawson on Lord Northcliffe. He points out that too much stress has been laid upon his war work and that the real claim to fame is that of a "consummate journalist, who changed the whole course of English journalism." That he "ruined *The Times*" Mr. Dawson declares is manifestly unjust. In truth he saved it from extinction when its circulation had sunk to 38,000, but it is equally clear that his instability again imperilled its existence.

Mr. Basil Williams writes on Lord Milner and, discussing his South African administration and the Boer War, declares that Chamberlain "was fortunate in having such an agent to carry out" his policy. It is to be noted that the Dictionary includes not only Colonial administrators, but also Dominion statesmen and public figures, so that it is more imperial than merely national in its scope.

Among ecclesiastics stands out the figure of Archbishop Davidson whose life and work is here sketched by his full-length biographer, Dr. G. K. A. Bell, the Bishop of Chichester. Space forbids mention of those distinguished in literature, art and learning, particularly historical science. Finally, it is right to stress the Dictionary's value in sketching the lives of the less eminent whose careers otherwise remain unrecorded.

MADAME DE LIEVEN.*

To open the letters of Madame de Lieven and read the following passages is to be released from a century-old ignorance :

I often wonder, *mon Prince*, how we shall look when we see one another again ; we have reached the point that one arrives at, I imagine, after twenty years of habit ; . . . How did we get the idea of thinking of one another, and how did the first illusion concerning our destinies come into being ? . . . I should very much like to come back . . . and to see what posterity thinks of these two intelligent people whose combined genius was devoted to snatching a fortnight once every three years.

At last her attitude towards her enigmatic love-affair with Metternich is revealed. Conjecture gives place to certainty. For hitherto we only knew her first cry of despair when after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle they parted as lovers. "Can you bear the thought of a still longer separation ? Tell me, Clement, what will become of us ? Have you thought of that ? "

In this lengthy postscript to their passionate beginnings she shows her eagerness to be again with him, her sense of the strangeness of circumstance that keeps them at a distance of "five hundred leagues," except when a European congress takes place, her final disappointment when he marries again and marries "a little girl." She never forgave him. It is strange to read her last letter written in a mood of conciliation and hope and remember that some months later London drawing-rooms rang with the abuse she lavished on her former lover.

Let us start again from the beginning. We should be hard put to it, you and I, to find in the whole world people of our own calibre. Our hearts are well matched, our minds too ; and our letters are very pleasant. . . . I repeat : you will find no one better than me. If you meet your like, show him me. Good-bye.

It was worth waiting for this intimate, friendly voice. The haughty ambassadress, celebrated for her "*air d'ennui et de mépris*" unmasks the sensitive, genuine side of her character, and having read these letters we need no longer wonder that the most distinguished men of her time were her friends. Her

* *The Private Letters of Princess Lieven to Prince Metternich, 1820-1826.* Edited by Peter Quennell. Murray. 18s.

fascination lies in her splendid vitality, which illumines her every utterance, even if she happens to be ill or bored. Obviously to those who were intimate with her, her company was a rare delight. For its sake they put up with her tantrums, her exaggerations, her bullying. People and people alone mattered to her. Her understanding of character was as keen and subtle as her understanding of politics was biased and incomplete. That is why in this correspondence there is not a single sound political judgment, but a brilliant gathering of personalities. They are wonderfully alive. We can almost hear their voices ; we share their quarrels and enjoy their jokes : Castlereagh and that extravagant personage his brother Stewart, Canning the unwelcome upstart, Wellington, irascible but dignified, Lord Grey, the King's preposterous mistress, Lady Conyngham. Madame de Lieven might have made a Saint-Simon. She has the gift of creating a personality in a swift phrase :

Pozzo arrived, to pounce on me, all wit and news. He stayed three hours ; I feel over-fed with genius. . . . Palmella is here . . . his intelligence and conversation are all velvet.

Critical, observant, quickwitted, she is equally entertaining whether she describes a boring evening at Windsor or tells how she steals out to post a letter in secret to Metternich. She describes many important events : Queen Caroline's trial, Castlereagh's suicide, Canning's slow, difficult rise to power. The honours, however, go to George IV. He is the hero of the correspondence. We see him in all his moods, surrounded by his intimates at the Pavilion and the Cottage, by turns melancholy, lovelorn, or ponderously frivolous ; often a buffoon, sometimes both wise and witty. She contributes nothing new to our knowledge of that strange monarch whose abilities we are only to-day able to appreciate justly. The value of her impressions lies in their informal, day-to-day character. It is not a portrait that she gives, but a series of admirable close-ups.

The older she grew the more politics absorbed her. On a journey to Italy she begs Metternich for news, news, news. "Indeed I appreciate politics far more than the sun," she writes. And when the following year she returned from Russia she made a confession which is perhaps the most interesting and surprising thing in the correspondence. She had come

away thinking it possible to have a "great political influence" on the Emperor Alexander. His sudden death prevented her from realising these new aspirations, but they testify to the extent of her ambition and her courage. As Metternich knew, no man was harder to manage than Alexander. But Madame de Lieven was nothing if not daring, and what greater proof of her temerity and skill is needed than this intimate correspondence with the head of European diplomacy, carried on with the knowledge, if not with the tacit approval, of the English Ministers? Posterity benefits by her courage and her affections. We owe to them this brilliant picture of the golden age of English society.

Mr. Quennell's suave and skilful comments add to the interest of the book, but his editing suffers a little from want of precision. Passages which call for a note remain unexplained: the reference to a "vexing political combination" on page 366 is a case in point. The gaps in the correspondence when Madame de Lieven and Metternich were together at Hanover and Verona should have been indicated, and one feels uneasy about the length and nature of the excisions made in the text. Probably justifiable, they should have been explained in each case. Nor does Mr. Quennell consider the question how far the later letters at the time of Madame de Lieven's conversion to Canning are genuine. Was she supporting him in London and writing with her tongue in her cheek to Vienna? This interesting point which touches the complication of the Eastern Question was well worth attention. But against these criticisms must be set the rare excellence of the translation. It reads so well that one forgets Madame de Lieven wrote in French. Indeed it is a model, and a much needed one, of what a translation of that kind should be.

H. DU COUDRAY.

PRINCE ROHAN ON EUROPE'S CHOICE.*

Prince Rohan has gained many friends and much approval by unswervingly devoting himself to the lofty ideals of European civilisation which he keenly advocates in his periodical *Europäische Revue*. So one may look forward to

* Karl Anton Prinz Rohan, *Schicksalsstunde Europas. Erkenntnisse und Bekenntnisse, Wirklichkeiten und Möglichkeiten*. Leykam Verlag, Graz. RM.7.

reading his opinions on the present crisis and his conception of the future of Europe. It is, however, to be feared that the majority of readers will feel rather disappointed with this huge bulk of topics extending from "the meaning of European *kultur*" and "personality and mode of life" down to sexual problems, cooking, and tourist traffic. Expounding what he thinks *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*, he has not avoided the danger of "*Qui trop embrasse, mal étreint*." Readers who are not accustomed to the dark and clumsy style prevailing in German philosophy will be rather surprised to find themselves even cautioned against the author's not dealing "*gründlich*" (thoroughly) enough with all these problems. He thrusts his readers into a vast ocean of opinions and assertions without giving them the safe feeling that the man at the helm is perfectly aware of the sands and shallows under the surface.

Leaving the chapters on *Kultur* to be discussed by professional philosophers, we turn to Prince Rohan's arguments on the present state and future lines of European politics, which, as they occupy more than half the volume, seem to form the chief concern of the author. In a rather outspoken manner, the vocabulary of which often reminds one of the Marxist school of sociology, he contrasts the bourgeois of the nineteenth century with "the man of the twentieth century" who is characterised as "*schlechthin antibürgerlich*" (decidedly anti-bourgeois). The bourgeois is "atheist, rationalist, sometimes also materialist"; he stands for safety, freedom, and property, whereas the typical features of the new man are faith, heroism, and collectivism. Consequently, Russia, Italy, and Germany are considered true representatives of this new age, which, incidentally, has witnessed the victory of socialism. For, according to Prince Rohan, "there is, in fact, no longer the general question of socialism at stake, but only the decision for one of the many possible socialisms," viz. Bolshevism, Fascism, or National Socialism. Even the "satiated" Western nations are in danger of being overrun, e.g. Belgium, by "the youthful prodigy of European counter-revolution," Léon Degrelle, the Rexist leader. This phrase, for which no reason or explanation is given, may be quoted as an example of the many arbitrary statements which bluff rather than convince the reader.

Bolshevism, though characterised as "the great adventure

of mankind," is completely rejected for being "anti-European," whereas Fascism, "in its deepest sense," means "rebirth of the European heritage," as it comprises the best elements of European civilisation, being "a plebiscitary democracy, aristocratically organised, authoritatively led." The same or even higher qualities are attributed to National Socialism. "The racial idea," says Prince Rohan, "applied to a whole nation, is, so to speak, the last consequence of European democratisation"; so that it is only natural to conclude that "National Socialism is becoming more and more, from day to day, the standard-bearer of European rebirth out of the noblest virtues of its heritage." Great stress is laid upon the Papal bull "*Quadragesimo Anno*" of 1931, "a Magna Charta of true conservative spirit." One is hardly mistaken in assuming that Prince Rohan ultimately puts his confidence in a Europe penetrated and guided by Roman Catholic conceptions of life and politics.

S. H. STEINBERG.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Dr. Vincent Taylor has published a valuable study of the Passion Sayings in the Gospel, preceded by an exposition of the Old Testament background, and followed by a doctrinal treatment of the Atonement.* The author is a very competent scholar and a careful expositor. He is well versed in all the literature of his great subject. While abreast of all the relevant higher criticism and accepting many of its results, his conclusions are, for the most part, liberally conservative. Every saying of our Lord, as recorded in the Four Gospels, is carefully considered and the views of other commentators are set forth both fairly and fully. Dr. Taylor's own view is substantially in accord with that of McLeod Campbell, Moberly and Lidgett. For him, the sacrifice of Christ is representative rather than substitutional, sacrificial and not expiatory, availing because spiritual. It is intimately associated with the Eucharist, in which communicants make our Lord's attitude and sacrifice their own. Hence the author unifies the objective and the subjective explanations of the great Deed of the Cross. His book must be highly commended for its scholarship, breadth of view and spiritual insight.

J. S. L.

* *Jesus and His Sacrifice*. By Vincent Taylor, D.D. Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

German and Czech: A Threat to European Peace,* by S. Grant Duff, is the thirty-sixth brochure issued by the New Fabian Research Bureau. In his Preface Dr. Hugh Dalton, M.P., speaks of the exceptional opportunities for intelligent observation which the author has had, and of the good use she has made of them. In these fifty pages the reader will find a masterly analysis of the most dangerous square on the European chess-board. She writes with warm appreciation of the young Czechoslovak State, and of the distinguished statesmen who have guided its destinies during twenty anxious years. Mistakes have assuredly been committed in the handling of the German minority, and the concessions granted in February 1937 should have been made ungrudgingly before Henlein emerged. Yet Miss Grant Duff shares to the full the prevailing sentiment of Englishmen that the domination of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany, directly or indirectly, would be a disaster not only for that little island of democracy but for the higher values of European civilisation. The dispute between the Czechs and the Henlein Germans, in the author's opinion, will be settled by the developments of the international situation. This remarkable brochure should make us reflect very carefully on our wider responsibilities.

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The history of *The Colonial Office*† during the years 1836-85 forms the subject of an important study by Dr. Henry L. Hall which must add to our knowledge of imperial administration during this formative period. The value of the work owes much to the author's painstaking research among the records of the Office which before 1836 had kept no minutes. Until 1854 it was a branch of the War Office, and for long was treated as a Department of secondary importance and the object of constant abuse. Apart from Dr. Hall's analysis of contemporary methods of administration and his appreciation of the personnel, his work is in large measure a justification of the Office's record. To the charges of vacillation in policy, he treats as liable the Government and not the Colonial Office itself which rarely had a free hand. For example, he cites the obstruction of other Departments and the difficulties of local clamour which ignored the realities of international and imperial consequences. Dr. Hall considers that the influence of the Permanent Staff "was not nearly as great as is supposed." It is noticeable that one of the strongest permanent under-secretaries, Sir James Stephens, was overruled on a series of important issues and not even consulted on others. He was generally opposed to further commitments and territorial expansion, and had his views prevailed the subsequent history, as the author shows, of South Australia, New Zealand, Natal and the Falkland Islands, *inter alia*, would have been very different. Dr. Hall argues that in native policy the Colonial Office foreshadowed the later system of indirect rule, and in the white colonies it encouraged the

* Gollancz. 1s.

† Royal Empire Society Imperial Studies, No. 13. Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

process of constitutional devolution. In the sphere of economic development he contends that much had been accomplished before the Chamberlain era. This volume is not intended to be exhaustive, but it should prove invaluable in understanding the growth of the Colonial Office and its general attitude to the major problems in the period.

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Professor Edward Jenks has prepared a new fifth edition of his well-known *Government of the British Empire*,* which surveys concisely, upon an historical background, the structure of the Empire and the constitutional and administrative characteristics of its component parts. The new volume has been revised to cover the changes in the last eight years and contains an additional chapter which reviews in particular the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and the progress of Indian reform. It is perhaps invidious to criticise a work which collects and analyses so lucidly such a mass of useful material; but some will regret, for example, that the unique character of the recent Ceylon constitution with its committee system is not discussed. Although legally outside the Empire, the Mandates deserve more than a paragraph. In one passage Aden and Perim are still described as "under the control of the Governor of Bombay." In discussing the judicial system, Professor Jenks has forgotten that by recent legislation appeals from County Courts lie direct to the Court of Appeal and not, as stated, to a Divisional Court, and that leave to appeal to the House of Lords can be granted not only by the House itself but also by the Court of Appeal. Another error refers to the late Governor-General of Australia as Sir Henry instead of Sir Isaac Isaacs. It should be added that such revising slips do not impair the general value of the work.

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Mr. Eric Parker's autobiography, *Memory Looks Forward*,† will be read with interest and pleasure by his many friends, known and unknown. Perhaps it will appeal most to sportsmen, because for the greater part of the author's life sport and its side issues occupied his time and attention. But there is much besides. Intimate and kindly recollections of famous men crowd the pages. There are accounts of happy holidays at home and abroad, while on almost every page we are given a glimpse of bird or beast or flower. In the last seven chapters Mr. Parker describes in detail how he has conversed, by word of mouth, with his wife and many friends in the next world. He says, "I have been asked to give a message, and I give it with all humility and trust." It is a message that will bring comfort to many of his readers.

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Welcome must be given to a popular edition of the late Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson's celebrated work, *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914*,‡

* Murray. 9s. net.

† Seeley Service. 18s. net.

‡ Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

which was written to show the inevitability of war in the absence of an effective international system of legal order. While Mr. Lowes Dickinson deliberately wrote to point a moral, he was careful to make his historical account accurate and unbiased. Since he wrote in 1926, much material, including particularly the British archives, has been published; but, as Sir Arthur Salter points out in his Foreword, "all the new information that is now in our possession has only added further detail, without changing the main outline and design. Never has the general picture been more vividly, or more faithfully, presented." The text is reprinted without alteration or abridgment, and Mr. Frank Hardie has added footnotes as to some crucial developments since 1926.

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*The Constitutional Year Book** enjoys rightly a reputation for making conveniently accessible a wide range of information, particularly on constitutional and political matters. A feature of the 1938 and fifty-second edition is a large extension of information relating to Government Departments and statutory public bodies. The volume covers changes up to the end of October 1937 and includes in *Addenda* some occurrences during the succeeding month. The statistical tables continue to set out a quantity of important facts upon financial, economic and social questions.

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A brief historical survey of English gardening is the subject of Mr. Ralph Dutton's new book, *The English Garden*.† The general reader will find it a most instructive and attractive volume, which describes in outline the changing character and conception of the garden, effected by changes in taste, Continental influence and the development of technique. The narrative deals with some of the great designers, and their work in famous English gardens. The book's value is certainly enhanced by the many photographs and reproductions of old plans and engravings.

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Students of philosophy will be glad to learn that it is hoped to issue a new and critical edition of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, if sufficient subscribers can be found. They will be contained in volumes 15-17 of the great collected edition of his works published by Felix Meiner Verlag, Leipzig, to which inquiries should be addressed.

* Harrison & Sons Ltd. 5s.

† Batsford, 7s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MARCH 1938.

THE REICHSWEHR AND THE NAZIS.

AMONG the combination of miracles that has enabled Herr Hitler to expand and consolidate the precarious hold upon the supreme power in Germany originally conferred upon him on January 30th, 1933, into his present undisputed and unlimited dictatorship, the attitude of the Reichswehr has aroused the greatest astonishment and speculation both at home and abroad. For years the opponents of the régime in Germany have clung to the Reichswehr as the only safeguard of fairness and decency left in the country; and by the relative amount of independence still conserved by it have been misled into imputing to it a political will, and a degree of opposition utterly non-existent. Similarly abroad the occasional pressure exerted by the heads of the army upon the policy of the Third Reich, as well as the obvious benefits derived by it from the rearmament policy, have been responsible for the absurdly distorted picture of Hitler as a pawn in the hands of the almighty General Staff, supposedly the real power in the State.

To understand why the leaders of the Reichswehr let the power that lay in their hands slip out of their grasp it is necessary to go back to the inauguration of the Nazi régime in the beginning of 1933. At that moment the prevalent attitude in the Reichswehr was one of disgust with all party politics and above all with the idea of the Reichswehr itself taking any active part in the scramble for political power. In the struggle of the last years of the republic the mass of officers had after many heart-searchings and internal conflicts decided to subordinate their private political inclinations to implicit obedience to their oath, and when General v. Schleicher, the only political mind in the army and personally not particularly liked outside his intimate clique, had tried to drag the army into the public arena, the failure of that experiment only served to confirm the officers in this fundamental attitude.

That the Reichswehr should, however, have proved willing to extend the interpretation of its "non-partisan rôle" in the State to the point of standing by and letting the Nazi Party

de facto abolish within a few months of its accession to power not only all other parties, but all political and legal safeguards against an unlimited and one-sided dictatorship as well, is only understandable in the light of the extremely capable manner in which this process was dressed up to appeal to their nationalist sentiment. From the very first day the new government was anxious to emphasise in every way conceivable that it considered the mandate entrusted to it by President Hindenburg as derived not from the authority of the republic but from that of a more remote and honoured past. In the person of the old Marshal the glorious traditions of the former Prussian army were claimed to have been preserved unto the day when they could be handed on to a new movement willing to bring about their resurrection against all foes, internal as well as external, an ideology which found its symbolic expression staged with consummate skill by the art historian Dr. Goebbels, when the opening of the New Reichstag at Potsdam was inaugurated by the Marshal's clasping the Fuehrer's hand in the Church containing the grave of Frederick the Great. Thus the "national revolution" was claimed to be the joint achievement of the two bearers of the military tradition, of the "political soldier" in the Nazi Party, and of the "military soldier" in the Reichswehr, who lent him his moral and material protection and support. Moreover, in every respect the soldier and his simple manly way of thinking and bearing himself was held up as the supreme example of all virtue, nor were the officers of the Ministry of War loth to hear from the lips of the most prominent legalist of Berlin University, Carl Schmitt, that even in Bismarck's and his successors' Second Reich the General Staff had been the unacknowledged pillar of the whole structure.

Small wonder that the younger officers were enthusiastic to a man and even the older ones more impressed than they were willing to acknowledge either to others or even to themselves. Moreover, the new régime had much to commend itself even to those who, unimpressed by these propagandist trappings, were in no doubts either as regards its more than curious conceptions of legality or its practical methods. It was not only the fact that the armed forces were ungrudgingly granted more than they had ever dreamt of asking, but above all the spirit itself in which Hitler dealt with the heads of the

services, that was admirably calculated to impress them. Here at last was a "soldier" who appreciated their needs and aspirations and whom they in turn could understand; who bluntly put before them his objectives in the international field and thus gave them a clear direction for their own efforts too. From them this feeling of a clear and firm leadership spread down all ranks and everywhere appealed to the natural proclivity of the soldier for strong and determined guidance.

On the other hand it would have been too much to expect the officers to realise the meaning and significance of those "liberal" notions and rights, so brusquely swept away, when the mass of the people failed to do so. Few if any of them, to do them justice, would have felt anything but horror and disgust for the terrorist methods by which these changes were effected—if they had had an inkling of their inhuman brutality, but less even than the average German citizen had the officer the opportunity of knowing anything of the horrors of political massacre and the concentration camp. The deeper issues involved certainly escaped all but the most thoughtful. That they should have failed to realise that external liberty was bought too dearly at the cost of internal slavery was perhaps not so much to be wondered at. But that they should—to this day—have overlooked the fatal consequences which the suppression of any independent opinion must inevitably have in the long run upon the efficiency and above all the morale of the whole nation; and the fact that thus even in the purely military field the Nazi régime was actually destroying as much with one hand as it was building up with the other; that must remain forever one of the most inexplicable of the many mysteries of the rise of the Nazis.

Thus thanks partly to the political naïvety of the officers and partly to the astuteness with which Nazi propaganda knew how to play upon both their virtues and defects, the abyss that separated the political gangsterism of the Nazis from the traditional standards of honour of the Prussian officer was almost completely obliterated and the opposition of the fighting services to the party restricted to comparatively limited and secondary issues, evolving out of the personal friction between men of such fundamentally different breeding and upbringing as the army and the party chiefs, and out of those issues, in which the intransigence and mistakes of

the party appeared to affect the immediate military interests of the Services.

Even so, the task of the man entrusted with assuring the army's support to the Government remained anything but easy. General v. Blomberg, a remarkably sentimental figure for a soldier, charming everybody who met him by his transparent honesty, simplicity and candour, had been completely won over by Hitler's personal magnetism. Deemed too "soft" by his fellow generals, he nevertheless succeeded in eliminating most of the friction by personally guaranteeing to Hitler the political allegiance of the Reichswehr and in return securing for it, for the time being, practically complete autonomy. His right-hand man General v. Reichenau, head of the key political department of the Reichswehr, the Wehrmachtsamt, whence Schleicher had risen to power, one of the few out-and-out Nazis in the Service, precipitated the first major crisis when in the beginning of 1934 he was put forward by the Party as their candidate for the post of commander-in-chief of the army, vacated by General von Hammerstein, the intimate friend of Schleicher. For once, however, Hindenburg's will, doubtless inspired by the heads of the Service, prevailed, and as the man of his choice General v. Fritsch succeeded to that position, an officer widely overrated, in the opinion of many who had had the opportunity to watch him both during and after the War.

The victory won on this occasion by the leaders of the Reichswehr clearly revealed, however, the fundamental weakness of their position. As long as the old Marshal continued to incorporate in himself the ultimate political and military authority in the country, they were able to stand up to Hitler on equal ground and even to invoke their joint superiors' decision against him by appealing directly to him as their Commander-in-Chief. But with the imminent death of the old President, to whom the best medical authorities gave not more than a few months at most, the situation might change radically and, with Hitler as his successor as President and Commander-in-Chief, the Reichswehr leaders would find themselves reduced from a position of equality to one of subordination, making them liable to the charge of rebellion if they persisted in their opposition.

Before, however, this critical issue could come to a climax the strength of the Reichswehr's position resulting from this

power of appeal to the man who had called Hitler into power and might dismiss him from it again, was once more finally revealed in the Roehm purge of June 30th, 1934. By threatening to involve the President's authority the Reichswehr leaders persuaded the still wavering Hitler of the necessity of dealing effectively with Roehm, who by his plans for a fusion of his S.A. with the Reichswehr and above all of the two officer corps had become a menace to their independence. The success of this move spurred certain circles within the Reichswehr to go even further and to attempt to bring about, while there was still time, an arrangement by which the independence of the Reichswehr would be permanently safeguarded, through the appointment of General v. Blomberg to the post of Reichspräsident and Commander-in-Chief, as joint trustee both of the Party and the Fighting Services. The rapid decline and death of the old President during the latter half of July 1934, however, overthrew these plans before they could be considered seriously, and Hitler promptly capped his immediate arrogation of supreme power by substituting a personal oath to himself for the one hitherto sworn upon the constitution.

With that step the constitutional aspect of the struggle was once and for all decided in favour of the Nazi régime. Henceforth the army had no legal foundation upon which to base its claim for complete autonomy within its own sphere. Yet so overwhelming was the material balance of power in its favour that for several months the issue hung in suspense. Would the Reichswehr be willing to forgo all influence upon the political reconstruction of the State? Would it at least maintain its own independence or would it give way to the steady pressure of the party's organs? Then suddenly, by the end of November, a small incident gave the answer to all these speculations.

At that time the general in command at Königsberg in Eastern Prussia arrested a consignment of heavy arms (field guns, trench mortars, etc.) destined for the local S.S. unit and asked the Ministry of War for further instructions. On receiving the order to release it to the addressee, he asked once more, but upon repetition of the order could do nothing beyond complying with it. In that moment the final decision in the struggle between the party and the army had been made. For by giving way to the demand of the S.S. the Reichswehr not only relinquished the claim, advanced by it

and confirmed by Hitler on the eve of June 30th, to be the only arms-bearing force in the country, "*der einzige Waffentraeger der Nation*," but by showing on this occasion its fundamental disinclination to contest the party's claims to the utmost extent had capitulated once and for all before the stronger determination of the Nazi régime. Henceforth the question of its influence upon the general development of the German State was decided and the only problem that remained was the degree to which it might be able to maintain its independence within its own sphere.

The further development of the relationship between the party and the army during the following years was the inevitable consequence of that decision. Time and again the heads of the Reichswehr saw themselves forced to intervene in questions of general policy, when internal struggles such as the Church dispute jeopardised the moral unity of the nation, or the hazardous external policy sponsored by the extremists of the party threatened to involve the country in imminent danger of a war for which it was not prepared. As the grip of the party on the whole life of the country tightened, their counsels were set aside more and more frequently, as in the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the success of which, achieved by Hitler against their express warnings, served not only greatly to diminish their influence in matters of foreign policy, but brought about a general weakening of the Reichswehr's internal autonomy, which up to that time had been successfully preserved against the party's attempts to encroach upon it.

Moreover, with the transformation of the former professional force into the vast host of the new army based upon universal conscription, the material basis of their opposition vanished to hardly a lesser degree than had their legal foundation. Neither the soldiers nor the officers could any longer be relied upon to back their leaders in an out-and-out conflict; and the latter had to be satisfied if, by giving way upon all other points, they succeeded in keeping at least the inner ring, the High Command and the General Staff intact. In these circumstances the only means of pressure left to them to emphasise their representations with the Government was the threat of a joint resignation of all the leading commanders, a precarious method which obviously was bound to come to grief sooner or later.

The significance of the Blomberg crisis, originally to all appearance provoked for the purpose of his supersession by the Army leaders upon an issue that seemed to them favourable, lies in the fact that it provided Hitler with the long-sought opportunity to liquidate once and for all these last remnants of the Reichswehr independence. By assuming virtual, in addition to nominal, command of the armed forces, he has eliminated the last possibility of opposition to his orders. The new men, Generals Keitel and v. Brauchitsch, who have taken over respectively the functions of Marshal v. Blomberg and General v. Fritsch without their predecessors' prestige, are mere military executives, with just sufficient political interest to be reliable in the Nazi sense. The ring of the Higher Command has been effectively broken up by the retirement of a majority of prominent opponents to the régime, although the ablest of all, General Beck, has remained at the head of the General Staff. A comprehensive purge of all other ranks down to that of major is generally expected and will doubtless follow. For Germany the significance of the events of the last weeks lies less in the real liquidation of all hopes, long groundless, for an overthrow of the Nazi régime by a military dictatorship, than in the symbolic significance of the engulfment of the last remnants of the glorious Prussian tradition by the totalitarian aspirations of the Third Reich; and for the rest of the world in the fact that after the subjugation of the great industrialists under the four years' plan the last brake upon the foreign policy of Germany has been removed.

ARMINIUS.

"GOGA-GAGA": AN OBITUARY.

IN a month which has brought with it the collapse of Austria's resistance under Herr Hitler's browbeating of Dr. Schuschnigg—the last act but one in a great tragedy which has been moving towards its inevitable end ever since the guns of Dr. Dollfuss destroyed the bulwark of democracy and socialism in 1934—it is pleasant to be able to write *finis* to the worst chapter in post-war Rumania's history. What was intended to be a cry of alarm for the Western democracies has thanks to the crazy incompetence of the comedy duo whom King Carol honoured with his confidence for seven weeks, Messrs. Goga and Cuza, become an obituary notice. No one could undertake this usually melancholy task with greater pleasure than the writer feels on this occasion. Not for a long time will Rumania recover from the seven weeks' misrule of the ill-assorted team headed by the vain and incompetent poet-dramatist and the eighty-four-year-old semitic-looking and anti-semite professor—"the Goga-Gaga Government"—which the King so incomprehensibly picked out to rule his country. Most of the evil they did lives after them; what remained of democracy in Rumania was buried with their bones.

It is true that little was left of the democratic constitution modelled on that of Belgium which the first Bratianu, Jon, the ex-anarchist of his Paris student days, brought to his country together with its new Hohenzollern ruler three-quarters of a century ago. It is true that during the last four years' nominal rule by the Tatarescu-Antonescu Government, King Carol was able slightly to loosen the close co-operation maintained by Titulescu with the democratic states, and to transfer one foot from the France-Little Entente camp into that of Berlin-Rome. And it is true that Rumania was so much the home of pogroms, three-quarters of a century ago, that recognition of her independence by the Powers in 1878 was made conditional on guarantees of full equality for Jews, that these guarantees were never even theoretically fulfilled until 1918, when the Jews of the old kingdom first acquired full citizenship, and that since then unchecked anti-semitic propaganda has produced recurrent outrages. Even so, King Carol's entrusting of power to the Goga-Cuza nationalists brought the outbreak of a European war appreciably

nearer, threatened the last vestiges of democracy in the country and spelled unimagined disaster for Rumanian Jewry.

These are large phrases. They were written in Bucharest by an "Aryan" working journalist who has known this country for twelve years, and represent unemotional impressions cold-bloodedly assembled. The Goga régime in Rumania meant that the European danger-point was for a time no longer Austria, Czechoslovakia or the Mediterranean, but the Dniester and Rumania's Black Sea coast. For centuries control of the vast, sparsely populated and fertile plains of what is to-day Rumania, with their vast capacity for agricultural and mineral production—above all of oil—has been the dream of the rulers of the over-populated, oil-less and comparatively barren German Empire. Up till 1918 Vienna, who controlled the better part of them herself, barred the way. From 1918 until December 1937 it was barred by the combination of France and the Little Entente, to which the Government of Rumania still adhered, though with wavering fidelity since 1934-5. If Goga's party leader and co-minister Professor Cuza had carried out his oft-avowed intention of "clearing out of that Jewish gang, the League of Nations," and if M. Goga had fulfilled the confident anticipations of Rome and Berlin that after the elections he would adhere openly to the fascist axis, only Prague would have remained to bar the way—a frail barrier enough, as Soviet Russia knows. Why Soviet Russia? Because unrestricted access to Rumania's oilfields and to her vast grain production would furnish Germany with those vital sinews of war, petrol and grain reserves, which have sufficed up to now to prevent her—assuming she had wished—from launching an attack on the Soviet Union. Whatever the press of Europe may say—or leave unsaid—every European statesman to-day recognises, either with anxiety or satisfaction, that the so-called anti-Comintern pact is essentially a Holy Alliance for aggression against Soviet Russia. Could or can the Soviets afford to stand idle while this last link in the chain of Nazi Germany's préparations for war is forged? Will they do nothing to prevent oil and grain being handed over to her by the present anti-Russian régime or by the still more aggressive one which must surely ultimately succeed it—that of Zelea Codreanu and his German-supported movement *Totul Pentru Ţara*—"All for the Country"—as the Iron Guard has been re-christened? A fascist

régime tied to the axis Rome-Berlin would be obliged to supply Germany with all the oil and grain she desired, letting her pay by taking Rumanian rearmament out of the hands of France and Czechoslovakia to place it in those of Germany. I am not yet wholly convinced that this was M. Goga's—or rather King Carol's—plan. Rumania is so compassed about with enemies—Hungary claiming Transylvania, Poland the Bukowina, Bulgaria the Dobrudja, as Russia claims Bessarabia—that surely no one could deliberately incense Russia further and lose the support of France and Czechoslovakia.

We had the warmest protestations of loyalty to old alliances from M. Micescu in Prague, Paris and Geneva, and from M. Goga in many interviews in Bucharest. But also I have had the assurance volunteered to me by M. Goga that he would make immediately a pact of friendship, not only with Italy, but also with Germany. We had M. Goga's sincere and undisguised admiration for the Duce and his works at home and abroad, and the equally sincere and obvious devotion of Professor Cuza and his son George to the Fuehrer and all his works. We have the known admiration of Rumania's Hohenzollern King for Hitler's methods of *Ordnung schaffen* within Germany, and his intense personal feelings against the Soviets. None of this implies or implied a deliberate intention to be false to old alliances, but it does tend to create an atmosphere in which these can with difficulty be upheld. Even M. Goga did not dare go to the country with a programme of hostility to France, for the whole Rumanian bourgeoisie is solidly francophile, as are the masses of peasants and workers in so far as they understand anything of foreign politics. Only M. Codreanu has openly an anti-French programme, and even he felt compelled to declare to me : " Much as we hate the present Jewish-Freemason régime in Paris, in no circumstances would the Rumanians take up arms against the French people." Despite Cuza and Codreanu, the Rumanian people stand in this respect still very much as they did in 1870 and in 1914. While the Hohenzollern Carol I was writing to Wilhelm I on the eve of the outbreak of the Franco-German war : " Where the banner of Germany waves is my heart," his Ministers were declaring on the same day to the Chamber : " Where France raises her standard, there are Rumania's sympathies and interests." And at the crown

council in Sinaia of August 4th, 1914, Carol I found his project of marching with Germany opposed by every member of the council. It is true that in those days there was no nascent dictatorship at home or fascist international abroad ; nevertheless, the core of the nation remains sentimentally bound to " the great sister, France."

Corruption, fraud and terror have been such regular concomitants of post-war Rumanian elections—with the exception of the successful election conducted by Dr. Julius Maniu, leader of the National Peasant Party—that it might seem as though the masses would lose nothing in the parting from the last forms of democracy. This is not the case. Even the "state of siege" by means of which the government of Tatarescu carried on for years did not entirely suppress criticism in the press. In Parliament the Opposition could always denounce, if it could not obtain redress for malpractices. There was always the prospect of the King being forced to make a change of régime every four years, even if the direction of the change was controlled by himself alone. Last December proved that not even the man whom the King selected to "make" the elections and govern the country in accordance with his will could be certain of success. The Court Circular had barely announced on the day of the last elections that the Court had "taken up residence" in Sinaia (secure in the belief that elections "made" by Tatarescu could only result in Tatarescu's triumph) when King Carol had to rush back to Bucharest. His plans had gone wrong. For the first time in post-war Rumania, the man designated as Premier by the King had failed to secure that 40 per cent. of the votes which automatically presents the Government with a bonus of 50 per cent. of the seats in the Chamber. (Only the remaining 50 per cent. are allocated proportionate to the recorded votes.) It was a first verdict of the nation (claim Dr. Maniu and other opponents of Carol's policy) against the system approved by the King. The Electoral College displayed unexpected independence and refused to sanction a swindle in the allotment of seats which would have saved Tatarescu. Nor could any coalition be arranged to save him. The next strongest party was that of the National Peasants. Here the King's personal quarrel with Dr. Maniu prevented an invitation to form a Cabinet. Then came the wild, inexperienced *Totul Pentru Ţara* of Zelea Codreanu.

Codreanu has committed the same offence as Maniu—attacked publicly the King's relations with Mme Lupescu. He is so strong a personality and his party is so united behind him by the *Führer Prinzip* that Carol's practice of *divide et impera* would not have enabled the Crown to continue to govern as well as rule, and the country would have been at the mercy of Codreanu's fanatical mysticism. Remained the anti-semitic Goga-Cuzists, whose (illegal) use of the swastika emblem had never hindered its leaders from being extremely accommodating in the matter of Mme Lupescu, despite her Jewish blood. M. Goga overnight found his secret dream had become reality: the King had called upon him to form a Government. He could not face a Parliament nine-tenths of whose members were arranged against him, so the law was given a new twist and it was declared that this Parliament was constituted, and could therefore be dissolved, although it had never met. Elections for March 2nd were decreed amidst angry cries of "unconstitutional" and "*coup d'état*."

A minority of qualified observers pretended that Carol's move showed wisdom. They argued that the tide of anti-semitism, nationalism and fascism was gradually rising in Rumania and threatening violent revolution. King Carol decided to use the comparatively pliable M. Goga as a safety-valve, instead of waiting for Zelea Codreanu to burst the boiler. Was not the mild-mannered Goga to be preferred, in everyone's interest, to young Zelea Codreanu, who had long ago killed his man (the Prefect of Jassy, whom he shot down on the steps of the court where some of his followers were going through a form of trial for maltreatment of Jews) and who gave the orders which resulted in his rival, Stilescu, being riddled with bullets when he lay in hospital recovering from a serious operation? Was it not astute of Carol to let Goga, under Royal control, satisfy anti-semitic clamour by a series of measures against the Jews which, when they had brought the country to the verge of ruin, could be stopped, kept on the statute book but responsibility for them denied by a clean-handed Liberal Party whom Carol could then call to office? Their secretly cherished anti-semitic wishes fulfilled by the Goga-Cuza team, they could arrive on the scene of the fire in the nick of time and extinguish the flames, thereby earning the gratitude of the country for the King and themselves. Such was the argument

which I heard put forward by responsible diplomats in Bucharest; the tragic farce ended two weeks later when Carol unceremoniously threw Goga out. Anyway, the world has seen attempts to throw a sop to the enemies of democracy before, and that such action only increases their appetite. It has made very little difference to Germany that the advent of Herr Hitler was delayed a year or so by the interposition of Brüning and von Papen. It will help Schuschnigg little to have accepted the cold-blooded Seyss-Inquart in place of the violent Leopold. Where dictatorship has been halted is not where democracy has cajoled but where it has fought it—in France and Spain. And lastly one has to ask whether, when the firemen do arrive, they will find much left of the economic structure of Rumania to save.

"The seven weeks' rule of Goga's anti-semitic régime completely destroyed the gradual economic improvement of the last two years," one of the leading non-Jewish industrialists of Rumania told me at the beginning of February, emphasising that he spoke purely as a business man devoid of political allegiances or philo-semitic tendencies. His views did not prevent him from criticising some of the methods of Jewish business men. "I do not dispute," he said, "that for instance licences as apothecaries are often secured by Jews through bribing state officials. By all means let them be tried and punished—but together with the Christians who pursue the same tactics and the officials who accept the bribes. Let us get rid of the acquiescence in the highest quarters of the vile system which deliberately underpays officials and expects them to make good on backsheesh! M. Goga's Government declared that spirit licences would be withdrawn from the Jews 'who are poisoning the nation with alcohol.' It was unfortunate for M. Goga that statistics (which he instantly suppressed) should then have been published by the Government licensing department, showing that nine-tenths of the poisoning was done by non-Jews, since only 4,000 out of 40,000 spirit licences were held by Jews. Could true statistics be produced of the number of Jews who improperly gained admission to the country, it would be found, most Rumanians believe, that the number does not exceed 4,000 or 5,000. M. Goga, however, violated the equality guarantees of the Constitution, the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, and the Paris Agreement

of 1918 by exceptional measures against the 750,000 Jewish citizens of the country, by calling upon them and them alone to establish their citizenship within a couple of weeks by vexatious and complicated measures, or be denationalised. The complete ignorance of our new rulers of economic cause and effect was shown, too, in the issue by M. George Cuza, the Minister of Labour, of the notorious decree forbidding Jews to employ Rumanian servants under 40, 'because of the well-known Jewish practice of selling female servants to the white slave traffic.' The official gazette published the order, as did Cuza's paper; all others were forbidden to do so. Now the Jews are allowed by the Government to carry on their 'vile practices' with girls of 21 to 40, but not with those under 21, for the order still stands, the age of 40 having been altered to 21! Furthermore, it will not come into operation at all until seed-time arrives—this because, too late, our anti-semitic wiseacres discovered that the original order would throw on the streets overnight some 100,000 servant girls." (I myself had evidence of this confusion of thought, when Professor Cuza assured me, with all the authority of the ministerial chair in which he was sitting, that the order was everywhere in force, only for M. Goga to deny this vigorously to me exactly twenty-four hours later.)

Apart from any considerations of humanity, it is impossible to apply in this backward peasant country of 19 million inhabitants a policy towards its 750,000 Jews, who form 80 per cent. of the cogs, big and little, in the commercial and industrial machinery of the country, measures which industrialised Germany, with its 500,000 Jews playing a comparatively minor rôle in the national life could at least attempt. In Rumania it is the village Jew who enables the small peasant proprietor to dispose of his produce. Going from village to village the Jew buys a sack of corn here, four astrachan lambskins there. What happened when Goga with his programme of "expropriation of the Jew in town and country" came into power? Overnight this small trading stopped. The anti-semites attributed it to an organised boycott; but the majority of Rumanians saw the simpler explanation—that the Jews, big traders or small, following the instinct of self-protection, ceased to buy and got rid of their stocks at any sacrifice, hid their money and prepared for the worst. The process spread right up through the economic

machine and was soon accompanied by a panic-stricken flight of capital ; non-Jewish concerns, of course, were stricken with the general paralysis. Lest it be thought that the admittedly high percentage of Jews in trade is due to their having ousted the Christians, it should be stated that it is they alone who have built up the industrial concerns they control, which usually employ 80 per cent. of non-Jewish labour. Excluded entirely from the haven of refuge sought by the majority of literate persons in this over-bureaucratized country—state employment of any kind—the Jews have concentrated on commerce, the law, medicine and the press, and have attained alarming proportions in these callings. Although forming only 4.2 per cent. of the population, the Jews in 1934 made up 13 per cent. of university students and 11.7 per cent. in 1935. Since then, although figures are not available, the proportion has continued to decrease owing to the growth of anti-semitism, the efforts to prevent them from entering the professions, and the most brutal physical violence to turn them out of the Law Courts and Universities.

In Bucharest a fortnight ago I talked to two young Jewish girl students of 22 and 23, who told me how they had been seized in the dissecting-room of the faculty of Medicine by bands of male students (Rumania's future doctors) and assaulted, one of them by being held down and savagely beaten across the buttocks with police truncheons, the other pummelled with fists into insensibility, to teach them that no Jews would be allowed to continue their studies. The same methods were adopted to "cleanse" the Law Courts of Jewish advocates. I attended the Central Courts in anticipation of seeing one of the regular *battues* in progress, but already every one of the 200 Jewish lawyers customarily seen about the huge building had fled. The procedure was explained to me by my guide, himself a victim. Christian lawyers regularly assembled in the barristers' refectory, posted sentinels at the exit, and then scoured the corridors in bands of twenty, setting upon and thrashing mercilessly every Jew encountered. In the court rooms where Jewish lawyers were pleading, the judge usually adjourned the trial and withdrew, to enable them with due regard for the dignity of the law to bash their Jewish colleagues, who were finally flung down the steps into the street. These scenes only came to an end with the decision of the *barreaux* of Bucharest and Jassy to suspend all Jewish

lawyers pending verification of citizenship under the new law. In Jassy, the headquarters of the two Cuzas and their swastika bands, I found the Jewish population, rich and poor, completely terrorised. They were resigned to surrendering their votes in March, rather than risk being beaten up by the Goga-Cuzist "lance-bearers" at the polling station. I had to move with the secrecy of a Trotskyist emissary in Moscow or a Communist courier in Berlin, so scared were the Jews of it being known that they had even seen me. In the "Ghetto," the terrible stews situated in a crater-like hollow below the fine houses and University on the hillside, the tumbledown shops were deserted, and the wretched inhabitants, clad in patches rather than in garments, starved and sickly, whispered together as fearfully as their wealthy brethren on the hilltop, while they picked their way amidst the slush and garbage of the uncleanly streets. For generations thousands of the poorer Jews have been left in this terrible squalor, paying rack-rents for indescribable hovels, while the state does nothing to provide light, water supplies or even sewers. In summer pools of water, covered with foul scum, breed malaria and other diseases among the human and canine derelicts and cripples; the whole water supply of the upper town, though drawn from pure mountain springs, has to be chlorinated by the city to prevent endemic typhus which until two years ago ravaged the city from these slums. In Kishineff, an hour from the frontier of Soviet Russia, I visited equally terrible hovels, where one had first to inquire if there was scarlet fever or typhus in the neighbourhood before entering, and saw the feeding of rag-clad unemployed Jews in the canteen maintained by their community. Rumania has no unemployment relief. The numbers of workless were increased rapidly every day through the measures of Goga's Government. It is a dangerous symptom in a rich country where there is such a riot of luxury as one sees in the wealthy quarters of Bucharest, close to the misery of the masses. The machinery of production and exchange gradually came to a standstill; the Jews disappeared from the social and artistic life of the country and ceased all spending. The members of this great and gifted branch of the human race huddled together like a family smitten by irretrievable misfortune, resignedly awaiting the successive blows of a cruel but unavoidable fate. In the society of the Jews of Rumania to-day one has an

irrational feeling of guilt and of shame that one is an outsider from such sorrow, and immune.

What of the Rumanian nation? The majority have no part or lot in what is going on, which men like the courageous Trajan Bratu, the Rector of Jassy University (for his sake I hasten to add that I never met him), have striven hard to prevent. M. Bratu has only one ear to-day, the other having been slashed off by Cuzists in an attempt to murder him last year. The democratic leaders seem, as in so many countries, to have missed the boat. M. Maniu, fighting leader of the great democratic National Peasant Party, is obsessed by his puritanical hatred of the King's relations with Mme Lupescu, and at one time even played with the idea of renewing the last electoral pact with the deadliest enemy of democracy, Zelea Codreanu, because the latter also hates her and helped Maniu to overthrow the Tatarescu régime, to co-operation with the Liberals. The Liberals are believed to have been promised by the King the reversion of the Goga-Cuzist posts within a few months, and the genuineness of their defence of democracy against Goga-Cuzist fascism was more than suspect. Owing to M. Goga having succeeded in ruining the country's financial and political credit within fewer weeks than the King would have given him months, there was a slight alteration. Goga, appearing all unsuspecting, bursting with self-importance and State documents, for an audience at the palace, was coldly asked why he had not resigned already; no wonder he collapsed and left the country. The King installed another makeshift, the omnibus government of the Patriarch, Miron Cristea, which is in essence government of the reactionary mis-called Liberal Party, with the Patriarch as place-warmer for Tatarescu. The open anti-semitic terror has abated, but the Jews still plead in vain for cancellation of the Goga-Cuza decrees. The fascist experiment has failed, and Carol has realised his age-old ambition of personal autocracy based on a military dictatorship, camouflaged by a number of well-known politicians.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

CHINA'S FIGHT FOR LIFE.

FOR seven months Japan has been endeavouring, in the words of her Premier, to "beat China to her knees," and China's head is still bloody but unbowed. In the north, it is true, a provisional government has been set up; the Japanese, at all events, have told us so, and a new "Peking tariff" has been put into force; but so far nothing has been heard of the functioning of this Government except in so far as Japanese bayonets are enforcing its obedience. It will be remembered that when the Japanese took Manchuria in 1931, new provincial governments were set up almost immediately, but where their Chinese heads had a prospect of fighting at all, the certainty of ultimate defeat did not deter them when they discovered that "independence" meant taking service under the Japanese. The invasion of North China in 1933, which ended in the Truce of Tangku, brought in a régime in a large part of North China not altogether unlike what had prevailed before in South Manchuria, and one of the conditions the Japanese attempted to impose was that only with their permission could any important executive hold office; but they found that whenever they got Chinese into office, even though they thought these were their own creatures, they gradually became less and less amenable. It was inevitable, just as it would be if Frenchmen tried to run Germany or if Germans tried to run England in similar fashion; but the Japanese found it excessively annoying, and the only remedial measure they could think of was to increase their own authority.

At the time of writing, winter has dulled the ferocity of the contest; but the suffering of the Chinese must be appalling. The Japanese have only their fighting men to care for, and their lines of communication to supply them. The Chinese have whole provinces cut off; the needs of life are unobtainable; and they must give up what they have to the demands of the invaders or of their own desperate soldiers. In hundreds of thousands they are without shelter, without food, without clothes, and without hope or direction. The perfected machinery of war has smitten them with every imaginable woe on a scale unknown to the Great War. As the desolation spreads, so increases the fantastic inadequacy of the invader's excuses.

In the military sense Japan has already won the war ; but in the economic sense she has already lost it. The conditions of peace which Japan has put forward include the payment by China of the expense she has been put to—a rather rash demand in view of recent history. One of the first of the press embargoes issued when the conquest of Manchuria began was a prohibition of any mention that Manchuria would have to pay the cost of its conquest. Since then, a virtue has been made of a necessity, and Japan's action now figures as generous aid extended to a people anxious to be free. Manchuria is still a channel of expense rather than a source of income, notwithstanding the monopolisation of its trade. There is little hope of China being able to pay a cash indemnity as she did after the war of 1894.

It is impossible at the moment to foretell how long China will endure. A people always regarded as lacking in the "military virtues" have shown a capacity for suffering and a heroism in the face of certain death, such as the leaders of no military nation would dare impose on their followers for fear of their morale breaking down ; but it seems likely that organised military resistance will cease before Japan becomes incapable of continuing her aggression. Then will come the question of reorganising communal life. That the Chinese people, down to the humblest and most ignorant, very cordially hate the Japanese is true, but they must live, and if they can buy only Japanese goods, sell only to Japanese, and get help and relief only through Japanese officials, then there is no help for it ; they will have to accept whatever offers.

A year ago a Japanese economic mission visited China, and those people who fear Japan so much that they always hail a peaceful gesture as the dawn of a new era were quite sure that the rough-handling of China was a thing of the past. And so it might have been if the Chinese had agreed to everything that the mission proposed. But what the Japanese called partnership and co-operation looked different from the Chinese point of view. The Chinese said that they were expected to give all licences, privileges and concessions required, to supply a large share of the capital, and agree to Japanese control and direction. On the larger enterprises, such as mines and railways, the Japanese dominance was to be even greater and the Chinese liability unlimited. So the discussions came to nothing, and the new era of peaceful

co-operation ended before it had begun. Nevertheless, this refusal to co-operate is given precedence over the firing of the rifle-shots at Lukowkiao as a reason for blowing people to pieces from Tientsin to Canton and from Tsingtao to Chungking.

We are told that the Japanese plans for China will not be the same as they have adopted in Manchuria. Some may see in this a damaging admission, just as they did when important personages disclaimed any intention of making Manchuria "a second Korea." But so far as that goes, Japanese writers used to say that British doings in Tibet were "even worse" than Japanese doings in Shantung. We may take it for granted, without waiting to be told so, that a people so clever as the Japanese are quite capable of varying their treatment of different regions according to the local conditions, not to speak of their profiting from early experiences in later projects.

One cannot ask the Occidental reader to think in the Japanese manner; but as there seems to be no likelihood of any energetic effort being made to prevent the Japanese from acting, to the limit of their powers, upon the Japanese point of view, it is important to remember that, from that point of view, China owes Japan a lot of money. We are always being told that the Japanese soldier believes in conquest by the sword but that the Japanese merchant prefers conquest by commerce. That is not invariably true: when there is some local trouble in China the merchants are the first to demand military "protection," and on the other hand, some soldiers have a great belief in the conquering power of money. For instance, General Count Terauchi (father of the present Commander-in-Chief) who was premier during a large part of the Great War, was not nearly so bellicose towards China as his civilian predecessor Marquis Okuma, but through the agency of one Nishihara, tried to conquer China by loans. Many of these loans were made not to the Central Government but to corrupt and needy satraps who would sign for far larger amounts than they received. Many of the loans were not honoured, but every time there is talk of the settlement of "outstanding issues with China" the repayment of the Nishihara loans never fails to be mentioned as an issue that clamours for settlement. It is highly likely that the revival of the Nishihara and possibly other somewhat irregular loans will be considered preferable to a punitive indemnity.

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upon. Therefore he counselled his money
desired to help China, to put their money in
Thus the aid to China and the payment
would both be sure. Marquis Okuma, w
Japan when this weighty advice was giv
enthusiasm, describing it as a happy combi
money and Japanese brains.

Some people who do not like the idea of
the idea of any sort of intervention hope
the quasi-philosophical idea that China
querors. That is an empty phrase : it applies
but only when the conqueror goes in and settles
will not offer herself for absorption. If her war
and if the Powers do not prevent her, she will run
services—Customs, Salt, Railways, Power, Posts,
will monopolise mining. But though a great horde
and experts will thus find employment, Japan's po

problem will be no nearer solution ; while as for her own financial embarrassments, it will take a long time for a country so impoverished and devastated as China is to-day to pay a dividend to a foreign managing bureaucracy, especially if there are preference shareholders in Europe and America with a first call. Five years of Manchukuo saw undiminished deficits of a thousand million yen a year almost wholly due to the new liabilities undertaken ; and as Manchuria was in a higher state of development than most of China, the outlook is not very bright.

Mr. Takahashi, shortly before he was murdered, pointed out that three or four more years at the existing rate of expenditure would see Japan's whole revenue swallowed up in loan service. During the last eight months the expenditure has increased tremendously. Taxes have been raised, it is true, a course against which Takahashi set his face uncompromisingly ; but Baron Go, Japan's greatest financial magnate, has denounced this policy, knowing that he runs no little physical risk in doing so.

There is a sense in which China does absorb Japan, and in this lies one of Japan's greatest future difficulties. The South Manchuria Railway employed thousands of Japanese, down to ticket-nippers, and embarked on many kinds of enterprise ; but the Japanese often complained that, when it came to commerce, the Chinese got all the business and would some day hold it as entirely as they held the tillage of the fields. There are Japanese emigration plans that deal in big figures—a million families to be put on the land in twenty years—but few people seriously believe in them, and the cossack colonies on the Sungari are expensive failures. The suffering to-day in China is as frightful as its infliction is senseless. If it were really incidental to finding a remedy for Japan's difficulties, one might find the excuse that necessity knows no law ; but he would have to be a great optimist who thought Japan's action remedial. The continual tightening of restrictions in Japan itself, the feverish fomentation of loyalty and the suppression of the mildest manifestations of free speech are ominous of the fears of those who have taken the destinies of the nation into their own violent hands.

A. MORGAN YOUNG.

Former editor of the *Japan Chronicle*.

THE SCANDAL OF WEST INDIAN LABOUR CONDITIONS.

“THERE is no money,” explained a publisher once to Sir John Harris, about a book on African grievances, “in niggers.” But “riots” by negroes (or Hindus) and oil undertakings are *news*, and may get headlines in London papers, as has Trinidad recently. The troubles which demand to be dealt with in the West Indies are far more widespread than what has been reported on recently from Trinidad. Further, the “riot” in question would seem by itself of little real importance to anyone who can appreciate the distinction between a shindy and a rebellion. Nor were the Trinidad Oil Companies in this case the villain of the melodrama. On the contrary, during two visits to Trinidad to inquire into economic conditions, I never heard their management complained of as oppressive; and they pay the highest wages in Trinidad. The true responsibility for the present deplorable state of affairs rests with the British consumers of sugar, who get their sugar too cheap (though our Government provides for paying living prices for home-grown beet—a less economical source of sugar) and with the Colonial Office and Governments, who have neglected the recommendations of one Royal Commission on the West Indies for more than forty years, and those of a second special Commission (which told them emphatic truths about labour conditions in 1930) for eight years from that date.

“Labour troubles,” resulting in conflicts between police or militia and dissatisfied labourers, strikers, and unemployed, occurred during the year 1937, in some cases accompanied by fatalities, in almost all the British West Indian colonies (British Guiana, Trinidad, Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Antigua, St. Kitts and Jamaica). In some cases the disturbances were not violent. The most serious occurred in Trinidad and Barbados, and have been made the subject of careful local inquiries by Commissions appointed specially to report on them. The Trinidad Report has been published here and widely criticised in the Press and in Parliament. I must take it as read. A few days after the trouble in Trinidad there was a “demonstration” in Bridgetown (Barbados) resulting in an outbreak of rioting repressed by the police. This was followed in the country districts by some

raiding of shops and fields of growing potatoes. A strong Barbadian Commission reported that the disturbance in Bridgetown arose out of the trial and deportation of an "agitator" named Payne, that the disorder in Bridgetown did not directly communicate itself to the country districts, but that outbreaks occurred spontaneously there, saying :

"The number of persons who suffered injury at the hands of the lawless is insignificant ; the attacks were made against the property of persons of every colour without discrimination. . . . The lawless acts committed in the country were more purposive than those committed in Bridgetown ; and it would appear that hunger or fear of hunger . . . were the chief causes. There is no evidence that Payne had any influence in these areas and it is doubtful if one person in a hundred outside Bridgetown had heard his name.

"It is our considered opinion after surveying the whole field that there was a large accumulation of explosive matter in the island to which the Payne incident only served as a detonator and that the real cause of the disturbance was economic. . . . Further, we are of opinion that the conditions which rendered this culmination possible *still exist and demand immediate treatment.*

"Modern factories for the manufacture of sugar have eliminated the majority of the smaller cane grinding units and have reduced the reaping season from five to three months. . . . The mechanisation of transport has eliminated a large number of freighters and carters. The shortening of the reaping season has left a period of acute hardship for agricultural labourers, for whom little work is available. The change in the number and character of manufacturing units has affected not only the labourer but also a number of subsidiary occupations.

"The evidence given by several plantation proprietors proves conclusively that the average day's pay of even the best agricultural labourers does not exceed 1s. 3d. and in the parish of Saint Lucy the highest wages earned by the best paid worker on one group of plantations for one year was \$92.57 (£18 11s. 10d.), which is equivalent to an average weekly wage of \$1.78 (7s. 5d.)."

In 1896 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the economic conditions of all the West Indian colonies and British Guiana, composed of Sir Henry Norman, formerly Governor of Queensland and of Jamaica (Chairman), Sir Edward Grey (late Lord Grey of Fallodon), and Sir David Barbour, formerly Financial Secretary in India. The present writer was their Secretary.

As we were leaving Barbados Sir Edward Grey remarked : " One of these days Barbados will blow up." Those Commissioners reported in the spring of 1897. Their principal recommendation for saving the sugar industry was that the British Government should neutralise competition by foreign bounty-fed sugar. This assistance was presently given through Mr. Chamberlain's action, and by the ensuing Brussels Sugar Convention the industry was helped to survive. The Commissioners were greatly concerned by the general poverty of the agricultural labouring class, and in this connection they wrote :

" We desire to draw attention to peculiar circumstances, which, in our opinion, impose a special and an unusually strong obligation upon the Home Government.

" The black population of these colonies was originally placed in them by force as slaves ; the race was kept up and increased under artificial conditions maintained by the authority of the British Government. . . . For generations the great mass of the population must remain dependent upon British influence for good government, and generally for the maintenance of the progress that they have made hitherto. . . . We have placed the labouring population where it is, and created for it the conditions, moral and material, under which it exists, and we cannot divest ourselves of responsibility for its future.

" The special remedies or measures of relief which we unanimously recommend are :

1. The settlement of the labouring population on small plots of land as peasant proprietors.
2. The establishment of minor agricultural industries and the improvement of the system of cultivation, especially in the case of small proprietors.

" The settlement of the labourer on the land has not as a rule been viewed with favour in the past by persons interested in sugar estates. What suited them best was a large supply of labourers, entirely dependent on being able to find work on the large estates and consequently subject to their control and willing to work at low rates of wages. But it seems to us that no reform offers so good a prospect for permanent welfare in the future of the West Indies . . . and in many places *this is the only means by which the population can in future be supported.*

" *It must be recollected that the chief outside influences with which the Governments of certain colonies have to reckon are the representatives of the sugar estates ; and that under such conditions it is the*

special duty of Your Majesty's Government to see that the welfare of the general public is not sacrificed to the interests or supposed interests of a small but influential minority which has special means of enforcing its wishes and bringing its claims to notice."

Unfortunately, when the capital interests of the sugar industry had been helped by Imperial fiscal policy, insufficient attention was given to their recommendations and warnings in the direct interests of the labouring classes. This neglect was due to precisely the reasons against which the Commissioners warned the Colonial Office, namely that the representatives of employers had a predominant influence in the local Government. In consequence of this apathy the wages of agricultural labour remained, and remain to this day throughout the West Indies, deplorably low, and almost the whole of the wage-earning population is under-nourished. These facts have been notorious for many years past, and have been emphasised by much recent evidence. This chronic poverty and starvation and not the machinations of "agitators," or Communists, or racial antagonism are the fundamental cause of general unrest when it appears in these colonies.

The recent disturbances were most serious in Barbados and Trinidad. Barbados is densely populated and has much unemployment. In Trinidad direct confrontation between employers and wage earners has been accentuated by large capitalisation of industry and consolidation or centralisation of factories. This fact has been illustrated by the circumstance that when in 1935 sugar factories in Trinidad began to pay dividends, having received assistance from the local Government and through Imperial Tariff preference, the earning of these dividends was assisted by a concerted reduction of the payment to cane farmers for canes from 14s. to 11s. per ton. The organisation of the employing interest has been reinforced by the development of the oil industry, and more recently the powerful firm of Tate and Lyle has joined the local capitalist combination.

In 1929 another Commission to inquire into the West Indian sugar industry was appointed by Lord Passfield in consequence of the alarming reports which were being received from the West Indies as the results of the acute depression of sugar prices caused by speculative over-production throughout the world. The first instalment of

this Commission's Report (Cmd. 3517), dated March 1st, 1930, dealt with the technical and productive aspects of the West Indian sugar industry, and set forth what it considered was urgently necessary to save the whole business from early collapse. That Report was presented to Parliament. It was followed by a second instalment (Part IV of the Report, *not* presented to Parliament) embodying a more detailed review of the social and industrial conditions of the sugar estate workers throughout the Colonies. In this survey special stress was laid on the appalling conditions of the wage labourers of Barbados and the enormous infantile death-rate, and it was pointed out that whereas the improvement of technical methods might benefit the managers of the industry, such improvement, both there and elsewhere, would probably result in the discharge of labourers, and tend to reduce wages, as it has in fact done, and create unemployment. In each instalment of this Report it was suggested that if financial help should be given to the sugar industry from public funds, such aid should be accompanied by public scrutiny of the economy of the factories and of the prices paid for cane supplies, especially wherever there was, as there is in the cases specified, either manufacturing or land monopoly.

Financial aid has been given to the industry, as was recommended, and the British Government has lately procured an international convention for the abatement of competitive over-production. These measures are enabling colonial sugar producers to carry on and pay dividends on capital; but the recommendations for the safeguarding of cane farmers and labourers have been ignored, with the results to their conditions which were foreseen. The recent disturbances are part of the consequent effects. Legislation for the regulation of the sugar industry is needed in all the colonies concerned.

It is significant that the recent disturbances both in Trinidad and Barbados originated in the methods by which so-called "Communist agitators" are now dealt with by the police under the provisions of laws purporting to aim at repressing sedition. The West Indian black man is extremely patient and law-abiding, but he strongly resents interference with what he considers his lawful rights as a British subject. When he thinks these are being tampered with he becomes

excitable, and as he has also acute economic and industrial grievances, such excitement sometimes flies to his head, especially when he hears his grievances formulated by a sympathetic and eloquent speaker. His first impulse when he considers he has such a grievance is to form a deputation to complain to the Governor. The earliest clash in Barbados last summer arose when the police stopped a procession on its way to Government House wanting to see the Governor. There were small similar incidents in other islands, of which not much has been heard, for there were no serious results.

The actual provocative of the "Morant Bay outbreak" in Jamaica (miscalled the Jamaica "Rebellion"), which produced such notorious results in the judicial murder of G. W. Gordon and the slaughter of unoffending Jamaican peasants, was this: Bogle, the peasants' leader, claimed to appear to a summons and to be admitted to bail till the case could be heard, and declared that he and his friends would resist arrest on other conditions. For this purpose he organised men for what he called a "battle" and went down to the Court House. His procession was confronted by a body of volunteers who levelled their rifles, and then the trouble began.

The massacre of the Bondelswaart Hottentots in S.W. Africa arose out of a very similar incident. The row about Harry Thuku in Kenya reflected the same feeling. In Barbados the so-called "agitator," Payne, was tried and sentenced on a trumpery charge which was upset on appeal. He was immediately re-arrested and deported, which infuriated his Bridgetown clientèle, who "demonstrated," and were forcibly dispersed by the police. Butler, the Trinidad "agitator," was arrested on a warrant stated to have been "obtained by Inspector Power."

Under recent "Sedition" laws any magistrate can issue a warrant or the police can arrest without warrant or disperse any meeting if they decide that a speaker's utterances are likely to cause enmity between classes, or that a meeting is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. Everyone knows that if the police or the volunteers attempt to disperse a public meeting where black people are discussing their grievances, and *especially if they show arms*, there *will* be a breach of the peace. Stones will be thrown by rowdies in the background, as they are thrown under like conditions in England, and the

police or militia will fire. The mob will retaliate, as they did at Morant Bay, and in Trinidad; and then there will be headlines in London newspapers. If black men are killed, their comrades will probably try to kill in revenge. The London police, when they took a similar line not long ago at Thurloe Square, were fortunate not to provoke similar trouble. The real provocative of these disturbances is the Sedition Laws. Black workers will seldom start rioting merely for higher wages, because they well know it is not likely to help them. They will rarely even strike. A strike is regarded locally as "seditious" as it used to be by law, and still is considered by many people in England. The "demonstration" started at Bridgetown because of Payne's second arrest. Excitement spread to the country, and the labourers raided shops and potato fields to satisfy their bodily needs. Very dangerous powers have been, or are being given in the West Indies and Africa, to half-trained policemen and raw young police officers, who know their paymasters' views about expressions of public opinion. This policy is not only futile to preserve the internal peace of the Empire. It is actively dangerous.

As I close this article, a letter reaches me from a West Indian correspondent whom I regard as a trustworthy witness. I quote the following extracts. They give a fair summary of the position as it appears to-day :

"The more recent troubles in the West Indies were symptomatic of the discontent fomented by the low wage standard paid to wage labour in the islands. Employers follow the policy of paying small wages, while they pay heavy interest charges and large dividends to shareholders and connections, pay comfortable wages to managers and on the whole maintain huge overhead expenses at the cost of the labourers.

"There has been no intention at sedition at all. The troubles first started at St. Vincent and St. Lucia, where the Government, instead of investigating the origin of the outburst, employed the most ruthless methods against the masses by killing and wounding several of them and subsequently prosecuting others for rioting. In the following months similar troubles arose in Trinidad. One particular leader, Butler (now in gaol for sedition), had done everything to apprise Government and employers of the discontent but neither of those classes heeded his warnings. Strikes followed and Government again employed its accustomed weapon in stifling the legitimate grievances of workers. It undoubtedly took up the cudgels of *vested interests* against the *workers* and not

until the matter had gone too far did the Governor recant and make a clean breast of the horrible conditions under which Blacks and East Indians were labouring in the island. Barbados, Jamaica, all the islands, experienced disturbances—not riots at all. ‘Sedition’ is an outrageous invention to prevent progressive men from speaking for their rights and it is uncharitable that Crown-ruled people should be subjected to such an imposition. The prosecutions under this head usher in a reign of tyranny which can only provoke life-long animosity. Social legislation to benefit workers is wanted; and in the Crown colonies there should be a disposition to rule justly irrespective of class. Except the West Indian worker receives a wage by which he could live and save there will be no peace between employers and employees, no matter how many *guns* are directed against them in their innocent demonstrations. Every worker in the islands is existing on starvation wages—the doors are closed against the people who cannot now migrate to other fields. Crown policy is wanting in statesmanship and is regarded as the chief citadel of exploitation.”

Subject, possibly, to some reservations in regard to the adjectives, I agree with this statement, which correctly, within my previous knowledge and recent observations, describes the facts in regard to the agricultural industries.

Sensational press reports of “collisions,” and “indiscreet utterances” by officials appear to be more effectual in calling British attention to colonial labour conditions than the official reports of the most authoritative Commissions, or long and complete cognizance of those conditions on the part of the British Colonial Office. The moral that may very naturally be locally drawn is unfortunate.

OLIVIER.

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE.

A SUPERFICIAL understanding of the functioning of the French Parliamentary machine and concern, at times no doubt well-founded, regarding internal conditions in France, have tended to blind many in this country to the remarkable continuity and strength which characterise French foreign policy ever since the War.

For obvious reasons this policy has not been one of hegemony and conquest, but has been recognisedly dictated ever since the War by the need for security. Whether she has resorted to intimidation, the building up of alliances, the conciliation of ex-enemies, the consolidation of the League—security has been France's first consideration, and was bound to be. The different means of achieving security and the different views as to their usefulness which have been held are alone responsible for variations in her policy. It is the pre-occupation with security which unites (where so much divides) the foreign policy of Clemenceau, Poincaré, Herriot, Briand, Barthou, Laval and Delbos.

This does not mean that, even from any French point of view, certain very serious mistakes have not been made. But the continuity is nevertheless impressive. A number of factors combine to explain it. Among them may be reckoned the circumstance that both long tradition and a clearly understood interest encouraged an insistence on the juridical aspect of international relations. This attitude received consistent support at the Quai d'Orsay, and notably from the late Philippe Berthelot. The reinforcement during the war years of the permanent Foreign Affairs commissions of Chamber and Senate should also be mentioned; for these bodies preserved a real importance in the post-war period, and have encouraged a sense of national responsibility in Government and Opposition alike. Finally, the continued existence should not be forgotten of a French conscript army, which has been viewed by the average Frenchman ever since the War as an unpleasant necessity and certainly not as an instrument of potential aggression. In days of inner tension it has been felt to be a rallying point; and it is the human basis upon which a system of military defence unparalleled in history has been built up. The appointment at the end of January of

General Gamelin as "Chief of the National Defence General Staff" co-ordinating land, sea and air forces, points to the complete integration of the national forces and resources into the system of security.

This consistent French policy of security was bound to have the support of all nations desirous of peace and opposed to any change in the *status quo*, and to include among its essential elements support of an effective League and rigorous respect for international obligations. Even to-day this element is all-important, and must be borne constantly in mind for a full understanding of French foreign policy in relation to the chief European countries. (Though history shows that there is nothing metaphysically inevitable in French-German antagonism, Germany is to-day the country which is bound to constitute France's most immediate concern.) The polemics and propaganda on the causes of the war of 1914, and the sympathy aroused in ex-allied countries by the sufferings of Germany under a crippling treaty, have led to a remarkably widespread ignorance with regard to the facts, where France is concerned, of a war largely fought on her soil and in which her losses were proportionately the largest sustained by any nation (one Frenchman killed in twenty-nine, one German in thirty-eight, one Briton in sixty-three). If the national integrity of that Germany which had twice invaded France within fifty years was to be respected, France must look for a sure guarantee; but the refusal of the American Senate to ratify the British-American Pact of Guarantee completely changed the situation for France. This all-important fact must be remembered if we are to see in true perspective allied post-war policy and France's share in it: the carrying through of German disarmament, the occupation and demilitarisation of the Rhineland, the imposition of Reparations, the occupation of the Ruhr, the building up by France of her Eastern alliances.

But we can observe a distinct evolution in attitude and method from the initial belief in intimidation, dictated by the war-psychosis, and the policy of direct conciliation which bore such good fruit in the years 1924 to 1929. The French *Bloc national* represented the spirit of the Versailles Peace—of which the late Jacques Bainville so neatly said: "*Elle est trop molle pour ce qu'elle a de dur, et trop dure pour ce qu'elle a de mou.*" The Left Opposition, on the other hand, was friendly

to Germany. Criticism of the Treaty was becoming more severe and more general daily ; and the coming into power of the *Bloc des gauches* in May 1924 marks an important date in the evolution of French public opinion towards Germany.

Already in 1924 the Protocol (in other words a carefully worked-out scheme of collective security) was put forward by France at Geneva, and was supported by the British Labour Government. The realisation of the Protocol would have satisfied France's fundamental need for security and her Eastern alliances could have fallen away or been avoided. But the Protocol was rejected in the late Sir Austen Chamberlain's famous speech at Geneva ; and it was then that the Treaty of Locarno was negotiated and signed. It fell, no doubt, far short of collective security ; but it symbolised the goodwill which characterised this period—the happiest in French-German post-war relations. The suspicions of the French Right were lulled ; younger Frenchmen of a conservative type entered into close relations with the Germany of Stresemann. The Left, despite the knowledge that German disarmament had never been properly carried through, and that secret rearmament had begun, worked for further *rapprochement*. The legalism of successive French governments in their approach to necessary modifications of Versailles was no doubt unfortunate, as was their mistrust which hampered disarmament. But the generous efforts and the achievements of Briand must not be forgotten. The French attitude to Germany was becoming progressively more accommodating. Germany had entered the League ; the evacuation of the Rhineland was completed by June 30th, 1930 (four and a half years before the time specified in the Treaty) ; Reparations were finally liquidated at Lausanne in 1932—and all this, it should be noted, had taken place before Hitler came to power. But the German revolution of 1933 suspended the *rapprochement* in the forms which it had hitherto taken.

What was to be France's policy towards the new Germany ? She had first and foremost to ask herself what were Hitler's intentions where France was concerned—for the policy which Hitler and his party stood for was one of hostility to the treaties which France had done more than any power to impose. Hitler, in his *Mein Kampf*, had written that France was to be smashed. His remarks on this item of his policy do not

appear in the expurgated English and American versions, but are known to the French ; and though, in an interview with a French journalist, the Führer has pointed out in extenuation that the book was written long ago, the passages have not been either removed or modified. Nor has German policy in practice, since Hitler's rise to power, done much if anything to allay French misgivings. He left the Disarmament Conference and the League in 1933 ; he introduced conscription in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles in 1935—Germany thus establishing at a stroke thirty-six divisions as against France's twenty-three ; and finally—though the Saar territory had duly returned to Germany in January 1935 (after which he declared there were no further territorial problems outstanding between France and Germany)—he repudiated Locarno in March 1936, and re-established German military occupation of the Rhineland.

All these acts were so many blows to France ; but the French Government, though possessed of a military superiority which they could not hope to have a few years later, did not retaliate. They had introduced the two years' military service in March 1935 ; but in the following March they refrained from driving out the few token battalions which Hitler, against the advice of the Reichswehr, had sent into the demilitarised Rhineland, despite their strong right in law and equity to do so ; and Sarraut and Flandin decided instead to rely on the consolidation of French-British understanding, with its military implications.

Efforts are nevertheless continuously being made, particularly from the French side, to reach an understanding on as many points as possible of common interest. An interesting example is the commission of French and German teachers of history, who met to reach an agreement regarding the interpretation of controversial points in the past history of French-German relations, and who issued their findings last summer. Another example is the initiative taken by the Quai d'Orsay in December last to reach an agreement in the matter of Press hostilities. It should, moreover, be mentioned that certain elements of the Right, scared by Communism, have shown some sympathy towards the new Germany, and have even toyed at moments with the thought of Hitler's help. But Germany's intervention in Spain discouraged such thoughts, and her activities in Morocco provoked an effective

reaction which had the whole French nation behind it. On the Left a natural mistrust of Nazi ideology and of German militarism is particularly strong. But there is a readiness in Frenchmen of all parties to come to a practical understanding, and the attitude of goodwill tempered only by elementary prudence, which is that of the great majority of Frenchmen, found effective expression in the speech made by the French Foreign Minister at the recent Radical Congress at Lille. His words found an answer when Neurath, then still German Foreign Minister, greeted Delbos on his way to Poland and the countries of the Little Entente, and the visit itself was not interpreted on either side as undertaken in a spirit of antagonism.

Such an interpretation has, however, at times been placed on the French-Russian Pact, though it was far from being inspired by a Bolshevik ideology, and was the direct outcome of Germany's refusal to join an Eastern Pact. It was the work of French statesmen of the Right and (at most) the Left Centre : Barthou, who first conceived it within the framework of Eastern Pacts ; Laval, who with Stalin initialled it in May 1935 ; and Sarraut and Flandin, who piloted it through the French Chamber in February and March of 1936. It was stated by General Weygand, who is the opposite of a Communist, that the Pact was a military necessity. The German Government in the spring of 1935 raised no objection to it. Italy recognised at the same time its complete legality. British ministers on several occasions expressed their recognition of its complete compatibility with all France's other engagements including Locarno. It is entirely defensive, is fitted clearly into the framework of the League, and can only function in the event of direct attack by Germany on either party. It thus has no legal bearing on the Spanish situation nor on the Russo-Japanese. The military conversations it provides for have not yet been carried through, and it is limited to five years, over two of which have passed.

Though this pact was not made by the Government of the *Front populaire*, it can be said that when Blum came into power a feeling of genuine sympathy with Russia was strong in France. When Russia came to the rescue of the Spanish Government with material and technicians, this sympathy grew in those quarters. But a latent fear of Bolshevism and a growing perplexity at Stalin's internal policy have weakened Russian influence and prestige in most quarters, and the

successive governments of the *Front populaire* have kept France's Russian commitments to their present minimum. If the French feel that they cannot give up the Pact, it is largely because they believe that to do so would be tantamount to driving Russia into the arms of the other totalitarian powers, with disastrous consequences.*

France's other and more concrete commitments in Eastern Europe also stand, but require to be viewed in a new light since the French-British conversations of December last and the voyage of Delbos which followed them. It was recognised by France and Britain that readiness to negotiate can only exist in an atmosphere of security; and it was the purpose of the Foreign Minister of France—the power which had initiated the Eastern alliances—to encourage this readiness and to strengthen this atmosphere. The journey cannot be described as a triumph, though the feelings which still link most of these peoples to the Western democracies did not fail to manifest themselves. Moreover, M. Benes' recent remark that the present would be a year of negotiations and discussions, showed the accommodating spirit which this visit had encouraged. None, indeed, of these countries—apart from Czechoslovakia—shows a marked preparedness to support the League of Nations; and the new developments in Yugoslavia and particularly in Rumania point in the opposite direction. Italy's dramatic departure from the League encouraged this tendency; but Delbos' voyage, coinciding with this decision, undoubtedly contributed to precluding some of its worst effects and to saving the League itself from disruption.

A view of France's relations with Italy is instructive in this connection. They cooled in most quarters after the rise of Mussolini, and it was not till 1933 that a tentative policy of co-operation developed. Italy might be used to keep Germany in check, and the Italian despatch of troops to the Brenner in 1934 at the time of the murder of Dollfuss showed that such a view was not mistaken. Relations improved in a few

* Such is the view of Pertinax, and of M. Paul Reynaud, whereas his colleague of the Right Centre Group, M. Flandin, who formerly sponsored the Pact, now opposes it, presenting in his change of attitude an exception rare enough to deserve mention. In a speech delivered at Bordeaux on February 13th he even went so far as to denounce French armaments as only benefiting the communists, and to accuse the present French Government, in defiance of the facts, of an unwillingness to negotiate with Germany.

months to such an extent that it was possible for France, in virtue of the Rome Agreement of January 1935, to move large bodies of troops from her Italian to her German frontier. The German introduction of conscription brought France and Italy yet closer together ; and we get the temporary establishment of the Stresa Front in the spring of 1935. How far was France committed to collaboration with Italy by this time ? Far enough, Mussolini thought, to permit of his starting on his Abyssinian campaign. And so we have the unhappy spectacle of a French Government seeking to remain faithful to a League policy proposed by Britain, involving sanctions for the first time, and at the same time seeking not to sacrifice Italian goodwill. The two ends were incompatible. The outcome which is well known was humiliating, and damaging to French as well as to British prestige.

Could Laval have avoided this dilemma by obtaining more complete British guarantees ? It is difficult to say ; but it is certain that his policy resulted in a serious set-back to the League and to collective security. The error was all the greater in view of the consistent emphasis placed by France on the juridical aspect of international relations. The consequences of that error from the French point of view were clearly exemplified when, in a speech of October 18th, 1936, M. Spaak described the new Belgian policy of neutrality as a direct outcome of the failure of collective security in the Abyssinian conflict.

The reaction against Laval was violent, and did much to prepare the triumph of his opponents in the elections of 1936 ; and though the new Government was almost immediately faced with a direct menace from Italy in the form of Italian armed intervention in Spain, though Italian agitation is becoming ever more serious in France's North African possessions and her vital Mediterranean communications are endangered, she has not sought further compromise with an arbitrary and irresponsible government, and in consequence of her refusal to recognise the King of Italy as Emperor of Abyssinia the French Government has not yet appointed a new ambassador to the Quirinal. The Nyon arrangement of last summer was made in conjunction with Britain under the ægis of the League and in defiance of Italy, France's immediate neighbour ; and Italian acquiescence in her initiative of February 3rd in reinforcing the Franco-British anti-piracy

policy by proposing to sink all submerged submarines, serves to emphasise the effectiveness of a firm policy of Franco-British international co-operation.

The French Government's treatment of the Spanish situation offers yet another instance of this co-operation which is the sheet-anchor of French foreign policy. Spain has, like Germany, been an age-long problem for France, though the Pyrenees constitute a natural barrier infinitely more efficacious than the Rhine, or even the Vosges. It has only been when the problems of Spain and Germany were linked together that France felt herself definitely threatened and that her reaction was determined and energetic. The possibility of such a situation arising seemed remote as late as the spring of 1936, when General Tournès, in an article on the French Army contributed to *Foreign Affairs*, wrote that "France has nothing to fear from England, Belgium, Switzerland or Spain, with whom for long she has been on the best of terms." But the rise of Franco with German as well as Italian armed support, suddenly re-created this perilous situation. France did not react with traditional energy; her policy was non-intervention. One of its causes is undoubtedly the pacifism of Léon Blum. Another is the internal situation in France, where intervention on the Spanish Government side might have precipitated civil war, and where class-feeling still tends to dominate reactions to the happenings in Spain. But the main cause of the policy is certainly the desire for the fullest possible collaboration with Britain.

Such was hardly the position in the post-war years, when there were often serious differences between France and Britain, particularly regarding the application of the Peace Treaties. However responsibilities be here apportioned, events seem certainly to have justified the diagnosis dictated by France's mistrust; and whereas the post-war situation tended to impose on Britain the role of arbiter, developments since 1933 have brought a rearming Britain to the side of France in a policy of Western defence. Recent happenings in the Mediterranean have shown ever more clearly that neither France nor Britain can stand alone; and common interests and ideals have alike contributed to bring the two countries closer together than they have ever been, as has been repeatedly proclaimed by spokesmen in both countries.

They are also agreed in aiming at that closer American co-operation which France has consistently sought, examples being the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the tripartite monetary agreement of 1936. Interests in the Far East may further intensify such co-operation. In the meantime Europe must look after herself; and here a policy of collective defence, backed by the economic resources of the western powers and by a full military understanding between France and Britain,* is bound to encourage conditions favourable not only to a general European settlement, but to one in the colonial field.

It is a far cry from this spectacle of armed equilibrium to the lapsed disarmament projects. Whatever the degree of France's responsibility for their failure, it cannot be attributed to any desire on her part for conquest or aggrandisement. She remains true to her fundamental policy: security and international order before disarmament; and her co-operation with Britain on this basis shows that her policy has fully recovered its continuity and found its justification.

WILLIAM McC. STEWART.

* The negative views of the Military Correspondent of *The Times* regarding the use of British man-power in an eventual war, involving powers all of which have vast trained conscript armies, are discussed and criticised in an interesting article by General Baratier in the *Temps* of January 3rd, 1938.

MACAULAY.

IT is now a hundred years since Macaulay left India, to take up again the astonishing career in politics and letters which, from wise and generous motives, he had deliberately cut short at the age of thirty-three. He had won the independence he was seeking. He had found in India, as he always did, admiring friends. He had made some enemies by his devotion to the public interest, but their attacks had left him undisturbed. He had known the splendour and tedium of high office, inhabiting a house larger than Lord Dudley's in London and employing the most renowned cook in Calcutta. He had consoled himself in his "intensely bitter exile" by an absorption in reading certainly not less intense, deep doses of the classics and the early Fathers : but even he had found the whole of Chrysostom impossible to read. Above all, he had carried through with rare vigour and ability two memorable pieces of public work, laying the foundations alike of the Indian educational system and of the great structure of the Penal Code. One wonders whether the exile could after all have been quite so bitter as one warm-hearted letter to a friend alleged.

It is hard to say which is the more brilliant of the two main periods of his life at home—the years between his boyhood and the flight to India, or the years of ripe achievement after his return. One recalls that incredibly precocious youth—the babe of three who talked, as a parlourmaid testified, "quite printed words"; the child of eight who began a *Universal History* and produced a poem in the style of the "*Lay of the Last Minstrel*," which he already knew by heart ; the small boy at school discussing Southey and Boccaccio, reminding his mother that "man is an animal made for society," and longing for companions who could talk and think ; the joyous and vigorous undergraduate of Trinity, where he quickly won triumphs and friends, where Charles Austin almost made him into a Radical—but not, as he wrote home, "a son of anarchy and confusion"—and where not even his unconquerable aversion to mathematics could keep him out of a Fellowship long ; and then the emergence into the world of letters with an essay on Milton which still holds pride of place in a volume on which multitudes of his countrymen have been brought up. "The more I think," said

Jeffrey to a contributor whose translations Cambridge Dons had found too bald, "the less I can conceive where you picked up that style."

From that day forward success such as falls to few men waited on Macaulay's steps. He was soon immersed in writing, for he had little opportunity, and perhaps little real inclination, to follow up his start at the Bar. His father's misfortunes in business made it imperative for him to earn money, to help his family as well as to support himself. He took on the burden with cheerfulness and bore it uncomplainingly for years ;

and such was his high and simple nature that it may well be doubted whether it ever crossed his mind that to live wholly for others was a sacrifice at all.

Otherwise the family misfortunes proved to be no check to his career. They did not even check the irrepressible high spirits of the party in Great Ormond Street, where Tom was always the leader in every species of fun. In 1828 Lord Lyndhurst made the young Fellow of Trinity a Commissioner of Bankruptcy. He voted for the suppression of the post almost as soon as he got into Parliament, though sheer poverty stared him in the face. An appointment at the Board of Control followed, and that he felt bound to resign because the new Whig Government's "Slavery Bill" did not come up to the hopes of his father, and he could not grieve his father by deserting him on the great question to which he had given his life. He spoke and voted against the Ministry, and they refused to accept his resignation. In Parliament he was already a force. In 1830 Lord Lansdowne, deeply impressed by his articles in the "Edinburgh Review," had offered him a seat at Calne, during one of the most interesting and exciting crises ever known in the history of Parliament. His first speech on the Reform Bill was a rare political triumph—as beautiful, said Peel with generous candour, as anything that he had ever heard or read. Other speeches not less impressive and successful followed. The young Member for Calne had stepped at once into the front rank of speakers in the House of Commons.

Fame in Society quickly followed these achievements in Parliament. Macaulay could not help noticing that he had become "a sort of lion." With men of letters, Jeffrey,

Brougham, Sydney Smith and Rogers, he had made friends already, though Brougham's friendship proved a jealous and precarious thing. Now the great world awoke to his importance. Whig leaders from Lord Grey downwards welcomed him as an ally. He was made at home at Bowood, and dined there when electioneering on mountains of potatoes and oceans of beer. At Lansdowne House an imperious voice demanded to be introduced to Mr. Macaulay. The domineering, sometimes intolerable, mistress of Holland House became a genuine friend.

She was quite hysterical about my going [to India]; paid me such compliments as I cannot repeat; cried; raved; called me dear, dear Macaulay. "You are sacrificed to your family. I see it all. You are too good to them. They are always making a tool of you; last Session about the slaves; and now sending you to India!"

Charles Greville, who had longed to meet him, was amazed to find him a lump of ordinary clay. Lady Lyndhurst did not hesitate at their first meeting to tell him he was fat. Some grumbled at the "torrent" of words. Others remarked on the careless dress and the indifferent shaving. Wiser judges were more impressed by the essential goodness of the kindly, homely features, so radiant with intelligence in talk, by the astonishing richness of a fancy and memory which never failed. Robustly sensible, cool-headed, independent, Macaulay enjoyed and quickly justified the welcome given him. But the choicest treasures of his humour and affection he kept for a few friends and his family at home.

Such men are not forgotten in four years. Macaulay came back in 1838 to serve a new Sovereign and to take his place among the leaders of a newly-dawning age. He was immediately engrossed again in writing. The editor of the "Edinburgh" clamoured for reviews. All his "tastes and wishes" preferred literature to politics. But the call of politics was not to be avoided yet. In 1839 he re-entered Parliament as Member for Edinburgh. He joined the Cabinet as Secretary at War. He was still under forty. He could still hold and fascinate the House of Commons: his rising, said an even greater orator, was a "trumpet call to fill the benches." He made several memorable speeches between 1839 and 1848. He stood high in the counsels of his colleagues. It was

Macaulay's strong personal appeal which decided Lord John Russell to serve under Lord Aberdeen. It was Macaulay's vehement upbraidings, too vehement at times, which in the stress of conflict wounded Peel. But Peel's greatness triumphed in the end. "I will certainly follow his coffin," wrote his censor. "Once I little thought that I should have cried for his death." It was Macaulay's high-spirited courage in politics which won and reciprocated Palmerston's regard. Those latter years in Parliament with their interests and distractions undoubtedly delayed his work upon his History. But they form an inseparable part of his career.

It is strange that a man whose life was one long story of success and popularity, finely won and unquestionably deserved, should have been the object of so much detraction since. Macaulay's fame and methods sometimes seem to irritate beyond endurance men usually tolerant and understanding. There are eminent critics quite unable to forgive him for not being something different from what he really was. A man who is perpetually re-reading classics which he knows by heart already, who has an aimless and devouring appetite for novels and literary trash, who shows no strong interest in speculation or philosophy, in theology or science, cannot, we are assured by one well-meaning biographer, have any "inward spring of meditation." There is a dreadful want of "moral draught and earnestness" about him, and—an odd comment on Macaulay's devotion to his father—an "utter inability to comprehend piety of mind." Mr. Cotter Morison is convinced that Macaulay's early entry into politics seriously damaged his literary faculty and "destroyed the tender bloom of his mind." Mr. Birrell, a critic of a different quality, would not, apparently, allow him any tender bloom at all. He joined the chorus of detractors once in an early paper which he wrote upon Carlyle.* In a pardonable desire to glorify Carlyle, Birrell denounced Macaulay for his limited range of ideas, for his commonplace morality and commonplace descriptions, and for a style "ineffectual for the purpose of telling the truth about anything." Gibbon and Carlyle are set apart as historians and artists: Macaulay is only an overpraised, prejudiced Whig, without humour or pathos or the capacity of understanding men like Luther and Loyola, Cromwell and Claverhouse, Carlyle and Newman. It is a

* The first in the first volume of *Obiter Dicta*.

sweeping criticism and cannot stand. Macaulay after all has given us brilliant sketches of Claverhouse and Loyola, has paid more than one noble tribute to Cromwell, and in several references to Luther has left us in no doubt where his sympathies lay. Is it not jejune—to use a word which John Morley applied to immature and prejudiced judgments—to exclude him from the company of great historians and artists because he was obviously neither a Jesuit nor a Jacobite, neither a Tractarian nor a mystic? Did Gibbon ever show much sympathy for causes such as these? And what ground is there for suggesting that Macaulay could not appreciate the historical genius of Carlyle? The odd thing is that Mr. Birrell as a man had no small share of the qualities for which he fails to give full credit to Macaulay—great gifts of oratory and debate, of striking, vehement and drastic statement, far-ranging interests and far-ranging humour, the same broad, liberal sympathies, the same dislike of sophistications and pretences, the same commonplace morality, if morality be commonplace, the same bluff, governing common sense, and the same essential kindness of nature and of understanding, which except in moments of paradox rarely went astray.

We may wonder at some of these judgments. But we need not apologise for Macaulay now. Of course his writings are easy to attack. On many points, which he discussed with his habitual decisiveness and freedom, historical knowledge is much fuller than it was a hundred years ago. Many people dislike a rhetorical, antithetical style, and Macaulay could not write without rhetoric and antithesis. Many people dislike over-emphasis and exaggeration, and Macaulay, in the *Essays* in particular, often laid himself open to this charge. It is a habit not unknown even in Carlyle. Macaulay's taste on minor points was not always impeccable. He could be very hard on the writers he reviewed. He had little patience with pretentiousness or pedantry. He could not forbear from condemning what he thought untrustworthy or mean. It was not the fashion of the *Edinburgh Reviewers*, or indeed of many reviewers in that generation, to be tender to the faults or ignorance of others. It was their duty to be omniscient themselves. Macaulay made mistakes in spite of his omniscience. But is it not true that, in surveying a vast variety of subjects, he kept a level astonishingly high, a style

astonishingly brilliant, and a judgment certainly not infallible but in most cases searching, cool and sane? If in his portraits he noted and developed superficial traits with remarkable dexterity, it does not follow that his estimates were shallow. Macaulay had not Burke's profundity, nor Burke's imagination, nor yet Burke's "proud precipitance of soul." He would never have claimed for himself what he awarded to Burke, "an understanding stronger than that of any statesman, active or speculative, in the eighteenth century." But with gifts almost as outstanding and achievements not less assured, Macaulay had, it can hardly be doubted, a soberer and steadier judgment of men and of affairs.

In 1839 he at last began his *History*, though he could not give himself entirely to it for some years. "I must not go on dawdling and reproaching myself all my life." The story of its publication—the first two volumes appeared in 1848—is one of the romances of literature. Only Scott's novels and Byron's poems had achieved such instantaneous and universal popularity. *History*, Macaulay once declared, should be a compound of poetry and philosophy, impressing general truths by a vivid representation of characters and incidents. Some may question his philosophy. Others will refuse him, he would have refused for himself, the title of poet. But few will deny his vivid presentment of characters and facts. "You're a jolly vivid man," said Tennyson once to a younger historian, penetrating, as Sir John Marriott has pointed out, the secret of Green's power. In method and in outlook Green is of Macaulay's school. Death interrupted the writer's plan. The scale of the *History* proved too ambitious. It remains a splendid fragment only. But it is a fragment which for the first time showed English readers what a superb and arresting story English history could be made.

Are there many critics now who would refuse to Macaulay the possession of the story-teller's gift, or deny the artistry, the colour and the finish of the pictures which he paints? And is there any who clings to the theory that his historical judgments cannot be trusted because he was a party Whig? He believed, no doubt, that the Revolution of 1688, the circumstances which begat it and the consequences which followed it, had established the freest and the noblest Empire which the modern world has seen. He was fearless

and outspoken in his views, quick to extol what he admired and to condemn what he deplored. But it is a delusion to imagine that he was incapable of doing justice to anyone but Whigs. There is no unkindness in his attitude to the old Cavaliers. For Bishop Ken and Patrick Sarsfield he expresses warm admiration. For Halifax, the least reliable of party men, he has nothing but praises. He can respect Tories like Nottingham and Ormonde, acknowledge the finer qualities of Clarendon and Danby. He never hesitates to condemn unworthy Whigs. He has little mercy on Shaftesbury or Buckingham, small regard for Horace Walpole, no shadow of excuse for the Master of Stair. He bows to the greatness of Dr. Johnson and of Mr. Pitt, though he may exaggerate Johnson's eccentricities, lament Pitt's mistakes, and fail, rather curiously, to appreciate Boswell. He honours rectitude and worth and he rebukes unworthiness—sometimes too scathingly—wherever they are found. He has been accused of conspicuous unfairness to Marlborough, and he, no doubt, overstated the case against him. But Macaulay was never deliberately unfair. It is not possible, try as we may, to acquit Marlborough of intrigue and faithlessness in his climb to power. But, had the historian lived to carry on the story, how nobly and how proudly he would have chronicled the days of Marlborough's greatness, the triumphs of that patient and masterly diplomatist, of that serene and magnificent master of war! Censor as he often was—there is a good deal in seventeenth-century politics to censure—appreciation, not detraction, is the History's aim. Macaulay wrote because he loved to commemorate his country's greatness; and he has left us what, within its limits, is surely a stately and lasting memorial to the character and genius of the British race.

It is not always remembered what a very large proportion of Macaulay's literary output the Essays represent. The famous History, though so ample in its treatment, contains less than a million words. The popular edition of the Essays, from which a few are omitted, contains over five million. And their range is as astonishing as their vigour. There are few departments of history or literature in which their author does not seem to be at home, few great names and themes with which he is not familiar—Milton and Machiavelli, Bacon, Bunyan, Byron, Hampden and Burleigh, Chatham and Pitt, the romances of Fanny Burney, the

ecclesiastical ideas of Mr. Gladstone. It is delightful reading he provides. Vehement, dogmatic, severe at times he may be. But when did a young reviewer bring such stores of knowledge, eloquence and humour to his task? The Essays were often written under pressure, with insufficient authorities to consult. They were never meant to be republished: the pirated editions in America forced the author's hand. Macaulay has frankly admitted their failings. Their style, founded in exuberant high spirits, rare gifts of rhetorical argument, and an amazing memory for details, may have its faults. But what a testimony to his genius they remain! And how many of his countrymen have drawn from these ephemeral articles written for reviews their most lasting impressions of English history from the days of Cranmer to the days of Burke!

Even now it is difficult not to linger over the Essays if one takes up the book. They are so chock-full of interest. Who but Macaulay would have woven round Sir William Temple a story so varied and delightful? Who else would have so amused us with Southey's foolish colloquies and Montgomery's fatuous verse? We cannot help enjoying it when he applies to Croker's Boswell Dr. Johnson's condemnation of a leg of mutton, or when he calculates that Nares' life of Burleigh, filling two thousand closely printed quarto pages, occupying fifteen hundred inches cubic measure, and weighing sixty pounds avoirdupois, "might, before the deluge, have been considered as light reading by Hilpa and Shalum." We cannot help admiring the vigour and the courtesy with which he discusses Mr. Gladstone's ecclesiastical opinions. Some think that Macaulay's dissertation on the theory of Apostolical Succession is unanswered yet. We know that his censures on Warren Hastings and Sir Elijah Impey are now to a large extent disproved. But how fine, in spite of those censures, his appreciation of Hastings was! How glowing his pride in Englishmen's achievements, his tributes to men like Clive and Hastings, Hampden and Chatham, always are! It is no wonder if, in spite of blemishes and errors, the Essays still hold their place in English hearts to-day.

Macaulay's life was fortunate and tranquil to the end. His great work never ceased to give him pleasure. Its universal welcome, the fresh fame and prosperity which the History brought him, was like an outpouring of national

pride. There were wonderful sales of the first two volumes—3,000 copies in ten days, 22,000 in a year and a half, and in America, untrammelled by copyrights, some 200,000 in a few months. Even these figures were eclipsed by the third and fourth volumes, of which 25,000 were sold before publication. For the first time in his life Macaulay could spend freely. He decided to allow himself a brougham, and went off in it, “pleased and proud,” to dine with Lord John Russell. Honours were already flowing in upon him. He became Lord Rector of Glasgow University, High Steward of Cambridge, D.C.L. of Oxford, Bencher of Lincoln’s Inn—the last a rare honour for a stuff gown who had never earned more than a guinea at the Bar. When a Peerage was conferred on him everyone rejoiced. Before that he had found a new home on Campden Hill quite near to Holland House, with a large delicious garden—a “paradise of shrubs and turf”; and there to his heart’s content he could indulge his genius for hospitality—he was a laughing student of the notorious *Almanach des Gourmands*—and his still greater genius for talk. At Holly Lodge he would stroll with young Montagu Butler among his lilacs and laburnums, talking of Juvenal, Catullus, Theocritus, Plato, and a thousand other things, and gathering round him to the last that “dear little circle” of relations, his love for whom had been his main enjoyment from his boyhood up. He was indifferent to the fear of death: his own life, he had declared at fifty, was as happy as any that he had ever known. When Jeffrey died, he wrote, “God grant that I may die so! Full of years; full of honours; faculties bright, and affections warm, to the last.” His prayer was granted in full measure. He left the world for legacy a golden record of achievement and the memory of a high-hearted, strenuous, stainless life.

CHARLES MALLET.

THE ANGLO-IRISH NEGOTIATIONS.

I WRITE in ignorance both of the outcome of the Anglo-Irish negotiations and of the final returns of the general election in Northern Ireland. But this last can hardly tell us anything new. No one expects Lord Craigavon's majority to be seriously impaired. It is true that traders and others have their particular grievances, and that from staunch Unionists one hears uncomplimentary references to the official gang and to the absurd cost at which the six-county administration is carried on. But while the financial provisions of the 1920 Act stand and so long as Great Britain is willing, as hitherto, to contribute towards Ulster services a sum more than equal to the Imperial Contribution actually exacted, neither the Northern Government nor its taxpayers have any motive for reducing expenditure—rather the reverse, since all the money is spent among them in one way or another. Such discontent as exists—apart from the enduring hostility of the large Catholic minority—finds expression only in "Independent" and "Progressive" Unionist candidatures. Here the issues are personal and domestic and have little bearing upon that of Partition.

It is true also that the customs barrier between administrative Ulster and the rest of Ireland is regarded much less complacently in Londonderry and the border counties, always dependent upon interchange of goods and services with the Free State (or, as we must now learn to call it, Eire), than in Belfast, whose chief economic interest lies in trade with the Commonwealth and foreign countries. But here again discontent is unlikely to have much visible influence on the polls. Few Unionists will do more than grumble; while the Labour Opposition is still astonishingly weak, regard being had to the huge industrial proletariat of Belfast and its neighbourhood. Liberalism, which I remember as a dominant force, in the days when my father was only one of many supporters of Mr. Gladstone, sitting for North of Ireland constituencies, is dead or dying. Armour of Ballymoney has no successors that I can hear of among the Presbyterian leaders. Once famous Liberal names—Charlemont, Sinclair, Sharman-Crawford—are to be found on the list of Lord Craigavon's supporters. The *Northern Whig* has long been distinguishable from its one-time antagonist the *Belfast*

News Letter only by the greater virulence of its onslaughts on "Southern Ireland." It would, I imagine, take some courage to avow Liberal convictions in their former stronghold, the Ulster Reform Club.

As for the Northern Nationalists, they seem to be hopelessly split between adherents of Mr. Cosgrave and Mr. de Valera, elderly sympathisers with the old Parliamentary Party, and intransigent Republicans. It is too probable that these latter will induce or compel many voters to boycott the elections altogether, while in any event a majority appears still determined upon the fatal policy of abstention from attendance in Parliament—strangely forgetful that it was the adoption of this very policy in 1918 which made it possible to pass the 1920 Act at all and thus to reduce the Northern Catholics to the servitude of which they now justly complain. Two Nationalist strongholds—South Armagh and the Mourne division of County Down—have fallen, unopposed, to Labour and official Unionism respectively. South Down, which at the last General Election returned Mr. de Valera himself, now passes inevitably to one or other of these parties. I conclude therefore—the returns available long before this appears in print will show if I am wrong—that the election will leave things very much what they were, except that on paper the Nationalist strength will have slightly diminished—a result doubtless foreseen by Lord Craigavon.*

To predict the upshot of the negotiations is much more difficult. So far all one can say is that the preliminary conversations appear to have been carried on with patience and good temper—a thing not to be expected while Mr. Thomas was at the Dominions Office. For whatever that statesman's merits, no one that knew the two men ever expected any good to come of his meeting with Mr. de Valera. Rarely can manners, temperament and intellectual outlook have been more utterly antipathetic. The principals are to meet again at a date not yet known; and meantime the technical side of various schemes is being considered by British and Irish civil servants.

* Figures published since this was written confirm the forecast. At the Dissolution official Unionists held 37 of the 52 seats. They now hold 35 and are pretty well assured of three of the four seats allotted to Queen's University. Independent and Progressive Unionists did even worse than was expected; the former carrying only two constituencies, the latter none at all, its leader losing his seat. Labour has, as before, two representatives, Nationalists, eight, with a good chance of another in the University, where alone in Northern Ireland proportional representation is still allowed to operate.

As everyone knows, the negotiations primarily relate to three things: Trade and Finance (including a settlement of the dispute over land annuities); the defence (naval, military and aerial) of these islands; and Partition. Seeing that the Partition fence is by far the most formidable—nay, in existing circumstances perhaps unsurmountable—I had feared its inclusion in the first round of the course would have involved an immediate smash. Since this has not happened, I am now mildly hopeful. But, as Mr. Frank MacDermot lately urged in a letter to the press, the prospect both of an immediate settlement of some sort and of a turn for the better in the political relations between the United Kingdom and Ireland would be greatly improved if the Government in Great Britain, having already announced that Partition can only be ended with the freely given consent of Ulster, would make it equally clear by a public statement that to constrain or persuade the north-east to remain politically separated from the rest of Ireland is no object of British policy. For, inexplicable as this may appear to Englishmen, the contrary belief is widely and sincerely held in Ireland. And before dismissing this belief as merely absurd, Englishmen will do well to remember, not only that the Ulster of to-day has its roots in the Plantation of the seventeenth century, but also that in our own days this Ulster, in its origin the creature of British policy, was again and again used by a great British party—in 1887, in 1893 and, with amazing recklessness, in 1912-14—to defeat the known wishes of a vast majority of Irishmen. Further they should recollect that the Act of 1920, which established the Belfast Parliament, was pushed through in defiance of the openly expressed abhorrence as well of the Southern Unionists as of Nationalists in north and south, whether Sinn Feiners or supporters of the old Parliamentary Party, and according to Lord Craigavon was accepted by the majority in Ulster itself with the utmost reluctance. Small wonder, then, if people argue: What Britain did in 1920, Britain can undo in 1938.

Such argument takes no account of existing conditions. Whatever Ulster may have felt in 1920, she is certainly not now in the humour either to revert to the *status quo ante* or to throw in her lot with a unitary system of Irish government. There is, indeed, a *via media*, best described by the once familiar phrase: Home Rule within Home Rule. In a

recent interview Mr. de Valera declared his willingness to "leave to the Belfast Parliament its present area of jurisdiction and its present powers as a local Parliament, giving to an all-Ireland Parliament constituted on the basis of Proportional Representation the reserved powers at present retained by the Imperial Parliament" in the six-county area.

For my own part, I was convinced as long ago as 1912 or 1913 that in some such plan lay the only hope of a friendly and durable settlement. Unfortunately, as most people now recognise, both Liberal and Nationalist opinion utterly miscalculated the strength of the opposition to the simple inclusion of the north-eastern counties within the jurisdiction of a Dublin Parliament; and those of us who had our misgivings about the policy thus pursued were borne down by the weight of the majority. Some tentative suggestions were indeed made, once at least, if I remember rightly, by Sir Edward Grey; but the suggestions were never followed up. Nor is this surprising; for once the Home Rule Bill of 1912 had been passed a first time through the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith's government, having regard to the provisions of the Parliament Act, could hardly be expected to drop it in favour of a totally different one, unless fully assured beforehand that the latter would prove acceptable. Later, in 1917 and again in 1920, something of the sort might have been attempted, for though political Ulster showed very little sign of reconsidering her attitude, Unionist leaders in Great Britain, taught prudence by the Great War and eager to conciliate American opinion, were in a chastened mood. But meanwhile Ireland had swung violently away from Constitutional Nationalism; and Griffiths' fatal doctrine of Parliamentary abstention had taken hold of the popular imagination. Thus the opportunity was lost. Has it recurred? I wish I could believe it.

Little has happened of recent years to dispose the North-East to co-operate in an all-Ireland Parliament; much, alas, to repel it. I am not now thinking of the Republican leanings of Mr. de Valera; for, as he hinted in the same interview, "under the new Constitution the sentiment for association with Britain can be reasonably met." In less cryptic words, if Ulster comes in at the door, the Republic goes out at the window. Nor am I thinking of the cry "Home Rule; Home Rule," so often heard on British platforms in

the old days. Apart from the fact that under these proposals all the present powers of the six-county Parliament would be retained, while the Protestant interest in the south would gain a powerful reinforcement by the inclusion of north-eastern representatives in the all-Ireland Parliament, even the hardest Orangeman would find some difficulty in convincing anyone that the Protestant minority in the south has not been better treated than the Catholic minority in the north-east. The new obstacle I have in mind is the High Tariff policy which, exercised with moderation under Mr. Cosgrave, has since the shelving of the Tariff Commission by his successors become wholesale and indiscriminate, until to-day there is hardly a single article of common use which escapes import duties. Now it always seemed to me that the one reasonable objection Ulster could advance against Home Rule—reasonable and therefore seldom mentioned by Ulster orators—was that a Parliament mainly representative of farmers might be expected to sacrifice trade and industry to agriculture. Strangely enough, the boot is on the other foot nowadays. In hot pursuit of economic self-sufficiency the farmer has been sacrificed to the industrialist. Serving in the front-line trenches during the "economic war" with Great Britain, he has had to face not only a vast increase in rates and wages, cost of feeding stuffs and household necessities (the direct consequence of duties imposed by the Free State), but, in effect, to pay to the British Government the full amount of the annuities (in the shape of the special duties imposed by Britain) and in addition half that amount to his own Government, plus a considerable share in the cost of the "export bounties" which have enabled him to keep a foot in the British market. The results may be seen at any public auction of farmlands south or west of the border.

Once more the fears of Ulster have proved ill-founded. But how are the world-wide commercial interests of Belfast to be harmonised with the tight little island economics of Dublin? If a mere phantom—for the Act of 1914 included no power of imposing customs duties—could scare the business men of Ulster, how much more the reality of to-day! Personally, I believe that their influence in an all-Ireland Parliament—exercised as it would be in much better atmosphere and combined with that of the numerous southern Nationalists who dislike the present excesses of Protectionism—would be

quite strong enough to enforce a salutary change. Indeed, if and when the reunion of Ireland becomes a question of practical politics, I shall expect to see opposition developing—of course on the highest patriotic principles—among certain hard-faced men who have done very well out of the quarrel with Northern Ireland, as well as among Gaelic fanatics who have been heard in private conversation to describe Partition as a blessing in disguise. I only wish I could believe that Ulster was yet ready to make the necessary act of faith. To call the Act of 1920 itself a “final solution,” as Lord Craigavon has recently done, is sheer nonsense.

Partition apart, the auspices are favourable, for each side has something of value to offer, and—not less important—each knows it will be able to implement any agreement that may be signed. It has long been evident that simple resumption of land annuity and other disputed payments is out of the question, if only for the reason that this would now involve either reducing Irish social services (already in some respects inferior to those obtaining in Great Britain) or imposing an intolerable strain on the Irish taxpayer. Notwithstanding retention of the annuities, over four and a quarter million pounds a year have been added to the taxpayers’ burden since Mr. de Valera assumed office; while, as already noticed, taxable capacity has been decreased by the steadily rising cost of living.

It is true that Britain, on the other hand, having succeeded in collecting the payments by special imposts on Irish produce, and having secured under the Coal-Cattle pact a virtual monopoly of Irish imports of coal, might contemplate continuance of this particular quarrel with equanimity. But even she undoubtedly suffers trading losses because of it, none the less serious for being difficult to estimate exactly, and may reasonably expect to increase the total volume of business with Eire by a friendly settlement.

Then there is the question of Defence. If, as I have seen suggested, in return for abolition of the special duties and a satisfactory trade pact, Eire would undertake to co-operate wholeheartedly in the defence of Irish coasts, who can doubt that such a bargain would be welcomed by all but the bitterest diehards? The gain to the United Kingdom in military and naval security need not be stressed; while on the Irish side the moral as well as material gain is hardly less obvious.

Mr. de Valera has always protested against those clauses in the Treaty of 1921 by virtue of which certain points on the coast of Eire remain in the control of the War Office and Admiralty. Rightly or wrongly, he sees in such retention a derogation from the equality of status with Great Britain guaranteed to the Free State under an earlier clause of that Treaty. Further, he has repeatedly expressed his readiness, whenever these were transferred to Irish jurisdiction, to use all the resources of Eire in the defence of Irish shores against foreign aggressors. I believe him in this, as in most things, to be perfectly sincere. I believe him also to be strong enough to carry his undertaking into effect. The intransigents will of course protest vehemently, as they would equally protest against any arrangement whatever that did not explicitly recognise the existence of an all-Ireland Republic. But they are neither numerous nor of any political importance. Mr. de Valera is assured, not only of the loyalty of his own party and of (at least) the benevolent neutrality of the Opposition under Mr. Cosgrave, but also of support from Irishmen hitherto almost equally hostile to both sections of the old Sinn Fein movement. Only last week I was talking with a strong Protestant farmer in Leinster who, after he had denounced both Cosgrave and de Valera as a pair of rebels, went on to say that if the latter came to a decent settlement such as would enable the speaker again to sell his cattle freely in the British market, he and his family would vote for de Valera for the rest of their lives.

Deep indeed will be the disappointment if the agreement fails to eventuate. Ireland has stood the strain of these six years better than most of us expected; and tariffs have unquestionably brought a certain measure of increased employment and consequent prosperity to some of our towns. But agriculture remains, as it always must, our chief concern. And here, as I have hinted, conditions are far less favourable. Within the last few weeks the Chairman of the Bank of Ireland, while reporting continued progress in the general business of the bank, again took occasion to remark upon the steady shrinking of farmers' deposits with its local branches—a sure sign of the gradual exhaustion of agricultural savings. Only last week again, the official figures of external trade showed once more how futile has been the search for alternative markets. In 1937 Great Britain took from us goods to

the value of £18,587,461 ; Northern Ireland to the value of £2,163,150 ; all other countries combined only £2,107,149. The United Kingdom alone needs our products in any considerable measure. With the United Kingdom alone have we, as a necessary consequence, anything approaching a just balance of trade.

To conclude. Now that the oath and the governor-general have disappeared, only three things stand between Nationalist Ireland and Great Britain : land annuities, the treaty clauses just mentioned, and partition. Assume the two first to be amicably settled, will Mr. de Valera insist that partition must be dealt with simultaneously ? He realises that the rest of Ireland has neither the power nor the will to coerce Ulster. Can he, after his talks in London, still imagine that only British pressure prevents Belfast from throwing her arms round the neck of Eire ? Unlike Parnell in most respects, Mr. de Valera resembles him in keeping his own counsel. He may decide to force the issue or he may not. Either way his own future is reasonably secure ; for, as a shrewd observer said to me the other day, he has, like a good general, provided himself both with a line of advance and a line of retreat. If he settles, his reputation as a statesman will stand higher than ever before. If he refuses to settle, he is assured of applause, less general but more vociferous. It will be equally easy for his admirers to claim for him the credit of having relieved the Irish farmer of a great burden at the cost of relatively brief sacrifice, or to portray him as one that would not barter the birthright of his country against a paltry material advantage at the dictation of a British Cabinet. Thus, not for the first time, he is in the happy position of having, if not the best of both worlds, at least the choice of a comfortable home in either.

HUGH A. LAW.

THE VAN ZEELAND REPORT.

SINCE the Armistice much study and many discussions and conferences have been devoted to the problem of sweeping away economic barriers. The nature of these barriers has varied considerably from time to time. After the War the import licence system developed. The usual form of protection, the customs tariff, was thought inadequate in many countries and was reinforced by requiring a special permit for imports of certain goods. The rules for the issue of permits and the figures for the total imports to be allowed were not usually made public, and so there could be no reasoned appeal against an arbitrary decision. This system gradually died out, and was only lingering on in a very few countries when it was finally abolished by the Convention for the Abolition of Prohibitions and Restrictions of 1928, and certain subsidiary agreements.

At once another form of barrier began to draw comment and to endanger the growth of world trade. This was the most commonplace of all trade barriers—customs duties. The International Economic Conference held at Geneva in 1927 took up a definite stand on this point. Presided over by Monsieur Theunis, who had been and was again to become Belgian Prime Minister, and including the foremost business men and economists of the world, the Conference declared that the time had come “to make an end of tariff increases and to aim at reductions.” The League of Nations took up the policy thus outlined, and the 1929 Assembly adopted a joint proposal of Great Britain, Belgium and France, launching the policy of “concerted economic action,” which took shape in 1930 at the well-known Customs Truce Conference. The Conference failed to agree on a real truce, but produced the Trade Convention, which was calculated to make any arbitrary increase in duties difficult, or even impossible, by requiring prior notice and providing a means of appeal.

The Convention, however, was never ratified, and it follows that the second part of the programme, which was the concerted lowering of tariffs, will remain a dead letter. The principle at least of the Trade Convention was kept alive by a small group of countries, which was also a group of small countries. We refer of course to the “Oslo Group,” comprising Belgium, Denmark, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,

Norway and Sweden, later joined by Finland. Under the Oslo Convention of December 23rd, 1930, these countries agreed to adopt among themselves a procedure similar to that of the Trade Convention.

However, customs duties soon ceased to be the chief centre of interest. The world slump brought with it other kinds of barriers which soon proved formidable. Almost simultaneously quotas and exchange control came to the fore. The quota system is a highly organised form of licensing. A limit is set not only to the total imports of a given product, but to the share of each exporting country. Even the firms or persons who shall be allowed to import are sometimes specified. As for exchange control, this puts a check on payments. Transfers of funds to certain countries and in respect of certain goods are placed under control. As a general rule the effect is to confine the payments made to a particular country within the limits of direct trade with that country. Exchange control thus tends to level out the balance of payments, or at least the balance of trade, between two countries. The old plurilateral conception of trade is replaced by a bilateral one. The traditional working of international relations is upset.

One of the reasons for the appearance of these new barriers was the serious disturbance of gold price levels in various countries. This disturbance burst the usual bounds of competition and called for exceptional means of protection. The adjustment of exchange rates carried out by a number of countries towards the end of 1936 improved the situation, and so the tripartite agreement of September 28th, 1936, between France, Great Britain and the United States, which announced to the world the devaluation of the French franc, included a joint declaration of the three signatory Powers that they attached "the greatest importance to prompt action for progressively weakening the present quota and exchange control systems, with a view to their abolition." An enquiry into the means of doing so appeared necessary, and the name of Monsieur Van Zeeland was at once brought up. Why Monsieur Van Zeeland? In the first place, someone familiar with every aspect of international trade had to be found, and few might lay as much claim to this knowledge as the Belgium ex-Premier, who, as Manager and Vice-Governor of the National Bank, and Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Overseas Trade, had followed the daily course of all the factors that disorganise and check the machinery of exchange. Further, such a task naturally falls to the representative of a country whose policy and interests lie in the direction of freedom of trade. We have already seen that Belgium had been a party to the chief recent movements towards a free exchange of goods and services. To what has been said on this point we may add that on July 18th, 1932, Belgium, her economic ally Luxemburg, and the Netherlands arrived at the "Ouchy" Agreement (actually signed at Geneva), which laid down a practical programme of tariff and quota "disarmament." No other country subscribed to this agreement, which gave rise to a controversy with the United Kingdom, and has remained a dead letter. We notice that the Netherlands too are always to be found taking part in any movement for economic co-operation. Shortly after the exchange adjustments of the autumn of 1936, Monsieur Colijn, the Dutch Prime Minister, invited the Oslo Group Countries to consider whether the time had come to resume their co-operation and to work for a lowering of trade barriers. His appeal met with a ready response, and on May 28th, 1937, they signed a Trade Expansion Agreement (*"Convention pour le Développement des Echanges"*).

To come back to Monsieur Van Zeeland's task—as early as November 1936, when the Belgian Prime Minister was on a visit to London, the suggestion was made that he should study the problem we have set out and make some practical proposals, but it was only in the early days of April that he was officially approached by the English and French Governments. He accepted at once and set to work without delay. The duties of Prime Minister being too heavy for him to undertake the groundwork himself, he enlisted the services of Monsieur Frère, a Belgian Government official with long experience of international economic negotiations, who was for some years Adviser to the Austrian National Bank. Monsieur Frère visited the capitals of Europe and held important conversations with the authorities of most countries. Monsieur Van Zeeland himself went to the United States and conferred with Mr. Roosevelt. The discussions came to an end towards the time of the summer vacation, and Monsieur Van Zeeland, who had now resigned the Premiership, was at leisure to draw up his report, the main lines of which we shall now set forth.



THE VAN ZEELAND REPORT.

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The report is in three parts, the first of which is merely general and introductory, dealing chiefly with a question on which all the rest depends, and which may be briefly put as follows: Is the common well-being of the nations to be sought by fostering the international exchange of goods and services, that is to say, through a distributive system rooted in such exchanges and in freedom of contract; or is it to be sought, on the contrary, in a policy of self-sufficiency, under which each nation strives to meet all its needs from its own resources and by means of its own industries? Monsieur Van Zeeland frankly recognises that there is something to be said for a policy of self-sufficiency, and even that it can bear some fruit in practice, but he immediately adds this fact, proved by experience: that even countries least dependent on others, whether by nature or device, are by no means immune from world fluctuations. Not one of them can withdraw from the comity of nations. Moreover, we are told that the States Monsieur Van Zeeland consulted were unanimously in favour of some joint action tending to lessen the obstacles to world trade. This theoretical agreement was often qualified by very great hesitation to take any practical step. However, Monsieur Van Zeeland found marks enough of goodwill to encourage him to go on.

In the second part of the report he makes a critical examination of all kinds of obstacles to world trade, and sets forth the steps he thinks necessary in each case to ensure an economic revival. As to customs duties which, as we have shown above, are no longer the most formidable of all barriers, he proposes nothing more than a truce. The only exception is in the case of "peaks," or duties exceeding the mean level of the tariff. These "peaks" should be smoothed out, the excessive duties being brought down to the general level.

As to quotas, Monsieur Van Zeeland favours more drastic measures. We are now dealing with exceptional regulations, which arose out of the world-wide slump and must now be abolished. However, this cannot be done at once, and in certain cases, when normal protection is not enough, duties on goods no longer to be subject to quota might be increased. Above all, quotas for manufactured goods should be abolished. Agricultural quotas are still justified if their purpose is merely to spread imports over the year in such a way that they cause no apprehension about the marketing of the home crop. In

any event no new quotas should be set up, and existing ones should not be made more stringent.

As to indirect methods of protection, effect should be given to the work of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations on this subject, which has already reached an advanced stage. In any cases not provided for, arbitration should be agreed upon, either under the terms of the Resolution of the Council of the League in 1932, or through the International Chamber of Commerce.

As to currency instability and sudden wide fluctuations on the exchanges, Monsieur Van Zeeland can see no real remedy save in the distant future, when world economic and financial stability has been restored. A cure can only be hoped for at the end and not at the outset of a long course of general economic co-operation. Meanwhile, the tripartite agreement between Great Britain, France and the United States of September 28th, 1936, for the adjustment of the French exchange, might be revised and extended. This agreement should be adapted to present circumstances and broadened to include every State taking part in the general movement proposed. This would mean provisional currency stabilisation, with a margin of fluctuation to allow of final adjustment. The stabilisation point of any currency is a function of various known internal and external factors, and in most cases it can already be worked out accurately enough to permit of such an agreement.

As for exchange control and clearing systems which are, in Monsieur Van Zeeland's eyes, the most harmful of all obstacles, they should be entirely swept away. Before this can be done, we must solve one of the difficulties that gave rise to the clearing system—the accumulation of frozen credits. We must clear up the relics of the past. This is only possible through agreements for debt adjustment in all cases where the respective situations of the debtor and creditor countries have undergone radical changes. Further, debts should be consolidated by means of bonds issued in the currency of the creditor country, guaranteed by the debtor, and available for financing trade through certain international organisations.

When the relics of the past have thus been cleared away, we must consider the question of assisting the countries that have given up exchange control. Assistance must take the

form of credits to enable them, on the one hand to keep up their exports, and on the other to finance part of their imports. For this purpose the mutual credit system recently set up by the Bank of International Settlements could be brought into general use. Further there might be need for a joint effort of all States, such as a common fund managed by the Bank of International Settlements and used, in given circumstances, to finance legitimate trading.

So far the problem of trade barriers has been considered in isolation. It is evident, however, that if we confine ourselves to this ground we shall achieve nothing. Experience proves this: anyone who followed the debates of the 1930 Customs Truce Conference will remember how the discussion would continually overstep its intended bounds, and take in vast questions on which the whole subject was unexpectedly found to hinge. Among such questions were the Danube problem, the industrial development of backward or agricultural countries, and price-fixing for cereals. We are now in the same position.

The problem of economic co-operation cannot be confined to the factors we have just considered. By its very nature it depends on a number of factors some of which are of a political or moral character. If we go to the source of things, the problem is above all one of restoring a feeling of mutual aid, and a will towards it, in countries that have sought salvation along the opposite road—by way of self-sufficiency. Generally speaking it is hardly economic difficulties that have driven these countries along this road. Thus we come up against difficulties of another order, with which the third part of Monsieur Van Zeeland's report is concerned. As these problems are really outside his terms of reference, he speaks with some reserve, and while stressing the absolute necessity of broadening the field of discussion, he scarcely goes beyond defining the problems to be solved in the new sphere.

The essential questions are:

- The problem of unequal distribution of raw materials, bringing in its train that of redistribution of colonies;
- Uneven distribution of capital;
- Racial and minority questions;
- Lack of a satisfactory settlement of international loans;
- The effects of a general armaments race;
- and lastly, political difficulties in general.

Monsieur Van Zeeland next recapitulates some of the remedies that have been suggested. With regard to the colonial problem, for example, he remarks that mandated territories might be transferred to international control, whilst in colonies properly so called we could either put the "Open Door" system into general practice, or form privileged companies with international capital to carry on purely economic activities. With regard to raw materials, we might visualise bartering what the colonies produce against the services and finished goods they need. Finally, a scheme of co-operation could not be set working without guarantees in the political field, particularly as regards the use to be made of capital facilities, the policy of rearmament and so on.

It is obvious that no narrow formula can be laid down for solving the problem of trade barriers in its widest implications. We shall have to depend on broad, adaptable principles. Monsieur Van Zeeland conceives of a Pact under which the various countries would undertake to do all in their power to raise the standard of life of their peoples. It would comprise first a negative part, in which the contracting parties would renounce certain practices contrary to the general interest, and secondly a positive part in which they would undertake to examine in a friendly spirit all difficulties in the path of trade. This pact would be only a prelude. It should be followed up by practical agreements, based on the work already done by the chief international organisation.

This conception might be put into practice in three stages. In the preparatory stage, representatives of the great economic Powers, and at the very least of France, Great Britain, the United States, Germany and Italy, should consider the plan in general and work out its chief practical lines. The field of discussion would then be widened. A special Bureau would invite the various countries to state what difficulties they were encountering in their international economic relations, and what assistance they considered themselves entitled to expect from other States, or were able to offer them. The Bureau would classify and collate the replies, and base a constructive programme on them. Then would come the third and last stage of the undertaking. After diplomatic overtures, pacts would be drawn up giving effect to the agreement between the various countries on the sundry

points of the programme, and signatures would be exchanged at a Conference.

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Monsieur Van Zeeland's report is certainly the work of a master hand. Never has the formidably tangled skein of economic difficulties been so skilfully unravelled, never have the requisites of an improvement in the economic atmosphere been so clearly outlined. Monsieur Van Zeeland thinks and writes as an economist. He is not fettered to any political fetish. Moreover, acting alone, he has been able to give us a report free from the half-tones, compromises, and weaknesses of matter and manner that too often mar the work of Committees and Assemblies, which must naturally take account of varying and sometimes even contradictory opinions. Accordingly his plan is the most uncompromising that has ever been put forward. Is this an advantage or a disadvantage? We can feel that Monsieur Van Zeeland was in some hesitation; in fact he admits that he went over his conclusions several times. Economic conditions have indeed undergone great changes since the three-party declaration of the autumn of 1936, and the monetary reform it brought about. The will to co-operate shown at that time has certainly weakened. Once again political difficulties darken the horizon. Moreover, the economic recovery marking the end of the slump, which was noticeable in all countries, has now ceased. Output and trade are again on the downgrade, and once more there is talk of a slump. All Governments react in the same way to such facts. They withdraw into their shell and make arrangements to depend as little as possible on anyone else. Is this really the remedy? Must we not correct this line of thought and action? Monsieur Van Zeeland rightly thought that the nearer and greater the peril, the more drastic was the remedy required, and he proposed what he conscientiously thought necessary. The doctor has had his say: now it is up to the patient to show the will to recover—and keep to the diet.

M. SUETENS.

THE LUDENDORFF MOVEMENT.

ON December 22nd, 1937, fourteen years after his first march to the Feldherrnhalle in Munich, the late General Ludendorff once again was brought to the "Steps of the Hall of Fame." *On the Way to the Feldherrnhalle* is the title of his last publication, in which he set forth his participation in the beginnings of the National Socialist Party. At these steps, during the *Putsch* of 1923, he had risked his life for the young Party, side by side with Adolf Hitler. Hitler, in the tribute which he paid to his former War Lord and then Comrade, spoke of Ludendorff as a "representative of the greatness of the German people." The personality of the General can in some ways be considered a symbol of his nation: his power of resistance during the war, his failure to master the political situation, and his flight into eccentricity after the breakdown of all he had worked and stood for. The obituaries in the British Press made many contributions to General Ludendorff's character and military career. Far less has been said on his relations to the present rulers of Germany and almost nothing about the work to which he and his wife, Frau Mathilde Ludendorff, devoted their time and energies throughout the last decade.

This work, the so-called "Ludendorff Movement," is distinguished by a character of its own among the many groups which have arisen to seek for new answers to the old religious problems of the German mind. Standing aloof from other "Nordic" and "Germanic" organisations, it has never subordinated itself to National Socialist claims, and thereby occupies a unique position in the religious and philosophical turmoil of present-day Germany. Known to-day as the *Deutsche Gotterkenntnis* (German Comprehension of the Divine), it received an accession of strength in the spring of 1937 when Hitler, after years of strained relations, once again became reconciled with Ludendorff. Why Ludendorff, after their early co-operation, had broken with him is not clear. Many reasons have been suggested, such as the difference in their social climate, the General's outspoken "liberalistic" attitude, and last but not least the influence of his wife. Ludendorff continued aloof; and when in 1935 Hitler went so far as to offer to make him Field Marshal, proposing even to visit him personally, he stood firm in his refusal. But for

Hitler's purpose the reconciliation with so distinguished a figure loomed as an urgent need. Ludendorff's position in a "co-ordinated" Germany was indeed peculiar. He alone enjoyed a certain immunity. He alone criticised in public the policy of the government, and was particularly outspoken in his views on the Spanish War. Another factor which prompted Hitler to win over so redoubtable a critic to his side was the tension caused by the Protestant Church.

It had become apparent, after Hitler's announcement in February 1937 of "Free Church Elections," that the various groups within the Opposition Church were drawing closer together. In such consolidation they might well become a stumbling block to the Government's Church policy. It therefore became imperative to disarm all possible counter-manceuvres, even if active support were out of the question. It may be rightly assumed that Ludendorff gained more from this act of "Reconciliation" than Hitler: for the alignment with Hitler made his Movement even more watertight than before against any attempts by the Propaganda Ministry at victimising the "German Comprehension of the Divine" for Nazi purposes. The ban which occasionally had been invoked against the Ludendorff Publishing House, and particularly against its periodical, *At the Holy Source of German Strength*, was now definitely lifted. The circulation of this monthly, even before it was "recognised" and without having the benefits of "compulsory" pressure for subscription, ranked highest among the numerous "Nordic" and "Germanic" magazines. By 1936 its circulation had reached 73,000 copies, whereas *Nordland*, the organ of the Nordic Faith Movement, stood second with only 21,300 copies. The Ludendorff Movement, moreover, has by now obtained the full "status of registration," along with the Roman Catholic and the German Evangelical Churches and other publicly recognised bodies.

As already indicated, a special feature of the Ludendorff Movement is the influence of a woman. This sets it apart in present-day Germany, where women for the most part have been relegated to the three "K's": *Kinder, Kirche, Kueche* (Children, Church, Kitchen). True, many women chafe under the rôle imposed on them, but occasional protests remain unheeded and, as far as the official face of Germany is concerned, men alone shape and mould it. The one striking

exception is the wife of the General. Her influence has pervaded the Ludendorff Movement especially in its definitely anti-Christian character. On her 60th birthday some months ago, the Ludendorff Publishing House presented her with a magnificent volume: *Mathilde Ludendorff: Her Work and Her Influence*, as a sign of its devotion. The foreword runs:

On the 60th birthday of the woman-philosopher, this volume is published—a work which will survive centuries and is not limited to the present day. . . . The philosophy of Mathilde Ludendorff can no longer be considered merely as a special domain of science, it is *the basic law of life itself*. It is the principle for the shaping of life—not only for the individual, but for mortal generations of an immortal nation. May this volume . . . present to the German people “The German Woman,” the greatest revolutionary of world history, who makes an old world collapse, thereby creating a new one through her vision and comprehension. . . .

However exaggerated this birthday eulogy of “The German Woman” may sound, it cannot be dismissed as a mere overstatement. For the part played by Mathilde Ludendorff in the shaping of the “German Comprehension of the Divine” is of decisive importance. In 1925, the tenth anniversary of the battle of Tannenberg, the General founded the *Tannenbergbund*, an organisation cast in a military pattern, the avowed purpose of which was to fight “supra-national powers” (*Die ueberstaatlichen Maechte*), i.e. the Jews, Freemasons, the Marxists and the Jesuits (the latter to include the whole of the Roman Catholic Church, while the Marxists were the scapegoats for the sins of Moscow). Other aims of the *Tannenbergbund* were to annihilate the Versailles Treaty and to further German militarisation.

When the Nazi Party came to power and incorporated the more influential of German organisations, the *Tannenbergbund* was prohibited after a short period of tolerance. But the less tangible aspects of its successor managed to survive and to develop into the movement known to-day as the “German Comprehension of the Divine.” This was viewed by the authorities as a more or less welcome phenomenon: it could at once be its missionary and its target. Without in the least being officially inspired, the Ludendorff Movement actually stood and fought for many of the aims which the Nazis hoped to achieve but could not officially proclaim, such

as the de-Christianisation of the nation. At the same time it could (until the "reconciliation" in April 1937) serve as a target, whenever foreign opinion made a Christian profession a political gesture.

The whole development of the Movement shows the influence of Frau Mathilde Ludendorff: it was she who transformed the militaristic organisation into a "spiritual" one; it was she who set the seal of its anti-Christian character, although it is known that the *Tannenbergbund* already proclaimed that a separation from any Church would be demanded of its members. However, for the half-educated middle class, the appeal of the *Deutsche Gotterkenntnis* lies in its so-called *rational* character rather than in its anti-Christian spirit. In this respect it differs from the more emotional and visionary type of the Germanic, Nordic and other mythical attempts at religion. The disintegration of all these "movements," moreover, is largely due to their lack of any constructive policy. In order that a policy should succeed in rallying people round a banner, something more is needed than violent attacks on Christianity, even if these attacks accord with official Nazi policy. The anti-Christianism in Mathilde Ludendorff's philosophy, radical as it may be, is incidental rather than essential. It serves the larger purpose which she has in mind: to bridge the age-old gap between science and faith, a task which, in her opinion, the Churches have entirely neglected in the past.

The *Freidenkertum* of pre-war Germany (people who viewed the universe through ratiocination, rather than faith and emotion) had drawn large sections of the middle class, as also of the proletariat, away from the Churches in the direction of a would-be scientific outlook. The Great War had swept away a large measure of this rationalism, opening once again the flood-gates to faith and religion as well as to their secularised corollary, emotionalism. This very loosening of the intellectual fabric led to a revulsion, a desire in many honest men and women, albeit insufficiently equipped scientifically, for something more clear and secure than vision and feeling. To such as these Mathilde Ludendorff's message came as a clarion call, with its emphasis on the fusion of science and metaphysics.

Philosophers, time and again, were able to catch a spark of truth. But their knowledge remained incoherent. . . . Natural

science had first to create a clear and coherent structure of knowledge concerning the world of phenomena, thus enabling philosophy, at a later stage, to fit into this structure the world of inner experience.

(From *The Vision of God in my Writings*.)

Viewing thus her mission, Frau Ludendorff feels certain that the gap hitherto left by physical science in a materially investigated universe can be filled by the knowledge of the Divine as experienced by her. Her philosophy is a strange mixture of a mystical "Gnosis" with nineteenth-century methodology of a liberal tincture. The spread of such philosophy is the more strange under a government that condemns Liberalism and silences the voice of women. Is it the element of the "Mystical Gnosis" which has been her safeguard from the State persecution? Or rather the unique position of the General within Nazi Germany?

Certain it is that what attracts her followers is the accommodation of mysticism to "knowledge." Another magnet is the spell of her style, the rhythmical form, in prose and in verse, in which she clothes her views. A typical example of her philosophy in rhythm is the poem *The Triumph of the Will to Immortality*, where she reveals her theory of man's self-consciousness, gradually reached by progressive steps through nature, as being identical with God's awakening in the universe:

In the great vital process, vaguely conscious
Organic life remains on the lowest of rungs.
But know ye!
Only one full consciousness did He create—
He created Mankind!
On the ultimate Day, when the last living man
Will be stricken by Death—then, and then only
Will the Divine again
Loose Its Vigil and Life!

Closely connected with her theory of the development of consciousness is her conception of *Self-Elevation*. She declares that a rational process of self-elevation, conceived in terms of the progressive laws of nature, is a challenge which appeals more to modern men than the Christian ideal of *Salvation*, which neither lends itself to a rational presentation nor appeals to people living under depressed and even

humiliating social conditions. *Self-Elevation*, in the circumstances, emerges as the only true path. Moreover, large circles, particularly of German middle classes, already alienated from the Church and feeling the sting of Germany's "War-guilt," were only too ready to revolt against the concept of "Sin," to view instead their individual shortcomings as steps leading up to ultimate strength.

How could your approach to God progress,
 If you were not carrying on your shoulders
 Willingly, yet intransigently,
 The heavy burden of your failures?
 (*Triumph of the Will to Immortality.*)

Whatever strictures may be levelled against the theory of Mathilde Ludendorff, both on philosophical and on Christian grounds, two things must be conceded. (1) She is aware of certain aspects of bourgeois approach to life which had been overlooked by the Churches; (2) she is fearless in her attacks on both Christianity and Dictatorship. It might be said, as regards the first, that assaults on Christianity in present-day Germany are too common to signify particular courage. But she launched her attacks long before it became a governmental policy. With regard to the latter, she stands firm in her rejection of Dictatorship and of a Totalitarian State in which all citizens are made to adapt their actions to a "Commonwealth of ants"; a state so conceived and organised can function for a time but, in her opinion, is finally doomed to spiritual death. But first and last she fights Christianity, which she accuses of having loosened the bonds between man and his environment, depriving him thus of all power of resistance against the "supernational powers" or the "sinister international forces" which are undermining the life of the German people. Together with her husband, she places Christianity first among those forces that have "pulled down all the ramparts against dictatorships," whereby the dictatorships of the Jews and the Bolsheviks are implied. In the most radical of her "works" (she always refers to her books as "works" or "creations"), in *Salvation from Jesus Christ* she describes Christianity as a "mental disease," caused by the inoculation of "occult doctrines" into the upright soul of Nordic man. In her view the only remedy for

this disease is "the return to our racial religion; the Liberation from Jesus Christ."

It is a unique phenomenon in present-day Germany that a woman should be the driving force of a large publishing house, still more that a woman should be the soul of an organisation free from State supervision, an organisation which emphasises the "self-elevation" of the individual more than its submersion in the national community. To judge from the circulation of her books (more than 500,000 copies have been issued since 1931), Frau Ludendorff occupies a most influential position; her husband called her "the Creator of the German Comprehension of the Divine." Apart from circulation or membership figures the bare fact remains that the *Deutsche Gotterkenntnis* (Ludendorff) has been given by the Government the same "public status" as the two Christian Churches. The importance of this fact should be apparent to all. It poses an urgent question to the Churches: What failures of Christian education and of Christian influence on cultural life as a whole made possible the rise of a movement which, in the face of it, can satisfy man's longing for contact with the Intangible and for knowledge of the Unknown? It is a question vital not only for the German Churches. This is the problem. What of the answer to a process of secularisation in which faith is engulfed in knowledge and God made one with the mind of man?

F. WHITELEAF.

THE REORIENTATION OF THE HEALTH SERVICES.

MORE than sixteen years ago an attempt was made in these pages to describe "The Plight of the London Hospitals" (CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August 1921), exhausted by their efforts during the Great War and faced with the difficulties of the post-war conditions. Since then there has been a continuous struggle not only in London but in many parts of the country to raise the income required to provide for the developments of medical work. The situation has been saved from disaster by the establishment of contributory schemes in accordance with the recommendations of the committee under the chairmanship of the late Lord Cave which reported in 1921. The result has been to give millions of people a direct interest in the upkeep of the hospitals and a proprietary concern for their welfare. Combined with the constant publicity in order to raise funds, these new organisations have kept the hospitals constantly in the minds of the people so that in a real sense a large portion of the population has become "hospital-minded." The educational work of this propaganda to inspire confidence in the hospital has operated against the general practitioner maintaining his place in the community as friend as well as medical adviser of his patients. Moreover, it has disseminated information about sickness and disease, and the general effect has been to create a non-healthy state of mind.

The group of workers known as P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning) in their latest report, dealing with the British Health Services, have endeavoured to provide a corrective by insisting that health means more than not being ill and that a policy must be formulated with a constructive aim. In more than four hundred pages the group have provided a comprehensive survey of the numerous services which have a bearing upon the health of the people. In the space available it is impossible to attempt even to summarise such an encyclopædic work of reference upon so vast a subject. It may be convenient to present some of the salient points by considering the welfare of a typical individual in an urban area, as the health services are not in operation to the same extent in the country.

The majority of confinements still take place at home under

a variety of conditions, of which the most usual in England and Wales is that there is a midwife in charge who calls in a doctor if necessary. There is, however, at present a marked tendency to enter institutions for the confinement. In the reorganisation of the maternity service in progress in Great Britain it is noticeable that the arrangements in Scotland are more sound in principle than those in England. Ante-natal supervision is the work of a doctor, and this is the first point at which the general practitioner does not occupy his rightful position. Even if the confinement is to take place at home a large proportion—in London in 1935 73 per cent. of expectant mothers—of those who receive systematic ante-natal supervision go to a clinic for it. One of the remarkable features about the increased attention given to the care of expectant mothers in recent years is that it seems to have had little effect. "While death rates from nearly every other cause have been steadily falling, there has until very recently been a slight but definite upward trend in the maternal mortality rate for many years" (p. 91). Much press publicity on the subject has had a bad effect. Rarely is there seen such a simple straightforward statement as is contained in this report: "The risk of child-birth is not high. There is one maternal death to about 260 live births." Even more remarkable is the figure relating to the babies. "Surprisingly little improvement," observes the report, "has occurred in the death rate of very young babies. In 1906-10, out of every 1,000 born 11.6 died within a day. In 1935 the figure was 10.7" (p. 370). The rate during the second week has fallen steadily, while the rate from two to four weeks has fallen continuously during the century and has been halved, but the greatest improvement has occurred at ages over one month, where the rate has been reduced by 60-70 per cent. Taking a broader view of the situation it is clear that this body of progressive thinkers, who cannot possibly be charged with possessing retrograde views, are in favour of reforming the conditions of the past rather than developing along the lines of recent activities. It may be a sentimental idea, but it is also an actual fact that the child born in a hospital is not born into a family in the same way as a child born at home, even if it be a crowded one. The restoration of family life is one of the keys to healthy living for all the members of it. Like all students of the subject, P.E.P. welcomes cordially the work of the Pioneer

Health Centre at Peckham, where family membership is a vitally important part.

The expectant mother, the babe, the growing child and even the adult are all in need of one commodity, milk, to improve the standard of nutrition and so assist to raise the standard of bodily health. The detailed criticism of the present anomalous position should be studied by anyone concerned to remedy the existing state of affairs, which is deplorable. In the practical proposals for increasing the consumption special reference is made to the children between one and five years old. "Many children," it is declared, "have sustained irreparable physical harm before ever they set foot in school" (p. 335). An adequate supply of milk would be one of the most important contributions to a satisfactory nutrition policy which in itself would provide an essential preventive and constructive health service. "Probably therefore," this section of the report concludes, "a nutrition policy should have a prior claim on any funds available for extending the health services" (p. 337).

At the age of two the child ceases to be a patient in the maternity and child welfare centre and enters a period of life for which there is no comprehensive scheme of medical supervision. The problem is described by the P.E.P. as "urgent," and the remedy under the existing arrangements appears to lie with the local authorities. Accordingly, stimulated by a circular from the Ministry of Health, local authorities have established toddlers' clinics which are similar to the maternity and child welfare clinics. Their main advantage is said by the report to be "to enable the children to secure extra nourishment" (p. 116). Connected with this age period between the years two and five is a special problem of accidents which account for 10.5 per cent. of all deaths between those ages as compared with 3 per cent. at all ages. It is true that the death rate from accidents during those years has fallen by 33 per cent. since 1913, but mortality as a whole fell by 56 per cent. in the same period, so that accidents now loom larger amongst the causes of death. In addition, accidents must also account for a large amount of disability and ill-health. Many of them constitute a portion of the pathetic body of cripples whose condition as a general rule is preventable. The increased knowledge of the best methods of dealing with cripples is one of the few acceptable legacies of the war.

Since then there has been a great increase of facilities of all kinds for their rehabilitation and treatment. In that connection the names of Sir Robert Jones and Dame Agnes Hunt will always be remembered as pioneers and are preserved in association in the remarkable Orthopædic Hospital at Oswestry in Shropshire. In 1919 the Central Committee (now Council) for the Care of Cripples was established, and the organisation of local clinics around that hospital has been followed as the model. The work has enlisted the co-operation of local authorities with voluntary associations to a degree which shows that the two forms of social service can form one effective combination. The Central Council, aided by one of Lord Nuffield's munificent gifts, is now engaged in extending the organisation throughout the country. Although much has been accomplished during the last fifteen years there are many large districts which are lacking even in facilities for treatment, with neither orthopædic hospital nor clinics, and even in the more advanced areas there are generally certain branches of the work still remaining to be undertaken. Details of the institutions available are contained in the *Directory* issued by the Council, and particulars of how the work is carried out are contained in their recently published admirable *Handbook*. Nevertheless, perhaps there is no sphere in which a reorientation is more necessary, since no one can placidly contemplate a large organisation spending considerable sums in dealing with conditions which, speaking generally, should not exist at all in a healthy community caring adequately for the welfare of the rising generation.

At the age of five the child comes under the supervision of the school medical service administered by the Board of Education by delegation from the Ministry of Health. All the children in elementary schools are medically inspected at least once in their first year at school, and then at the ages of eight and twelve. Local authorities must also provide for the medical treatment of children in secondary schools, for which they are directly responsible, and they may arrange for it in other schools. They need not, however, as they must do in elementary schools, provide for the medical treatment of children under their care. When the defects have been ascertained the extent to which they are remedied largely depends upon the efficiency of the care committees who supervise the general welfare of school children. The judgment of the P.E.P.

Report is that the foundations of a school medical service "have been well laid," but "economy is undoubtedly cramping" (p. 123) its development. "Moreover, while the children are under the supervision of the school service they may not necessarily have a family doctor" (p. 126). The improvement of either or all of the three services available for the child up to the time of leaving school cannot be "an adequate substitute for the institution of an efficient panel doctor service for the dependents of insured persons and others." It is much to be desired that in any measures taken to carry this proposal into effect an early opportunity will be taken to get rid of the description "panel doctor." The aim is to establish a family doctor service and there is no particular reason why it should be known by any other name.

The adolescent is particularly susceptible to prejudice against any form of attention which seems to be imposed on him. Medical men who freely give their services to boys' and girls' clubs know the difficulty of gaining their confidence so that advice on matters of health is acceptable. Moreover, the fact that the service of a panel doctor is received through a compulsory deduction from their wages when they become wage-earners is sufficient to cause resentment. Even at the age at which the adult has been admitted hitherto to national health insurance, and for some years after, the prejudice against the panel doctor leads many to resort to the doctor known to their parents with whom they have had some association in earlier years. Confidence in the medical adviser is a primary essential, and it is that which leads so many to the hospital with an established reputation. The extreme example is the man, by no means uncommon, who is willing to pay a fee in the hospital but resents the suggestion that he should have the consultation as a private patient in the medical man's own consulting-room. The P.E.P. Report quotes with approval the report of the Committee on the Scottish Health Services which summed up the rôle of the general practitioner in the following words: "The general practitioner acting normally as family health adviser, is an indispensable instrument of national health policy," and they added: "without his assistance as health adviser and as a principal *liaison* between the homes of the people and the statutory medical services, these services cannot in modern conditions function to the full extent as part of a comprehensive policy for

promoting and safeguarding the health of the people." There is too much ignorant criticism of the general practitioner, and the informative description of his difficulties in the P.E.P. Report contains material which deserves to be widely disseminated, although they appreciate that there is no cut-and-dried solution of the problem involved in enabling him to be a preserver of health as well as a curer of disease. In this connection it is worth while to note that the Pioneer Health Centre is concerned wholly with the former and does not seek to act in the latter capacity. The P.E.P. Report does not attempt to make any detailed proposals for the solution of the difficulty which it so ably explains, but contents itself with saying: "it seems likely that the position of general practitioners could be very much strengthened and public confidence in them fully restored, if they could evolve some acceptable system of working in local groups from well-equipped central dispensaries." Here again this body of progressive thinkers are advocating the reform of something old rather than the establishment of a new agency, for dispensaries manned by general practitioners preceded as a general rule the foundation of hospitals.

The proposals contained in the P.E.P. Report owe much to the *International Studies* of Sir Arthur Newsholme, summed up in *Medicine and the State*, surveying the relation between the private and official practice of medicine with special reference to public health. There is an impression in the minds of a good many people that in continental countries where the State takes a large part in the organisation of the medical service the result is more efficient. The evidence provided by Sir Arthur Newsholme's researches does not support this opinion. Having enumerated the desiderata of a good general medical service in which private and public and quasi-public medical facilities would be efficiently related, he finds that existing arrangements in most countries show in an unfavourable light. In Denmark and to some extent in Norway and Sweden the general medical service for the poorer people, and especially the very complete hospital arrangements and midwifery service, "call for imitation in many respects. In Germany, while much high-class work is being done, there is even more confusion between various services than in Britain. . . . In Central and Eastern Europe there are overgrown poly-clinics, including special treatment centres

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for the insured very unsatisfactorily related to the domiciliary treatment given by insurance practitioners." In nearly all of them the position of the general practitioner is a matter of some concern, and that is particularly true of the United States where the introduction of health insurance and the extension of contributory schemes have in recent years stimulated special consideration of the problem.

The Rockefeller Foundation with the means and organisation to make a world-wide survey of the requirements to improve the health of the people has been satisfied that modern conditions require far more attention to be given to mental health. The P.E.P. Report devotes a section to the subject though the stage which has been reached only justifies its inclusion among "experimental services." It was "the moral and mental upheaval of the War" which "brought these new studies of the human mind to the fore." The repercussions of mental events on health have gradually come to be realised by doctors to be more important. This importance has perhaps been more apparent because of the weakening, through the onset of specialism, of the family doctor, who dealt almost unconsciously with the whole "personality." The neuroses are social diseases which are to be found quite as much in relation to school or home environment as in industrial life. The investigations of the Industrial Health Research Board have discovered that 75 per cent. of the factory accidents generally occur among 25 per cent. of the employees. Thus there are evidently many people suffering from mental ill-health which is never diagnosed. The conclusion is obvious "that more should be known about them, and that preventive and curative measures should be taken wherever it is possible. More knowledge is perhaps the chief requisite at the moment." Accordingly the General Medical Council have ordained that from the beginning of this year instruction in "the elements of normal psychology" shall be included in the medical curriculum so that once again the family doctor shall have the knowledge to deal with developments of the conditions which formerly could be treated by his sympathetic understanding of human nature.

In all the various health services voluntary authorities and local authorities contribute in a greater or less degree. The position of the voluntary hospitals accordingly takes its place in a consideration of the main problems of their respective

spheres. The conclusion of the report is "that one of the most crucial problems of co-ordination which remains to be solved is the relationship between voluntary health services on the one hand, and state and local authority's services on the other." But they decline to provide any cut-and-dried solution. In fact they do not even make the attempt. "It is impossible to say what are to be the future spheres of the voluntary and public services, both of which are now so rapidly expanding. We can, however, say quite definitely," they add, "that both are likely to be necessary for as far ahead as it is possible to look and that both, therefore, must be made more efficient in discharging their respective functions and in co-operating with one another." To many people it may seem to be a disappointing conclusion that there are too many unknown factors in the present situation for any but a policy of *festina lente* to be a sound one. One of the immediate needs is an adequate supply of nurses, and to that the Ministry of Health and the Board of Education are directing their attention through Lord Athlone's Committee. But even that one item is going to occupy some time, and others which have almost as direct a bearing on the main problem are looming ahead. In the meantime it is as a comprehensive statement of all the aspects of a subject of vital importance to the nation that this report is invaluable to all concerned.

C. E. A. BEDWELL.

THE RHYTHM OF LIGHT.

WHEN the theatre realised that all that is necessary to alter the emotional quality of a scene is to change the angle and intensity of light, it took over a lesson from Nature. It is light, the eternal scene-shifter, that makes the drama of landscape, for it is light, more than any other external influence, that determines our mood. Our response to it is now consciously æsthetic, but fundamentally it is an organic response, an inheritance from our vast photogenic and phototropic past, when all life, vegetable and animal, was completely dependent on solar light and heat. The minutes and seconds into which, for our convenience, we have arbitrarily split physical time, are fictitious divisions—children and savages seem unaware of them—but solar time is biological time; its daily and yearly natural rhythms of darkness and light, of warmth and cold, like the lunar cycle, are embodied in us, impressed on the very stuff of which we are made. In spite of our rapid pulses and the small circuit of our blood, a pre-natal cord, the cord of an association beginning æons before the birth of man, attaches us to Earth's giant heart that beats but twice a year, in the intake and out-sending, the systole of autumn, the diastole of spring. With them we still are synchronised.

The fingers of light grope deep into things fluid and solid, into water and soil; not only the hot fingers of sunlight, but the cold fingers of the moon; the oyster in its shell waxes and wanes with the tides, and French peasants believe that the juices in the grape's tiny sphere swell to the pull of the full moon. Shelley was thrilled by the thought that vegetation at the bottom of lakes and rivers, and along sea coasts, "the sapless foliage of ocean," never exposed to direct sunlight, undergoes its own obscure autumnal change. There was something mysterious to him in the fact, of which the only explanation seems to be the persistence of biological habit. And though modern inventions have rendered us in so many ways independent of the seasons, far down in our subconscious depths, in that ancient sea-water blood of ours, we still fluctuate with them, and they alter our physical constitution and our mental moods.

It is from the two dynamic seasons that poetry receives its impulse. Summer and winter may have a few occasional

singers, but autumn and spring have inspired the great body of verse. The inspiration of the Renaissance was vernal ; the Elizabethan Age was ringing with spring song. Since then an autumnal mood has slowly gained on English poetry. This is with the growing melancholy and disillusionment of men's thoughts, but there are climatic reasons why with English poets autumn should be the favourite season. Spring in our climate holds too many disappointments, too much hope deferred. As early as February one becomes aware of the polar shift, but as the light lengthens the cold strengthens ; it is an orphaned light without sunshine, and our long expectancy suffers repeated checks and setbacks. The northern world is called too long before it is time to get up, and if it does get up it encounters " the dry And blackening east that so embitters March." The bridal trees stand waiting at the altar for a spring that does not come. Farther south the change of season, like the change from day to night, takes place more suddenly, all at once. We scarcely know what invisible heralds first apprise us that the procession has started and spring comes slowly up this way. But in the slow increase, as in the gradual decrease, there is the compensation that light runs through a whole scale of subtle gradations lost in direct vertical rays. And our emotional response is correspondingly sensitive and prolonged. In countries where summer overstays, which are parched and exhausted by excess of sunshine, it is impossible that the moment when we first feel that summer is leaving us should have the same poignancy. For hardly have our skies been filled to the zenith with sunshine before the withdrawal begins. In August the light already slants on the ripening corn, the shadows of the trees fall differently, the clouds come down and stand in shining masses on the edges of the fields, motionless, or if they move it is like Wordsworth's cloud " that moveth all together if it move at all." It is then we have the first intimation of parting, of coming loss ; the light is valedictory. It is then we feel, with Emily Dickinson, though she is speaking of some revelatory touch on the face of a winter landscape :

When it comes the landscape listens,
Shadows hold their breath ;
When it goes 'tis like the distance
On the look of death.

Even in England on hot midsummer days we know something of the intensity of light that blinds and extinguishes colour instead of evoking it, but with a lessened intensity, a more oblique angle, a more saturate atmosphere, the colours of landscape in all their relative values, emerge—the inner luminousness of things, “the harmony and lustre in the sky, That through the summer is not heard nor seen.” Surely the recollection behind those words is of English skies when from midday on the clouds are rosed and nacrous, the light has the pensive slant of afternoon, a long afternoon, beginning in August, and ending in October with the turning of the leaves.

That turning also is gradual. There is no such conflagration of colour as that which sweeps whole mountain-sides in North America, for instance, where the trees are caught by frost with all their sap up in their veins; English woodlands die no such sudden, violent, and, as it were, intestate death; they have first slowly given back all that was essential of their lives to the life of the tree. The analogy of “that troubling symbol,” as Hilaire Belloc calls it, has haunted human imagination, no doubt for ages before Homer said: “As the generation of leaves, so is that of men.” And the deeper our knowledge of the process goes, the more complete becomes analogy between the biochemical changes in vegetable and human metabolism through which both fall into the sere and yellow leaf. Shakespeare saw it in part, but (Darwin not yet having written his pamphlet on Earthworms) he may not have suspected how the last term of all is fulfilled on some moist lawn in October or November, when the fallen leaf is drawn down into its little grave for worms to devour it. Palestine was a pastoral and treeless country, and there in the lament over man’s mortality he is likened to the flower that withereth, and the grass that is cut down. Shelley’s “pestilence stricken multitudes” is probably the most dramatic simile of the leaf—one might say melodramatic—in literature, but it is a thought too morbid. Elsewhere he has a lovelier line, reminding us of the many things modern life has lost, for what city-dweller now can hear “the autumnal leaves like light footfalls, Of spirits passing through the streets”?

Shelley had an autumnal mind; he is the greatest celebrant of the west wind, the “breath of autumn’s being,” but the prevailing wind in poetry generally seems to come from the west. No poet of the British Isles would ask the east wind to

make him its lyre, except in a facetious sense. Charles Kingsley once wrote some robust verses in praise of the north-east blast, but years afterward, when a friend met him shivering in the streets of Cambridge with his coat collar turned up, he recanted: "I was young and foolish, then." In Caliban's island, unexpectedly, the south-west is the curse: "a south-west blow on ye, and blister you all over." But the boisterous south-wester was beloved of George Meredith; his spirit rises to it exultantly, not only in the poem of that name, but again and again, in poem after poem, he is intoxicated by the sound of wind in trees. He knew the dryad voices well, as he says, "Discerned them as the leaves took flight," distinguishing each separate instrument, aspen and beech, and the "bull-voiced oak," the violoncello, the great bull-fiddle of the forest orchestra. The Bacchic season, with its timbrels and its ecstasy, stirred his blood, yet nowhere in English verse does one hear so perfectly the deep, undiminished midsummer swell of the woodland wave as it comes over valley and hill in the woods of Westermains:

Like the voice of Time, as slow,
The voice of Life, as grave,
The voice of Death, as still.

Between the andante summer movement and the stormy autumn climax occurs an intermezzo, a transition audible only to the most delicate ear; though no leaves have fallen, or even crisped, as far as the eye can perceive, they speak with a thinner sibillation, with drier tongues. It is audible even in the undeciduous pines whose tall masts receive on the points of countless fine aerials the first broadcast of change, "a loftier stress of mournfulness." And that first change in the quality of the sound, like the first change in the quality of the light, because it is so slight, is strangely disturbing. It is the premonition, the whisper of farewell: change too subtle yet to be tonic, without the dynamic stimulus of change. Active change always appeals to the restless human spirit; we must follow the colours when they are really on the march, and the music pipes to us. "With the great gale I journey," sings the Shropshire Lad. He does not say from what quarter, but we know, because it is thronged with the dancing leaflets whirled "From all the woods that autumn Bereaves in all the world." For Shelley's immaterial spirit it was easy to be lifted above

this earth like the leaf that he invokes, but the feet of Housman's buoyant poem touch the ground; its rhythm is the rhythm of marching muscle and blood, a physical exultation, as Shelley's is a spiritual exaltation.

No doubt the revolutionary in Shelley was sympathetic to change, "The high year's flaunting crown, Shattered and trampled down," the promise of the coming generations, the new leaves pushing out the old. But Keats's great ode to Autumn is still as one of those September mornings on which the spiders spin their webs; still as that pause of breathless consummation, the golden age of the year, when the world rests on its garnered achievement. Even those who have not sown or reaped or contributed a stroke towards it, share in the sense of fulfilment. The symbol is not yet troubling; only a yellow leaf falls here and there to a silent touch. The soil is warmed through; warmth radiates from below, as it falls from above. Everything basks: the cats on the doorsteps; the swallows on the roofs of barns, gathering strength in their wings for that morning when we shall suddenly miss something and look up to feel the emptiness their going has left at the very top of English skies; the earth lies idle in the sun, a haze of dreaminess, cobwebs of sleepiness across her eyes. If there is one last output of growth it is quite effortless, without root or stem, a mere stirring of the soil where little fleshy mushrooms push up their paps; as effortless as the last flowering of Alpine pastures covered with the violet shadow of autumn crocus, its goblets of Venetian glass blown immediately out of the ground by summer's parting breath.

As we warm ourselves in the weaker rays, and watch the downward drift "green-golden, orange, vermilion, golden and brown" that strews the ground with the colours of old Persian rugs, it is no wonder the sight comes home to us and we feel a touch of inward frost. We know the whole great spread of foliage was only to trap the sunshine, and if the machinery is now scrapped and the chlorophyl factories close down, it is because the motor power is gone. In the words of the physicist: "The chemical electrical system which forms the fundamental mechanism of life in the last resort simply uses the energy of sunlight, stored in the free oxygen of the air, for building from it the body of life; and there is thus the closest connection between sunlight and life structures."

M. A. KINROSS.

WHITE WINGS.

THE natural history of the ocean bird opens upon an æsthetic note. Romance is inseparable from its habitat, the wild symphony of its cry, and the unending pageantry provided by white-winged hosts in perpetual motion. Indeed, the poem of marine avifauna might aptly be regarded as Nature's masterpiece, combining the grandeur of storm-swept seas and mighty precipices with the beauty of living creatures that utilise the tempest as a means of displaying their grace and prowess, and the sombre cliffs, not only as a background for their evolutions, but also for the gentler side of their existence—a setting for an attractive home life and an appropriate, though austere nursery for their young.

Regarded as a group, sea-fowl are eminently picturesque, and nowhere throughout the animal kingdom is the great living colour scheme displayed to better advantage. It is, of course, only consistent with natural law that breasts perpetually lathered by the cream of the breakers should be snowy white, and that the plumage of the deep-diving cormorant should assimilate with the green water-weeds and the dark rocks among which this somewhat gloomy bird rests and breeds. The wonder of individual conformation and colouring lies rather in the whimsicality, if one may use the expression, so freely displayed. There is no apparent necessity for the puffin's quaint shape, the oyster-catcher's orange bill, nor for the varied characteristics which serve to identify each member of the extensive *Gaviæ* order. The most imaginative ornithologist could advance no convincing reason why the gannet's ivory wings should be black-tipped; why the black-headed gull should have acquired red legs, the kittiwake black, the common gull green, and even more baffling are the differences of habit, often slight, yet sufficing to keep each species distinct and apart.

Of all the sea-fowl perennially numerous upon our English coasts, the great black-backed and the herring gull have most in common. They do not evince that marked tendency to draw aloof which is noticeable when either of these species shares a feeding-ground with other ocean birds. Now and again one sees a few black-headed gulls sprinkled amongst a flock of their larger congeners, but as a rule the birds of a feather conform to proverb. I recently witnessed an interesting

example of this in Whitby Harbour. Upon one side of a breakwater a large dark-capped flock could be seen rising and dipping ceaselessly over the waves. Beyond the wall lay a vast flotilla of herring gulls with a few black-backed giants conspicuous among them, the circumstance serving to illustrate yet another point of distinction. The black-headed gull seldom rides the waves, nor is he content to remain for long quietly afloat like his larger relatives, for he possesses a more restless soul in keeping with his brighter attire.

Indeed the black-headed, or brown-headed gull as he is sometimes more aptly termed, might almost be regarded as providing a link between the larger gulls and the terns towards which he inclines in many respects. He mingles more readily with terns than with his nearer relations, but lacks the buoyant rambling flight of the "sea-swallows," nor can he dive, although his quick descent to the water's level at times almost suggests a tern. This apparent holding aloof of one species from another is, of course, partly due to different feeding habits. The main store of the coast-line is claimed by all sea-birds alike, but the larger kinds naturally require the more substantial commodities, and forgather where such supplies can be obtained. It is this greater need which renders the herring gull and his black-backed cousin more carnivorous. It also constitutes their inestimable value as scavengers, although in theory such a rôle seems inconsistent with the poetry of sea-bird history.

Apart from this, however, the black-backed and herring gulls seem closely akin. They habitually rest in company, and when in autumn the young black-backed first appear upon the Yorkshire coast (where the species seldom breeds), preceding their parents by a week or two, they attach themselves to the herring gulls, upon whose hospitality they make immediate demands. Conspicuous in their immature plumage, these huge youngsters approach their hosts confidently, and, bowing with unwearying persistence, claim the food which they pretend to be incapable of procuring for themselves. Odd as it may seem, the herring gulls feed them, producing a meal by the simple process of regurgitation, as though the young impostors were their own fledglings. Later, the adults of each species dine in company, and I have seen them engaged in the grim task of demolishing the carcase of a sheep adrift upon the waves, a black-backed giant firmly perched upon the

gruesome raft while the herring gulls flitted around and secured any morsels that were available.

Yet between these kindred species there are the inevitable slight distinctions of habit, for while the herring gull almost invariably nests upon the sheer face of a precipice, the black-back adheres, when possible, to the grassy summit of some sea-encircled rock or islet, and in his breeding habits generally is less gregarious, preferring his own little castle, or at least a pinnacle to himself.

Definite distinctions when upon the wing may also be noted. The actual flight in each case is much the same, differing only in scale. The great black-backed gull is a beautiful aeronaut. Although possessing the span of an eagle, he has lost nothing of the herring gull's peerless grace. The wing curvature, being virtually identical, permits the same serene and placid sailing, and when the big birds are upon the move, one may witness those interminable slow processions which are equally characteristic of the herring gull. I recently counted two hundred and thirty-four passing over a Yorkshire headland at half-minute intervals. One does not, however, see flocks of black-backs indulging in prolonged wheelings and circlings after the manner of the inferior species. At migration time they rest in considerable flocks upon rocky flats or seaweed expanses exposed by the receding tide. Upon the wild stretch of coast north of Robin Hood's Bay I have observed imposing armies of these huge sea pirates grouped about in companies numbering from twenty to two hundred. If flushed, however, they take deliberate and stately wing to some quieter point without lingering for protest or evolutionary display, as though considering such procedure beneath their dignity.

An immense company of these gigantic fowl in motion can scarcely fail to provide an imposing spectacle, but apart from the commotion of their snowy wings when first they mount, very little sound accompanies the exhibition. Beyond an occasional raucous scream, or a cackling, deep-throated "laugh," the great black-backed gull is mainly silent. He has no wailing note, and his voice entirely lacks the ocean bird's customary plaint. This is only characteristic, since amongst sea-fowl as in all feathered life, size, with a few exceptions, tends to silence. The larger gulls, again, are wilder in the main. Being less common upon the inhabited coasts

than their congeners, they have not as yet acquired much confidence in *homo sapiens* or his benevolent intentions. Curiously enough, like many similar birds, they are less timid of crowds than of individuals. One may see several big fellows drifting fearlessly about among the ships in a populous harbour, but a great black-backed gull never remains perched upon a remote cliff-top to permit close inspection by a solitary human being—a position that would disturb a herring gull very little. Nor can one imagine his distinguished presence among the gulls and daws—that heterogeneous band of hope—which frequently gather around a picnic party on a beach. He would seem as completely out of place as would a raven upon such an occasion. Possibly he will acquire the necessary degree of boldness if he continues to increase. Upon the shores of Nova Scotia where ravens are abundant, even these wary birds have been coaxed into a state of astonishing tameness, and one may yet see the great black-backed gull soliciting contributions from the hands of man as confidently as the common birds of the shore.

Few of our avifauna are more confiding than the gull family as a whole—these wild yet strangely friendly creatures which by nature inhabit the places over which man has no control. My earliest impressions of black-headed gulls were obtained by watching them come to feed at a window in Grosvenor Road, and as for the larger and less popular herring gull, no species can prove more entertaining if encouraged. He is one of the most individualised of the feathered race. In Cornwall a year or two ago, my wife and I were attended upon cliff walks by a knowing old reprobate who followed as attentively as a dog, although for a different reason, his porcelain wings drifting him slowly along about twenty feet overhead, and keeping pace with inexhaustible patience until a halt for lunch was eventually made. Then he would drop to the ground near by, and his descent would be the signal for a number of his confederates to appear from an apparently empty sky- and sea-scape and assemble around. Upon one occasion we had forty-three within a radius of a few yards.

One can always derive amusement from watching sea-birds feeding. Irrespective of species, they are so unashamedly greedy. Nobody pretends to have any interests other than his own, and yet at times they co-operate unwittingly. I have watched four great black-backed gulls trying to wrest a meal

from a huge piece of floating offal. Each bird, fearing that another might secure the best share, strove to obtain a hold as near to the next tugging beak as possible. Thus, they all pulled in a row and merely towed the meat about without detaching any. At last it occurred to one that, the tactics being obviously unprofitable, he might forestall the others by attacking from the opposite side. This he did, with marked success for all concerned, until the rest followed his example. If one bird secures a hunch which he cannot swallow at a gulp, he is immediately called upon to share it with less successful competitors—a natural dispensation which, though not always appreciated, is doubtless beneficial to the digestion. The temporary possessor takes flight with his plunder, assiduously pursued by as many of his companions as hope to benefit, and the chase which ensues frequently develops into an astonishing exhibition of aerial agility and speed. One has seen a Sandwich tern endeavouring to escape to a sand-bank with a fish that was too big for immediate disposal, chased over the sea by a contingent of its fellows, the feathered sprites glancing and dipping with a celerity that the eye could scarcely follow. In this "hunt" one or two herring gulls participated, and it is not unusual to see jackdaws and gulls hot in the combined pursuit of a single bird with a well-loaded beak.

Upon such occasions all "caste" distinctions are set aside. Whatever its species, the fortunate individual—if it can so be considered—becomes "he" for the time being—everybody's game. In the feathered world there is no sense of ownership in the matter of provender. Food belongs to anyone who can secure it, and when it is wrested from him, the deprived creature always appears to take the loss in good part. There is no sulking among wild creatures from whose unconscious philosophy humanity has much to learn.

It is matter for wonder that the gull with his highly developed personality and close association with mankind has not figured more conspicuously in fable and mythology. Apart from the ancient superstition that each snow-white body encases a spirit that once was human, the sea-bird is seldom encountered even in folk-lore. Kipling, with his flair for fantastic fiction, might have supplemented the *Just So Stories* with an account of the reason for the black-headed gull's emigration to inland pools at nesting-time. Actually, this departure from sea-bird procedure constitutes an interesting

example of wild-life distribution, which also in this case brings the black-headed gull a definite step nearer to the terns.

It would almost seem as though Nature, realising the wealth of avian life lavished upon the shore at this season, had deliberately extended the pageantry to waters which otherwise lack a decorative summer population. One can only regret the limited number of these attractive colonies, to which the birds adhere most tenaciously when once adopted. The selection of the place in the first instance is frequently unaccountable. Quiet and extensive sheets of water may be overlooked in favour of pools which appear to possess few advantages. Neither feeding facilities for the young nor space over which to test their newly found wings are taken into account. The gulls have their own standards of desirability, and at times one cannot but approve their choice.

A picturesque settlement contrives to exist, despite disturbance and wholesale depredations, upon the Sneeton High Moor, within dangerous proximity of the main road between Scarborough and Whitby. Here upon an early summer day, when the upland air vibrates with the curlew's trill, every means of approach to the heather-encircled mere which the gulls have appropriated is patrolled by white-winged sentinels whose harsh, challenging scream sets in motion a veritable snow-storm of birds whirling and sweeping across the dark background of moor and pine, while innumerable voices raised in clamorous protest create a babel even more bewildering.

The cry of the black-head is a singular blending between the notes of the tern and the herring gull. Most closely resembling the former, although harsher, it is more querulous than mournful, and is suggestive of the bird's impatient nature. As long as an intruder remains in *motion*, even at a considerable distance from the pond, the outcry continues. The gulls do not resent the proximity of man, however, provided he remains still, preferably sitting or lying in the heather. One may walk to the water's brink with the living whirlwind clouding the air above in a manner which suggests that the tumult of wing and voice will never subside until the supposed enemy has definitely withdrawn. The moment one sits down, however, the tension perceptibly lessens. The deliriously swooping, sweeping, screaming gulls slacken their wild gyrations. The frenzied circlings evince a marked waterward tendency, and though now and again an individual detaches

himself from the flock and hurtles over the stranger's head with a menacing scream, the clamour rapidly abates. It continues, indeed, for a while, but it has assumed an entirely different tone, perceptible even to a human ear, as though the birds were assuring one another that the alarm had been unjustified, and within a surprisingly short space of time the whole flock resettles. Mothers return to their young, brooding birds to their eggs, while the gentlemen of the community withdraw to the patches of bare turf in the vicinity where a conspicuous litter of white feathers, sprinkling the sward like bog-cotton, bear testimony to their frequent for-gatherings.

These quaint assemblies—obviously open to “men only”—are habitual among gulls of all species. The males, apparently, escape from the nursery atmosphere with its demands and responsibilities in a comically human manner, and the groups inevitably suggest smoking parties. Very effective they look, outlined against the greenery, also very comfortable and decidedly care-free. Sea-birds are fond of resting upon land, and will frequently sit for long periods upon grass or among young green corn, even during hot, still weather, when a human being would experience a craving for the water.

The hen black-heads, meanwhile, collect upon the little rushy islands where they are joined by the young which always take to the water when a general alarm is raised. Here a considerable assortment takes place, the chicks bowing respectfully to all adults until they find their mothers and receive rations. There are few prettier sights in the animal kingdom than that of a gull feeding its nestlings. In this respect the herring gull particularly excels. The great stately bird displays such infinite patience and gentleness as she bends towards the chicks, lowering the beak which can prove so formidable and cruel a weapon but which is now filled with the warm food stored in her body for the purpose. Her entire attitude is so solicitous. She is so careful that each little one receives its meal without flurry or discomfort, as though to indicate that the entire proceeding is a labour of love, which it certainly seems to be.

The black-headed gull, perhaps, lacks that indefinable suggestion of graciousness, but much of the charm is there as the chicks—mere downy oddities, but little gulls from bill-tips to paddlers—gather round, each awaiting his turn with

less patience than the mother displays. A few adults which have no young to feed swim about, their gliding motion and somewhat odd poise on the water suggesting paper boats, the long necks serving as funnels. These are probably hen birds whose broods came to grief, as sometimes happens with the earliest hatchings, but although lacking individual duties, these bereaved mothers linger instinctively in the neighbourhood of the nurseries.

All is peace until once again the watcher, to whose presence little attention has been paid, is obliged to move. Then instant pandemonium breaks forth anew. The white storm re-erupts after the manner of an old-fashioned snow-globe, when shaken; the chicks swim out in little dark flotillas to the deepest parts of the pool, and the domestic picture becomes once more a scene of indescribable confusion.

Yet scarcely confusion, for like the entwining ropes around the maypole, each wildly wheeling bird becomes a unit in a vast intricate pattern, maintaining its own place and level in the feathered whirlwind which, for all its cyclonic flurry, rotates like clockwork and without collision. A flock of gulls at such a time is not characterised by the unanimity of motion which impels each turn of wild duck or plover a-wing. The exhibition, though lacking the same mechanical grace, is more complicated, and therefore the more wonderful to witness. Every pair of sharp wings cuts its own pattern which, none the less, seems to be identical and to correspond with those of others in one complete bewildering figure, flight above flight, evolution within evolution.

The beauty of a sea-bird's flight is not displayed to the best advantage, however, in mass exhibition. Upon such occasions, as when the almost incredibly numerous gannet host arises from the slopes of Grassholm, the birds cannot be seen for the flock. Far more beautiful, though less impressive, is the sailing course of a lone gannet over the sea's deep blue, describing its stately snowy curves above the tumbling porpoise school, beneath which the mackerel shoal is visible. The headlong plunge of that single bird, piercing the seascape with a shaft of white light, is as spectacular as anything in Nature's pageant, where comparison, after all, is out of place, since everything is relative.

DOUGLAS GORDON.

UNIQUE TREASURES OF THE KING.

AMONG English royalties three men stand out as being principally responsible for the superb collection of art treasures belonging to the Crown which is housed mainly within Buckingham Palace, Windsor Castle, and Hampton Court. The first, Charles I, was a great connoisseur and a born collector. His unique gallery of priceless masterpieces was broken up and sold by the Commonwealth, but a proportion of it was reassembled at Whitehall after the Restoration. The Prince Regent, afterwards George IV, spent money on art with a prodigal hand, and to him we owe the exceedingly comprehensive gathering of masters of the Dutch School which form the main strength of the Buckingham Palace Gallery. Here the fortunate visitor (it is not open to the public) can regale himself upon a feast of paintings that are literally priceless, such as Rembrandt's self-portrait and his *Shipbuilder and his Wife*; the exquisite Vermeer *Young Lady at the Virginals*; two great works by Frans Hals; the Metsus, De Hooches, Cuyps, Van Dycks, to mention only a few great names. The third royal art patron was the Prince Consort, who interested himself in quite a different field, and would no doubt be surprised to observe how highly valued to-day are his then modest purchases. It was to the Italian and German Primitives that Prince Albert looked.

There is in Buckingham Palace a tiny room called the Royal Closet which has a greater fascination than any of the magnificent chambers of State. It is the room where the Royal Family assemble before a State procession is formed on the occasion of an Evening Court or a Ball, and its presence is entirely concealed from the adjoining White Drawing-room by an ingenious swing door disguised as a heavy mirror above an ebony cabinet containing china. A gentle pressure on the secret latch sets the whole piece in motion, and the Royal Closet is then in direct connection with a long vista of State apartments.

Inside this room hang some of the finest of the Prince Consort's purchases, but it is not our purpose to examine these here, but rather to discuss another and lesser-known work of art acquired by the Prince, and which hangs near the Royal Chapel in the Private Apartments. This is the Holy Kerchief, or Likeness of Christ, and apparently a direct copy of a sacred

portrait which has for centuries been revered in Genoa as the actual likeness of Our Lord. It came to the Palace among a series of copies of icons from the collection of a Prince Ludwig van Oettingen-Wallerstein. The original is the subject of one of the most ancient Christian legends. Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea (known as "father of Church history"), first recorded it about A.D. 325 and told of that King Abgarus of Edessa who was suffering from an incurable disease and who sent a message into Palestine with a letter imploring aid from Jesus. A reply was sent saying that it was impossible for Jesus to visit him, but that a disciple would be sent. After the Ascension, Thaddæus was told by the Apostle Thomas to go to Edessa and heal Abgarus, with the result that the king was cured and was baptised together with all his subjects.

Now it will be noticed that there is no mention of a picture in this legend—a significant fact when it is realised that the use of holy pictures was not introduced into the Church till a much later date. But in the reign of the Emperor Justinian Edessa was being besieged by the Persians and the morale of the defenders was evidently failing. The Bishop of Edessa thereupon declared that a portrait of Christ Himself, sent with Thaddæus, was concealed in the walls. Its discovery led to a complete rout of the enemy and for a time the mystic painting remained as the pride of Edessa and the talk of Christendom. Later it passed to the Byzantine capital with its fellow discovery—the most valuable manuscript in the world—nothing less than an autograph letter from the Saviour. All the golden glories of Byzantium were assembled to welcome these priceless relics, and a year after their entrance into the city a commemorative sermon was preached by the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenetos. Sad to relate, the Kerchief vanished in the turmoils of the 1204 Crusade.

Throughout the centuries from that time three paintings were definitely claimed as the original. As Louis XI built the Sainte Chapelle in Paris expressly to safeguard the relics taken from Constantinople, the *Sainte Face*, as it was known there, had undoubtedly the most impressive claim. It was destroyed in the Revolution. The second is now in the private chapel of the Pope in the Vatican. The third, I believe, is in the chapel of the convent of San Bartolommeo at Genoa. The position of them both renders them quite inaccessible to the

ordinary visitor or student. We have therefore in Buckingham Palace a link with an ancient if improbable legend. It is an oil painting on wood some $15\frac{1}{2}$ by $13\frac{3}{4}$ inches in dimension. The centrepiece, showing the head of Christ, is about 8 by 6 inches, and it is surrounded by ten minute paintings blocked out in squares and underset by other squares inscribed with clumsy Greek characters. These illustrate the story of Abgarus, showing (1) the king in bed giving his messenger the letter ; (2) Christ standing while His portrait is painted ; (3) Christ receiving a napkin to moisten His face ; (4) the messenger receiving the miraculous napkin from Christ ; (5) Abgarus holding the portrait ecstatically while the messenger tells him the story ; (6) Abgarus casting an idol down from a column and erecting the Likeness upon another ; (7) the bishop climbs the column by means of a ladder ; (8) the bishop brings down the Portrait to his waiting acolyte ; (9) the bishop pours holy oil into the flames wherein the Persians are perishing ; (10) the transit of the Likeness from Edessa to Constantinople. A quaint and rare treasure to find within the sound of the roar of London traffic.

There are many such thought-provoking curiosities to be found in the royal palaces. General Gordon's Bible, for example, carefully preserved in the private apartments of Windsor Castle in an ornate casket, and kept open perpetually at the beginning of the sixth chapter of the Gospel according to St. John. It is close to the door that led to King George V's private smoking-room, with its stone steps leading from the windows to a rose garden. Investitures take place in the Throne Room, but in this quiet sanctum many of the late King's personal friends received their honours in a more intimate manner. Also, in Buckingham Palace, there is that interesting reminder of the clock-making king, George III. This is a magnificent four-sided clock, nearly 3 feet high, which since 1768 has been recording upon its four dials the time of the day ; the solar time ; the position of the planets ; the temperature ; the state of the tides at the leading ports around Great Britain ; and the Signs of the Zodiac with the sidereal time. Yet it does not make music !

This extraordinary timepiece was put together to the King's design by a famous clockmaker named Christopher Pinchbeck, a most worthy citizen who worked in Cockspur Street. It is now placed in the centre of the great bay window of the

Music Room, whence one looks out upon the entirely sylvan views of the Palace garden, with its ornamental water which is part of that vanished little London river whose course to the Thames is continued within the great pipe straddling over Sloane Square station. Horology was indeed that king's favourite hobby, and in the Library is preserved a notebook with copious instructions in his own handwriting on such momentous topics as "Directions for Mounting a Watch," "Directions for Unmounting a Watch," and "Explanation of the Motion." These are written in a clear and flowing script with each heading carefully underlined. For another astronomical clock, now in the Long Corridor, he paid Pinchbeck £1,042, and in 1764 he gave the Cornish watchmaker Arnold 500 guineas for a repeating watch set in a finger-ring which that craftsman had sent to the King as a birthday present.

At every hand there is some story or historical association to be gleaned. There is Rembrandt's *Head of a Rabbi* at Hampton Court on the canvas of which can be seen the master's signature in a certain light. Not far away is that fantastic lady of the Elizabethan era in fancy dress who for years was catalogued as the Queen herself but who is now described as the unfortunate Lady Arabella Stuart. At the back of the canvas is written a rather melancholy sonnet with its plaintive ending :

My musique may be plaintes, my physique teares;
If this be all the fruite my love-tree beares.

It is an eerie sensation to be alone in these corridors in the dusk of a winter evening, and on such an occasion the thought rises involuntarily to the mind that Hampton Court has at least two authentic ghosts—the woman who sits at her spinning wheel and the unhappy queen who comes wailing from the Chapel to the Haunted Gallery. And while we are speaking of unhappy queens let us remember the most tragic of all royal ladies, Mary Queen of Scots, and visit at Windsor that mystery painting of her with her own execution scene inset at the side. She is kneeling at the block, her two ladies, Jane Kennedy and Elizabeth Curle, stand in the right background, and the executioner with English officials are around her. Francis Legge, Keeper of the King's Pictures in 1816, says that "the executioner is standing by with the axe lifted

up ; having struck one blow," and a translation of the Latin words which form an inscription tally in a sinister manner : " In the presence of Queen Elizabeth's commissioners and ministers, was this most august queen, daughter, wife, and mother of kings, cruelly wounded thrice by the executioner who at the third stroke severed her head from her body."

To pass to comedy, here in the same palace (but in the private apartments) is Hogarth's portrait of David Garrick and his wife. Little Garrick, gay in a bright yellow waistcoat beneath a blue coat, and wearing a large button-hole, is in the act of composing a prologue to a comedy. His wife is playfully trying to upset his pose by snatching the quill pen from his hand. It is sad to relate that during the actual painting of the portrait Garrick and Hogarth started an argument which led to a violent quarrel and the painter, with artistic temperament, daubed the eyes with a copious load of paint. It remained in store during Hogarth's life and then was sent by his widow to Mrs. Garrick, coming eventually to George IV through the sale-room.

So ends this little ramble in royal territory.

ROY BISHOP.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE POLITICAL JUNGLE : EAST AND WEST.

A BELATED recognition by the British Government of the dominant importance of Japan's designs in the Far East had the apparent effect during the early days of February of suggesting that it might be well at any rate to cultivate peace nearer home. For many months it has been obvious to ordinary people, but not to the British Government, that the burden of simultaneous bad relations with Japan in the Far East and with Germany and Italy in Europe was too much of a bad thing. It conflicted with common sense and with the elementary strategic considerations which must underlie the policy of a nation that still maintained its imperialist interests. If, for instance, the British navy were to be confronted with an attack on Hong Kong, or if British economic or financial interests in China were to be still further challenged, it was obvious that the three thousand miles of communications through the Mediterranean had better be lined by the ships of a friendly rather than of an unfriendly Italy. In diplomatic practice, however, it takes months, sometimes years, for obvious facts to become obvious enough to Governments.

It was not till the second week of February 1938, for instance, that the British Government showed any sign of a disposition to make a "deal" with Italy, though the opportunity had been wide open since the conclusion of the "Gentleman's Agreement" on January 4th, 1937. In this section of last month's *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* an account was given of the latest attempts of the Italian Government to induce the British Government to talk away the bad relations that had obtained between the two countries since the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. In the middle of January this year the situation was one of a deadlock. By reason partly of the increasing pressure of Japan in the Far East a slight change was now slowly imposed upon the relationships of the Western European Powers. Europe as it were against its will was being forced into better behaviour.

Curiously, the process was started by another of the recurrent French parliamentary crises, one effect of which was to illustrate the general rottenness of Europe and thus

to suggest that if the common interests of the European Powers in the Far East were to be protected against Japanese encroachment, it would first be necessary to modify the bitterness of the divisions in Europe itself. The position of France did not essentially differ from that of other countries. It is hard for the seismic disturbances of contemporary politics to be understood unless the general context be borne in mind.

The context is simple enough. In the summer of 1914 there began a world revolution of such intensity and of such elementary import that, although the process has already taken nearly a quarter of a century, the final results will probably not emerge for many more years. It is even obvious that governments could not plunge the whole world into war, as they did in 1914, without finding that they thereby destroyed the world as they had known it. What is to take the place of the social, political and economic structure that was brought down in 1914? No one yet can tell. We are in one of the great transitional periods of history, and we do not know into what it is leading. Democracy, or the system of Liberalism and freedom in politics which we knew before the Great War, is at any rate a thing of the past. Russia, Germany and Italy among the Great Powers are the new type. The theoretical difference between bolshevik dictatorship on the one hand and national-socialist or fascist dictatorship on the other has no substance. In finance and economics the old capitalist system has been overthrown equally in the three countries. Political life is dictated without parliamentary sanction by those who have usurped power and who retain it by force. Political enemies are dismissed from their posts or shot. The "purge" is a method as characteristic of the Wilhelmstrasse as of the Kremlin. In all three countries the Government confiscates private property to pay for its extravagances. They are all bankrupt, and all armed to the teeth.

Though the private manufacture of armaments be one of the pet aversions of certain pacifist propagandists, yet the countries whose governments are all powerful over private enterprise have taken the leadership in the world's armaments race. There is no check upon armaments expenditure when governments themselves are the manufacturers of armaments.

In the countries called "democratic," for instance in Britain, France and the United States, political dictatorship

differs only in degree and in method from the dictatorship exercised in the titular dictatorship countries. The British Government confiscates more private property in one year than any other Government in the world. Within the past twelve months a capital tax has been added to income tax as the method of British Governmental extortion. It was placed on the Statute Book by a so-called "Conservative" Government. Private enterprise and private liberty in all countries have in a greater or a lesser degree been abolished. Spain is engaged in a civil war of which the result will be merely to decide whether the dictatorship is to be imposed from the Left or from the Right. It will be all the same to the Spanish people.

THE CRISIS IN FRANCE.

In France the process of bolshevisation came later than in most other countries of the world. It was only in June 1936 that M. Blum presented the Third Republic with its first Socialist Government. It was in June of last year that M. Chautemps began his attempt to rescue France from the results of the first twelve months of her socialist practice. But M. Chautemps was attempting the impossible. He was dependent upon Socialist and Communist support, in other words upon the continuance of the Popular Front. M. Blum was Vice-President of his Cabinet, thereby symbolising the essential fact.

M. Chautemps' experiment culminated at the beginning of the present year in an attempt to recapture social order (which had been shattered under M. Blum's Administration) by inviting the employers and the workers' organisations to a peace conference. M. Gignoux, President of the Employers' Federation, on January 10th accepted M. Chautemps' invitation with so many reservations that his acceptance was in effect a refusal. None the less the conference duly met on January 12th. The big employers were not represented. M. Chautemps tried to launch what he called a Social Code by claiming thinly that he himself was the representative of the Radical Socialists and of big business. That device was so transparently unsound that the inevitable result began to be reflected in advance by a flight from the franc. In the early hours of January 14th, during a stormy session of the

Chamber, M. Chautemps himself recognised the inevitable and deliberately brought down his own Government by a studied provocation of the Communists. His Government was dependent upon Communist support. The particular circumstance was that M. Ramette, a Communist deputy, had wildly demanded an increased public expenditure, especially on public works, a sliding wage scale and increased unemployment pay. He added exultantly, but innocently : "Confronted with your words, M. le Président du Conseil, we have been concerned to express our legitimate anxiety, and if we do not vote against the order of the day it is solely because we do not wish to break up the Front Populaire." M. Chautemps at once angrily retorted that the Communists had asked for their liberty (they had in fact done nothing of the kind), and they could have it. M. Blum and his Socialists decided to go with the Communists, and M. Chautemps there and then went to President Lebrun to hand in his resignation (5 a.m., January 14th).

It has to be remembered that the focus of politics in Paris is persons rather than parties. The many "party" groupings are formed round a particular person. They are a shifting conformation. M. Chautemps' following, known as the Radical Socialists, are in effect a party of the Right. In the Chamber their strength was as four is to six against the Socialists and as four is to three against the Communists. In the Senate they commanded almost a majority over all other groupings. M. Chautemps of necessity had tried to carry with him the Left groupings in an attempt to undo the work of the Left. The experiment did not make sense. Its failure, when established, confronted Paris with an insoluble problem. Even more alarming than the social unrest was the magnitude of the financial burden that France in common with all countries had to face. The normal amount of annual post-war borrowing resorted to by the French Treasury had in the past three years been doubled by the cost of additional or abnormal armaments. The additional expense incurred in those years totalled no less gigantic a sum than 45,000,000,000 francs. Still further expense had now to be faced to counter an expanded programme of naval expenditure just announced by Italy.

After five days of concentrated lobbying in which M. Lebrun in turn vainly called upon M. Chautemps, M. Daladier and

M. Sarraut to form the new government, M. Chautemps on a second attempt (January 18th) was successful. He thereby did something that looked interesting to the student of French internal politics. What he set up did indeed look like a landmark in the recent evolution of party politics. In 1936 M. Blum had launched a predominantly Socialist Government and had constituted the Popular Front on a full Socialist basis. In 1937 M. Blum reaped his own harvest and a new government was formed by the Radical-Socialists under M. Chautemps. But the Chautemps Government still rested upon the Popular Front. Now in 1938 M. Chautemps formed a Radical Socialist Government without the participation of the Socialists, and thereby in appearance reverted to the situation of 1924, when a Radical Socialist Administration was launched by M. Herriot. But the evolution from a Socialist-cum-Radical-Socialist to a Radical-Socialist-cum-Socialist and then to a pure Radical Socialist Government was, however, conditioned by the circumstance that though M. Chautemps now had neither Socialists nor Communists in his Cabinet he was still dependent on Socialist and Communist support in the Chamber. He could be outvoted by two to one. Moreover, the Radical-Socialists, though in their practice, especially in economics and finance, they belonged to the Right, by tradition and by political theory they belonged to the Left. M. Chautemps therefore had to retain for his Government the label of the Popular Front.

From the general European point of view M. Chautemps' first important act as the new Prime Minister of France was to unify the system of national defence. Three days after the constitution of his Government he invested M. Daladier, Minister of National Defence and War in the new Cabinet, with powers of co-ordination and control over the Ministries of Marine and Air. Unity of command in time of war was thus assured in advance. To complete the scheme General Gamelin, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, became Chief of the General Staff of National Defence; and Controller-General Jacomet, Secretary-General of the Ministry of War, became Secretary-General of National Defence.

As often before, the irony of French parliamentary politics was thereupon neatly illustrated. On January 21st the new Chautemps Government appeared for the first time before the Chamber. It was the same Chamber that had brought him

down a week before, but it now voted him a measure of confidence by the devastating majority of 501 to one. The Socialists and Communists who were responsible for that vote were giving their enthusiastic support to a new Government which differed from the old only in having dropped themselves.

UNREST AT GENEVA.

It happened that several other events conspired with the French domestic crisis to suggest that Europe might be capable of something better than dissension and mischief. The League of Nations Council—the hundredth of the series—was to have met in Geneva on January 17th but had to be postponed to January 26th because of the French crisis. The main business before the Council was to consider whether the League of Nations could survive. Next, there was a certain amount of discomfort in Germany over the growing recognition that one of the incentives to Japanese defiance of European, including German, interests in the Far East had been the acute dissensions between the so-called “democratic” and the so-called “totalitarian” states in Europe, a circumstance which gave an ironic turn to Germany’s membership of the Three-Power Pact signed in Rome last November. Next, Mr. Van Zeeland’s report on economic conditions was known to be ready for submission in its final form to the British and French Governments, which had invited him to make the investigation, and it was known also that the report would have the effect of emphasising in a practical form the harm done by the persisting political barriers placed against normal international trade. The sense of that warning was fortified by certain pressure that had been brought to bear upon the British Government by important City influences with a view to exploring as a matter of emergency the possibility of renewed contact in trade and in finance between Britain and Germany. The private City pressure was openly supported in one public speech after another. The Chairman of Barclays Bank, for example, declared that “the international financial machine has been impeded for too long, and there is a risk of the brake becoming rusted to the wheel. A resumption of overseas lending . . . would supply a much needed lubricant.”

The general sense of awakened dissatisfaction was increased when Mr. Eden and M. Delbos reached Geneva on January 26th. They were faced with a lately accentuated condition of confusion among the small Powers. Those Powers had been alarmed by the alignment of the League on one side of the potential European division into warring camps. Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Poland had taken the deliberate precaution of advertising their independence of the Geneva "camp." Those earnest people who feel deeply about the horrors of the dictatorship countries and who by their indignation emphasise the European divisions, happen also for the most part to be the same people who most earnestly believe in the League of Nations. Their very prosecution of one of their causes is a source of embarrassment to another of their causes. The Geneva spectacle was no less ironic than that of the small European Powers being driven into a panic by the League of Nations itself, for the reason that the League of Nations had been jockeyed into the virtual position of partisan between two great groups of armed Powers; and the small Powers with the realism imposed upon them by the threat to their very existence were not sure that from their point of view the League of Nations was not the wrong camp. Colonel Beck, Foreign Minister of Poland, in January denounced the League Covenant.

It thus came about that the small Powers put the Great Powers to shame. Britain, France and Russia were members of the League. Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States were not. How then could the League safeguard the peace? It threatened to do the very opposite. If the League of Nations became, not a method of closing the differences between States, but a method of emphasising them and making an issue of them, how could the small Powers place their confidence in it? Mr. Eden, in a speech he made to the Council on January 27th, showed an incipient appreciation of so ironical a situation by declaring that the British Government "will welcome any co-operation in the work of the League which non-members may be disposed to give" and would "do all in their power to ensure that the League shall not become the home of any ideology save that of peace through international co-operation."

EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST.

By the end of January the spectacle presented by Europe was one of almost complete chaos. The Great Powers were divided into two camps, with Britain, France and Russia on one side, Germany and Italy on the other. The League of Nations, meeting for its hundredth session in Geneva, was making an exhibition of its own reduction to absurdity. Spain was held in the grip of an obstinate civil war, Germany and Italy being ideologically identified with one side in the war, and Britain, France and Russia with the other.

In the Far East meanwhile Japan was embarked upon the gigantic enterprise of annexing China to the complete disregard of the substantial interests of the European Powers in China. The Yangtze was virtually controlled by Japan because the ships of no other Power could penetrate up river in safety. The fall of Nanking had induced Tokyo to consider the formulation of its precise ultimate claims. On January 16th the Japanese Government announced its readiness to build up a rejuvenated China in co-operation with a new Chinese Government. But China—it was possible for the first time in a quarter of a century to speak of “China” as a recognisable single entity—was not ready to capitulate. On the very day following Japan’s offer to “rejuvenate” China, the Chinese forces answered by a renewed offensive on three fronts. Though Japan now had to face the necessity of fighting every inch of the way against an incalculable and probably inexhaustible country, yet she left no doubt of her determination to face the prospect. In population China outnumbers Japan by five to one. That factor in the long run must count, especially as signs are not wanting of an increasing spirit of resistance among the Chinese higher command. On January 21st the Chinese military headquarters at Hankow announced that several high officers of the army had been executed, many more dismissed, and one general degraded, for failure to carry out orders. The purge is always a disquieting method, indicative of weakness, not of strength. But in this particular case the interesting thing was that for the first time in a generation evidence was shown of an effective central control over the armed forces of China.

Faced with the failure of the attempt to conquer China by China’s voluntary surrender, the Japanese Government

grimly proceeded to outline its further plan. On January 22nd Mr. Hirota, Japanese Foreign Minister, made a more than usually unrestrained statement to the Diet. Machiavelli's "Principe" was never more greatly flattered. A Far Eastern bloc dominated by Japan was the single theme of Mr. Hirota's discourse. Yet he developed it with the now familiar finesse and gaunt irony of the Japanese mind. "Japan," he said, "has no territorial ambitions in China." She respected "the rights and interests of third Powers." He gave a warning to Great Britain, who, he said, was expected to "comprehend correctly Japan's position in Eastern Asia" and to "co-operate with Japan." In short, he foreshadowed a vast Japanese Empire and gave out for the comfort of his projected victims the assurance that neither Chinese nor foreign territory or interests would suffer, if only that territory and those interests were surrendered to Japan without further ado.

The Far East had become the scene of one of history's great wars of conquest. Europe was sunk in political vendetta and competitive armament. America was forced into another demonstration of her rôle as Greek chorus to world affairs. On January 28th Mr. Roosevelt was diverted from his routine business of confusing the American people by retaining in form the capitalist system while making it certain that he would never allow that system to work. On that day he sent a message to Congress asking for a large increase in naval expenditure. His programme was estimated to cost some £160,000,000. He declared that "our national defence is, in the light of the increasing armaments of other nations, inadequate for the purposes of national security." His tone was defensive, whereby he contrived to give a deserved commentary on the state of the world.

THE GERMAN "PURGE."

It was in such a background that Herr Hitler decided to stage the second great "purge" of his career. January 30th last was the fifth anniversary of his assumption of power. It had been his custom on each anniversary to convene the Reichstag and to make a studied statement of his past achievements and future plans. This time the meeting of the Reichstag was postponed and the usual speech was not made.

For ten days the outside world resounded with speculation about what was happening in Germany. The answer came suddenly on February 4th, when Herr Hitler announced a sweeping list of changes in the personnel of his colleagues, political and military. Field-Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister, and General Freiherr von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, resigned. Seven Army Generals and six Air Force Generals retired. Disciplinary measures were expected to be taken against many other officers. General von Brauchitsch was made Commander-in-Chief of the Army; but Herr Hitler himself took over the supreme command of all the armed forces, with General Keitel, head of the Wehrmacht Office in the War Ministry, as his Chief of Staff.

On the political side Baron von Neurath was appointed President of a new secret Cabinet Council with the specific duty of advising Herr Hitler on diplomatic matters, and Herr von Ribbentrop, Ambassador to Great Britain, took his place as Foreign Minister. The Ambassadors to Austria, Italy and Japan were to be recalled.

At the same time it was made known that Herr Hitler would address the postponed Reichstag on February 20th. This paper had to be written before that speech was made. Those who were closely in touch with him claimed to have some ground for the opinion that Herr Hitler diagnosed the year 1938 as a critical year for Germany. After 1938, so ran the argument, the balance of armed force potentially arrayed against him would go heavily against him, chiefly as a result of the British rearmament programme. The Halifax mission had failed to excite any disposition in the British Government to grant any measure of colonial satisfaction to Germany. From the point of view of prestige the alternative field of diplomatic success was the extension in some form or another of German influence to the Germans over the border, especially in Austria. It was no longer the opinion of any serious person in any country that Herr Hitler would send his troops either into Czechoslovakia or into Austria. But it certainly was the opinion of many serious people that the denial of colonial satisfaction implied an inevitable alternative ambition in south-east Europe. How that ambition was to be achieved no one yet could tell. During the first fortnight of February the German press was quieter than it could ever be remembered to have been during the five years of National-Socialist

Government. It was obvious that Dr. Goebbels was deliberately withholding all information.

It happened at the same time that attention was again attracted to the European implications of the war in Spain. The Non-Intervention Committee burst into new activity. Conversations between Mr. Eden, Lord Plymouth, Count Grandi and M. Corbin led to a general deduction, not discouraged in any quarter, that at last an agreement might be reached in the Non-Intervention Committee about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Spain. Signor Mussolini indeed no longer discouraged those who speculated upon the chances of an Italian withdrawal. Those who in the British press did speculate upon such a possibility went on for the most part to misread their own evidence, or to allow their wish to father their thought. To the minds of the well-informed people there was no doubt that General Franco had no further desire for the assistance of Italian or any other foreign troops ; and that Signor Mussolini had so many troops in Abyssinia and in Libya that even without his commitments in Spain his home forces were seriously depleted. The protracted war in Spain therefore was known to have placed a strain upon the Italian forces such as Signor Mussolini would gladly relax. But in the minds of many British commentators the deduction was made that Signor Mussolini was about to "scuttle" from Spain, and that the Berlin-Rome axis was on the point of collapse from the very weakness both of Germany and of Italy.

No delusion could have been more dangerous. It was no secret that Herr Hitler was as determined as was Signor Mussolini that General Franco should be given immediate belligerent rights so that he could cut off Barcelona from sea-borne supplies. There was not a shadow of doubt that General Franco, Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini had reached an understanding on that point. It was probably not an accident that at the very time when the evacuation of Italian troops from Spain was raising premature hopes in Britain and in France that the Spanish problem in its international aspect was as good as settled, there occurred another outbreak of "piracy" in the Mediterranean. The British steamer *Endymion* was sunk by torpedo on January 31st, when steaming off the coast of Spain. Ten persons were drowned, including one woman. On the following day Mr. Duff Cooper

hostilities in June 1935 ; and the subsequent attempts at a permanent settlement up to the spring of 1937. The history of Austria and Hungary *vis-à-vis* Germany and Italy naturally includes 1935. On the other hand this volume excludes the Abyssinian issue which was dealt with in the Survey for 1935 and has reserved for its successor the early stages of the Spanish imbroglio and the policy of non-intervention.

The Survey is written and compiled with admirable lucidity, precision and objectivity, though the difficulties, even impossibility, of assessing the lasting value of many events are obviously, and admittedly, manifest. The Anglo-Italian Declaration of January 2nd, 1937, for example, failed to create any durable improvement in the relations of the two countries. Again in Czechoslovakia Professor Toynbee convicts the excessive optimism of those who thought at the end of 1936 that the Sudetendeutsch movement had passed its zenith. But most remarkable was the more conciliatory and pacific attitude of Japan towards China and Russia but which has proved only the calm before the present Japanese storm of aggression. There can be little doubt, however, of the basic tendencies in international affairs during 1936. "The most conspicuous and widespread movement," as Professor Toynbee shows, was the retreat, at times almost a rout, of the forces that since the institution of the League had been supporting an international collective system. The pacific passivity of Great Britain and France disclosed apparent weakness in the face of Italian aggression and the German military reoccupation of the Rhineland. With the failure of collectivism and the marked success of the treaty-breaking Powers there was a search for the old forms of security. Among all nations great and small, authoritarian and democratic, there was the consistent rearmament movement which Professor Toynbee treats as "one of the most ominous and the most notable features" of the year. For the smaller Powers armaments alone can never be sufficient and hence there was the general tendency to reconsider their international situations, either in the direction of neutrality or alliance. "The most striking move towards detachment" was that of Belgium, and Professor Toynbee also lays particular stress upon the attitude of Poland. By reaffirming her attachment to France, as a counterpoise to her German Pact, Poland was emphasising her neutrality and by her

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informed the House of Commons that the naval patrol would forthwith be increased. On February 2nd Mr. Eden added to that information by recalling the provision of the Nyon Agreement that warships should be empowered to counter-attack pirate submarines. On that same day both M. Corbin and Count Grandi discussed the emergency with Mr. Eden. On February 4th another outrage was perpetrated, the worst of the series that had begun last August. The British steamer *Alcira* was bombed and sunk off the coast of Spain by two seaplanes displaying General Franco's mark of the black St. Andrew's cross. The crew were saved, but there was no doubt left in any mind that General Franco was giving deliberate warning that he was determined to have belligerent rights at sea. What was interesting was that Italy joined with France in supporting the British Government in a scheme whereby the warships of the three Powers were instructed to sink at sight any submarine found submerged on the shipping routes established by the Nyon Conference. On the very day when the attack was made on the *Endymion* the Burgos Administration was dissolved, after serving as General Franco's political headquarters for fifteen months. In its place he proclaimed a "Government of the Nation" with himself as Prime Minister.

By the middle of February, therefore, the general facts of the world were that the United States had announced an enlarged programme of naval building; Japan was prosecuting her conquest of the Far East; France had passed through a parliamentary crisis and had set up a unified command of all the armed forces for use in war; General Franco had set up a formal government in that part of Spain which he controlled, and had made it known that he had not abandoned his claim to belligerent rights; Germany had carried out a purge of leading army generals who were known to have differed from Herr Hitler not so much on matters of high policy as on the appropriate time for giving effect to them; Italy and Germany had decided to withdraw from military, but not from technical, participation in the Spanish war, but were determined to give full support to General Franco's claim to belligerent status; and Europe as a whole was waiting anxiously for the statement that was due to be made in the Reichstag by Herr Hitler on February 20th.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 12th, 1938.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN 1936.*

The publication of the 1936 volume of the annual *Survey of International Affairs*, issued under the auspices of Chatham House, will be welcomed by students who find in Professor Arnold J. Toynbee's yearly reviews indispensable aids to an adequate knowledge of post-war affairs. The bulk of this new volume of a thousand pages has been written by Professor Toynbee with the assistance, as previously, of Mr. V. M. Boulter. Economic affairs have been treated by Mr. H. V. Hodson. Developments in America and the Far East are dealt with respectively by Miss Katherine Duff and Mr. G. E. Hubbard. There are also contributions by Mr. D. A. Routh on the Montreux Convention of July 1936 and by Mr. H. Beeby on the administration of the Palestine Mandate during 1935-6. Upon a number of other questions also the narrative is not confined to the year 1936. It includes, for instance, the course of Anglo-Egyptian relations from the breakdown of the London negotiations in 1930 to the consummation of the 1936 Treaty; and the efforts of mediation in the Chaco Boreal War from 1934 to the cessation of

* *Survey of International Affairs, 1936.* By Arnold J. Toynbee, assisted by V. M. Boulter. Oxford University Press. 38s. net.

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rapprochement with Rumania was endeavouring to recreate a *cordon sanitaire* between Germany and Russia. The conclusion of the Austro-German Agreement, followed by the erection of the Berlin-Rome axis, was succeeded by increased tension between Germany and Russia over Czechoslovakia. Under German pressure and from motives of self-interest Yugoslavia and Rumania were inclined to leave Czechoslovakia in the lurch, and there was also a loosening in the Balkan Entente with an inclination to detachment by Greece. In 1936 it was "almost imperative to view the history of Central and Eastern Europe," if not Europe as a whole, from the viewpoint of Russo-German rivalry.

Encouraged by the success of Italy and Japan both Russia and Germany "were rising menacingly to their feet" and their competing propaganda campaigns "were perhaps the most prominent features in the international history of the year." It was significant, however, that while fascism had caught the missionary spirit of communism, in Russia the Communist International was under eclipse as Stalin sought for an anti-fascist front with the democracies. If these so-called ideologies, which as Professor Toynbee points out were growing in rivalry as they converged in similarity, were radiating through the world, there was in 1936 "no cogent evidence" that Christianity would be subjugated nor proof that liberalism would disappear. Indeed the Blum Government and the Rexist fiasco in Belgium demonstrated its latent power of resistance. The ideological Great Powers, however, were reassuming in 1936 at the expense of all lesser States "that monopoly of the international arena which they had held during the century ending in the General War 1914-18."

In his section on economic affairs, Mr. H. V. Hodson discusses in particular the termination of the gold bloc by the Three-Power Currency Declaration and the general rise in prices. There is no evidence, he argues, to show any clear direct connection between the latter and rearmament; and also the effect of attempts at national self-sufficiency can be exaggerated easily. Nevertheless figures suggest that "no error is made in ascribing to rearmament a considerable part of the stimulus to general industrial activity in Western countries, and therefore individually to higher prices for industrial raw materials."

THE SUFFERINGS OF CATALONIA.

Professor Allison Peers' study of Catalonia* supplements his admirable work *The Spanish Tragedy*, reviewed in these pages a year ago. Nobody in England can speak with greater authority on Spanish and Catalan history and literature, and his latest book fully maintains his reputation. The first half of the volume records the troubled fortunes of the Catalonian nation from its union with Aragon in the Middle Ages to the reign of Alfonso XIII and the coming of the world war. The second half relates in greater detail the movement towards autonomy in the last half-century, the struggle with Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, the triumph of the national cause with the establishment of the Republic in 1931, the mad adventure of the revolt of 1934 when the Centre-Right came to power in Madrid, the restoration of autonomy when the Left won the election of February 1936, and finally the civil war which began in July 1936.

The leading actors on the stage—Macia, Companys, Azaña, Lerroux—are clearly portrayed, and the strength of the national demand for autonomy is demonstrated on every page.

Whatever might have been the case in other parts of Spain, in Catalonia a military rebellion could find no justification in the state of the country. With its self-government restored, and with every reason to hope that all the public services conceded to the Generalitat by the 1932 statute would shortly be transferred to it, Catalonia desired only to be left alone to organise its life as it had been unable to do for five centuries. At the very moment when such a period of peace at last seemed to be in prospect, a rebellion, in appearance as reckless and insensate as the Dencas-Badia insurrection of nearly two years earlier, destroyed all hope of an immediate return to prosperity.

The rebels in Catalonia were promptly suppressed, but elsewhere Franco marched rapidly forward. Moreover the rising in Barcelona unleashed the most savage passions and brought the worst elements to the top. Of the terror which raged in the great city for many weeks Professor Peers speaks with just severity.

The Catalans differ from the rest of Spain in race, language and tradition, but in cruelty there is unfortunately nothing

* *Catalonia Infelix*. Methuen. 10s. 6d.

to choose between them. Moreover, though as a people they are harder workers, they are equally lacking in the spirit of compromise and co-operation. The author closes on a note of sadness. "For none of the peoples of Spain is the immediate outlook darker than for the Catalonians." Whether the rebels or the Government win, he sees little prospect of the autonomy which Catalonia desires and needs ; for it is Anarcho-Syndicalism, he assures us, which dominates the province at the present time. Foreign lovers of Spain who have kept their heads know perfectly well what the country needs—a progressive government at Madrid capable of carrying out urgently needed educational and economic reforms, the maximum of autonomy for Basques and Catalans, and outward respect for the Church, which, despite its unpopularity in many sections of the working classes, is too deeply rooted in the national life to be ignored.

G. P. G.

THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN GERMANY, 1830-1900.*

Is an historian entitled to review this book ? It deals with sociology and literature, yet I hope that the answer will be in the affirmative. For it is a very original and personal piece of work and a valuable contribution to historical research. Certainly, we historians are the most broadminded and generous people in the world ; we are even prepared to learn from these dangerous modern busybodies who always sneer at us, I mean the sociologists. Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt, who has now added a London Doctorate to his Berlin degree, combines extraordinary literary knowledge with wide historical reading and has thus collected the necessary material for answering several new questions. One of the charms of the book is that of meeting many old acquaintances in a new garb. *Problematische Naturen, Soll und Haben, Die Ritter vom Geiste*—admired by our grandfathers, discussed by our parents, and in spite of some indulgent smiling swallowed even by ourselves—these and many other lesser works are examined as sources for a scholarly interpretation of the ruling factors in the history of the fatherland.

* *Aristocracy and the Middle Classes in Germany, Social Types in German Literature, 1830-1900.* By Ernst Kohn-Bramstedt. With a foreword by Dr. G. P. Gooch. London. P. S. King & Son Ltd., S.W.1. 15s. net.

Some authors have dropped the use of the technical term "middle class." Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt is, I think, right to resume the word and to amplify it by a large variety of conceptions and observations. For the last hundred years the position of the German middle class has been the central problem of our social history. About 1820 there was a middle class which formed the real kernel of German life: bound to the soil, skilful in every kind of artisanship, producing able scholars and reliable administrators, respectable, loyal, steady, educated. The ruling aristocracy could not obtain better subjects; the servants and tenants, the labourers and apprentices, could not imagine more considerate masters. Thirty years later this wonderful social pyramid is in full disintegration. Capitalism has formed a new wealthy patriciate which attacks the aristocracy, which suppresses and exploits the lower middle class, which gives work to the big class of paupers, that unpleasant group, the irritation and despair of old-fashioned administration. The intelligence and organising gift of the employers saved innumerable people in Germany from starving, for it should be kept in mind that a huge army of workmen existed before adequate work could be found for them. The industrial revolution in Germany, which came so much later than in this country, forms the background for the author's studies. What was the attitude of the aristocracy? It is illuminating to learn how the different types of the aristocracy were affected by the new deal. The upper classes, of course, the princes and counts of the old Holy Roman Empire, remained in the main rich, independent and influential landowners. The second class, the barons of the *Uradel*, had first to make their peace with capitalism by taking part in business, for it was the only way of keeping up their social standard and maintaining the castle or mansion on the old estate. Many a member of this class was not clever enough to find the right way in time. The younger sons and daughters of all these families had to obtain a position somewhere in the new bourgeois society. They brought with them a title and an immense family pride, both of which were in many respects attractive to the upstarts of the middle class. The daughter of the wealthy banker felt herself deeply honoured by marriage with a coronet; the able military officer or civil servant was only too glad to use the brilliant name of his *fiancée* as a key to the most select social circles.

Intermarriage between the aristocracy and the middle class became a problem of psychological and social importance in Germany as in no other country on the Continent, because the social superiority of the noblemen was nowhere else so unbroken by the revolutions of the last century. Even the lowest class, the *Briefadel*, whose titles might have been bestowed by any princelet and who did not enjoy much reputation amongst the connoisseurs, even that class of knights had the benefit of many social privileges and, for obvious reasons, laid special emphasis on its dignity. For the laymen there was no visible difference between the "von" of the *Uradel* rooted in the period of the Crusades and the "von" bestowed by the recent favour of some petty Duke. Hereditary ennoblement in Prussia was practically available for every General or Cabinet Minister; in South Germany personal knighthood was linked with the commander class of some orders of merit, and therefore became so ordinary that many commoners of old families did not make use of it out of self-respect. The clash of burghers and noblemen, their mutual attraction by interest and curiosity, the disappointments, the dislike, even the hatred resulting from so permanent a tension, became an inexhaustible theme for the German novel. Historically, the result of all these achievements was the well-known alliance between the German aristocracy of whatever kind and the rich patriciate, and the resultant formation of a new upper class receiving its political direction chiefly from industrial capital, with the essential stipulation that the social and economic standard of the Junkers had to be kept up, if necessary even by the occasional sacrifice of national wealth and interests.

The last and most startling development of modern German social history could not be discussed by the author because it is the outcome of contemporary events. A new middle class has been formed after the definite breakdown of its predecessor in consequence of the ruin caused by the inflation. Only a comparatively small group could save any property from so terrible a catastrophe. The majority lost their money but neither their social self-respect nor their ambitions. Penniless, they felt instinctive dislike for proletarian ideas or sentiments. They were anxious to adopt any slogan which promised to raise them again. The struggle was not so much that between the upper and the lower classes as that between

the members of the same social class. The new German middle class, concealing their empty purses under a cloak of envy and ambition, offered excellent material for the ideas of National Socialism.

What I like most in Dr. Kohn's book are his acute observations and his epigrammatic remarks on snobs, upstarts and philistines in the fatherland. The philistine especially is an illuminating subject for any study of German social history. He is immortal because of his marvellous capacity for changing colour. He is the same again and again, the same in self-sufficiency, in boasting and bragging, in a hidden sense of inferiority, in his need for highbrow words, in his particular manner of satisfying his emotions by half-artistic rubbish. In other countries the philistine is merely the harmless and boring middle-class type without taste and interest. In Germany, the most amusing type will even assume heroic and Bohemian pretensions; he longs to startle people and to become the centre of passionate discussions. As a well-known author has effectively put it: in Germany the philistine is always your neighbour. It is to be hoped that Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt will continue his stimulating studies.

VEIT VALENTIN.

POTEMKIN AND CATHERINE THE GREAT.*

For two and a half centuries, since the advent of Peter the Great, Russia has been a mystery which Western Europe has failed to solve. But history seems at least to show that her power, if not her prosperity, depends upon individual leadership. During these eight generations, her outstanding leaders are usually accounted no more than seven: Peter, his true successor Catherine, her grandsons Alexander and Nicholas, and the three revolutionaries Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. Among them Peter alone can rank as a true-born Slav, for Lenin was probably less than half Russian in blood. These facts suggest the dazzling prize that may await the discoverer of the true Potemkin. The tradition which made him an indolent egotist, supreme only in creating illusion, has long been suspect, and students have surmised that the conqueror

* *Potemkin*. By George Soloveytchik. Thornton Butterworth. 18s.

of Catherine and the Turks, the creator of Kherson, Sebastopol, Odessa, Nikolaiev and the Russian fleet must be a considerable man. It is at least suggestive that between 1774, when at twenty-five he became Catherine's favourite, and 1791, when his death left her desolate, she, whose foible as all agreed was vanity, ascribed Russia's success to him. "You," she declared, "have given me means to be an empress," and he was her consort, her prompter and her agent, military, diplomatic and social, right through those amazing seventeen years. His vast accumulation of wealth and titles, the homage paid him by Russians and foreigners alike, his achievements in empire-building of every kind—all this no less than his culture, eccentricity, vice and splendour, makes him a fascinating subject for research. Should Potemkin denote the second in genius among Russian statesmen, a name ranking with Peter, Masaryk and Pilsudski in the forefront of the great Slavonic world?

Rich as may be the prize, however, it is not astonishing that no full biography of Potemkin has yet appeared. The biographer must surmount the broad barrier between Muscovite and European sources which was heightened in 1917. He must penetrate the German Catherine as well as the Russian Potemkin, when even the hieroglyphics of their amorous correspondence remain undeciphered. The Russian environment, the politics of Europe, the eighteenth-century atmosphere must all be understood. Potemkin, as his contemporaries described him, beckoning a woman with one hand and signing the cross with the other, with lust unsated by five cherished nieces, finding a full dozen paramours for his empress-wife while she allowed him equal liberty—such is not every student's meat.

Mr. Soloveytchik, in his attractive volume of some 350 pages, may justly claim to have neither evaded nor perverted the facts of "a great story that needed telling." Though he makes no attempt to rival the balanced brilliance of a Ségur or the ant-like industry of an Adamczyk, his work is more comprehensive and fruitful than their design allows. As a Slav he has kinship with Potemkin; as a resident in England, France and Sweden, he can appreciate Catherine and the non-Slavonic world. The Slav, it is true, is wont to rank the spirit above the letter and to scorn our quasi-legal reverence for time, while no foreigner adopts the precise national implication

of every word in our language. In hard fact, Paul was not twenty-one in 1772, nor was there a campaign of 1764-74, while Peter III was no more "sadistic" than Catherine a "temperamental" woman with a "morbid" interest in Prussia and a "shifty" foreign policy, nor Cathcart a useful ambassador nor Galitsin a great general. France could no more be "sure of her hold over Russia" than could Potemkin line with cheering crowds 500 miles beside the Dnieper. The reader of despatches, moreover, should not forget that many are written to be read in the country of their origin and that few diplomatists do not exaggerate their own intimacy with the local court. But we must enjoy and gratefully recognise the amplitude of Mr. Soloveytchik's citation of contemporary records and his unfeigned interest in his hero and his times. Thanks to his bold and skilful brush-work the giant figure of the most grandiose among adventurers remains imprinted on the reader's mind.

From all his store of vivid anecdote perhaps the most revealing is the account of Potemkin when, weary and dejected, he was awakened by the preliminary fireworks of a lavish municipal welcome at Mohilev. An enormous shapeless body with a sinister-looking one-eyed dishevelled head emerged from the carriage to sulk through an elaborate service in the Cathedral, endless presentations, deputations of all kinds and odes in five languages. Having publicly imbibed one of his fifteen daily bowls of cabbage soup, he demanded coffee, only to dismiss it with the characteristic lamentation: "I only wanted to long for something and even here I have been done out of my pleasure." Often a poet and always a theologian, he next discussed religion with the Greek and Latin Archbishops, the Grand Rabbi and an Evangelical, to whom he declared that he was about to become a monk. The ensuing ball he attended in an old dressing gown and little else, but next day resumed his role of court dandy and statesman—"straight, magnanimous and loyal . . . with a genius for organisation . . . and never a hypocrite." "He is an honest man, he is a good man, he is a great man," wrote Suvorov, the supreme Russian soldier, "and I would be happy to die for him." Many eminent contemporaries, the supreme diplomat, Harris, among them, gave him unstinted admiration. Others, such as Nolcken, often predicted and indeed recorded his fall, only to admit, a few

months later, his restoration. Mr. Soloveytchik surmises that he and his imperial partner staged quarrels to hoodwink the politicians—an interesting suggestion in a stimulating book.

W. F. REDDAWAY.

VICTORIAN WRITERS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERATURE.*

In a series of learned and illuminating studies which suggest the lecturer rather than the essayist, Dr. Routh reveals the passing of the Victorian era as an illusion because its great writers were faced with the problem that still baffles their successors: namely, the spiritual interpretation of an age in which science is moulding the conditions and destiny of mankind.

So the Victorians were really in sympathy with the iconoclasm of our age . . . and nearly all our most destructive and daring ideals were freely mooted among our fathers and grandfathers . . . and we are living on the thoughts which they originated (or in their turn borrowed from their predecessors), especially when we condemn them as unprogressive.

They, too, were conscious of a disparity between insight and experience, that rift which Heine noted as spreading across culture since its wholeness in antiquity and the Middle Ages. But they were purposive and confident, "at one with life," however much they revolted against contemporary circumstances and ideas; while moderns lacking their intellectual and emotional earnestness are "deadened by the worst of all spiritual problems, the blight of aimlessness." Yet the author traces its source to great Victorians who sought help from the past instead of surrendering wholeheartedly to the present. Deficient in spontaneous inspiration and over-anxious to convince themselves and others, "they over-emphasised their arguments and even falsified their illustrations"; and "by their mere insistence on the wisdom and artistry of the past" provoked an excessive reaction from later writers who "then found that they had unlearned how to live." The author admits that "the triumphant civilisation of the nineteenth century became imbued with a quality

* *Towards the Twentieth Century. Essays in the Spiritual History of the Nineteenth.* By H. V. Routh, M.A., D.Lit. Cambridge University Press. 21s. net.

which resisted spiritual penetration and denied scope to imaginative reactions," but he ignores similar excuse for his contemporaries.

It is the virtue of our age to free the mind by freeing the body. This outlook is clouded, but not darkened, by the world crisis through which we are passing, and which almost compels the optimist to believe that backward races may trust in the League of Nations but progressives must trust in poison gas.

He omits any reference to poison gases which paralyse the mind and help to account for the blight he deplores. Victorians no more than the Greeks could have conceived the scientific devices by which modern tyranny subjugates thought in various nations, stifling that free exchange of ideas to which the author reveals "our supposedly insular genius is astonishingly sensitive." He extols Mill's essay *On Liberty* as a corrective of Victorian culture and a signpost for future generations, because it asserted "a fellowship, not of creeds, but of self-reliant enquiry," which should enable men so to transform society that they would attain their full status as human beings. But the vision was exclusively addressed to the reasoning faculty and therefore failed to counteract the spell of great Romantics who derived inspiration from transcendental philosophy.

Yet the genius and idealism of Newman, Tennyson, Browning, Carlyle and Ruskin were doomed to "magnificent failure" because "Physics after a century's controversy and research has displaced Metaphysics in the quest for ultimate reality." To them and others we owe "some of our most sacred enthusiasms and most disconcerting perversities." Later writers who lacked such sacred enthusiasm are more severely criticised by Dr. Routh, who notes that "the men of imagination become more spiritually self-sufficient and infidel than the men of science." Samuel Butler, Nietzsche and Bergson are commended for adapting science to humanism, though freed from the humanistic tradition; and J. S. Haldane (in his *Philosophy of a Biologist*), Jules Romain and Thomas Mann indicate how we can contemplate life in the spirit though not in the style—as yet—of great literature.

Our present discontents impose a concerted spiritual effort, a creative anti-materialism. . . . The complicated exigencies of nationalism, political administration and financial redistribution

do not prove that the spirit is only breath nor that the individual is a fool to believe in individual worth. The danger which threatens our moral freedom is moral licence.

To Berdyaev the author's exposition would illustrate the inadequacy of scientific humanism; and those who accept some of the author's conclusions and literary estimates will reject, or only partially admit, certain others. The task of keeping abreast with science is compared by him with that of Theseus and Prometheus: but while scientific humanists grope in the twilight, they should discern surely as clearly as Victorians the clouds which darken minds, depriving men of hard-won freedoms and the power to trace paths in the light they shed.

D. P. H.

SIR JOHN COKE.*

Sir John Coke (1563-1644) was an able and conscientious public servant under three sovereigns, Elizabeth, James I and Charles I, and an ancestor of Queen Victoria's Lord Melbourne. The present biography is mainly compiled from his carefully preserved letters and papers on State and private affairs, and makes very interesting reading; it has delightful illustrations. On leaving Cambridge, Coke, through the influence of his kinsman, Fulke Greville, took a minor post in the Treasury of the Navy, then being equipped to meet the Armada; in later life, as its Chief Commissioner, and as Charles's principal Secretary of State, he became involved in the King's hated demand for Shipmoney. Coke held other important administrative offices—"the Ordnance, the Colonies, the Fisheries, the Post Office, all in turn came under his hand"; he was Master of Requests, and represented his University in Parliament. The inauguration of a regular system of letter posts over the whole country is due to him; he zealously fostered the interests of the settlers in the North American colonies, as he did those of seamen afloat and ashore. The desperately needed reforms in the Navy were probably the object nearest his heart, but in all three reigns he was up against a chronic shortage of money. Coke was several times assured, by Buckingham and others, of the royal "contentment" with his services, but he must have felt little "contentment" himself on the occasions when he

* *The Last Elizabethan*. By Dorothea Coke. John Murray. 1937. 15s.

became perforce the mouthpiece for some of Charles's "miserable quibbles." He had the misfortune to be appointed a Commissioner in the fruitless negotiations with the Covenanters; the Queen's party, and others who were jealous of him, sought to make Coke the scapegoat for this failure. They eventually secured his dismissal, and he retired quietly to his estate, Melbourne, in Derbyshire. He had throughout his career sought refreshment in country pursuits and his gardens, while, as a devoted and beloved husband and father, he is a pleasant contrast to his better-known, contemporary namesake, Sir Edward Coke, the Attorney-General. The Civil War brought tragedy to his last days, driving him from his retreat and dividing his family. But for most of his long life Coke was a successful and happy man, with troops of friends, in whose young people he took an active interest. An affectionate letter from the "Winter Queen" commends the young Prince Rupert to his care.

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

*This was Germany** is a translation of the fourth and final volume of the well-known letters of Princess Marie Radziwill to General di Robilant, whose acquaintance she made when he was Military Attaché at Berlin. French by birth, German by marriage, and possessing friends and relatives everywhere, she was able to survey the European scene with greater knowledge and detachment than almost any woman of her time. Covering as they do the last seven years of her life, from 1908 to 1915, the letters take us into the heart of the gathering storm. French men and women rarely like Germany, and the Princess was no exception. The leading performer on her stage is of course the Kaiser, of whom she writes without concealment. "His brain is no longer normal," she declares, "or he would not make such mistakes." Yet her comments are not invariably hostile. "There is no question in the minds of those who know him that he had the best intentions, but he has been ill served. Bülow was incapable of giving him a single piece of good advice. In the background there is that frightful caterpillar Holstein." That is a typical sentence from this lively book. Letters dashed off to an old friend are not history, but they help us to visualise Europe in the last years of peace. Bülow, as usual, comes off badly, for his insincerity was generally recognised. Bethmann, as usual, inspires far more respect by his character than by his ability. The Princess was not ill-natured, but she was difficult to please.

* John Murray. 15s.

An important volume dealing with the possibilities of immigration has been published under the auspices of the American Council of Foreign Relations in *Limits of Land Settlement*.^{*} Under the editorship of Dr. Isaiah Bowman the volume contains a series of factual studies on particular aspects and areas by ten specialists, which should prove of great value to students of the problem and help to remove a number of common misconceptions. The area of empty spaces suitable for potential immigrants is frequently exaggerated. The best lands are already occupied and Professor Carl O. Sauer declares that "most expansion will depend on technologic advance, not on old-fashioned pioneering." Dr. Bowman considers that new land cannot accommodate a population in sufficient time and numbers "to be of real social importance to the countries of origin." Moreover in Dr. Sauer's view already in the world "most of its inhabitants are where they belong." In the absence of trade strangulation areas of dense population enjoy "great and persistent economic advantage and cultural energy."

In the face of existing conditions, however, immigration remains a question of vital importance, as in the case of Japan. In the course of a most informative article Dr. Karl J. Pelzer points out that in each of the next years a quarter of a million new workers must be added to the labour market. As is well known, Japanese emigration as yet has brought little relief. The writer points, *inter alia*, to the workers' dislike of emigration, foreign restrictions and particularly climatic conditions, as in Manchuria. He pleads for migration to the "vast unused area of the Pacific" where labour is needed and colonisation is unsuited to the European but admirable for the Japanese.

Canada as an area for settlement is discussed by Mr. W. A. Mackintosh, who envisages a possible renewal of the post-war average of 100,000 settlers a year; and Mr. Griffith Taylor foresees a threefold increase in the Australian population when the country is developed to the same extent as the United States. The great potentialities for settlement in Siberia are discussed by Mr. Bruce Hopper. But owing to the very high rate of population increase in the U.S.S.R. he points out that Russia will be able to supply her own labour power. Mr. J. H. Wellington deals with African settlement, particularly with the great possibilities for further development in East Africa. In Abyssinia, he declares, "there is little doubt that most of the plateau surface will be found to be suitable for European settlement." But Brazil alone of the great immigration areas still has, contends Dr. Bowman, "an enormous area of undeveloped land of great fertility." Its development, however, is retarded by a low technological level and by political inability to encourage, organise and protect the immigrant.

^{*} Distributed in U.K., Europe and the British Empire (Canada excepted) by Royal Institute of International Affairs, St. James' Square, London, S.W.1. 15s.

"ideologies" inspired by fanatical hatred of those "free institutions" which the Balfour Report on Inter-Imperial Relations rightly declared in November 1926 to be the "life blood" of the British Commonwealth.

It should have been—it ought to-day to be—the undeviating purpose of British policy to safeguard this "life blood," and to check and enfeeble by every means in our power the vampires who would destroy it. Yet, instead of seeking sedulously to strengthen in Europe and the world the forces that were ranged against predatory dictatorships, instead of arming ourselves betimes in the service of the ideal embodied in the League of Nations, we have allowed ourselves to be beguiled by the pretence that Fascism and Nazism were defending order and property against Communism, and have closed our eyes to the truth that, of the conflicting "ideologies," Communism though false in doctrine and damnable in practice is the least dangerous.

Now we have our reward. Nemesis dogs our steps. Lest even a semblance of freedom be preserved in Austria by the will of her people, we have seen Austria invaded by the military might of Hitlerite Germany, a might of which our Ministers sought until a year or two ago to deny the very existence though they should have known, as others knew, that it was being built up in secret. Worse than the rape of Austria has been and is the sequel. The 16,000 Nazi police who followed hard on the heels of Hitler's submissive *Reichswehr* are far more sinister than his guns and tanks and bayonets. How many thousands of Austrians who hoped to be free, who dreamt of preserving their country as the last refuge of sane Germanism, have been taken into "protective custody," beaten with steel rods in prison and otherwise tortured we may never know. If Hitler and Himmler can prevent it no voice, no shriek of agony, from Austria will be allowed to reach the outside world. Her Jews, too, will be pariahs. We may hear of the suicides of the "suicided," of opponents "shot while trying to escape," but we are unlikely to hear of the nameless abominations practised in Nazi concentration camps upon defenceless victims who may even be forced to parade before selected foreign visitors and journalists and to declare themselves well treated, lest worse befall. Nay, if precarious peace be still preserved, we may see our noble lords invited to bear witness to the admirable order

which reigns in Austria, and return home to assure us that, even if the process of "assimilation" was a trifle vigorous, it was merely the fulfilment of the natural desire of one German people for union with another. Presently—who knows?—a British Foreign Secretary may be persuaded again to disguise himself as some sort of sportsman, and to re-open "friendly conversations" with Herr Hitler for an Anglo-German agreement. All these things have been. Why should they not again be?

Hitler, to do him justice, may not make it quite so easy for us to be fooled, and to fool ourselves, as it has been in the past. Early in March our Nazi-loving Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, began preliminary official "conversations" with Herr Hitler. The Government has said nothing of them hitherto. But I have reason to believe that Hitler laid down, approximately, five conditions as the framework of further "conversations." These conditions are stated to have been:

1. Any Anglo-German negotiations must be accompanied by an offer of colonies to Germany.
2. There can be no connection between a colonial settlement and a general European settlement.
3. The British press must be controlled and prevented from publishing news or views displeasing to Hitler.
4. No attempt must be made to separate Italy from Germany.
5. There must be no interference with German efforts to suppress "Bolshevism" anywhere.

After the rape of Austria, which came as a shock to Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax—though why it should have shocked them is not clear since they had encouraged Hitler to think Great Britain contemptible by getting rid of Mr. Eden two or three hours after Herr Hitler had scorned him publicly—timid steps were taken to let the German Government know that this country has "taken note" of the assurances given by Field-Marshal Goering to Czechoslovakia. The value of these assurances may be judged in the light of similar assurances which Hitler and Goering progressively gave to all the German parties after the advent of Nazism to power—and proceeded forthwith to smash and suppress those parties. But is the defence of Czechoslovakia a British interest? Another question may suggest the answer. Is it or is it not a British interest that

in the negative. The "Shiver Sisters" are not—or not yet—the British people. Their prototype, Horatio Bottomley, shrieked "To Hell with Serbia!" in July 1914. Within a few days the British people were fighting—as they thought at first—"for Belgium" while in reality they were fighting for their own lives. I object strongly to any conception of British interests that would have us "fight for Austria" or "fight for Czechoslovakia." The British people ought only to fight for well-understood British interests; and any "foreign" policy that is pursued on their behalf should seek to safeguard the two greatest British interests. The first is our own individual freedom and the preservation of the British Commonwealth as a free, democratic polity based on representative institutions. The second is the prevention of war. The deep uneasiness which our people feel—and feel more deeply than ever after the removal of Mr. Eden from the National Government—springs from fear lest misguided and short-sighted official tactics land us sooner rather than later in the very war which those tactics are ostensibly designed to avoid.

If one method be worse than another in the treatment of foreign policy—that is to say, of our main home affair since the very existence of this country may be involved—it is the method of propaganda by slogans. Let us look at the slogan: "To Hell with Czechoslovakia!", for example. One evening last year a distinguished statesman from the Eastern half of Europe was discoursing learnedly to a British "expert" audience upon the juridical implications of the League Covenant. A British peer rudely told him not to expect help from this country because he would not get it. "We do not ask for your help" was the swift retort which the statesman, presently amplified to the following effect: "We are accustomed," he said, "to look upon Great Britain as a country that keeps its word. We know that, since the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, Great Britain and France have entered into arrangements that are tantamount to a reciprocal defensive alliance. We admire the strength of the British navy, we know something of the growing strength of your air force, and we think that your programme of rearmament may help to prevent a European catastrophe. But we do not imagine that Great Britain, with all her strength, can be responsible for the defence of French continental frontiers; and we understand that France must cultivate the friendship

action and to face the consequences. This British interest is imperfectly understood.

The principle that the defence of the Low Countries is a traditional British interest was reaffirmed three or four years ago in a White Paper which bore the initials of a Prime Minister, the late James Ramsay MacDonald. It is incontestable, though it is rarely present to the public mind. Still less obvious does it seem that the defence of France must be an axiom of British policy. France, our people are disposed to imagine, is strong enough to defend herself without our generous "help"; and it does not readily occur to them that, in the contingency against which our air-raid precautions are directed, we might need the help of France quite as much as the French might need ours. Nor have our official spokesmen taken any pains to tell our people that the defensive arrangements which have been concerted between Great Britain and France are, for this very reason, reciprocal.

In recent years our various National Governments have tacitly assumed that "foreign affairs" are "foreign" and that they can best be handled if our people are kept comprehensively in the dark. Then, when crises have occurred, the cry has been raised that "public opinion" would not stand this or that, and that the country "would never fight" for something it knows nothing about. Enlightenment has come, at intervals, from members of the Opposition and from "candid friends" of the Government, such as Mr. Winston Churchill. But "popular" newspapers like Lord Beaverbrook's "Expresses" and Lord Rothermere's *Daily Mail* have continued to assure their readers that what happens, for instance, in Central Europe is no concern of ours, and that we are not going to run any of the madcap, quixotic risks which the peace crusaders of the Left would have us run. Even Mr. Garvin wrote in the *Observer* of March 6th:

There is another question, and it is the acid test. Will any orator at the thousand meetings this week pledge the Opposition to go to war in these circumstances for Austria and Czechoslovakia? Yes or No? . . . To these test questions the answer of the British people is "No"; and if the Opposition stand for the contrary they will be crushed at the polls. "Because we are not geese," as Palmerston said.

Nothing is more goose-like than to put these questions in this way and to affirm that "the British people" will answer them

in the negative. The "Shiver Sisters" are not—or not yet—the British people. Their prototype, Horatio Bottomley, shrieked "To Hell with Serbia!" in July 1914. Within a few days the British people were fighting—as they thought at first—"for Belgium" while in reality they were fighting for their own lives. I object strongly to any conception of British interests that would have us "fight for Austria" or "fight for Czechoslovakia." The British people ought only to fight for well-understood British interests; and any "foreign" policy that is pursued on their behalf should seek to safeguard the two greatest British interests. The first is our own individual freedom and the preservation of the British Commonwealth as a free, democratic polity based on representative institutions. The second is the prevention of war. The deep uneasiness which our people feel—and feel more deeply than ever after the removal of Mr. Eden from the National Government—springs from fear lest misguided and short-sighted official tactics land us sooner rather than later in the very war which those tactics are ostensibly designed to avoid.

If one method be worse than another in the treatment of foreign policy—that is to say, of our main home affair since the very existence of this country may be involved—it is the method of propaganda by slogans. Let us look at the slogan: "To Hell with Czechoslovakia!", for example. One evening last year a distinguished statesman from the Eastern half of Europe was discoursing learnedly to a British "expert" audience upon the juridical implications of the League Covenant. A British peer rudely told him not to expect help from this country because he would not get it. "We do not ask for your help" was the swift retort which the statesman, presently amplified to the following effect: "We are accustomed," he said, "to look upon Great Britain as a country that keeps its word. We know that, since the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, Great Britain and France have entered into arrangements that are tantamount to a reciprocal defensive alliance. We admire the strength of the British navy, we know something of the growing strength of your air force, and we think that your programme of rearmament may help to prevent a European catastrophe. But we do not imagine that Great Britain, with all her strength, can be responsible for the defence of French continental frontiers; and we understand that France must cultivate the friendship

and the alliance of Central and South Eastern European countries whose co-operation would lighten the task of French national defence. Of course, these friendships and alliances have to be reciprocal, just as your defensive alliance with France now is. And, should these smaller friends and allies be exposed to attack, France would be bound to lend them aid. If, as a result, France should be attacked, will Great Britain hold aloof? We think that respect for your pledged word, to say nothing of your care for British interests, warrants us in assuming that you will not hold aloof. On this assumption you would be helping France who would be helping us. This is what I meant by saying: 'We do not ask for your help.' We think you cannot afford not to help us, for you would have to help France."

Those of us who calmly consider what British interests really are need to examine this reasoning. Certainly, no British Government that cares for national interests ought to leave our people without guidance upon so grave an issue. Bluntly put, the question is whether a Nazi Germany in military and economic control of Europe from the North Sea to the Black Sea would be compatible with our safety and freedom. If this question cannot be decided quite so automatically as the statesman from Eastern Europe suggested that it would be, it is an issue upon which an uninstructed public opinion in this country might be deeply divided. Upon the prospect that it would be divided the German and the Italian Governments are probably counting in their own choice of tactics. To keep it divided may, indeed, be an object of their sedulous propaganda among us; for they realise that nothing would be more likely to paralyse a British Government in a moment of crisis than doubt whether it could be sure of public support in an emergency that might involve, albeit indirectly, our own peace and safety.

On March 7th the Prime Minister—who had been hard pressed by his critics ever since he accepted on February 20th the resignations of Mr. Anthony Eden and Lord Cranborne—made an almost impassioned statement to the House of Commons. Declaring that the root of his political creed is "individual liberty," he said:

Subject to reasonable restrictions, I believe in liberty of thought, of speech, of action. Without that there can be no true democracy. I do not believe that a democracy need necessarily be less efficient

than other systems of government. It may indeed sometimes lag behind in time in making its decisions, but at any rate democracy can do what no dictator can permit to himself; democracy can afford to make mistakes.

For the preservation of democracy, which means the preservation of our liberty, I would fight myself, and I believe that the people of this country would fight. I am convinced in the innermost core of my mind that the course we are pursuing in putting forward our present programme for defence is the surest way of avoiding the grave necessity of fighting at all.

This statement was loudly cheered. It expresses the feeling of the country. Where it stands in need of elucidation is precisely in its relation to our rearmament and defence programme. British freedom does not yet stand alone in the world. But if there be doubt whether Great Britain cares for the freedom of other countries which hold Mr. Chamberlain's belief as passionately as he holds it, and if those countries be allowed to go under or be otherwise compelled to bow before the armed dictatorships, no conceivable degree of isolated British rearmament can save this country from finding itself in a position of relative weakness and inferiority. This is one very practical reason why we should be careful not to discourage and, still more, not to throw to the wolves smaller countries whose weight and vigour might help us, in an hour of decision, to preserve our own freedom and thus to maintain a British interest.

Upon the differences between the Prime Minister and the former Foreign Secretary which led to the resignations of Mr. Anthony Eden and of Lord Cranborne it is unnecessary to dwell in detail. Nobody who has had direct experience of public feeling on this matter can doubt that Mr. Eden's stand in favour of international good faith has earned him the gratitude and admiration of many, perhaps the majority, of his fellow countrymen. Mr. Winston Churchill in an impressive speech described Mr. Eden's departure as "an irreparable loss to the Government . . . because he seems to be the one fresh figure of first magnitude arising out of the generation which was ravaged by the War." Yet I should be inclined to add that, if time be granted us, the irreparable loss to the Government may turn out to have been a notable gain for the country. There was a danger, amounting almost to a certainty, that in the event of an international crisis in which the defence

of ulterior (if not immediately apparent) British interests would have demanded firm and far-sighted decisions, we should have been confronted with a revolt of several Ministers, supported by that part of our press which has been influenced by German and Italian propaganda. Thanks to the resignations of Mr. Eden and Lord Cranborne the responsibility for tactics which the better-informed sections of the public regard with misgiving has been saddled fairly and squarely upon the shoulders of the Prime Minister, Lord Halifax and their colleagues. Should this policy fail, and should Ministers resist the temptation to go farther in the way of concessions than they ought to go, lest the public verdict be that "Eden was right," the power of revolting Ministers to thwart a wiser policy in future will have been lessened or destroyed. This may well be a national advantage.

Another advantage is that a potential basis for an alternative National Government has now been created. No unprejudiced observer of our public affairs can suppose that the country would willingly entrust its destinies to the leaders of the Opposition, especially after the lamentable misjudgment they showed in moving a vote of censure which enabled the Government to blur the lines of the Eden crisis and to ride off with a merely party majority on an issue of grave national importance. But the country would view with confidence a return to office of men like Mr. Eden and Lord Cranborne in a broader National Government inasmuch as they have proved themselves men of character as well as of talent.

The present elimination of Mr. Eden may therefore turn out to have been a blessing in disguise. For the moment it has ensured a far more vigilant control of the conduct of our foreign policy than public opinion would have exercised had Mr. Eden remained in office. Under this control Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax will be likely to scrutinise more carefully whatever specious proposals may come to them from Berlin and Rome. In this respect "Eden out" may be more powerful than "Eden in"; and the slender chances that any sound Anglo-Italian or Anglo-German understanding can be reached will have been improved. But whatever Government may now or may presently be in charge of British interests the fundamental necessity will remain to determine what those interests are, the order of their precedence and the methods by which they shall be defended.

We should not be spending more than £1,500,000,000 on rearmament, nor would the Government be spreading knowledge of precautions against air raids, unless there were reason to believe that we may at any moment be engaged in a life-and-death struggle. The scene is set for a drama of the grimmest sort; and unless we are minded to play our part with the grimmest determination not only shall we not prevent the drama from being played but shall fail in our duty to ourselves and others. In which direction does our duty lie? We have been told that we cannot let ourselves be drawn into the conflict between the Bolshevik and the Fascist-Nazi "ideologies" which is alleged to be dividing Europe and the world into hostile camps; that we must keep clear of these dictatorial systems and hold aloof. This is very poor doctrine. It condemns us to a perpetual, panic-stricken defensive, to a series of timorous manoeuvres and expedients by which we have convinced the greater part of the world, including the United States, that we are on the run and shall run the faster the harder we are pressed.

During a recent visit to the United States I was often asked: "When will Britain be herself again?" To answer was not easy. One of the worst effects of the "Eden crisis" has now been to deprive us of the remnant of confidence and goodwill which we possessed abroad. Our hard-headed business men, who would not dream of buying a business without reference to the "goodwill" attaching to it, are light-heartedly ready to throw to the winds all the "goodwill" of our national business. They forget that we and the peoples of the British Commonwealth hold an ideology of our own, a liberal faith in the virtue of individual freedom and of democratic institutions which, as Mr. Eden once said, is not a half-way house between Communism and Fascism but "is in another street altogether." We have no need to be faint-hearted in the propagation of this faith. In the last resort, by Mr. Neville Chamberlain's own confession, we should be ready to fight for it, for it is the only faith that will ever avail to hold the British Commonwealth together or to gain for us the support of the United States.

So it seems to me that British policy ought to capitalise without delay our ultimate determination to fight for our faith. We should, I think, make a virtue of necessity and take the offensive against the false and degrading doctrines of

"totalitarian" systems and proclaim the superior virtue of our own liberal outlook and our readiness to uphold it. In no other way shall we ever be able to approach our ideal of peace. The principles of freedom upon which this country and the British Commonwealth stand are the bugbear and the ultimate enemy of Fascism and Nazism, both of which proceed from an ideology of war. In this respect, and for the present at any rate, the ideology of Russian Communism is less dangerous. Its aim is not aggressive war however false its doctrines and damnable its methods of government may be. With Communism at home we know how to deal. With Fascism and Nazism many of our "hard-headed men" are inclined to sympathise because Fascism and Nazism masquerade as bulwarks against the Communist menace to private property. A little experience of "business" in Germany and Italy would help to cure them of their folly.

If our rearmament means anything it is meant to deter Fascist or Nazi aggression. Have our Ministers and newspaper proprietors never thought of encouraging by firm statements of liberal policy the high proportion of the German and Italian peoples who loathe the tyrannies under which they live? We have no quarrel with the German or with the Italian people. Rather should our aim be to save them both for Europe, to hasten the day when a free Germany and a free Italy shall be able to join with us and other countries in creating a Europe set for peace and co-operation. From such a Germany and such an Italy no reasonable concession would be withheld. To a Germany and an Italy whose totalitarian ideology is expressed in threatening readiness for aggressive war no blackmail should be paid.

Even to-day, when the eleventh hour has struck, it might not be too late to save Europe and ourselves from disaster by a firm profession of liberal faith on the part of this country, with our new armed strength in the service of peace as its background. The British Dominions and the United States would regain a confidence in us which they have wellnigh lost. They would say: "Britain is herself again." Above all, this country would have shown that it has lost neither the will nor the power to stand up for British interests.

WICKHAM STEED.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S PROBLEMS AND THE OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA.

THE occupation of Austria by German troops, and the setting aside of Austrian sovereignty by Herr Hitler's declaration that Austria is now a part of the German Reich, all of which was accomplished in a few days, have given rise to fresh problems for the neighbouring state of Czechoslovakia. Properly speaking they are no new problems at all, but ancient and familiar ones, that will now be in the limelight of international discussion. That military circles in Czechoslovakia have long busied themselves with the possibility of a *Gleichschaltung* or even a complete annexation of Austria is clear from the fact that to-day about 260 miles of Austro-Czechoslovak frontier is very strongly fortified, which fortification has been carried out for more than two years with unusual energy and at great cost.

The length of the Czechoslovak frontier with Germany in the north and the west, i.e. the Silesian, Saxon, and Bavarian borders, had hitherto been about 540 miles long. As the already fortified Austrian frontier of Czechoslovakia must now be regarded as a prolongation of the Czechoslovak-German frontier, Czechoslovakia has now, in effect, a frontier with Germany of no less than 800 miles which, in case of necessity, she would have to defend. The full difficulty of this task may be easily imagined when one considers that the Franco-German frontier is only 200 miles long. Hence the conclusion is drawn that a very great part of the German land and air forces would, in case of conflict, be engaged in dealing with Czechoslovakia, and could not be employed in action in the West. Herein lies the striking significance of an alliance with Czechoslovakia, not only for France but also for England, if the latter should—as is hoped in Prague in the interest of world peace—leave no more room for doubt that, in the case of a Franco-German conflagration, unprovoked by France, England would regard it as her duty to hasten to the aid of her French ally. The Quai d'Orsay, as is known, is very decided in its view that France would regard an attack on Czechoslovakia as an attack on herself, and would stand by her alliance treaties accordingly. These problems, which concern also the two Great Powers of Western Europe, did not arise freshly with the occupation of Austria; they have

only taken on a tremendously topical character, and they give rise to questions which no longer merely employ a moderate number of specialists and Cabinets, but have become an exceedingly important factor in the public opinion of the whole of Europe, especially in the western countries. This is the first, and, for Czechoslovakia, not the least important consequence of the occupation of Austria by National Socialist Germany, an occupation carried out without the least regard for national rights, but, nevertheless, always regarded by Prague as a distinct possibility. I am convinced that Dr. Benesh meant just this when, in the early summer of last year, he emphasised in the course of a conversation I had with him :

The question of an Austro-German "Anschluss" is no more a purely Czechoslovak problem ; I have long considered it as a European problem. Should this problem one day become acute, it will have to be solved from the point of view of all Europe, for the four Great Powers are so much interested in it that Czechoslovakia has no desire to take upon herself alone the responsibility for this problem.

The fact that Czechoslovakia is now flanked on three sides by an aggressive and militarily strong neighbour cannot be denied, although there is properly no new danger but the realisation of a German desire for expansion which has long and openly been taken into account in Prague. Now the question arises whether, through this lengthening of the frontier, an effective isolation of Czechoslovakia has been attained, as always desired by Germany. Here also Dr. Benesh said to me some time ago that a country with France and Russia, the two greatest military powers of the Continent, as allies, could never be isolated, quite apart from the fact that even then he considered the Anglo-French alliance as indestructible. I believe that the leading politicians of Czechoslovakia have no reason to depart from what the President then said. If, as some would like to do, we consider the occupation of Austria as a complete isolation of Czechoslovakia, we may be making a grave mistake. Not only are the treaty obligations of France and Russia absolutely clear, but also the will of the French and Russian Governments to stand by them in all circumstances. The most important Continental alliance against German aggression and the creation of a National Socialist hegemony in Europe, the

Franco-Russian treaty, can never function if one of these two great Powers be inactive, supposing the important link in this alliance system were cut through by the taking by storm of Czechoslovakia and the destruction of her sovereignty.

It is perhaps the greatest error one can fall into, when considering Central European conditions, to put the situation of Austria and that of Czechoslovakia on the same level. Austria, through the policy of Dr. Dollfuss, the Chancellor in 1933 when she stood at a cross-roads, decided on what was for the moment certainly a more convenient way, but a much more dangerous one. She placed herself under the fickle protection of Italy, instead of keeping to the path of democracy and thus—as in Czechoslovakia—building up a firm system of alliances with other democratic states. In her hour of destiny Austria had friends but no real allies who would have taken up arms for her. Obligations to Austria, which arose from the League of Nations and the already severely shaken principles of collective security, were of a general, almost platonic, nature. The alliance system of Czechoslovakia has suffered no harm through the occupation of Austria. On the contrary, one may even say that the treaties of alliance with Czechoslovakia are to-day more highly valued than ever by allied and neutral countries in all parts of the Continent. Wherever there are clear alliance treaties with Prague it is emphasised that the necessity of invoking these treaties in case of need is plain. Where there are no direct and automatic treaty obligations, public opinion is growing alive to the necessity of making much needed assurances to Czechoslovakia, in the interests of the country itself concerned. These facts are a second, but no less important, consequence for Czechoslovakia of the occupation of Austria.

A third consequence, the real significance of which should not be under-estimated, is the moral conviction of the Czechoslovak people, becoming more and more in evidence, that they will be the masters of their own destiny. This is clear not only from the speech of the Premier, Dr. Hodža, but also from an unconditional drawing together of all Parties, with the single exception of that of Herr Henlein, whether Right or Left. Thus M. Hampl, Chairman of the Czech Social Democrat Party, declared in the great March debate in the Parliament :

Czechoslovakia is the only country in Central Europe where the working people can develop socially and democratically. Czechoslovakia is our resurrection, our life, and our grave. We will guard our liberty and our independence and will not shrink from any sacrifice. We will never permit Czechoslovakia to become a vassal state. We hold to the dictum of Masaryk, that it is better to die free than to live in chains.

And on the extreme Right of Parliament, the Agrarian deputy, M. Žilka, replied to some threatening sentences in the last speech of Herr Hitler :

The German Chancellor has remarked that, in the case of a continued attitude of the Press as it is at present, the iron mountain of the German army may be set in motion. But there are other iron mountains in Europe, too, which can well be forged into weapons and set in motion should the most elementary principles of neighbourly good conduct be abandoned. We will defend ourselves with all our strength, not only in our own interests, but in the interests of the whole culture and civilisation of Europe.

He who carefully observes the reaction of the Czechoslovak people to Germany's annexation of Austria, can witness to the astonishing tranquillity and confidence with which they look the facts in the face, in spite of their recognition of the gravity of the situation. A superficial observer might call it phlegm. But one who knows this people knows very well that their temperament is anything but phlegmatic, just as they hate exaggerated and sanguinary eruptions. Here is security and confidence arising from a sense of moral cleanliness and right. But it is also confidence in their own strength and trust in their allies ; in short, in all those things that in Austria in the critical hours were not at hand, and which could no longer be conjured up by patriotic avowals, wireless broadcasts, and belated efforts to resuscitate a self-destroyed democracy.

Nevertheless, even when one considers how the destiny of this country neighbouring on Austria has come to depend on its own strength, founded on its systematic armament, and its equally systematically built-up alliances, and—no less important—on the feeling of moral right, all this does not mean that one should close one's eyes to sober realities. Until some years ago military experts believed that a military aggressor must possess a threefold strength in men and material to enable him to meet the defender on an equal

footing. After experiences in Spain, however, the experts have revised their opinion in so far as they now recognise that a five-fold superiority of the aggressor is necessary in order to meet the strategically, economically and politically more favourable position of the defender. This fact is of remarkable importance with regard to Czechoslovakia, who will take up arms only in her own defence and turn the enormous length of her frontiers against a potential attacker. Superficial observers of the strategic situation of the country formerly laid much stress on the fact that this length of frontier must be considered a factor of military weakness to Czechoslovakia. To-day, after the above-mentioned experiences regarding the essential disadvantages of an aggressor and the extraordinarily strong fortifications of the frontier of this country, we may rather say that this long frontier is a strength for Czechoslovakia, and simultaneously a weakness for a possible attacker. In addition, Czechoslovakia, as mentioned before, has much strengthened her Austrian frontier, while Austria herself did little or nothing in this direction. Doubtless National Socialist Germany will very soon endeavour to remedy this state of things. But for this very much material is needed, as also the financial means for the purchase of such material; besides which a considerable time would be necessary, owing to the almost uniform flatness of the land, the fortification of which would be so arduous and so costly.

Thus one can understand the spontaneous assurance of Berlin that no action whatever is contemplated against Czechoslovakia. Further, although it was possible to occupy Austria very quickly with German troops, there are many political reasons why it will take a long time, and that a time of many difficulties, before the Berlin Government is able to *gleichschalten* Austria not only *de jure* but also *de facto*. Opposition in particular parts of the country, especially in Vienna, will remain considerable, even though under the impression of the first shock, the now united Opposition of Socialist and Clerical groups may find no opportunity of getting seriously active. The Nazis obviously need a breathing space. There is anxiety to avoid conflicts; and the disclaiming of designs on Prague is intended to restore the atmosphere of "tranquillity after completed action" in Western Europe.

Much, even if not the fate of Czechoslovakia, will depend upon whether the assurance that Czechoslovakia is now safe

from any attack by Germany succeeds in convincing the Parliaments and Cabinets of Europe. It would be a great danger to European peace if public opinion in the Western democracies and in America were persuaded of Germany's good will to leave Czechoslovakia in peace. That this will does not in fact exist is clear from the threatening declaration of Field-Marshal Goering, that he would see to it that the ten million Germans living in the two South Eastern neighbouring states should come under the protection of Nazi Germany. As far as the German minority in Czechoslovakia is concerned, there is no manner of doubt but that it enjoys a far greater measure of democratic protection than any other German minority in Europe; and the conditions under which this minority lives can in no wise be compared to those in Poland and Italy, where Germany has hitherto shown no inclination to take the German minorities under her protection. The reason is clear. It is simply that it is not a question, for Berlin, of race and nationality; it is far more a problem of foreign policy and strategy; and it was these causes that made it seem advisable to make constant attacks on the treatment of the German minorities living in Czechoslovakia and Austria. This policy of minorities protection, in which Germany has properly no voice after her withdrawal from the League of Nations, as everyone who knows the circumstances could testify, will doubtless be again used against Czechoslovakia when the right moment is thought to have arrived.

For the next few months, therefore, one may count on a certain relaxing of the tension, but there is every reason to be careful in judging this desire of Berlin for a breathing space. Czechoslovakia, particularly after the annexation of Austria, remains the most endangered country in Europe. The fact that an attack on this country would mark the beginning of a European war, the extent and magnitude of which no man can foresee, changes nothing. Everyone who does not wish to close his eyes to realities will have seen from events in Austria the menace that is hovering constantly over Czechoslovakia, and will have realised how essential it is in the interests of world peace to see these facts clearly, and to arrive at the right and just conclusion.

GERHARD SCHACHER.

Prague.

THE FUTURE OF THE LEAGUE.

IN September 1935, three weeks before the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the British Foreign Secretary declared in the Assembly of the League of Nations that :

The League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.

To-day there is no question of "steady and collective resistance to *all* acts of unprovoked aggression." It is not so easy to be sure where the League, or this country, stands in regard to "the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety." But, apart from Italy, no State that was a member of the League in 1935 has openly gone back on the principles of the Covenant.

On July 4th, 1936, when the League Members gave up collective resistance to Italy, they decided to take stock of their position in the League. An inquiry was begun and is still in progress. Its purpose has been to elicit proposals for improving "the application of the principles of the Covenant." A committee, with twenty-eight members, was set up by the League's Assembly on October 10th, 1936. Its most recent session ended on February 2nd, 1938. At this meeting Holland and Sweden, warned by the fate of Abyssinia, proposed suspending the operation of Article XVI of the Covenant, the "sanctions" Article. Belgium and Poland favoured this proposal. But the integrity of the Covenant found support from another group of weak countries, China and Spain; and also from M. Paul Boncour on behalf of France and Lord Cranborne on behalf of the United Kingdom. Reading between the lines of Lord Cranborne's report to the Committee, it is plain that the British Government shared the view expressed by M. Litvinov representing Soviet Russia: "Better a League without universality than universality without League principles." In the British view, firm adherence to League principles evidently offered the best chance of making the League's membership universal.

Thus, at the beginning of February 1938 half a dozen League members wished to abolish the obligation in Article XVI to take action against a Covenant-breaker in certain

circumstances. They wanted to cut compulsory sanctions out of the Covenant. Other members of the League, including Britain, France and Russia, took the opposite view. They favoured the maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety. To some of these States, including the Soviet Union, it seemed that the chief purpose of the League should be to prevent the outbreak of war by "collective security." In their view, the sure prospect that the strength of all would be used for the defence of each so that aggression could never succeed, would prevent it from being attempted. But the United Kingdom and another group of countries felt that this aspect of the League must be kept in the background for the present, and that obligations to use force against any aggression anywhere should be regarded as in suspense (or "frustrated") until the amount of available force became sufficient to ensure success. Eventually the "Committee of Twenty-eight" decided to adjourn and to meet again before making any recommendation in regard to "the application of the principles of the Covenant." The principles themselves remain intact. The League as a whole has not even considered altering them. In this sense, the League still stands "for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety."

And this country? Does it stand where it did in the early days of February, when represented by Lord Cranborne on the Committee of Twenty-eight? "I can assure your lordships that what was our policy last week remains our policy to-day": such was the pledge given by Lord Halifax to the House of Lords on February 24th, four days after Mr. Eden had resigned the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister had already told the House of Commons on February 22nd:

I would not change an article in the Covenant. I would leave the Covenant as it is. I would not tear up a single article of it, not even Article XVI in the hope that some day it may be reconstituted in such a form that we may rely upon being able to use its powers for the functions for which they were originally intended. I would have it clearly understood to-day that the League cannot use and cannot be expected to use them, and that the nations which remain in the League must be saddled neither with liabilities nor with risks which they are not prepared to undertake, nor must other nations expect that the League will provide that security which it was once hoped it would provide.

The same, or very similar, words would have described British policy before Mr. Eden's resignation. Then as now the Government might be said to stand for "the maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety" subject to the obligations of Article XVI being regarded as, for the present, in suspense. How, then, has British policy been affected by the departure of Mr. Eden and Lord Cranborne?

Mr. Eden believed that the application of the principles of the Covenant was the best practical politics. Therein he differed from some, but not from all, of his late colleagues in the Cabinet: he could never have said, as Sir John Simon did say, that "we are not prepared to see a single ship sunk in a successful battle in the cause of Abyssinian independence." The Prime Minister is one of those who believe in the League ideal. He would like to see the dream come true. But in present circumstances he regards it as no more than a dream. Not so Mr. Eden; and there are several other members of the Cabinet who, in varying degrees, share Mr. Eden's point of view. Then why did they not resign with him? Because different men, all equally sincere, will differently estimate the precise moment when the gap between divergent lines of policy becomes unbridgeable; and also because those who, like Mr. Eden and Lord Cranborne, have to watch the policy closely will most fully appreciate how far a particular step is likely to lead in the wrong direction.

That is not to say that negotiations between this country and Italy or Germany are wrong in principle or inconsistent with the application of the Covenant. Quite the contrary. Mr. Eden, we may be sure, would gladly have opened discussions with Germany or Italy in order to discover whether the British Government could go to the other Members of the League and to the U.S.A. and say:

We have ascertained that, in return for such and such action which we and certain among you would be prepared to take, and which we hope you would all approve, Germany or Italy or both would agree (*a*) to take part in an all-round reduction and limitation of armaments and (*b*) to rejoin the Society of Nations, it being understood that the League will for the future be as much concerned to provide justice as to safeguard the new settlement, maintain peace or promote human welfare outside the political field. We therefore propose that formal negotiations to this end should now begin.

But suppose that Germany or Italy or both believed that "now-or-never" threats—or, as Lord Cranborne said, "blackmail"—would get them all they want. Suppose they thought that nothing would be required of them save promises not to fight and promises to give up piracy, Bari broadcasts, and other illegitimate or unfriendly practices which should never have been begun. Suppose the Nazi and Fascist leaders were convinced that they had only to hold out a little longer in order to be landed in the haven where they would be: an anarchic world with rich and lazy nations providing an inexhaustible supply of Danegeld! With such an alternative in prospect, is it likely that Hitler or Mussolini would show any readiness for negotiations aiming at a world-wide society of equal nations, where Germany and Italy would find themselves on the same footing, not only as Britain and France, but also as Holland or Denmark or Czechoslovakia; and where there would be no longer any need for national self-sufficiency or for the sacrifice of individual liberty in order to attain national unity? If Mr. Eden and Lord Cranborne saw the issue in some such light as this, no wonder that, with Kipling, they thought it better policy to say:

We never pay any one Dane-geld,
No matter how trifling the cost,
For the end of that game is oppression and shame,
And the nation that plays it is lost!

It is not enough to answer that "the main purpose in foreign policy must constantly be peace." Danegeld may buy peace, but not for long. The main purpose of foreign policy should rather be to bring about an ordered world where permanently stable peace is by no means the only boon that comes from the government of mankind in the common interests of all men. "We must stand by our conception of international order without which there can be no lasting peace," said Mr. Eden to his constituents on February 26th. Improved health, culture, material well-being, and conditions and hours of work, together with a steady rise in the minimum standards of social justice and individual liberty, are among the results of good government. A foreign policy, conducted according to the principles of the Covenant, will aim at providing all the Members of the League with these non-political blessings as well as with international justice and peace.

To pursue this aim is to seek to apply the principles of the Covenant. A policy thus directed is a League of Nations policy. (It has often been argued of late that such a policy has been tried and found wanting. It would be nearer the truth to say that, like the Christian religion, it has been found difficult and not been tried.) A brief glance back at the past eighteen years will show that the deplorable state of the world to-day is mainly due to successive failures, through lack of will, to apply the principles of the Covenant. Each of these failures discouraged public opinion in the democratic countries whence the League drew most of its support. And every set-back to public confidence was an additional reason why democratic governments should fear to act on League principles when the next occasion arose. This vicious circle can only be broken by a resolute act of will. It might have been done under favourable conditions in the Spring of 1935 had the British or French Governments been prepared to run the same risks in defence of the Covenant as in defence of their national territory.

It is a mistake to suppose that the British Government had no choice but to fight or to let the League down. Mussolini chose to attack Abyssinia rather than Malta or Egypt because he knew beforehand that Britain would fight, even single-handed, to defend either Malta or Egypt. Had he felt equally certain that Britain and France would fight rather than allow him to annex Abyssinia, he would surely have left Abyssinia alone. And the next likely aggressor would then have been strongly disposed to leave aggression alone. It is at least probable that the present war in China would never have begun; and that the growing prestige and authority of the League would have made foreign intervention in Spain seem so inexpedient that, lacking all hope of help from abroad, the Spanish army leaders would not have ventured to rebel against their Government.

If then the worst evils in the world to-day, and the danger of worse evils still to come, are due to lack of will to apply the principles of the Covenant in their entirety, may we not assert with Mr. Eden that "because there has been one failure" or any number of failures "that is not a reason why the world should turn its back upon an endeavour which is the only alternative to catastrophe and chaos"? That was said in the autumn of 1936. But on February 12th, 1938, Mr.

Eden repeated : " The world—I say ' the world ' deliberately—will build again on the same foundations."

Eight days later he ceased to be responsible for the conduct of British foreign policy. His going was deplored in this country by his late colleagues no less than by the political opponents of his party. Other nations loyal to the League received the news with consternation, and this was particularly true of those foreign statesmen, for example the French Foreign Minister, who had worked most intimately with Mr. Eden at Geneva. In Washington, his loss was felt as a grievous blow to the new doctrine, announced in President Roosevelt's Chicago speech of last October, that " The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold the laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure." Only the avowed enemies of the League, notably in Germany and Italy where Mr. Eden's dismissal had been demanded by the Dictators, were left to triumph over the fall of a great British Foreign Secretary ; and, even in Germany, the first high notes of exultation were soon toned down when it appeared that the British Cabinet did not intend to leave the League, but remained loyal to it, at least in principle.

What this loyalty amounts to in practice only time will show. That is not to say that nothing can be done for world-reconstruction except to wait and see. His Majesty's Government, in the first place, should watch carefully, as no doubt they will, the " Chamberlain experiment " in order to avoid the danger of an Anglo-Italian agreement that would buy the complaisance of Italy at the cost of the friendship of France, the goodwill of America, and the League conception of international order. If the experiment succeeds in promoting international co-operation and achieving international peace and security, Mr. Chamberlain will have earned the gratitude of mankind. But if not, the Government, with so tried a friend of the League as Lord Halifax at the Foreign Office, will surely lose no time in returning to the straight path of League policy preferred by Mr. Eden.

The Cabinet is responsible to Parliament, and Parliament has a vital part to play. Votes on party lines, with automatic majorities for the Government of the day, do not give a complete picture of the control exercised by Parliament. An influence out of all proportion to their numbers was exercised by Mr. Winston Churchill's father and his " Fourth Party "

in the Parliament of 1880-5, when the official Opposition made but little impression on Mr. Gladstone's Government. Why should not this phenomenon reappear? Mr. Winston Churchill himself, Mr. Eden, Sir Archibald Sinclair and Mr. Harold Nicolson are brilliant speakers, exceptionally well informed on foreign affairs, holding ideals widely shared by public opinion, and each of them has a considerable following in the country. These men and others of all parties in both Houses, with such help as might be forthcoming from the official Opposition, could exert a very great influence to get League principles systematically applied in the actual conduct of British foreign policy. Divergent views on domestic issues need be no bar to organised collective action in regard to international affairs, whether in Parliament or in the country.

The effect might be decisive if public opinion were well enough educated and organised. Behind the Cabinet and Parliament stands the nation. Sir Austen Chamberlain once wrote that "Governments in these days are the servants of their peoples in respect of foreign policy." Another famous Foreign Secretary prophesied that the history of Europe after 1920 would be a race between Education and Catastrophe; and Lord Grey helped to give Education a good start. But it is a dark horse, seen with difficulty by newspaper reporters. Consequently we are apt to overlook the steady growth, in every constituency, of the number of young voters whose education has made them convinced believers in the principles of the Covenant as practical politics. Education may yet win a striking victory over Catastrophe.

Indeed, (the future of the League is first and last a problem of education.) It is not facts but values that concern us here. Little good comes of amassing knowledge of disconnected facts concerned with international relations, however objective or concrete such facts may be. What is needed is a sympathetic understanding of the abstract principles which link together and give meaning to large numbers of such facts. That is the object of the study Mr. Walter Lippmann has presented in *The Good Society*. The main concern of Mr. Lippmann's book is with the principles of good government. It might therefore be described as a modern Utopia—or rather Pantopia, since it rediscovers the truth that the best government is only possible for a society that is world-wide.

Mr. Lippmann reminds his readers how, in 1612, Chief

Justice Coke told King James I that the King was "under God and the law." So also the Good Society must be "under God" as well as "under the law." The law alone is not enough. It is no Pole-star to guide the forward march of mankind, but has the humbler rôle of whipping in the laggards so that the behaviour of free citizens, or nations, will not fall behind its gradually advancing requirements. Only in so far as all men share the same high purpose to seek first the interests of the whole of God's family—to "seek first the Kingdom of God"—can they all feel free to put their best into life and to get the best out of it. If what I most want to do is what my neighbours want done in the interests of us all, then and only then am I at liberty to do as I please. Liberty is founded on the rock of *ὁμόνοια*, harmony of purpose: a purpose which is superior to dictators, kings, parliaments, magnates, mobs and even majorities. Where that principle is rejected there is neither liberty nor peace, and men or nations have no choice but to fight for or against some one of the partisans contending for supremacy. In particular, if the foreign policies of all countries were directed by a common purpose to seek first the interests of the world as a whole (and no country has more vital interests than these) national independence would be reconciled with League principles.

The development of a common purpose harmonising the foreign policies first of League Members and eventually of all the world is to be achieved by each Member State so educating its citizens as to cultivate in each of them a League loyalty that is second to no other political sentiment, not even to State patriotism, in its intensity. That is, *mutatis mutandis*, what Hamilton, Madison, and the other Federalists did for the original thirteen States of the American Union; and just such a common loyalty forms to-day one of the strongest bonds uniting the nations of the British Commonwealth. (To foster a League loyalty,) widening into a world loyalty, is therefore as much a part of a League of Nations policy as to aim at the application of the principles of the Covenant in the conduct of foreign affairs. The one is as needful as the other if the future of the League is to be the good government of the world.

While, however, this and other lessons concerning the government of a world-wide society may be learned from the

experience of smaller human groups, and particularly from that of such great democracies as the United States of America and the British Commonwealth of Nations, caution is needed in applying to the whole what is true of the part. The larger the society with a government of its own, the lighter that government ought to be. Mr. Lippmann has pointed out that the totalitarian collectivists, who insist upon intricate, centralised and bureaucratic government, are in rebellion against the interdependence of mankind. The evolution of political unity in America has involved the diminution of State authority ; but the Federal authority at Washington only shares—it does not usurp—the task of governing the United States. The Federal government is no State government writ large. Nor should a world government resemble overmuch the Federal, State or local governments which it ought to supplement but must not supplant.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

Note added on March 17th.—Since the above article was finished on March 1st, its argument for a “League of Nations policy” rather than a policy of Danegeld has been powerfully reinforced by the coercion of Austria. The use of the armed forces of Germany and the acquiescence of Italy have demonstrated how lightly the Dictators valued their promises to respect or preserve Austria’s independence. And promises, without guarantees of their fulfilment, are all that we can be sure of obtaining in return for Danegeld.—M. G.

HAVES AND HAVE-NOTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT's re-election in 1936 by the overwhelming majority of 25,500,000 votes to Landon's 15,600,000 was a triumphant vindication of his foiled attempt to legislate on behalf of America's domestic Have-Nots. All that the New Deal vainly sought to do, and much more, was already a commonplace in more than one European State, a fact which gives point to Mussolini's recent criticism that while Italy is master of capital the democracies are still under its sway.

Roosevelt began his new term of office in high hope. In the House of Representatives, the Democrats counted 334 against the Republicans 89. In the Senate, the Democratic majority was 75 to 17. He decided to continue his crusade, and his Inaugural Address on taking the Oath of Office for the second time, on January 20th, 1937, pledged him to carry on with his fight against poverty. He denounced the "autocratic powers" that curbed the progress of the people. He declared with truth that he saw "a great nation upon a great continent blessed with great wealth of natural resources," and he went on :

I see a United States which can demonstrate that, under democratic methods of government, national wealth can be translated into a spreading volume of human comforts hitherto unknown—and the lowest standard of living can be raised far above the level of mere subsistence.

The important words are "*can demonstrate*." What American democracy demonstrates in fact, Roosevelt proceeded to show :

But here is the challenge to our democracy. I see tens of millions of its citizens—a substantial part of its whole population—who at this very moment are denied the greater part of what the very lowest standards of to-day call the necessities of life.

I see millions of families trying to live on incomes so meagre that the pall of family disaster hangs over them day by day.

I see millions whose daily lives in city and on farm continue under conditions labelled indecent by a so-called polite society half a century ago.

I see millions denied education, recreation, and the opportunity to better their lot and the lot of their children.

I see millions lacking the means to buy the products of farm and factory, and by their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions.

I see one-third of the nation ill-housed, ill-clad and ill-nourished.

I have not space to trace in detail the melancholy history of American politics since these burning words were uttered. I can only mention the unfortunate attack upon the Supreme Court; the failure to make progress with a new edition of the New Deal; the special session of Congress in the closing months of 1937 which, called together to pass social legislation, found itself confronted with a new slump for which the mild term "recession" was coined; the quick march to renewed distress which may be measured by the amazing facts that steel output fell at one time to 19 *per cent. of capacity* and that some 11,000,000 Americans are now unemployed or roundly as many as when Roosevelt first took office. The close of the year found the President and his Cabinet (it is difficult for us to realise that American cabinet ministers are not responsible to parliament) campaigning against what Mr. Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, called the "Ducal Economic Overlords." On December 30th, 1937, Mr. Ickes, in attacking the "moneyed aristocrats," declared that they "threaten to enslave the United States through a sit-down strike of capital." He added:

An irreconcilable conflict between the power of money and the power of democratic instinct, has reached such intensity in recent months that . . . it must be fought to a finish—until plutocracy or democracy—until America's 60 families or America's 120 million people—win.

The reference to "60 families" clearly referred to a remarkable book by Mr. Ferdinand Lundberg, entitled *America's Sixty Families*, which analyses the distribution of American capital and declares that the United States is dominated by a hierarchy of its sixty richest families, buttressed by some ninety families of less wealth. Mr. Lundberg's story amounts to the charge that America is a full-blown plutocracy in which the word democracy is *pour rire*. The American moneylords he pictures as economic Bourbons who have learned nothing since the fatal year 1929, when all the nations were brought near to bankruptcy by American speculation. This fiery speech followed utterances only less fervid by Mr. Cummings,

the Attorney-General, and Mr. Jackson, the Assistant Attorney-General. The delivery of such speeches must have had Presidential assent, but Roosevelt's Message to Congress of January 3rd, while denouncing the misuse of capital, reciting a number of capital abuses, and adding that "the selfish suspension of the employment of capital must be ended," explicitly stated that he was not attacking capitalism but merely a few abusers of capital. The overwhelming majority of business men and bankers, he said, were good citizens; "only a small minority have displayed poor citizenship by engaging in practices which are dishonest or definitely harmful to society." It is good to be able to add that he again defended the millions of American Have-Nots.

Not many days later, Roosevelt was telegraphing to the heads of the great corporations to come to conference with him at the White House, and American Big Business was understood to be rallying from the worst of the attack. As I write, early in March, the Republican Party is formulating charges of economic tyranny, centralisation and excessive bureaucracy and expenditure, which by courtesy of the B.B.C. were broadcasted to the British people on March 1st by Mr. Glenn Frank, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee. Something new, under the sun, to hear rival American politicians debating before a foreign audience! Whatever the issue of the conflict between Roosevelt and his critics, no one has ventured to deny the truth of the dreadful accusation of January 1937, that "*I see one-third of the nation ill-housed, ill-clad and ill-nourished.*"

When I read those words in *The Times* report, I recalled how thirty-three years ago I had quoted, in the opening pages of the first edition of my *Riches and Poverty*, some words of Campbell-Bannerman:

In this country we know, thanks to the patience and accurate scientific investigations of Mr. Rowntree and Mr. Charles Booth, that there is about 30 per cent. of our population underfed, on the verge of hunger. Thirty per cent. of 41 millions comes to something over 12 millions—almost identical as you see with the whole population of the Colonies.

America has roundly 130 million people, so that it is over forty million Americans who are "ill-housed, ill-clad and ill-nourished."

Since *Riches and Poverty* was written in 1905, something has been done in Britain, by minimum wage legislation and by the deliberate redistribution of wealth through graduated taxation, to mitigate poverty. Since 1900, the expenditure on public social services has risen from £36,000,000 to £500,000,000 a year. It is to me an abiding consolation that *Riches and Poverty* furnished the stimulus to such memorable reforms. It is to be hoped that Roosevelt will prosecute inquiries into what it has been found possible to do in lands which lack the mighty natural resources of the nation where still he clearly perceives so much disgraceful distress. Let him ponder, in a country where police and militiamen, using machine-guns, armoured cars and tear gas, beat down the strikers of 1937, what would have been the condition in Britain to-day if social legislation had not assuaged in some measure the just discontents of the years of "Labour Unrest" which opened the twentieth century.

No representation is here made that Great Britain has built a satisfactory economic structure; the general case of the Haves and Have-Nots within our own borders remains and must be faced. The British Death Duty returns for the financial year ended March 1934 show that 134,193 estates passed in the twelve months with a net value of £524,000,000, and that no less than £348,000,000 of this was left by only 8,335 persons! This means that about 240,000 persons own nearly 70 per cent. of the national capital. Gross inequality of incomes necessarily follows upon such ill-distribution of accumulated wealth. Here, as in America, the nation in its main activities is owned and controlled by the few. That is hardly a condition of economic democracy. It must be added that while our Press hails with joy every new American warship, it damns the New Deal with exceedingly faint praise.

Just as in domestic affairs peace cannot reign while gross economic inequality exists, so in international relations acute inequality of opportunity breeds discontent and war. In both cases the Error of Distribution, as I called it in *Riches and Poverty*, produces similar results. At home and abroad, the Haves and the Have-Nots face each other in a discontent that grows with knowledge. One could have wished that President Roosevelt, when he delivered that striking Inaugural Address in January 1937 had found

wisdom to add to his long list of "I sees" yet another, thus :

I see populous nations, composed of people like ourselves, suffering even greater sorrows than those endured by the 40 million poor Americans whose degradation I have denounced to you. Those poor nations, unlike our United States, are not gifted with magnificent territories, ores and petroleum. We, the American people, cannot be indifferent to their unfortunate position. We look forward with confidence to negotiations to bring about a fairer distribution of world opportunity, so that the story of the Haves and Have-Nots shall disappear in international relations even as we are determined to end it here in America.

Alas! no such logic has informed the utterances of a President who is obviously a man of generous mould. We find him, so far from sympathising with the Have-Not nations, denouncing them in the very speeches in which he has such good cause to deplore the sorry condition of the Have-Nots of the American scene. And that although America itself, through its elected representatives, denied a former President, Woodrow Wilson, the power to make America a signatory of the Peace which caused the major inequalities of Europe to exist. No one better than a President of the United States should grasp the nature of the injustice suffered by Germany, Italy, Austria and Hungary, to name no more. It is not merely that certain nations *have not*, it is that they have been unjustly deprived of what had been solemnly guaranteed to them by treaty. If the Fourteen Point Peace had never been made, openly in the sight of all men, with the President of the United States as the *liaison* officer that transmitted the cabled agreements, and if the Treaty of London had never been signed and sealed in the blood of 700,000 dead, the Have-Not nations would have a case on all fours with that of the forty million poor Americans against their overlords. In truth, however, the Have-Not nations have a double right—the natural right of human beings to a decent existence; the right of nations to the fulfilment of treaty obligations.

Italy, with the conquest of Abyssinia, has declared herself a "satisfied" nation, although still so markedly inferior in natural resources. Germany, cut in two by the Polish Corridor, and deprived of her colonies, still demands satisfaction. Both these nations were denied as much as polite discussion so long as they remained unarmed. Arms alone, unfortunately,

have gained them respect and attention. Let us recall that fatal week at Versailles only nineteen years ago when at one and the same time Italy and Germany were flouted and scorned ; Italy gleefully presented with the *fait accompli* ; Germany sternly—nay, rudely—told to sign and not to argue. No vision of a Rome-Berlin axis presented itself to the framers of a treaty-breaking treaty. One is reminded of the saying of a great lady : “ Always be kind to girls ; you never know whom they may marry ! ”

Aggression ! It was not enough to frame the five dictated “ treaties ” (one of which was so promptly cut to pieces by the sword of Kemal Ataturk), as instruments for the permanent oppression of the vanquished. France and Belgium it is necessary to recall (for current discussions never mention it) violated even the Treaty of Versailles by making war upon disarmed Germany in 1921-5, marching white troops and negroes into the Ruhr in an attempt, as monstrous as it was stupid, to collect the astronomical reparations assessed upon the defeated. That invasion killed hundreds of Germans, while tens of thousands were imprisoned or ruined and over 100,000 deported for resistance to the cowardly attack. Britain frowned upon the aggression, but the League made no sign of disapproval of this wanton violation of its own Covenant.

Although the Ruhr outrage ceased only twelve years ago, we found President Roosevelt at Chicago on October 5th, 1937, violently denouncing Germany among others as a breaker of the “ pledged word ” and as imperilling “ the maintenance of international morality.” He went on to threaten the Have-Nots with “ quarantine,” which being interpreted means blockade—the denial of food and raw materials. I venture to say, as one who took a leading official part in devising the successful blockade of Germany in the Great War, that blockade is the most grievous form of warfare, because it first hits the old, the sick, the women, the children ; and that to talk lightly of it in time of peace, and while discussing the position of the Have-Nots, is to speak without due thought. Roosevelt is too good a man to have uttered the word quarantine in full knowledge of its implications.

It is not possible within the compass of this article to detail the economic inequalities of the nations ; I must content

myself with naming the most extraordinary fact of all, that the small territory of Germany, only 182,000 square miles, contains more Germans than there are British people (English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish) in the whole of the British Empire, which covers a fourth of the entire land surface of the world. The population of Germany (1937) is 68,000,000; the entire *British* population of the British Empire is 65,000,000; the entire *White* population of the British Empire (including French Canadians, Boers and all others of European stock) is 73,000,000. Those who wish to consider these and all other facts of the cases in perspective can find them clearly stated in my *Can War Be Averted?*

Dr. Frank H. Simonds, in the *Saturday Evening Post* of October 5th, 1935, had some pungent words on the subject which I commend to British readers. "The map of the world," he pointed out, "which has been created by wars innumerable and discloses injustices and inequalities beyond numbering," is no proper basis for "a scheme for perpetual peace"; the League of Nations stands for "a program of the beneficiaries of past wars seeking instinctively to keep peacefully what their ancestors had acquired by fighting." He went on to trounce the proceedings at Versailles:

Wilson spoke for an America which, by wars with the mother country, with the Indians, with Mexico, had won the richest portion of the earth's surface and was satiated. Lloyd George represented an empire upon which the sun never sets and for which, as a preface to peace, he claimed the lion's share of Germany's meagre colonial estate. Clemenceau acted for a republic whose colonial empire extended from the Barbary States to the Congo and was now to be rounded out by the acquisition of the Cameroons and Togoland. In effect, what these statesmen of fortunate peoples said was, "*We have got enough; let's all stop*" . . . There is almost always some moment in a poker game where every player can quit a winner if he stops then. But the temporary winner is never permitted to end the game on the ground that he has suddenly discovered that gambling is wicked although he had thought it morally beyond reproach up to the moment he won the last pot.

There is, however, an infallible method of "stopping now." To secure an agreement to stop warfare we can and must repudiate the principle of war, and accompany that repudiation by evidence of a change of heart. It will not do for any nation to accuse others of "aggression" even while refusing

to reconsider as much as its own most recent war conquests, held against its own word pledged in Point 5 of the Famous Fourteen.

The price of peace between Haves and Have-Nots is the same, whether at home or abroad, whether in domestic or international affairs. At home, it will not serve to offer peace to frustrated millions save upon terms of social security and honourable economic status, involving the transmutation of mere "employment" into the dignity of shared control of the purposes as well as of the product of the nation's labour. Abroad, it will not serve to offer peace to frustrated nations save upon terms which enable their peoples to thrive upon a fair share of world opportunity, so that their labouring millions may no longer be charged, and most despicably charged, with the *lack of a proper standard of life*.

Is it not something worse than thoughtless to pour scorn upon nations for being poor even while they are deprived of the means of gaining wealth? I confess that when I see articles in the Press mocking Germany for restricting the amount of material in a shirt, or for the invention of a fish sausage, or for the economising of cereal flour by the addition of potato meal, I feel inclined to ask the writers what they would think of a well-to-do fellow citizen who jingled his money in his pockets while mocking the poverty of a friend and declaring that an efficient police, "rearmed," would see to it if the friend became "aggressive" or dared to break a window to seize a loaf.

There is yet a wider consideration in this matter of Haves and Have-Nots. It is that, as I pointed out in *Can War Be Averted?*, every nation is interested in a better distribution of the world's natural wealth and opportunity. It is not the Have-Not nations alone who would gain by a better distribution. Just as within a nation any improvement in the condition of a deprived or frustrated class is a general domestic gain, so with the world at large. To improve an under-developed land, to populate a territory rich in soil and materials, is something done for all men. The world as a whole gains when any part of it gains, loses when any part of it suffers loss, and is deprived and frustrated through the neglect, the loss, the backwardness, the lack of population, of any territory. The world is not yet adequately brought into use, even while access to it is denied to great peoples.

LEO CHIOZZA MONEY.

STRUGGLES FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN.

THE supremacy of Ancient Rome in the Mediterranean during some 500 years has incited ambitious rulers in that sea to strive to monopolise it as the ideal base for assuring world power. Let us examine briefly why three of them utterly failed.

Philip II of Spain (1556-98) strove to monopolise that sea and thence absolutely control the New Worlds of West and East, accorded to her and Portugal by the Papal Bull of 1493. As a Habsburg, he ruled most of Central Europe, also the Dutch Netherlands (with their colonies) and much of Italy. Further, in 1580 he annexed Portugal, thereby acquiring her vast Eastern Empire, and thus dwarfing even the old Roman Empire. Meanwhile, in 1571, the victory of the Spanish-Italian fleet at Lepanto over that of the Turks extended his supremacy over the Levant, and many of our merchantmen sailing thither were seized. Thereupon the London Levant Company prepared "tall and stout ships" (to use Hakluyt's phrase) which far surpassed the galley-like craft of the usually placid Mediterranean. At last, in 1586 near Sicily, five of our Levanters beat off the attack of "11 galleys and 2 frigates" of the Spanish Navy.

The Spaniards, defective alike in ships, seamanship and strategy, utterly failed in their "Invincible Armada," and thereafter English and Dutch seaworthy and well-armed ships often worsted those of Spain, in 1596 even capturing Cadiz. In 1607 the Dutch fleet near Gibraltar utterly routed the largest fleet of Spain, thereby compelling her soon to grant full rights of trading to the Indies. Thus ended her Mediterranean and oceanic monopolies.

Even more serious was her absorption in the Thirty Years' War of 1618-48, which led on to destructive attacks by the French. These were due largely to their resentment at rigid Spanish control of the Mediterranean, which told heavily against Provence. Already Henri IV had fortified that fine natural harbour, Toulon; and now Richelieu made it an ideal naval base, which long won for France supremacy in that sea. Spain, suffering defeats and losses in those waters, on her own frontiers, also in Flanders and in both the Indies, now saw her World Empire collapse; for its vastness proved a weakness

when she lost control of the Mediterranean, also in 1640 of Portugal, now once more independent.

The young Louis XIV, helped on by Cromwell, soon soared to supremacy both on sea and land. Finally, in 1700, when the disputed claims to the throne at Madrid ended in his grandson succeeding to it as Philip V, this Franco-Spanish alliance promised world supremacy; and Britons, Dutch, and the subjects of the Emperor resolved to prevent it. Their maritime chances increased in 1703 when the apprehensive Portuguese joined them, thus affording Lisbon as a base for action against the Franco-Spanish "lake," the Mediterranean. Though in 1703-4 the Anglo-Dutch fleet failed in a few efforts against the Spanish coast, yet these caused so wide a diffusion of defence forces as to leave Gibraltar weakly garrisoned. Accordingly, the sixteen British and six Dutch battleships and their landing force easily captured that grand strategic post. Soon off Malaga a French fleet attacked the Allies, but failed and retired to Toulon. Three other Franco-Spanish efforts brought no result; and, with Gibraltar in British hands, the Toulon fleet now remained severed from the Atlantic and Channel forces of France. Also in 1708 the allied fleet landed a considerable force in Minorca near Port Mahon and captured that fortress, thus securing an excellent base for actions against Southern France, which greatly helped Marlborough in the north. Naturally, Great Britain, which had provided a great majority of the warships and troops in the Mediterranean, retained Gibraltar and Minorca at the Peace of Utrecht (1713), thus bringing about a balance of power in that sea.

The next would-be monopolist of the Mediterranean was Napoleon Bonaparte. For, during the war with Revolutionary France, our abandonment of Corsica and the Mediterranean late in 1796 owing to Spain's sudden hostility encouraged that great Corsican to aim at vast oriental conquests. Accordingly, in 1797, he brought about the partition of the Republic of Venice, gaining for the French that city, her fleet and her Ionian Isles, the keys to the Levant. Also by bribery and intrigues he undermined the Order of St. John in Malta, and urged the French Directory to threaten to invade Ireland and so detain Britain's warships in home waters. In this last he failed; for in April 1798 Pitt had resolved that part of Earl St. Vincent's fleet, then blockading Cadiz, should be sent

into the Mediterranean to watch and attack the French force preparing at Toulon. Accordingly, Nelson sailed in, and finally in Aboukir Bay destroyed Bonaparte's naval support and cut him and his army off in Egypt.

No naval victory ever led to results so widespread and decisive: At once Nelson despatched secretly to India an officer to warn the Viceroy of Bonaparte's designs, which were soon crushed at Seringapatam. Meanwhile our fleet had sailed for Malta and both encouraged and helped the Maltese to attack the French garrison of Valetta, which finally surrendered to us, not to the Maltese. We also recovered Minorca, and thus once more commanded the West Mediterranean. Further, those age-long enemies, Turkey and Russia, now joined hands and despatched their conjoint fleet to drive the French from the Ionian Isles. Finally, Russia and Austria started against France the Second Coalition, which at first so far succeeded as to induce Bonaparte to abandon his troops in Egypt and make for Provence, landing there in time to be hailed as "Conqueror of the East," and so become First Consul, that is virtually Dictator, of France.

Greatly was his position strengthened by extorting from Britain's weak Cabinet the gainful Peace of Amiens, whereby we handed back to the French and their Dutch and Spanish allies all our colonial conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad, which he compelled these to give up. As for the Mediterranean, we abandoned Elba, restored Minorca to Spain, Egypt to the Sultan, and Malta to the Order of the Knights of St. John. He soon paralysed that Order by confiscating all its landed properties in Italy, thereby rendering impossible the garrisoning of mighty Valetta. Further, his annexations of Piedmont, Parma and Elba, his despatch of an expedition to Pondichery and an official statement in the *Moniteur* of January 30th, 1803, as to the ease with which France would regain Egypt and the Ionian Isles, aroused even our Premier, Addington, to firmness. Malta being in a helpless state and not guaranteed by the Powers, he soon demanded its retention by us for ten years. This led to war in May. Nelson now set forth the strategic issue at stake—"Malta is a most important outwork to India." Also Napoleon at St. Helena revealed to Gourgaud the secret of his world policy—"The East only awaits a man. He who masters Egypt masters India."

The first important result of Trafalgar was in the Mediterranean. For Napoleon's imperious command to the combined fleet to put out from Cadiz was in order to secure the mastery of that sea and support the large French force then about to invade South Italy and overpower the Anglo-Russian troops there defending the Bourbons of Naples. Though the allied troops were overwhelmed early in 1806, yet Collingwood, successor to Nelson, used his fleet to convey and convoy the Bourbon sovereigns, their Court, and most of their troops to Sicily, which our fleet and troops helped long to defend against Joseph Bonaparte (now King of Naples). Well might Napoleon soon write that our effective hold on Sicily and Malta formed *une barrière infranchissable* to his oriental designs. After conquering Prussia he issued at Berlin the famous Decree of November 21st, 1806, founding his portentous Continental System for blocking out Britain's trade and thereby strangling her—a policy which led him on to Tilsit, Madrid and Moscow. At Tilsit (July 1807) he forced the Tsar to give up, *inter alia*, the Ionian Isles; and, as by April 1809 he had annexed all the Papal States, he expected utterly to dominate the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile he had absorbed Portugal and Spain by measures so harsh as to provoke stern resistance and lead to the Peninsular War. Therein our control of all the neighbouring seas exerted an immense influence in favour both of Wellington's army and of our hard-pressed merchants. Year by year the value of our cotton imports into Gibraltar increased, reaching £1,983,000 in 1813. Those into Malta exceeded them by £430,000, a fact explained by the increasing needs of Italian, Greek and Turkish peoples. Also we had then reconquered nearly all the Ionian Isles and thence despatched into neighbouring ports great quantities of British goods and colonial produce. No wonder that Napoleon exclaimed—*Maudit sucre, maudit café, maudites colonies!* These indeed were the underlying cause of his ruin. For European peoples demanded tropical produce, which Britain alone now supplied, and even French and Italians secretly smuggled in. Thus, our hold on Gibraltar and Malta practically nullified his southern annexations, and at the Peace of Paris (1814-15) we insisted on retaining Malta and the Ionian Isles.

Did we now try to monopolise the Mediterranean? On the contrary our only great effort was to suppress Algerine piracy,

as was ordered conjointly by the Powers at the Congress of Vienna. In July 1816 there sailed from Plymouth nineteen warships, which Spain, France and South Italy were expected to help. Not a sail did they despatch; and only six Dutch frigates joined our fleet under Lord Exmouth. On August 27th a fierce but successful fight ensued against that formidable fortress, Algiers, and the Dey agreed to release more than 1,200 Christian slaves (nearly all South Europeans), to refund the heavy ransoms lately extorted by him from Naples and Sicily, and to give up piracy. After losing 128 killed and 690 wounded (the Dutch, only 13 and 52) our battered fleet withdrew; but, alas, the Dey soon resumed piracy, also again after an inadequate Anglo-French force assailed him in 1819. Yet in 1830 France, after suffering from the Dey losses and insults, attacked him with both a fleet and an army, which captured Algiers, and soon began to conquer and annex Algeria, the base of her now vast possessions in North Africa. These made her supreme in the Mediterranean. Her supremacy there was notably enhanced in 1881 when she seized Tunisia, thereby exasperating the Italians and driving them into the arms of Austria and Germany until 1915.

Meanwhile, Britain had helped on two divided and oppressed peoples. In 1827 she delivered the Greeks of the Morea by destroying in Navarino Bay a large Turco-Egyptian fleet about to enslave them once more. This assured Greek independence in 1830. Further, in 1863 she handed over the Ionian Isles to the Greek kingdom, thus strengthening it but weakening our position in that sea. Also, in 1860, she had helped on Garibaldi and his "Thousand" to land in West Sicily, then fight his way on to Messina, and finally cross to South Italy, all of which he won over to the cause of freedom and unity. How, then, can Italian Fascists now accuse us of making selfish use of our Mediterranean supremacy since 1815? Our only territorial gain there has been Cyprus, over which in 1878 Disraeli secured control from the Sultan in order to check the recent expansive efforts of Tsarist Russia. This action, though sharply censured by Gladstone, answered its purpose; and, at worst, it is slight compared with the acquisitions of Italy in North Africa and the Ægean Sea, where she seized the Tripolitana and the Dodekanese.

Noteworthy also are Germany's efforts in the Near East. Wilhelm II, after striving for naval supremacy and colonies,

sought to extend German-Austrian-Turkish influence as far as the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. That Bagdad Railway plan of 1902 was to assure speedy through communications via the Bosphorus and Bagdad to the Persian Gulf for a new East India trade, while a branch southwards could convey troops near to the Suez Canal and into Arabia. Thus did he expect to deal a fatal blow by land against our force on or near the Canal and so cut off our reinforcements from India and Australasia. Yet in the Great War we drove the half-starved Turkish assailants back into the Sinai Desert, then into Palestine, whence General Allenby's army, helped by a few French troops, expelled them, as also from Syria. The collapse of this enterprise told heavily against the Central Powers and Turkey, finally cutting off their food, etc., from the East. In the Peace of 1919 France received the mandate for Syria, and we that for Palestine.

Turkey and Egypt, though then opposed to us, are now quite friendly. How comes this change? Mainly because their chief danger now comes from Fascist Italy. Terrible has been her change of front since 1922. Previously, her attitude to Britain had been consistently friendly. Thus Tittoni, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1903-9, greeted the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 as confirming the prospect of peace, especially for Italy and the Mediterranean. Satisfactory also were her relations with us respecting Somaliland, Eritrea and Abyssinia. As for Tripoli, she would not occupy it unless piracies compelled her. The outlook darkened in 1911 when she did so, and thereafter expanded her "Libya" to the borders of Egypt and the Sudan. Discontent with her British and French Allies became keen at the terms of peace in 1919, which yielded her very little oversea, though we granted her South Somaliland, and the French a fragment near Eritrea. Finally, in October 1922, the fervid patriotism of the Fascists led up to the dictatorship of Mussolini. His policy of armed force culminated in the attack on Abyssinia. Always anti-British, he held us partly responsible for that dispute by diverting Abyssinian trade down the Nile.* But that trade had not changed since Tittoni's period. Though his conquest of Abyssinia led to sharp friction with Britain, yet we came to terms with him in the Mediterranean Agreement of January 2nd, 1937, which stipulates (a) "freedom of entry into, exit

* *What next, O Duce?* (1937), pp. 11 and 12. Miss B. Baskerville.

from, and transit through the Mediterranean," as this was "a vital interest" to both nations: also (b) they disclaim "any desire to modify, or see modified, the *status quo* of territory in that area," but "will respect each other's rights and interests there."*

Highly satisfactory are these essential terms. Despite Fascist charges to the contrary, we abode by them, though difficulties arose about the protection of sea commerce off Spain and Palestine. Still, our successful rearmament, and the welcome which it received in France, Greece and Turkey, led him to take us more seriously and to give permanence to the Agreement, though it aroused sneers from aggressive minds in Italy.

"The Mediterranean is our sea: Malta is our Malta, for the British stole it from us." These were typical shouts of extreme Fascists. This last is false. For in 1530 the King of the Two Sicilies granted Malta in perpetuity to the Order of the Knights of St. John. The old suzerain claims of the South Italian Kingdom had utterly lapsed by 1798, and no protest was made in 1814 when we retained Malta and Gozo. Nevertheless, Fascist fanatics in Italy strive to concentrate popular feelings against Malta as the central point of the Mediterranean. Absolute control of its narrow waist is desirable strategically; and they point to such a control by the Old Roman Empire as the first aim for the New Empire proclaimed by Mussolini in May 1936, after the conquest of Abyssinia.

In this spirit was it that, on the fifteenth anniversary of the Blackshirt success at Rome in October 1922, Mussolini there addressed a host of Fascist "aristocrats," urging "the resurrection of the Roman Empire" as the climax of their patriotic efforts. This ambitious programme pointed clearly to all lands and seas between the Tagus and the Nile in order to assure domination of the Mediterranean, the unifier of the Old Empire. Hence his persistent efforts to assure the success of the Fascist General Franco in Spain, also to encourage Levantine Arabs against our Palestine mandate. Above all, he resolves to command the Mediterranean and its shores by aircraft, which overpowered Abyssinia's defences. But bombing terrors now appal several lands, especially Turkey and Egypt. Accordingly, these States have come to friendly relations with us and the French. On December 30th,

* *What next, O Duce?* (1937), pp. 11 and 12. Miss B. Baskerville.

1937, the new Premier of Egypt, Mohamed Mahmud Pasha, spoke of her friendly relations with foreign Powers, "particularly with our ally, Britain." Fears of Italy have also strengthened the new Balkan Entente, which now includes formerly hostile Greece and Turkey.

Apprehension has also spread far over the Indian Ocean. Very suggestive was the recent declaration of Mr. Lyons, Premier of the Union of Australia,—“For her the Mediterranean is now as important as is the Tasman Sea.” May these important assertions sink deep into the hearts of all Italians. May they also remember that Britain, when supreme in the Mediterranean, never monopolised that sea, but thrice helped other trading peoples to overthrow a riparian Power striving to establish over it a tyrannical monopoly. Did we not also help to put down piracy and to assure the liberty and unity of the Greek and Italian peoples?

J. HOLLAND ROSE.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GABRIELE D'ANNUNZIO.

BORN in Pescara in the Abruzzi on March 12th, 1863, D'Annunzio carried in himself to the last the stamp of that still wild region, the natural and human atmosphere of which he so magnificently described and celebrated in his *Novelle della Pescara* and in the pastoral tragedy—perhaps the least unsuccessful of his tragedies—of the *Figlia di Jorio*. From there he drew his almost inexhaustible capacity for exultation in pure animal health and strength, in the possession of vigorous muscles, of quickly sensitive nerves, of deep and broad breathing, his proneness to certain pathological predilections and cruel delights, such as follow one upon the other in the *Libro delle Vergini* and in *San Pantaleone*; his sensitiveness to all elementary vital joys, to the sudden joys of convalescents in the process of recovering and rediscovering life; and especially to the irresistible, intoxicating, tormenting reassertions of the sexual impulse; his delight in the spectacle of the ferocity of crowds, his fierce searching into all kinds of primitive savagery. From there he imbibed that *ferinità* which, as he avows in his *Contemplazioni della morte*, ever persists under his deepest fervour and the deepest disturbances of his spirit; that *ferinità* which culture will only refine; that *ferinità* that will ever close his heart to the emotion of pity and reverence and prevent his Muse from knowing and enjoying laughter and indignation; that undaunted irrepressible *ferinità* which will ever disable him from giving us, especially in dealing with women, mere bodies instead of souls and characters, statues and gestures—however splendidly carved and chiselled—instead of the inwardness of virtuous and heroic deeds; that *ferinità* owing to which his art, like his life, will ever remain on this side of morality, untinged by it; that *ferinità* owing to which, however much he may imitate or translate or develop motives and scenes from Maupassant or Baudelaire or Zola or Dostoyevski or Tolstoi, he remains far beneath them.

In trying to look at humanity from above and from outside, he falls below, for great art is the expression of the fully human. Literature and literary learning will be like a kid glove worn in order not to soil one's fingers in handling now this, now that poor piece of human experience; or, instead of

being used for the discovery of one's soul or to the celebration of an Idea, will just be worn as a jewel or as a wreath to adorn and enrich one's pleasures and one's enjoyment of one's self. Botticelli, Lawrence, Gainsborough will become mere means of interpretation of this or that woman: Correggio will be of use in understanding Elena in *Il Piacere*, Perugino to throw light on a given scenery. Similarly, history will become a mere celebration of adultery to which Greece will contribute Helen, Judæa Herodias and the unnamed woman in the Gospel; and Rome Ennia Junia, just as England will contribute Lady Macbeth, and other lands Godoleva and Isolde, while the Renaissance will contribute Monna Castora, Donna Violante, Anne Boleyn.

Nor very different will be the function of religion. The sacrament of the Eucharist will inspire him to say that the forehead of a lady lover is "*tenue e pura come una particola*"; that the hand of another holds "the holy wafer between her pure fingers" and that the bed of another still seems like an altar. In the *Parable of the Foolish and the Wise Virgins* D'Annunzio will not hesitate to side with the foolish, who know how to enjoy; in the *Parable of the Rich Man and of Poor Lazarus*, it is the rich man who will have all the poet's favour, and from Hell will exclaim to Lazarus, compelled to envy from Heaven:

"Lo, my eye has beheld all these things, my ear has heard them, my tongue has tasted them, my nostrils have smelled them, my hands have handled them, all my flesh has squeezed joy from them."

Virginity itself will only be a special object of thrill: that of the sensuousness of virginity. *La Città Morta*, Mycenæ, with the graves of the Atrides, will merely be the occasion for the description of an atmosphere suggestive of crime and incest. In *Gloria* a sculptor will only see a body from which a thousand statues seem to spring more alive than herself, and another woman will only be interesting for the feelings she experiences and conveys in consequence of the amputation of her hands. In the *Dream of a Spring Morning* we are given the emotions of Isabella clasping during a whole night, flooded by its blood, the body of the lover who has been murdered in her arms. . . . Such is the monochromic background of the art of D'Annunzio emerging between 1881 and 1900 from contact with the fashionable Roman society of

that time, within whose magnificent palaces, where vice and pomp seem as it were ennobled by the radiance of Italian art, he moved, in increasing acquaintance, as Croce said, with the love of sport and the sport of love; as also of the D'Annunzio emerging from contact with the great currents of European literature, especially French and Russian.

And yet these are not the only emotions celebrated by D'Annunzio. He has never been a mere *gaudente*, satiated with pleasure. Nobody has better expressed the doom "that is over man, of having to taste the nausea of what already intoxicated and exalted him, the dim sadness and weariness, which is at the bottom of all human happiness, as the bitter water of the sea is at the mouth of every river," the boredom, the shame, the intrinsic chastisement inexorably accompanying or waiting upon triumphant *voluptas*. He has not ignored the longing for moral heights, the dim expectation of sweetnesses, different from all merely animal and natural sweetnesses; but he has never attained; he ever remains *in via*. His very pantheism is radically different, for instance, from that of Shelley, as expressed in the Ode to Adonais or in the last verses of *Prometheus Unbound*; while in Shelley the *at-one-ment* of the individual with the Universe is an *at-one-ment* with what is higher and deeper than even the highest and deepest in man, in D'Annunzio the *at-one-ment* is a sheer immersion in nature as detached from any high specifically human characteristic; a delight in nature as sheer chaos of experiences and amoral reality. D'Annunzio positively revels in rebellion against spirituality and especially Christian spirituality.

Such has been our author. Of him it has been well said that, when we read his prose we find ourselves often hurled from admiration to boredom and weariness and then back to admiration. It is not the prose we would wish and yet it almost conquers us; and after having conquered us it fills us with satiety and then, further on, with doubt whether he means to persuade us or to cheat and mock us by affecting thoughts and feelings different from those he is really experiencing; we go on reading and often discover the real poet and more often still the successful artist and magnificent craftsman in words, above all the King and master of the word:

"Word, o deep and mystic reality, full well do I know thy nature and thy mystery and the awful might which is thine!"

And this not merely in the case of Italian! The *Martyre de Saint Sebastian* bears witness to his full mastery of French; and there are still living in France literary men who avowed to the writer their astonishment at a gathering of French men of letters, when D'Annunzio recited and almost sang, one after another, several mediæval French poems, all unknown to his listeners: "*il est tout à fait un chartiste!*" (a specialist in mediæval documents), exclaimed one of them. Fogazzaro, a few months before his death, on the occasion of the writer's first and last visit to him in his beautiful villa in Valsolda (Lake of Lugano), expressed the conviction that, but for his lack of spiritual convictions, D'Annunzio "might even have equalled or surpassed Dante himself: 'Nothing seems to me beyond his powers!'"

No doubt, then, D'Annunzio marks a characteristic stage in the development of modern Italian literature: the stage of rupture with the cultural tradition of Manzoni, Leopardi, Carducci. Of Manzoni, the last great representative of Catholic literature, in whom, as in Dante, thought and action, ideality and reality, are still in harmony, D'Annunzio only retains that historical spirit, due to the Romantic period and without which his *Francesca da Rimini* would be merely a lurid description of adultery and licentiousness. The pessimism of Leopardi, in which that harmony is first broken, is rather felt and retained through the influence of Schopenhauer, in so far as it voices the feeling, far from absent in D'Annunzio, of the vanity and satiety and weariness following upon any purely sensual and sensuous life. Similarly, especially in the early D'Annunzio, we easily recognise Carducci's influence.

But in all three cases historicism, pessimism, paganism, undergo a radical change: they cease to be world-views, i.e. links between experiences; henceforward there are only single experiences, moments of experience to be successively contemplated, expressed and enjoyed in their expression. There are periods in history in which patriotism, religion, philosophy, all the great steel springs of the spiritual organism of humanity cease to act in souls and life is like a necklace whose pearls have fallen separate and the eye of the soul can only arbitrarily fall successively on each of them. In so far as each of them is looked upon with clear steady piercing glance we have still the eye of an artist; in so far as each of

them is at any moment arbitrarily chosen as the object of such a glance, this glance is that of an artist of dilettantism, of a dilettante artist.

When we have allowed ourselves to admire and enjoy all that there is to be admired and enjoyed in all D'Annunzio wrote, we cannot help becoming aware of fatal deficiencies. First of all this art is intrinsically affected with fragmentariness, with a lack of wholeness, which, as Croce remarked long ago in his first classical essay on D'Annunzio, is the natural æsthetic form of psychological dilettantism. Some have said that our poet, so stupendously rich in means, does not know any worthy use to which to put them. The poet himself admits as much when he makes one of his most famous creatures confess that "he loves more expression than thought," and when, in the *Trionfo della Morte* in order to explain and justify why so many apparently extraneous things have been thrust and packed into it, he proclaims that he has evoked around the agony of the dying man all the most luring imaginings and stretched out a many-hued carpet under his faltering steps; for indeed not merely the shortest lyrics, but all the tragedies and novels and long poems of D'Annunzio, what are they but collections of lyrics and cycles of lyrics? What are the *Vergini delle Rocce* but the *Canzoniere* of the Virgins doomed to sterility; and what is the *Gioconda* but the *Canzoniere* of the beautiful hands? Out of this lack of wholeness we see proceeding an excessive abundance of images, which, while imposing themselves, severally taken, as singularly perfect, issue, taken cumulatively, in a kind of dazzling, tiring light. Furthermore, because D'Annunzio is essentially a lyrical poet and a lyrical poet without abiding ideal inspiration and, therefore, inevitably celebrating now this, now that, moment of sensuous experience, we find him again and again expressing far better in verse the things he tried and failed to say in prose.

Such is Croce's judgment in a famous but now old essay. D'Annunzio has been, according to Croce, the most magnificent and *imaginifico* representative of an Italian and perhaps European moment of experience in which, on the one hand, the sciences of nature, clothing themselves in pseudo-philosophic cloaks, seemed to have left no room for Religion or any idealistic cosmic intuition of life; and, on the other hand, the rising of the *bourgeoisie* has destroyed the faith in the

brotherhood of men and nations once rooted in the Fatherhood of God and has proclaimed competition in its place, while Socialism inherits its materialism and proclaims history as a dialectic process ruled by class warfare. In such a situation what can spirit, intrinsically unable to remain idle, do but rest its restless eye indifferently on this or that among the myriad facets of life's prism? And, as a world reduced to being a mere succession of more or less ephemeral and disconnected thrills would soon wear out even its beholders, and to be a world it needs some nexus, inevitably it will tend to organise itself hierarchically around the thrills more permanently thrilling; and what can these thrills be but those of voluptuous pleasure and cruelty? That is why in D'Annunzio's art, in tragedies as well as in novels, sensuality and cruelty are the queens of the world, coupled with a certain cult of the heroic, which is the cult of egoism far more than of heroism, and is more akin to the *virtù* of the Renaissance than to ethical *virtus*.

All this is undoubtedly true and yet, as developments since the Crocean essay (1903-4) was written, prove, is far from being the whole truth. It may seem to many that a radical change took place in D'Annunzio when, between 1903 and 1911-12—the years of the Tripoli war—the poet who once had called the four hundred Italians fallen at Dogali, at the dawn of Italian colonisation in Africa, “four hundred brutes brutally gone to death,” gave us the *Odi Navali* and the *Canzone di Garibaldi*. But, as Croce has conclusively shown, what really attracted D'Annunzio was the fascination of war, the ideal enjoyment of very slaughter and bloodshed. In the last-mentioned poem the ideal significance of the hero is completely lost: *libertà*, *popolo* count for nothing; the Garibaldian epos is resolved into a purely picturesque series of episodes without inwardness: a gallery of magnificent but soulless statues. And the writer fails to see any deeper significance in all D'Annunzio wrote or did during the war or since. He remained essentially an immensely gifted adventurer in life. None among his so-called heroic deeds but has been equalled or surpassed by numberless anonymous soldiers, and it would not be difficult to mention episodes—well-established ones—where he shrank from the path of heroism. Fiume itself was not so much a goal as a stage, and none of his most recent works shows that he ever ceased to

be more than an amoral being in love with violent and spectacular situations, an eruption of titanic, plutonic, sub-human energy into civilised humanity. Those who compared him to Byron should reflect on Byron's generous idealism for freedom, and on what Byron would have done with Garibaldi.

No. There has never been in D'Annunzio anything more sincerely felt than the gospel summarised in the famous three verses: *Volontà, Voluttà—Orgoglio, Istinto—Quadrige imperiale!*" D'Annunzio has been something more than a mere dilettante of feelings, as Croce judged him, only in the sense that he was a dilettante of action for action's sake, the poet of the irrationalistic voluntarism and activism characteristic of so much modern life. And he remained a dilettante to the last in the sense that far from losing himself ecstatically in what he brings to life, in the very act of creating it he detaches himself from it and rejoices in his creation for its being so explosively, so provokingly rich in amoral life, in a life which not only has within itself alone its norms, but also delights in rising above all norms it forges for itself, in order to behold its freedom from every norm, its triumph through very death over its own nature, if to be and to have a nature is to obey a law. In 1912, in the *Contemplazioni della Morte*, written on the occasion of the death of Pascoli, the sweet poet of *Myrica*, it seemed to many as if Death had led him to the threshold of Christian Mysticism. But it was only for a moment: he tasted and beheld from afar the mystic Death, and Christ remained still for him *my most beautiful foe*. It was his deepest self, indeed, that led him to choose as his motto *gioire o morire* (to enjoy or to die) in contrast to the great Teresa's *soffrire o morire!*

Undoubtedly therefore he was a creator and a forerunner of Fascism in its hypernationalistic and even more in its intrinsically anti-Christian aspects. And the Vatican's organ was the interpreter of all ethically minded spirits in declaring him one of the most pernicious influences in contemporary Italy. It is almost impossible indeed to recall to mind another instance of such a sacrilegious misuse of divine gifts.

ANGELO CRESPI.

FREEDOM AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM.

THE link between classical liberalism and present-day socialism—often still misnamed liberalism—is undoubtedly the belief that the consummation of individual freedom requires relief from the most pressing economic cares. If this seems attainable only at the price of restricting freedom of economic activity, then that price must be paid ; and it may be conceded that most of those who want to restrict private initiative in economic life do so in the hope of creating more freedom in spheres which they value higher. So successfully has “the socialist ideal of freedom, social, economic and political,”* been preached that the old cry of the opponents that socialism means slavery has been completely silenced. Probably the great majority of the socialist intellectuals regard themselves as the true upholders of the great tradition of intellectual and cultural liberty against the threatening monster of the authoritarian Leviathan.

Yet here and there, in the writings of some of the more independent minds of our time, who have generally welcomed the universal trend towards collectivism, a note of disquiet can be discerned. The question has forced itself upon them whether some of the shocking developments of the past decades may not be the necessary outcome of the tendencies which they had themselves favoured. There are some elements in the present situation which strongly suggest that this may be so, such as the intellectual past of the authoritarian leaders, and the fact that many of the more advanced socialists openly admit that the attainment of their ends is not possible without a thorough curtailment of individual liberty. The similarity between many of the most characteristic features of the “fascist” and the “communist” régimes becomes steadily more obvious. Nor is it an accident that in the fascist states a socialist is often regarded as a potential recruit, while the liberal of the old school is recognised as the arch-enemy. And, above all, the effects of the gradual advance toward collectivism in the countries which still cherish the tradition of liberty on social and political institutions provide ample food for thought. Anyone who has had an opportunity to watch at close range the intellectual evolution of the peoples who

* *The Times* of July 16th, 1936, in a review of J. Nehru, *India and the World*.

eventually succumbed to authoritarianism cannot fail to observe a very similar chain of cause and effect in a much less advanced state proceeding in the countries which are yet free. Are we certain that we know exactly where the danger to liberty lies? Was the rise of the fascist régimes really simply an intellectual reaction fomented by those whose privileges were abolished by social progress? Of course the direction of affairs in those countries has been taken out of the hands of the working classes and has been placed in those of a more efficient oligarchy. But have the new rulers not taken over the fundamental ideas and methods and simply turned them to their own ends?

It is astounding that these fateful possibilities which suggest themselves have not yet received more attention. If the suspicion of such a connection should prove right it would mean that we are witnessing one of the great tragedies in human history: more and more people being driven by their indignation about the suppression of political and intellectual freedom in some countries to join the forces which make its ultimate suppression inevitable. It would mean that many of the most active and sincere advocates of intellectual freedom are in effect its worst enemies, much more dangerous than its avowed opponents, because they bring the support of those who would recoil in horror if they understood the ultimate consequences.

An attempt will be made here to show why this connection, which experience suggests, must be regarded as of a necessary character, dictated by the inherent logic of things. The main point is very simple. It is that the central economic planning, which is regarded as necessary to organise economic activity on more rational and efficient lines, presupposes a much more complete agreement on the relative importance of the different ends than actually exists, and that in consequence, in order to be able to plan, the planning authority must impose upon the people that detailed code of values which is lacking. And imposing here means more than merely reading such a detailed code of values into the vague general formulæ on which alone the people are able to agree. The people must be made to believe in this particular code of values, since the success or failure of the planning authority will in two different ways depend on whether it succeeds in creating that belief. On the one hand it will only secure the necessary

enthusiastic support if the people believe in the ends which the plan serves ; and on the other hand the outcome will only be regarded as successful if the ends served are generally regarded as the right ones.

A fuller exposition must begin with the problems which arise when a democracy begins to plan. Planning must be understood here in the wide sense of any deliberate attempt at central direction of economic activity which goes beyond mere general rules that apply equally to all persons, and which tells different people individually what to do and what not to do. The demand for such planning arises because people are promised a greater measure of welfare if industry is consciously organised on rational lines, and because it seems obvious that those particular ends which each individual most desires can be achieved by means of planning. But the agreement about the ends of planning is, in the first instance, necessarily confined to some blanket formula like the general welfare, greater equality or justice, etc. Agreement on such a general formula is, however, not sufficient to determine a concrete plan, even if we take all the technical means as given. Planning always involves a sacrifice of some ends in favour of others, a balancing of costs and results, and this presupposes a complete ranging of the different ends in the order of their importance. To agree on a particular plan requires much more than agreement on some general ethical rule ; it requires much more than general adherence to any of the ethical codes which have ever existed ; it requires that sort of complete quantitative scale of values which manifests itself in the actual decisions of every individual but on which, in an individualist society, agreement is neither necessary nor present.

This fact that a measure of agreement which does not exist is required in order to translate the apparent agreement on the desirability to plan into concrete action has two important consequences. In the first instance it is responsible for the conspicuous inability of democratic assemblies to carry out what is apparently the expressed will of the people, because it is only when it comes to translate the vague instructions into action that the lack of real agreement manifests itself. Hence the growing dissatisfaction with the " talking shops " which fail to carry out what to the man in the street seems a clear mandate. The second effect of the same cause, which

appears wherever a democracy attempts to plan, is the general recognition that if efficient planning is to be done in a particular field the direction of affairs must be "taken out of politics" and placed in the hands of independent, autonomous bodies. This is usually justified by the technical character of the decisions to be made, for which the members of a democratic assembly are not qualified. But this excuse does not go to the root of the matter. Alterations in the structure of the civil law are no less technical and no more difficult to appreciate in all their implications; yet nobody would seriously suggest that legislation should here be delegated to a body of experts. The fact is that in these fields legislation will be carried no further than true agreement between a majority exists. But in the direction of economic activity, say of transport, or industrial planning, the interests to be reconciled are so divergent that no true agreement on a single plan could be reached in a democratic assembly. Hence, in order to be able to extend action beyond the questions on which agreement exists, the decisions are reserved to a few representatives of the most powerful "interests."

But this expedient is not effective enough to placate the dissatisfaction which the impotence of the democracy must create among all friends of extensive planning. The delegation of special decisions to many independent bodies presents in itself a new obstacle to proper co-ordination of State action in different fields. The legislature is naturally reluctant to delegate decisions on really vital questions. And the agreement that planning is necessary, together with the inability to agree on a particular plan, must tend to strengthen the demand that the government, or some single person, should be given power to act on their own responsibility. It becomes more and more the accepted belief that if one wants to get things done the responsible director of affairs must be freed from the fetters of democratic procedure.

That the increasing discredit into which democratic government has fallen is due to democracy having been burdened with tasks for which it is not suited is a fact of the greatest importance which has not yet received adequate recognition. Yet the fundamental position is simply that the probability of agreement of a substantial portion of the population upon a particular course of action decreases as the scope of State

activity expands. There are certain functions of the State on the exercise of which there will be practical unanimity. There will be others on which there will be agreement among a substantial majority. And so on until we come to fields where, although every individual might wish the government to intervene in some direction, there will be almost as many views about how the government should act as there are different persons.

Democratic government worked successfully so long as, by a widely accepted creed, the functions of the State were limited to fields where real agreement among a majority could be achieved. The price we have to pay for a democratic system is the restriction of State action to those fields where agreement can be obtained; and it is the great merit of a liberal society that it reduces the necessity of agreement to a minimum compatible with the diversity of individual opinions which in a free society will exist. It is often said that democracy will not tolerate capitalism. But if here "capitalism" means a competitive society based on free disposal over private property, the much more important fact is that only capitalism makes democracy possible. And if a democratic people comes under the sway of an anti-capitalistic creed, this means that democracy will inevitably destroy itself.

But if democracy had to abdicate only from the control of economic life, this might still be regarded as a minor evil compared with the advantages expected from planning. Indeed many of the advocates of planning fully realise—and have resigned themselves to the fact—that if planning is to be effective, democracy in the economic sphere has to go by the board.* But it is a fatal delusion to believe that authoritarian government can be confined to economic matters. The tragic fact is that dictatorial direction cannot remain confined to economic matters but is bound to expand and to become "totalitarian" in the strict sense of the word. The economic dictator will soon find himself forced, even against his wishes, to assume dictatorship over the whole of the political and cultural life of the people. We have already seen that the planner must not only impose a concrete and detailed scale of values into the vague and general instructions given by popular

* Cf. Mr. Stuart Chase's statement that "political democracy can remain if it confines itself to all but economic matters." Quoted by Dr. W. Lippmann, *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1936, p. 729.

clamour, but must also, if he wants to act at all, make the people believe that this imposed code of values is the right one. He is forced to create that unity of purpose which—apart from national crises like war—is absent in a free society. Even more, if he is to be allowed to carry out the plan which he thinks to be the right one, he must retain the popular support, that is, he must at all costs appear successful.

The decision on the relative importance of conflicting aims is necessarily a decision about the relative merits of different groups and individuals. Planning becomes necessarily a planning in favour of some and against others.* The problem here is, of course, not that the different people concerned have not the most decided opinions on the relative merits of their respective wishes; it is rather that these opinions are irreconcilable. But the ground on which the more or less arbitrary decision of the authority rests must be made to appear just, to be based on some ultimate ideal in which everybody is supposed to believe. The inevitable distinction between persons must be made a distinction of rank, most conveniently and naturally based on the degree to which people share and loyally support the creed of the ruler. And it further clarifies the position if to the aristocracy of creed at one end of the scale there corresponds a class of outcasts at the other, whose interests can in all cases be sacrificed to those of the privileged classes.

But conformity to the guiding ideas cannot be regarded as a special merit, although those who excel by their devotion to the creed will be rewarded. It must be exacted from everybody. Every doubt in the rightness of the ends aimed at or the methods adopted is apt to diminish loyalty and enthusiasm and must therefore be treated as sabotage. The creation and enforcement of the common creed and of the belief in the supreme wisdom of the ruler becomes an indispensable instrument for the success of the planned system. The ruthless use of all potential instruments of propaganda and the suppression of every expression of dissent is not an accidental accompaniment of a centrally directed system—it is an essential part of it. Nor can moral coercion be confined to the acceptance of

* This is freely admitted by all the authoritarian governments when they insist on the predominance of politics over economics, and has been clearly formulated by one of the sociologists of present-day Germany, Professor Hans Freyer in *Herrschaft und Planung*, 1933.

the ethical code underlying the whole plan. It is in the nature of things that many parts of this code, many parts of the scale of values underlying the plan, can never be explicitly stated. They exist only implicitly in the plan. But this means that every part of the plan, in fact every action of the government or its agencies becomes sacrosanct and exempt from criticism.

It is, however, only the expression of criticism that can be forcibly suppressed. But doubts that are never uttered and hesitation that is never voiced have equally insidious effects if they dwell only in the minds of the people. Everything which might induce discontent must therefore be kept from them. The basis for comparison with conditions elsewhere, the knowledge of possible alternatives to the course taken, information which might suggest failure on the part of the government to live up to its promises or to take advantage of opportunities to improve the lot of the people, all these must be suppressed. Indeed there is no subject that has not some possible bearing on the estimation in which the government will be held. There is consequently no field where the systematic control of information will not be practised. That the government which claims to plan economic life soon asserts its totalitarian character is no accident—it can do nothing less if it wants to remain true to the intention of planning. Economic life is not a sector of human life which can be separated from the rest ; it is the administration of the means for all our different ends. Whoever takes charge of these means must determine which ends shall be served, which values are to be rated higher and which lower, in short what men should believe and strive for. And man himself becomes little more than a means for the realisation of the ideals which may guide the dictator.

It is to be feared that to a great many of our contemporaries this picture, even should they recognise it as true, has lost most of the terror which it would have inspired in our fathers. There were, of course, always many to whom intellectual coercion was only objectionable if it was exercised by others, and who regarded it as beneficial if it was exercised for ends of which they approved. How many of the exiled intellectuals from the authoritarian countries would be only too ready to apply the intellectual coercion which they condemn in their opponents in order to make the people believe in their own ideals—incidentally another illustration for the

close kinship of the fundamental principles of fascism and communism! But, although the liberal age was probably freer from intellectual coercion than any other, the desire to force upon people a creed which is regarded as salutary for them is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the attempt to justify it on the part of the socialist intellectuals of our time. There is no real freedom of thought in a capitalist society, so it is said, because the opinions and tastes of the masses are inevitably shaped by propaganda, by advertising, by the example of the upper classes, and by other environmental factors which relentlessly force the thinking of the people into well-worn grooves. But if, the argument proceeds, the ideals and tastes of the great majority are formed by environmental factors which are under human control, we might as well use this power to turn their thoughts in what we think a desirable direction. That is, from the fact that the great majority have not learnt to think independently but accept the ideas which they find ready-made, the conclusion is drawn that a particular group of people—of course those who advocate this—are justified in assuming to themselves the exclusive power to determine what the people should believe.

It is not my intention to deny that for the great majority of individuals the existence or non-existence of intellectual freedom makes little difference to their personal happiness ; nor to deny that they will be equally happy if born or coaxed into one set of beliefs rather than another, and whether they have grown accustomed to one kind of amusement or another. That in any society it will be only the comparatively few for whom freedom of thought is of any significance or exists in any real sense is probably only too true. But to deprecate the value of intellectual freedom because it will never give everybody the same opportunity of independent thought is completely to miss the reasons which give intellectual freedom its value. What is essential to make it serve its function as the prime mover of intellectual progress is, not that everybody may think or write everything, but that any cause or any idea may be argued by somebody. So long as dissent is not actually prevented there will always be some who will query the ideas ruling their contemporaries and put new ideas to the test of argument and propaganda. The social process which we call human reason and which consists of the interaction of

individuals possessing different information and different views, sometimes consistent and sometimes conflicting, goes on. Once given the possibility of dissent there will be dissenters, however small the proportion of people who are capable of independent thought. Only the imposition of an official doctrine which must be accepted and which nobody dare question can stop intellectual progress.

How completely the imposition of a comprehensive authoritarian creed stifles all spirit of independent inquiry, how it destroys the sense for any other meaning of truth than that of conformity with the official doctrine, how differences of opinion in every branch of knowledge become political issues, one must have seen in one of the totalitarian countries to appreciate. One must hope that those in the western world who seem to be ready to sacrifice intellectual freedom because it does not mean the same opportunity for all do not yet realise what is at stake. Indeed, the great danger comes from the fact that we take so much of the inheritance of the liberal age for granted, have come to regard it as the inalienable property of our civilisation, that we cannot fully conceive what it would mean if we lost it. Yet freedom and democracy are not free gifts which will remain with us if we only wish. The time seems to have come when it is once again necessary to become fully conscious of the conditions which make them possible, and to defend these conditions even if they seem to block the path to the achievement of other ideals.

F. A. VON HAYEK.

THE DOMINIONS AND GERMAN COLONIAL CLAIMS.

AS Australia, New Zealand and South Africa hold under mandate half of the former German colonies assigned to the British Empire, the Dominions cannot but be affected by Germany's campaign for their return. The territories in question are all "C" Mandates which, subject to certain safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population, may be administered under the laws of the Mandatory State as an integral part thereof. Their distribution is as follows :

Territory	Area (sq. miles)	Population	Mandatory Power
Pacific Ocean :			
New Guinea, etc. ...	93,000	484,374	Australia
Western Samoa ...	1,113	54,363	New Zealand
Nauru	8	2,696	British Empire (U.K., <i>Austr.</i> , N.Z.)
Africa :			
South West Africa ...	322,393	359,516	South Africa

Two main factors operate to place South Africa in a different category from Australia and New Zealand in relation to the German colonial claims. In the first place, compared with the Pacific Mandates, South West Africa—which is, incidentally, two-thirds as big as the Union itself—is nearer to Europe and to Germany. Secondly, there is in the territory a considerable German community. Whilst the German inhabitants of the other former German colonies were mostly repatriated, South Africa adopted, in the words of General Smuts, "a much more merciful attitude." By the end of 1919 (i.e. one year before the formal grant of the Mandate by the League Council) 6,374 Germans had been repatriated, but 7,855 were allowed to stay. General Smuts and the Administrator of the territory, Mr. Hofmeyr, impressed on these that the Mandate was "annexation in all but name" and that they could, therefore, hope neither for the autonomy of South West Africa nor for its return to Germany.

The German colonists, however, retained the impression that South Africa was merely holding the territory in trust, and that its reversion to Germany would certainly follow her

admission to the League of Nations. The resulting uncertainty of their status prompted General Smuts to take up negotiations in London with the German Government in 1923. It appears from the published Memorandum that in the course of the conversations the German Government agreed to advise its nationals in South West Africa to accept Union citizenship under a general naturalisation law. South Africa agreed, on the other hand, that persons so naturalised should not be liable for military service against the German Reich for a period of thirty years. At the same time Herr von Haas, of the German Foreign Office, made a statement—not in the Memorandum, though many South African writers seem to think so—to the effect that he recognised that “the future of South West Africa is now bound up with the Union of South Africa.” The Nationalist opposition had been all the time very critical of General Smuts’ policy of incorporation of the territory into the Union, but the coming into office of General Hertzog’s Government made no change. Indeed, the policy of settling Union citizens was continued to such an extent that the German settlers complained that it had the deliberate object of “swamping” them; and certainly the South West Africa Commission of 1936, appointed by the Union Government, admits in its Report that “the coming of these settlers had the effect of converting the original German majority into a minority.”

But the political question involved did not become urgent until 1933, when the coming of the new régime in Germany gave the German community cause to hope and to agitate for a change in the status of the territory. This political activity, coupled with the deplorable economic condition of the territory which the effects of an exceptionally severe drought on the unprosperous and newly-established Union settlers and the world economic depression had combined to produce, led the non-German European population to seek its incorporation into the Union as a fifth province—which would have forestalled any possibility of its return to Germany. In the meantime the Administrator took such a serious view of the activities of the National-Socialists that in July 1934 he banned the Hitler-Youth Movement and in October the National-Socialist movement altogether as “detrimental to peace, order and good government of the territory” under the powers conferred on him by the Criminal

Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1933. And by a proclamation of March 1937, the German *Bund*, an organisation alleged to have replaced the National-Socialist Party, was proscribed.

This reaction of the Union Government to the political activities of the German community provides us with an indirect indication of its attitude to Germany's colonial demands, so far as South West Africa itself is concerned. But the Government has not a very good conscience over the grievances of the German community inasmuch as both the Constitutional Commission of 1935 and the South West Africa Commission have referred to the administration of the territory in radically condemnatory terms—terms which the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission have never used, though as M. Rappard put it at the 1937 summer session of that Commission, “they have had their apprehension for a long time past.” While M. Rappard probably had in mind the native revolt in 1922 as well, the criticism of the Union Commissions was mainly directed against the financial policy of the Union in covering the yearly deficit of the Territory by according it loans, the interest on which it is able to pay in full only by borrowing again from the Union and again increasing the burden of interest payments to such an extent that “the situation must resolve itself in the not distant future in absolute bankruptcy.” Active financial aid and incorporation into the Union as a fifth province—this for political reasons also—were proposed. Both Commissions emphasised that the smooth working of the Mandate system was practically impossible as long as uncertainty about the political future of the country prevailed. For there was widespread feeling that the future would not be decided upon in accordance with the principle of the Mandate, but would depend on developments in Europe. The majority of the non-German European community was ready to welcome even such a compromise as purely administrative incorporation into the Union to “lessen this intolerable uncertainty,” but demanded action and not merely general assurances that the territory would not be returned to Germany.

But even such general assurances were not easily forthcoming. Thus in response to a question about the German colonial claims asked in the Union House of Assembly on March 12th, 1934, General Hertzog asked “hon. members, all of us, please to be very careful as to what we say and the

words, we use about matters of a nature which must necessarily have a reference to foreign affairs." He declared, however, that the Union Government had not the least intention to act otherwise than faithfully to carry out its duties as Mandatory until such time as the object of the Mandate was attained. Yet doubts as to South Africa's intentions were again raised when Mr. Pirow, Minister of Defence, in a speech on the occasion of the visit of the German cruiser *Emden* early in 1935, expressed the hope that "Germany may soon become a colonial power again, and that in Africa." He qualified this by adding "How, where, and when, that cannot even vaguely be indicated at the present moment," which was interpreted by many as a sign that South Africa was working for a satisfaction of Germany's demands by the return to her of Tanganyika—under United Kingdom Mandate. The London correspondent of the *New York Times* even reported that General Hertzog had come to London at the time of the Silver Jubilee "in all seriousness" with a plan of giving to Germany the native republic of Liberia. (This is indeed an idea that seems to attract some South Africans; only recently a Union journalist reported a private address to students by Mr. Pirow in which Liberia was mentioned as well as the Cameroons.) Others suggested that Union ministers were hinting at "sacrifices" by Portugal and Belgium, or even France, particularly when Mr. Pirow, on returning from the defence conversations in London more than a year later (July 1936), reiterated his view that "Germany cannot be kept out of Africa for ever," but adding this time that it was vital to Union interests that the status of Tanganyika and South West Africa should remain unaltered. But still no official statement from the Government was forthcoming, and its policy seems to have been to avoid committing itself. Thus Mr. de Water, Union High Commissioner in London, in June 1936, replied to the suggestion of the Mandate Commission that it would contribute much to the pacification of South West Africa if the Union Government were to declare once and for all that the words "restoration to Germany" were out of its diplomatic vocabulary, in these terms: "It is a very big question, fraught with the most far-reaching consequences. . . . In its wisdom, the Union Government has decided, for the moment, not to make a statement of the kind referred to."

He added further that the question could not be settled on the narrow platform of South African policy, but only on the wider one of world policy.

At the end of 1936, however, the Union Government was impelled by the findings of the Constitution Commission to issue a statement "in order to allay, as far as this lies within its power, the sense of insecurity of the inhabitants." It was declared that

"the Union Government is not prepared to consider the possibility of the transfer of the Mandate to another Power, and wished to assure the people of South West Africa that it has as little thought of abandoning the Mandate as it has of abandoning its own territory. No one need, therefore, be perturbed by statements of persons who, for political reasons, make play of the imminent return of the territory to Germany."

But it was thought inexpedient to follow the advice of the Commission to make the territory a fifth province of the Union. And the hope of the Mandate Commission of some measure of financial assistance not involving appropriations for the service of debts has not yet been fulfilled—the moratorium in the matter of interest payments actually arranged being a poor substitute. Likewise the request of the German community that German should be made the third official language has not been granted.

It seems in fact to be General Hertzog's policy to work for a diplomatic agreement with Germany. On March 31st, 1937, he declared in the House of Assembly that "South West Africa must not go back to Germany . . . but we hope some day to come to a compromise with Germany in solving (!) the problem. . . . I do not want to go any further, and to make myself guilty of one of those indiscretions for which an opportunity like this sometimes actually gives some provocation." But so far such negotiations, if, indeed, they have ever reached an advanced stage, have been without result. Thus General Smuts, in a speech made before the last Congress of the United Party early in December, 1937, reverted to the view that the Memorandum of 1923 was "a formal agreement whereby Germany acknowledges that the future of South West Africa is with the Union. . . . Our claim to [it] is therefore based not merely on force and victory, but on an agreement with Germany." But even assuming that this interpretation is correct it seems hardly helpful, in the fifth

year of National-Socialist Germany, to refer to a Memorandum drawn up when the Weimar Republic was also in the fifth year of its existence! Moreover, immediately after the speech, the *Völkische Beobachter* denied that Germany had ever renounced her claim. It was officially announced in Berlin, on March 11th, 1938, that an exchange of notes had taken place between the German Government and the Union of South Africa in which Germany maintains her claim to the return of all her former colonies. The placing of the German colonies under a mandatory system and by later agreements (Memorandum of 1923) will not be regarded as legal. On the other hand, the Union Government maintains that the London Memorandum of 1923 finally settled South West Africa's legal status as territory administered by the Union.*

If the negotiations with Germany are not yet advanced enough for an "indiscretion" to enlighten us, the reaction to Mr. de Water's "Ottawa indiscretion" of September 1937, is at least illuminating. For the general exception taken in the Union press to the High Commissioner's expression of his personal view that "the nations would no longer delay to examine in a spirit of reasonable moderation the point of view of Germany about the colonial issue" revealed clearly that the Union's attitude to the question is dictated primarily by political and strategical considerations. It would indeed be difficult for the Government to meet the German assertion that the Union, with her small white population, does not need to seek space in South West Africa; that she does not need the cattle or raw materials of the territory as these are not complementary, but competitive, to her economy; and, finally, that her twenty years' administration has ended in failure. The reply of the Minister of Finance to a motion in the House of Assembly that the competition resulting from the unrestricted entry into Union markets of primary products from the territory was extremely detrimental to the interests of Union producers, that "it was in the interest of the Union that no other Power should ever have a footing

* The *Cape Argus*, commenting the following day on the exchange of notes and the Austrian situation, declared that "it is not pure coincidence that South Africa was brought into the menaced area on this very day by the announcement that the German Government maintains its legal claim to the return of South West Africa. This announcement is a definite act of hostility which makes it essential for the Union Government to revise the whole situation, and also to exercise a much closer surveillance over the movement of Germans both in South Africa and South West Africa."

on the borders of the Union, and these disadvantages must be looked upon as an insurance policy against such happenings," reveals the Union's real objection.

The Union Government, however, unlike the other Mandatories of former German colonies, will have to reckon with the complaints of the compact German community living next to it until it has satisfied their demands or reached an agreement with Germany. And since politico-strategical questions are involved, it is unlikely that the Union and Germany alone will reach such an agreement. Moreover the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the formation of the Rome-Berlin axis have increased rather than lessened the difficulties of the Union Government in this matter.

In this respect—the absence of any considerable German communities in their Mandated Territories—Australia and New Zealand are in a more favourable position in regard to the German colonial claims; the greater distance from Germany is also to their advantage. In New Zealand the acceptance of the Mandate was not greeted with much enthusiasm; many would have preferred Great Britain or the United States as Mandatory for Western Samoa and some influential papers thought that New Zealand's failure in the Cook Islands had proved that her small financial and administrative resources did not justify her taking any new territory in trust. And although Australia pressed for annexation at the Peace Conference and accepted the Mandates scheme with some disappointment, it cannot be said that she has taken any great interest in the territories coming under her rule. She had been too much occupied with the development of her own territory to care much about New Guinea. Yet, in spite of a general lack of interest and the unwillingness of young Australians to go there as officials, the administration has not, on the whole, been a failure; the territory has a favourable trade balance and in the last few years economic progress has been realised.

Politically, however, Australia became anxious about the future of the Territory when Japan withdrew from the League and denounced the Washington Treaty, for it was doubtful whether she still subscribed to the non-fortification stipulation in regard to the Pacific Islands. Thus already in 1933 it was suggested by Australian circles that it might be better for New Guinea to be in the hands of another White Power—

stronger than Australia. (In this connection it is interesting to recall that as early as 1930 German authors called upon their Government to impress upon Australia the advantages she would derive from the creation, by the return of these islands to Germany, of an "insulated zone" (*Isolierungsschicht*) between her and Japan—an argument that has lost its force since the coming of the Third Reich and close German-Japanese co-operation.) The German colonial demands have since 1935 impelled Australian statesmen again to impress on their countrymen the value of the Mandated Territory. For example, in a ministerial statement to the Commonwealth Senate on March 13th, 1936, Sir George Pearce, Commonwealth Minister for External Affairs, while allowing that the "possession of colonial territory does not, and cannot, solve the problem of the supply of raw materials" used the "purely material aspect" of the question as an argument for the "non-return" policy. He pointed out that 3,000 Australians had settled in New Guinea, that the Commonwealth had expended roughly £300,000 in its development, that it absorbed Australian products of an annual value of £400,000—a figure still rising, and that its gold production alone amounted to about £1,500,000 a year. But his chief argument was a politico-strategical one—that "New Guinea, by virtue of its geographical position in relation to Australia, its natural harbours, its facilities for naval and military aircraft [!] is of considerable strategic value to Australia from a defence aspect, so long as the existing form of control and administration obtains." The prompt denial by Sir George Pearce of Lord Elibank's assertion, made early in 1937 on returning from a tour of the Dominions, that Australians and New Zealanders "would not feel very strongly" about the return of Germany's colonies, and the rejection by the leading newspapers of Melbourne and Sydney of the idea of the return of the territory in spite of Mr. Lyons' characterisation of the resolution demanding annexation passed by the Goulbourn (N.S.W.) Branch of the Returned Soldiers' League as "mischievous," are indications of a revived interest in the territory. In March 1937, Mr. Drummond, Minister of Education, said the time had come for Germany's claim to raw materials to be considered. And in April of the same year six professors and lecturers of the University of Melbourne sent a manifesto to Mr. Lyons as a

"guide" for possible discussions at the Imperial Conference, in which they advocated Australia's taking the lead in satisfying the "have-nots" by offering to throw New Guinea into pool for redistribution.

In New Zealand also a Study Group of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs published in 1937 a report entitled "Western Samoa, Mandate or German Colony?" which contained the conclusion that from the economic point of view New Zealand could well do without the Mandate: she does not share in the main export—the copra crop—and takes little of anything else; there is no potential market for rubber and vanilla in the Dominion and the fruit she takes from Samoa could as well be procured from Fiji. The administrative record was not a brilliant one, though in recent years the native troubles had abated; but there was "a fairly widespread appreciation of the success of previous German rule and, perhaps, a tendency to disparage New Zealand's own record." It was contended that the problem was primarily a political one; in view of German-Japanese co-operation New Zealand could not wish to see Samoa in German hands, which "would give Japan in peace time an advanced base south of the Equator." Already in July 1936 Mr. Savage, the Dominion Premier, referring to Mr. Pirow's speech, had expressed doubts as to whether there could be any consideration of the return of any territory to Germany without an opportunity for full discussion between the Governments of the Empire. The same view was taken by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons on July 27th, and he added that there had so far been no discussion of the questions with the Dominions. Whether it was discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1937 we are not told, but the Dominion Secretary denied as late as November 9th that the Government had been in consultation with the Dominions about it.

In Australia it has been asserted that the German colonial claims have been of some service to the Empire in curbing the tendency of the Dominions to assert the right to deny the principle of imperial co-operation when it suits them. From their claims to the former German colonies the Dominions derived their right—since conceded—to pursue independent foreign policies. And from their claims to keep those same colonies they are deriving experience of the responsibilities which such a right entails.

GERARD M. FRITERS.

HISTORY AS TAUGHT IN OUR SCHOOLS.

IT is generally agreed that history ought to be taught to all students in all schools and universities, and this opinion seems to be reasonable. Probably not all would agree as to what makes it an indispensable subject. Many would say that it is "useful." This is true, but we must determine for what it is useful. Seeley called history past politics and politics present history, and the subject was of interest to him only so far as it provided material for the political theorist or the practical politician to enable him to shape his course. This is an imperfect view. In education generally it is easy for us, while pursuing what seems to us immediate tangible advantage, to miss both that particular object of pursuit and also still more desirable possibilities. History makes, more than most subjects, an appeal to the imagination, and a boy may have this faculty aroused by the long stately roll of Gibbon's sentences, and afterwards by the epic narrative of Herodotus, or the trenchant political aphorisms of Thucydides. The treatment of distant countries, Persia, Parthia, Syria, the perception that the inhabitants of these and many other lands, had entirely different standards and motives, opposed to our own in every possible way, and the general sense that mysteries and romance are being disclosed—these things lead a youth towards knowledge and make history well worthy of study for itself alone. However, we gain valuable results by supplementing our studies with Seeley's method, and, in fact, his treatment had more influence upon English political thought than any other academic teaching during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

To learn something from the past which would be a guide in the politics of to-day, is beyond doubt most desirable. The English are probably more ignorant of history than any other civilised nation. Whenever Irish affairs were to the fore, it was obvious that very few of our journalists had any knowledge of Irish history. In all Imperial and foreign affairs it is the same. For the doings of Warren Hastings or Clive their authorities are two inaccurate essays of Macaulay, for the American War of Independence they rely upon Whig fabulists, and practically all French and German history before 1789 is a blank to them. Our people have no historic sense; they permit the destruction of historic buildings without

protest, not feeling that they are in any way the poorer for their disappearance. Consequently, public opinion is always likely to misjudge events as they arise, e.g. the Spanish civil war, and is at the mercy of unscrupulous propaganda.

The question arises—is our history teaching defective? Mr. H. G. Wells emphatically declares that it is. Soon after the end of the War, he published *The Outline of History*, a large work, though small in comparison with its theme, the history of the world. He designed, as he said, to write “a review of existing knowledge of man’s place in space and time,” and so he began *ab ovo*, with the earth in space, and asked the question—how long has the earth endured? From the first, critics agreed that the book had considerable merits. Mr. Belloc gave the author credit for perspicacity, a sense of time, the power “of making the image he has framed in his own mind arise in the mind of his reader,” and also for accuracy and sincerity. *Per contra* is the radical defect which he discovers. “Provincialism means thinking that one ‘knows all about it’; Provincialism means a satisfied ignorance; a simple faith in the non-existence of what one has not experienced. Provincialism invokes a contempt for anything foreign and, what is worse, an actual denial of things which the provincial person has not been made familiar with.” To Mr. Belloc, of course, this grave fault is principally exemplified by his “violent and blind reaction against the Catholic Church.” It is obvious that such an attitude will lead him into innumerable misjudgments, e.g. the contempt he expressed before the learned assembly for Palestine because it was small. Yet the first lesson a child is taught at school is that quality far outweighs quantity.

However, we postulate that Mr. Wells has a comprehensive conception of human history, and we will go on to say a word about his censure of the way we teach it, and attempt to give a brief account of what it is and what it ought to be. He has a very serious disqualification for the part of historical critic, which, of course, tells equally against the value of his historical work. He is, as he complains of the teachers, quite out of date. He believes that whatever knowledge he obtained from text-books, laboriously studied in good Victoria’s golden days, still remains the last word in their respective subjects and a part of the world’s irrefragable truth. He learned all about Darwinism, descents, origins, and the like in the days of his

youth, but, although he believes in progress, he does not admit it in the sphere of his youthful knowledge. Man is descended from monkeys, so Darwin said, but unfortunately most authorities now discredit the theory, and Mr. Wells in his history is obliged to put it at no more than a probability, although elsewhere he continues to assert it as an incontrovertible fact. He evidently thinks that the methods of school teachers are still the same as those when he was a boy. He is right in saying that it is futile to give strings of dates, to discourse mainly upon battles and dynasties, and so on. But Green's *Short History* was published a good many years ago, and the preface promises substantially the same kind of history that Mr. Wells desires, and it has been in general use ever since. Almost everything which the complainant says ought to be done is now being done. I am told by a University lecturer that "there was a refresher course in history for elementary teachers in July and some were greatly interested in local antiquities." The lifeless methods which Mr. Wells condemns have long since passed away. He proposes that six hours a week should be given to history teaching according to the *Outline*, and, no doubt, if this were done without bias, there would be no harm in it.

Mr. Wells reveals another sad failure in his theory of pedagogy. He believes that education and instruction are synonymous terms. This is really the Gradgrind error, which flourished long before our novelist was born. "What I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them." And the poor children were handed over to Mr. MacChoakumchild, "who knew all about all the Water Sheds of all the world (whatever they are), and all the histories of all the peoples, and all the names of all the rivers and mountains, and all the productions, manners, and customs of all the countries, and all their boundaries and bearings on the two and thirty points of the compass"—all this was the nearest they could get to the *Outline* in those days. He had also "taken the bloom off the higher branches of mathematics and physical sciences." This is the perverse idea which it is the object of all schoolmasters to drive from parents' heads, that knowledge can and should be thrust into the youthful head, and that the result is an educated man. This has ruined

Indian Universities. Probably its vogue is rapidly diminishing in this country, but it is still formidable. Mr. Wells will, of course, point out that his subject is teaching, i.e. instruction in history, but the teacher's business is not solely with facts. And no subject gives better scope for character training than history, and the attitude of Mr. Wells towards religion and patriotism leaves us in doubt as to whether he would be a safe guide through the perplexing paths of the subject.

Bishop Stubbs has placed the value of history in an extremely clear light. He says: "It was not my work to make men Whigs or Tories, but to do my best, having Whigs and Tories by nature as the matter I was to work upon, to make the Whigs good, wise, sensible Whigs, and the Tories good, wise, sensible Tories; to teach them to choose their weapons and to use them fairly and honestly." He was writing on the 'seventies, but, *mutatis mutandis*, his comments apply to our own day. He goes on: "The growth of sound historical teaching would have spared us such national humiliation as we have undergone during the last few years, in the treatment of the Public Worship Act, the Judicature Act, and the Royal Titles Act." Those who ought to have knowledge and wisdom showed themselves, for the most part, when discussing these momentous questions, to be grossly ignorant of important historical facts. "I am quite sure that both the speakers and writers on those subjects would have been very much wiser and more modest men, if they had, I will not say attended my lectures, but passed a stiff examination in the History School: if we could not have made them wiser, we would at all events have made them sadder."

We find to-day the same ignorance of history on the part of those who guide our destinies. At least we ought to instruct the people who theoretically control them. This teaching should be, as Stubbs says, without bias. In the elementary schools this fault is by no means uncommon; what Herbert Spencer called the anti-patriotic bias and the patriotic bias are sometimes in evidence. Nothing will more thoroughly eradicate these defects and give a wider range to the teachers' views than special courses at Oxford or Cambridge. History not very long ago moved in grooves; Carlyle, Macaulay, Freeman, and others were accepted as unimpeachable authorities; their views were imbibed by teachers and

naturally overflowed into the press. And, in the daily newspapers at any rate, we seldom find anything but the old views which have been superseded by modern research.

A glance at recent examination papers of the London Matriculation shows that the students are expected to have read sound works and to have exercised thought. Perhaps we may object that the questions, in some cases, demand too long an answer. Thus in half an hour we are to sketch the parliamentary history in the reign either of James I or Charles I, and another demand is to trace the history of religious affairs in England during the reigns of Charles II and James II. To deal with the Parliaments of 1625-8, the Long Parliament, the Treaty of Uxbridge, and many other complicated matters, some still obscure—that is a somewhat excessive task, and hardly less arduous is the discussion of Acts of Uniformity, Five Mile Acts, the Popish Plot (still a mystery), Dispensations, Indulgences and the like, in such a brief time. A further possible criticism is that the questions deal too much with external events. Macaulay complains of a “vile phrase, . . . the dignity of history,” saying that historians of the eighteenth century neglect a number of important circumstances because they are undignified. “How should a writer, who can talk about senates and congresses of sovereigns, and pragmatic sanctions, and battles where ten thousand men are killed, and six thousand men with forty stands of colours taken, stoop to the Stock Exchange, to Newgate, to the theatre, to the tabernacles?” As we have seen, Green put forward the same view. On the other hand, Seeley contended that “government, and legislation, and wars and alliances, concern the state, but scientific discoveries or artistic masterpieces do not.” And of the historian he says: “He is not an anthropologist, or an ethnologist, but if I may coin the word, he is a politician. The political group or organism—the state—is his study.”

The truth lies between the two views: To keep to the main events is best for the general historian. It is difficult to see what bearing Green’s lengthy notice of Spenser has upon the reign of Elizabeth, or even Chaucer upon that of Edward III. But some of the undignified events, as Macaulay says, do have a most important bearing upon history and national life, and these must perforce be related. Lecky in his treatment of the eighteenth century has made a judicious selection of

materials. Taking at random part of the syllabus of a provincial university (the Honour School of History), we may note that the knowledge required is reasonable. "*The Age of Elizabeth*. A study of social, political and ecclesiastical reconstruction and progress, of changes in outlook and intellectual achievement." The books recommended are documents edited by Tawney, Prothero, and Tanner, and also two books of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Zurich Letters, Elizabethan Voyages as described by Hakluyt, and Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus*. Here, then, is a reasonable foundation for a knowledge of the period, not only the purely political history, but the religious development—most vital in that period—and the explorations which laid the foundations of our Empire, and a reference to the literature of the time. It may be added that no one should claim knowledge of that period unless he has studied Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*. It is also satisfactory that, in the elementary schools, attention is being paid to local history. This gives an opportunity for open air investigation, and there is no reason why local libraries and the like should not help. Unfortunately most children now live in urban districts, but for them there are museums and galleries, and in London, at any rate, these advantages are freely used.

At the beginning of this article we complained of the absence of the historical sense in our countrymen. Teachers should point out to their pupils how jealously the French conserve natural beauty, how they avoid disfiguring it with litter, how they preserve bridges, buildings, every memento of the past—things which we see demolished and make no attempt to save them. In effect, there is no reason to doubt that teachers, as far as their opportunities go, teach history well and employ up-to-date methods. By so doing and by varying their methods as time calls for change, they will lay the foundations of a knowledge of history which will make the young proud of belonging to a land of old and just renown.

W. A. HIRST.

DREAMS IN CHILDHOOD.

THE dream life of children reveals some similarities with that of savage or semi-savage peoples. So also, it may be argued—and modern anthropologists like Dr. Seligman provide confirmation—does the dream life of the civilised adult. There seems to be ground for Nietzsche's speculation in *Human—all too Human* that in dreams we traverse the thought of earlier humanity, and reason in our dreams as primitive people reason in their waking state. In some recognised features however the child's mind resembles that of primitive peoples more closely than does the sophisticated mind of a civilised adult, though resemblances and differences are merely of degree. Most characteristic perhaps of the child's dreaming mind is a greater facility in visualising mental imagery. De Quincey in his *Confessions of an Opium Eater* remarked that this childish ability was the first symptom of the effect on him of opium.

I know not whether my reader is aware that many children, perhaps most, have a power of painting, as it were, upon the darkness, all sorts of phantoms: in some that power is simply a mechanic affection of the eye; others have a voluntary or semi-voluntary power to dismiss or summon them, or as a child once said to me, when I questioned him on this matter, "I can tell them to go, and they go; but sometimes they come when I don't tell them to come."

Children's dreams also show universal characteristics belonging to the dreams of adults. Possibly if they had been more fully recorded and studied they would provide evidence that, as Wordsworth wrote, "the child is father to the man" in a sense somewhat different from the narrower conclusion of psycho-analysis upon the influence in later life of an emotional "complex" formed in childhood. But one aspect of Wordsworth's thought was developed by Charles Lamb's speculation in *Witches and Other Night Fears*. He suggested that the intensity of dreaming in childhood or youth was a good criterion of later creative energy. Certainly it may well be that the characteristics of an adult person's dream life, which lend to it a measure of individuality, could be traced in the same person's youthful dreams. At least in the more egoistical kinds of day-dreaming the adult does reveal a kinship with the child that dreams of happy surroundings or heroic victories

in compensation for the shortcomings of this difficult world. This is the "wish-fulfilment" in dreams that became Freud's fundamental theory. Children's dreams are notable for their greater frankness, a less complicated symbolism to hide immoral egoistical wishes.

The frankness of the child is well shown in its dreaming, and egotism in conflict with authority or "duty" is nearly always present in thinly disguised forms, as in the dream by a school-girl that she is swimming to save a friend from drowning when she meets a teacher in the water, who tells her to go back to school at once, because she has been selected to take the part of Julius Cæsar in the play. Children often dream of the removal of rivals or those in authority over them (such as parents and teachers), and the preceding example may be compared with the following by Gustav Flaubert, the French novelist, when he was a boy.

I was going through a green field with my mother and we were passing the bank of a river. We went close to the edge and my mother fell in. I saw the water bubble, the circles extend and then disappear. The water resumed its normal aspect and I heard nothing more than the soft noise of its natural movement, as it flowed between the reeds and rushes. Suddenly I heard the voice of my mother crying "Help! help! Come to my aid, oh my poor child." I bent down and lay flat on my stomach, peering over the rushes in order to see whence the cry came. The shouts continued but I could see nothing. An irresistible force held me fast and though I heard the cries of "Help! help! I am drowning," I could see nothing. The water flowed on smoothly and the voice I had heard from the depth of the water plunged me into pain and despair.

Anxieties occasioned by schooling, examinations, and employment naturally provide the motive of many dreams of older children, though only in this century has any notice been taken of them in a serious way. We can revert to the psychological observation of such disturbances later. There is a probably unique example in the ancient world, and that is the record of a childish dream revolving around a conflict over the dreamer's future career. It is told as a tale by Lucian, who was born at Samosata, Syria, towards the end of the first century, but it appears to be a true record, though possibly shaped by the writer's mature skill. The conflict between two careers was dramatised in the dream of two

women who pulled the boy in opposite directions and successively appealed to him. One promised him the chance of becoming a famous sculptor, the other praised the career of learning and promised him the immortality of the wits, and to her side he went. Lucian did abandon his uncle's stone-cutting business, to which he had been apprenticed. He went adventurously away to Greece and later to Gaul, working now as a teacher of rhetoric, now as a lawyer, and then becoming a critic and satirist of the philosophers. "I have related my dream," he wrote, "to persuade the young to right courses, especially such as, being disheartened by poverty, might debase their genius by low pursuits."

The problem of the career perhaps does not nowadays set up any serious conflict until rather later, but among the causes of childish horror in dreams are all the forms of pressure from authority, whether of parents or school teachers, while many pleasant dreams have a fairy-tale quality of escape from oppression or shame and the conquest of giants or the winning of glittering prizes. Last century the fears inspired by crude religious teaching haunted many children. Mr. Herbert Palmer's autobiography, *The Mistletoe Child*, gave some account of the Victorian atmosphere. Early in the century, however, an example was set down by Robert Southey, the romanticist and biographer of Nelson. The Miss Palmer he referred to was his governess :

One of the oddest dreams in my recollection befell me when a mere child, about six years old, but it is as fresh in my memory as if it were last night's scene. It was that the Devil came to pay Miss Palmer a morning visit in the dining-room in Galloways Buildings, and I was the only person in the room with her. There I sat trembling upon one of the flat-bottomed mahogany chairs, while she was bustling about in all hurry and delight of receiving unexpectedly a visit from a great person. "Be seated, dear Mr. Devil." Her smile and his smirk, and the villainous nose and eyes of old Horny, and his diabolical tail, are before my eyes at this moment.

There is in this dream more than the religion-inspired fear of the Devil. It is a fairly frank reflection of jealousy, and "old Horny" was probably a dream-representative of a disliked visitor who engaged Miss Palmer's attention. Southey was sufficiently interested in his dreams to keep a diary of them, but he lacked the insight of his contemporaries, Charles Lamb

and William Hazlitt. The remarks of Lamb in the essay already referred to are among the few good critical observations on childish dreams that were made before the end of last century. Lamb, from his own experiences, described the child's night-fears.

"From my childhood," he confessed, "I was extremely inquisitive about witches and witch-stories. My maid, and more legendary aunt, supplied me with a good store. But I shall mention the incident which directed my curiosity originally into this channel." Readers of his essay will remember that this incident was his discovery of his father's copy of the *History of the Bible*, by Stackhouse. It was illustrated by pictures, one of which especially haunted the boy :

I never laid my head on my pillow, I suppose, from the fourth to the seventh or eighth year of my life . . . without an assurance, which realised its own prophecy, of seeing some frightful spectre. Be old Stackhouse then acquitted in part, if I say, that to his picture of the Witch raising up Samuel (O, that old man covered with a mantle!), I owe, not my midnight terrors, the hell of my infancy—but the shape and manner of their visitation. It was he who dressed up for me a hag that nightly sate upon my pillow—a sure bed-fellow, when my aunt or my maid was far from me. All day long, while the book was permitted me, I dreamed waking over his delineation, and at night (if I may use so bold an expression) awoke into sleep, and found the vision true. I durst not, even in the daylight, once enter the chamber where I slept, without my face turned to the window, aversely from the bed where my witch-ridden pillow was. . . . Parents do not know what they do when they leave tender babes alone to go to sleep in the dark.

While recalling his own childish terrors Lamb realises that he did not need either Stackhouse or the maid's stories to know fear, and tells of a boy (the son of Tom Moore) "brought up with the most scrupulous exclusion of every taint of superstition, who was never allowed to hear of goblin or apparition . . ." who "finds all this world of fear from which he had been so rigidly excluded *ab extra*, in his own 'thick-coming fancies.'" The modern psychologist has an explanation of the "thick-coming fancies," which are, as Lamb says, independent of legends, in the mind's symbolising tendency in dreams. Anxieties, fears and longings belong to waking life; and in sleep the mind clothes the primitive emotions,

using, like a touring theatre manager, whatever "props" are available for scenery.

Lamb's conclusion, however, is echoed by other modern students of the mind, though they have no "scientific" warranty for his belief that "Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimæras—dire stories of Celæno and the Harpies—may reproduce themselves in the brain of superstition—but they were there before. They are transcripts, types; the archetypes are in us, and eternal." It might be from Æ's *Candle of Vision*, if not from Nietzsche. Our fears do not need any imagery, Lamb says, and "all the cruel, tormenting, defined devils in Dante—tearing, mangling, choking, stifling, scorching demons—are they half so fearful to the spirit of a man, as the simple idea of a spirit unembodied following him?

Like one that on a lonesome road
Doth walk in fear and dread,
And having once turn'd round, walks on,
And turns no more his head;
Because he knows a frightful fiend
Doth close behind him tread.

That the kind of fear here treated of is purely spiritual—that it is strong in proportion as it is objectless upon earth—that it predominates in the period of sinless infancy—are difficulties, the solution of which might afford some probable insight into our ante-mundane condition, and a peep at least into the shadow-land of pre-existence."

Nevertheless the child's fears may be intensified—if only by giving them terrible forms—as Jean Paul Richter, the German contemporary of Lamb, wrote in his *Autobiography*, describing the same kind of experiences. It is interesting to find that the ancient Egyptians recognised this problem. In the Berlin magic papyrus, by Erman, are formulæ to be used as spells in driving away ghosts that torment children in sleep. The satisfying of a nostalgia for home, or the equivalent, in terms of a remembered scene, is common in wish-fulfilment dreams of children. Thus Gerhardt Hauptmann recalled a dream that recurred at intervals in his childhood, always leaving a "sweet melancholy," a sort of "shadow spell over my soul":

In my dream I always saw a slope of old beech trees, illuminated by sunlight and on which I plucked blue anemones along with

other small children. The flowers had pushed through the dry, gold-brown foliage. That was all. I suppose this dream was the recollection of a specially fine spring morning which I had once experienced, but it seems that the first relish of arcadian pleasure to which the senses of the child awoke, coincided with this hour of rapture. When I lie outstretched on the Olympic earth, I feel I have returned in spirit to the moment of that first childish rapture.

This may be compared with the recollection of a childish dream by that unbalanced genius, Strindberg, whose later dreams were so unlike the following idyllic scene :

In my dream I had gone to my beloved Scharenhof, which I found in spring's efflorescence. The birch-trees had burst into bloom and the sea rocked gently to and fro. My villa was furnished with exquisite taste, not one especial style but a mixture of many styles. Here I made my preparations for the summer, the beautiful northern summer, with its nights of marvellous transparent clearness. There should the writing-table stand, shaded by the blossom of the apple-tree which stood outside the window, there the book-shelf and facing the south would be my sleeping-room, looking on a meadow flecked with simple flowers : everything was beautiful and pure, as it must be in the springtime when all is recreated. This idyll appeared to be complete but no happiness is without alloy. Of a sudden, from the courtyard, I heard the cries of reindeer and as I opened the window to see, two crows fluttered around ; they had built their nests in an adjacent tree ; they were in a state of commotion and their wild, hoarse cries struck fear into my heart. I went out into the yard, took a handful of sand, newly deposited there, and threw it into the nest. Thereupon the birds screamed, flew over the meadow, beyond the sea and disappeared in the blue ether.

The following example of a schoolboy's dream, translated from Wilhelm Stekel, illustrated the absorption of modern imagery by the primitively innocent egotism.

I was on a yacht that my father had built, and it was going to the isle of Malta, which my father had bought from England for five million crowns. The crew of the yacht were men of Hamburg. As Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Malta I was shortly afterwards sent as Attaché to Vienna. I went into the Gymnasium [College] where I had been educated and saw my schoolfellows sitting for their exam. When I entered the class-room all sprang up and congratulated me. At that moment I woke up through a loud music. I had upset my glass which was full of water and had fallen on to the floor.

The boy's desire to impress his schoolfellows is mixed up here with his elders' political resentment of British maritime and imperial supremacy which he had adopted and merged with his purely personal childish wishes. Without going so far as to suggest the formation of another sub-committee of the League of Nations, we are justified in claiming that a comprehensive study of the dreams of European school-children would yield important evidence as to the prospects of international peace in the near future. The desire of a vast number of adults who remember the last war for peace between the nations cannot be questioned, but to what extent has it prevailed over the rooted animosities and suspicions which are part of the new generation's mental environment? What the children are dreaming to-day they will as citizens be helping to externalise in action to-morrow.

The modern study of adult dreams has been mainly what is called psycho-therapy, an attempt to cure or alleviate morbid conditions in the individual's mind. The connection between individuals' complexes and those of modern society at large have only occasionally and with irrelevant motives been traced. Any comprehensive study of the motives underlying the political behaviour of nations would have to embrace the extensive and at present largely irrelevant literature of psychology, which brings us again to the promise of valuable results in studying the dreams of children. Dr. C. W. Kimmins, an experienced educationalist, compared the dreams of modern schoolchildren with those of civilised adults and found that they were not only more literal, the meaning being less involved in symbolism, but also that the child's attitude when recalling the dream showed greater readiness to dive back to the dream thought. Very often children display the savage's uncertainty in distinguishing between dream and waking life. This is why the dreams of children reflect more directly the dreamer's mentality. The following two, taken from Dr. Kimmins' book, *Children's Dreams*, make interesting reading. The first is by a boy of twelve, the second by a girl of the same age :

Yesterday while I was sleeping in bed, I suddenly found that I was walking down the stairs of my house into the kitchen. I walked slowly into the kitchen, where to my surprise I saw a large table covered with delicious eatables, such as Christmas pudding and turkey and meat. I went upstairs, and in my bedroom instead

of a bed there stood another large table covered with a snow-white cloth, and in the centre was a pudding with holly stuck in it. I went to cut a piece off for myself, and to my disappointment I found it had vanished. Many children sat round the table and of course every one wanted something to eat. Soon as they had finished one pudding I gave them another. All the children were enjoying themselves very much except me, who was not having anything to eat. I tried to take something off the dishes, but everything disappeared from my sight. I went downstairs to find my mother, but she was nowhere to be found. I searched everywhere but I could not find her. I suddenly slipped over a piece of orange peel and bumped my head against a table, and then I woke up to find I had been dreaming in bed all the time, which made me very disappointed.

I dreamt that my mother bought me and my sister a large Christmas tree, and on this tree there was a number of tiny little candles which were of different colours, and there was a lot of toys hanging on it. Mother had a wish-bone, which she had kept, and she said that we could see who got the wish and so we pulled and I had the wish. I wished that my Dad was home on Christmas Day. When Christmas Day came we were dressed in our best, and our uncles and aunts had come and we were enjoying ourselves. We went into the parlour and we found somebody dressed up as Santa Claus, and he asked us what we wanted off the tree. When we had got what we wanted he took off the clothes of Santa Claus and it was my father, and so my wish came true, and then I woke up and told mother.

The boy's rather pathetic attempt to get a bit of the feast for himself will probably strike a responsive chord in many an older male bosom. It is a fact that an extensive reading of dreams by children of to-day suggests a correlation between such dreams and certain post-Victorian changes in the attitude of the sexes towards each other. If the above dreams had been dreamt fifty years ago they would not seem so apposite to the social atmosphere. Boys' dreams to-day far more often than girls' reflect a sense of failure and the need for self-assertion. There is no doubt that communal morality and international relations will be far better understood in the near future as a consequence of the systematic study of such dreams.

R. L. MÉGROZ.

FRIEDRICH HEBBEL.

THE four Germans born in 1813, Hebbel, Wagner, Otto Ludwig and Georg Büchner, are usually treated as the leading dramatists of the nineteenth century. This, however, is one of the many misunderstandings of literary history. Otto Ludwig's creative power found expression in the province of the novel and of criticism. Büchner succeeded in expressing his revolutionary passion and his knowledge of men in short scenes, full of poetry and spontaneity and similar to those of the Storm and Stress of the eighteenth century. The two great novels of Otto Ludwig are examples of a new kind of narrative poetry, while his drama *Die Makkabäer* is in some degree an iambographic imitation of Schiller's plays. *Der Erbförster*, though historically important through its influence on the naturalists of the last decade of the century, is thus more epic than dramatic.

Richard Wagner alone amongst the three others belongs to the whole world. We are awaiting the third volume of Mr. Ernest Newman's admirable work about him, the merits of which are but little indicated even in describing it as the most important contribution to *German Studies* in England as far as they are concerned with art and literature. The high honour in which Wagner stands in the world is due, of course, to his music. But Wagner, the young Richard Wagner, desired to be more than a composer. He desired to create a new tragedy in order to create a new culture. He went even so far as to excuse his aspiration to express himself in musical language by reference to the lack of scope offered by the modern written language. His ideal was Greece. He longed for a new community to give birth to a new people's drama. He knew that it was impossible to procure such a community at a moment's notice. But he wanted to be himself the poet who would create a new tragic drama which might again enable the stage to assume the rôle it played in Greece. But it was not to be his destiny to contribute to the realisation of this eternal German ideal. Knowing that he was not an artist in words, he turned to opera, aiming thus to surpass tragedy which is dependent on the written word alone. In trying to be a Shakespeare and a Beethoven at the same time, he left to others the task of achieving a combination of Shakespeare and Sophocles. Such combination has yet to be realised, as is proved by

Eugene O'Neill's *Mourning Becomes Electra*. As far as Germany is concerned it is the central problem of the whole development of the German drama. The first who tried to amalgamate drama in the antique style with that of Shakespeare is H. W. von Gerstenberg with his tragedy *Ugolino* (1768). Schiller wrote to Goethe that one could use Gerstenberg's *Ugolino* to give a clear insight into the idea of tragedy. Both have striven—theoretically and through their dramas—to attain this insight. Heinrich von Kleist despaired of success in thus realising the very essence of his poetical ideas. But his *Robert Guiscard*, though a fragment, remains a brilliant proof of his struggle to combine the two styles. At the time when Wagner tried in vain to realise his object as a poet, another man went the same way with more success: Friedrich Hebbel. It is remarkable that nearly all Wagner enthusiasts are hostile to Hebbel. The reason is perhaps that they feel, probably quite unconsciously, that Hebbel was more faithful to the dreams of his youth than their hero.

Hebbel was born on March 13th, 1813, in the little village of Wesselburen in Dithmarschen, a part of the then Danish duchy of Holstein. There is no poet of modern times whose struggle not only for a higher life, but also for a mere existence was harder than that of the man who once said: "What should a writer of tragedies be if not a hero of tragedy?" His origin was as humble as that of Carlyle. His father was a poor mason. But while Carlyle thought of his parents with the greatest gratitude, Hebbel had to confess that Klaus Friedrich Hebbel had hated his son. While Carlyle was able when scarcely fifteen years old to go to Edinburgh University, Hebbel, after the death of his father, became at the same age what one might euphemistically describe as a clerk in the parochial administration. In fact he was the maid-of-all-work for the bailiff, and had to sleep in one bed with the coachman. He remained in Wesselburen till 1835. By this time he had contributed a considerable number of poems to the *Pariser Modeblätter*. Its owner, Amalie Schoppe, now managed to interest a number of wealthy Hamburgers in his work. They wanted to give him the opportunity to prepare himself for the gymnasium in order to enable him to go on to the University. In Hamburg no less than in Wesselburen, Hebbel was dependent on the petty bourgeois temper of people who thought him bound in eternal gratitude because

they gave him a few farthings to secure his livelihood. He has called the assistance of free meals from his rich patrons the way to the destruction of his inner being. The more he had to suppress his pride, the more it grew. Here in Hamburg still more than in Wesselburen was the basis of his so-called "arrogance," for which he was blamed by people who could not distinguish between the conceit of the pompous fool and the wounded pride of a man who was far ahead of his time and yet dependent on the good intentions of mediocrities.

There is a great difference between the mental structure of Hebbel and Carlyle. They resemble one another, however, in temperament. They had the same struggle for independence, not by compromising with the influential powers of the world, or by swimming with the tide, but by always going against the majority wherever found. And it was everywhere that they found it. To this is due their proud resistance to the temptations of literary success and their bold effort to change not conditions but the very nature of man. Both were prophets, the one as a poet, the other as a writer. But while Carlyle was already an independent teacher, and contributed to Brewster's *Edinburgh Encyclopædia*, it was no help at all to Hebbel that he placed a then nearly unknown dramatist like Heinrich von Kleist far above an amiable and famous versifier like Theodor Körner. The director of the "Johanneum," where the twenty-three-year-old Hebbel played the rôle of an industrious student, refused to give him the matriculation testimonial necessary for entering a university, because he had failed to convince him of his progress in Latin grammar. But at this time the world had not yet fallen sick of examination-fever, as a result of which attempts to do justice to all bring justice to none. The universities were, indeed, not broadminded enough to give Hebbel the full academic rights, but he could listen to as many lectures as he desired. However, it goes without saying that he could not be a Law student obedient to the wishes of his Hamburg supporters.

When Hebbel returned in 1839 from Heidelberg and Munich to Hamburg, which he could have called with more reason than Heine "the cradle of his young sorrows," he was neither a lawyer nor had he passed any other examination. But he was Hebbel. The same year, in a few weeks, he finished his first great tragedy *Judith*, which was produced on July 6th, 1840, in Berlin. A new German dramatic

poet was born. In March 1841 he finished his second tragedy *Genoveva*, followed towards the end of the year by his only comedy *Der Diamant*. In Copenhagen—Hebbel was born a Danish subject—he secured a travelling scholarship of King Christian VIII, and went to live in Paris and Italy. This means neither that his financial misery was at an end, nor that the stay in southern countries had any remarkable influence on the creative part of his personality. Apart from Lessing he is the only German poet for whom that Italian experience, so frequently the lot of German artists, was without any real importance. In Paris he wrote the tragedy of common life, *Maria Magdalena*. When he came to Vienna towards the end of 1845, he was extremely short of money. The actress Christine Engehausen lived there. She would have played Judith in Hamburg but for her appointment at the Burgtheater. They were married in 1846. The motive on her side was pity for the unhappy poet, whose works she had admired for years; on his side the conviction “that a man belongs to that force which is the most important in him, because it is from it that his own happiness comes and such services as he may render the world arise.” These are his own words and he adds: “as regards myself it was the poetical force. How could I have preserved its vitality in the miserable fight for existence? I was unable to make a trade of poetry and I had, therefore, no chance of victory.” Now, as a husband, he had his chance. For the second time he was saved by a woman.

For the second time. Every biographical sketch of him must speak of the first woman about whom it is not too much to say that she replaced the whole world for him during his days in Hamburg. She made up for the humiliation he had to endure in the houses of his supporters. Without joy and peace, full of himself, but treated like a little schoolboy and very often worse, Hebbel found in Elise Lensing the human being who gave him the love of a woman, the devotion of a comrade, the help of a mother and the understanding of a friend. She bore him a son. Hebbel left her because a man “belongs to the force which is the most important in him.” The eternal conflict of duties, of the duty to one’s work and the duty to a human being is symbolised to the highest degree in the relationship between Hebbel and Elise Lensing. It depends on the point of view of the individual whether he will

regard Elise's later stay for a year with Hebbel and his wife in Vienna as a light shining through a darkness which Hebbel himself has called an "uninterrupted night of remembrance." In any case, it is a proof of the magnanimity of both women concerned.

Hebbel's marriage was happy. He regarded Christine as the image of his womanly ideal. Mariamne in his next tragedy, *Herodes and Mariamne* (1848), bears the stamp of her personality. The leading woman characters of his last three tragedies, *Agnes Bernauer* (1855), *Gyges und sein Ring* (1856), and *Die Nibelungen* (1862), have brought on Hebbel the name of a second "*Frauenlob*." More than that, he is the only great dramatist of his and later days who regarded marriage and love as identical. Christine was, as in former times Elise in Hamburg, the only friend he had in Vienna. He had admirers and pupils but no friends. That was understandable in a town where friendship meant abandonment of principles. Hebbel never grew accustomed to Vienna, and shortly before his death he contemplated going to live in Weimar, where the Grand Duke Karl Alexander was one of his greatest admirers. Amongst those who were particularly faithful to him during this time was the private secretary to the Grand Duchess, Marshall, an Englishman, to whom we owe it, by the way, that one of the most interesting letters of Carlyle to Eckermann has not been lost. But Hebbel died on December 13th, 1863. His wife survived him nearly half a century, thus living to be a witness of his fame.

Hebbel's fame as a dramatist only developed when Germany, towards the end of the nineteenth century, became sick of materialism and positivism in art and thought. Ironically enough, Ibsen was one of its creators. Ibsen enthusiasm, that is to say enthusiasm for the social criticism of the later Ibsen, led to enthusiasm for a man whose social criticism was rooted in a metaphysical outlook which Ibsen had abandoned when he turned from *Brand* to *The Pillars of Society*. Much more important was the dramatic theory of the so-called "New Classicists." Their ideal was the overwhelming of literature through art, particularly through the art of the drama. Hebbel regarded the drama as the peak of art. Nobody was more opposed to the fashionable writings of his own time and to the ideas of "Young Germany," which corresponded to the German pseudo-liberalism of the early

twentieth century than he, desiring as he did not emancipation but the rules of law. When, shortly before his death, he stayed in London, he was most impressed by the "moral climate" of England. He admired the free movement of a people within the pale of a strong law, "in a word the respect which the English nation has for itself." For the highest peak of morality was, according to Hebbel, the duty of man to adapt himself to the stringency of life.

The dualism between the law of the individual and the law of the universe is the subject of all his dramas. His dramatic work, as far as Germany is concerned, represents the last great effort to combine the drama of the antique style with that of Shakespeare. In every drama he demonstrated the existence of an universal will (the classical "fate") and the dependance on it of the individual. His work is therefore timeless, unlike most of the plays which sprang from a critical attitude to society. It bears, of course, traces of the age in and against which it was created. But Hebbel is able to regard the problems of his epoch in the light of eternity, thus contributing more to the deliverance of mankind than most social plays. It was primarily for this reason that the generation of 1900 discovered him again. There were three Austrians who served the Hebbel renaissance in three directions, thus making up for the lack of understanding Hebbel had met with in Vienna. A new edition of Emil Kuh's biography was published which is even to-day indispensable in connection with Hebbel's human side. Alfred v. Berger brought him to the foreground through the wonderful performances of his dramas at the newly founded "Deutsches Schauspielhaus" in Hamburg, while R. M. Werner achieved the same result through his critical edition of his works, diaries and letters. It is true that Hebbel's works, too, were dragged into that sphere of school-philology which Sir Walter Raleigh regarded as a kind of "stamp-collecting." He became the victim of a mania for stating influences, which treated the poet not as a force, but as a source. A final verdict on his life and work has yet to be written. But that does not prevent us from seeing clearly the place of his poetry in the history of dramatic art.

As already stated, the ultimate principle of the world is, according to Hebbel, the dualism between the universe and the individual. Life involves from the beginning a necessary guilt. Man sins against the universal will because he is born.

Tragedy has to be and can be nothing but the representation of this metaphysical guilt. Shaftesbury, in the eighteenth century, asked the poet to depict perfection of character in order to avoid the consequences of strictest imitation of nature. Hebbel maintains that the perfect character does not exist, because life as isolated cannot observe restraint and must, therefore, be guilty. The eighteenth century and the nineteenth - up to Hebbel, including the classicists and romanticists, understood very well the dualism between the creative genius who despises all limitations and the beauty and harmony of the universe. But it was only Hebbel who made no difference between the genius and the ordinary individual, and who changed the harmony of the universe into the will of the universe. Of course he was a dramatist, and as a dramatist he had the right to choose characters who surpass the average. Holofernes in *Judith* illustrates Swinburne's verses in *Dolores*: "The delight that consumes the desire, the desire that outruns the delight." But Clara in *Maria Magdalena* belongs to the lower middle class. In both cases, however, and in his other plays as well, Hebbel succeeds in convincing us of the possibility of triumphing over dualism, of overcoming the primary and ultimate guilt. The individual is guilty from the beginning. If, however, he understands the task assigned to him by the universal will, then dualism no longer exists for him. The identity of supreme and individual will has been attained. Every human being has his own destination, a mission imposed on him and on him alone by the universal will. Man can fulfil his mission if he remains true to himself. Hebbel represents this basis of his ideology in showing how far his heroes fall short of fulfilling their duty to act according to the supreme will. They perish because they do not understand their task which will be fulfilled against their will, and in spite of their deeds. Because Hebbel symbolises the relationship between universal and individual will through the relationship between the two sexes, many have discovered in his tragedies nothing but the strains and stresses of sexual relations. This conception changes him into an emancipationist of the "Young German" kind, while he was in reality the only dramatist of the nineteenth century who desired to transform the bourgeois into a human being.

ALBERT MALTE WAGNER.

HOW THE SHAPES OF LEAVES HAVE COME.

IF anything in Nature appears purposeless or merely ornamental, we may be quite sure we are ignorant of some part of the life of the creature possessing it. Seeing how complicated are the reactions of living creatures to each other and the general laws of the universe, this is hardly surprising, for it has been well said that, as far as knowledge of the world goes, we are like children picking up a few pebbles on the shore of the ocean.

Such a trifling matter as the shape of a leaf may, at first sight, seem to have little or no bearing on the life of the plant possessing it, yet we cannot fail to realise, not only that leaves vary infinitely in shape and size, but that each species adheres very constantly to the prescribed pattern. Botanists have remarked on this since their science first came into being and have devised a whole code of terms to describe each form with minute accuracy. Leaves are linear, lanceolate, orbicular, cordate, ob-cordate, reniform, ovate, palmate, hastate, sagittate, pinnate, pinnatifid and so on. In addition to these forms and combinations of them, there are terms describing the margins of leaves, which may be obtuse, acute or acuminate, entire, ciliate, crenate, dentate or lobed. Indeed, it would be easy to fill a page or two merely with a list of the terms used to describe leaves.

Another fact which is fairly prominent in botany is that plants of the same genus, or even the same natural order, usually have leaves of the same type, though sufficiently different to enable them to be used in determining the species. The ferns, for instance, have pinnate, or multipinnate leaves, grasses are linear, elms ovate, poplars cordate and so on. There are exceptions, as in the great order *Umbelliferae*, in which the majority have more or less pinnate or compound leaves, but some are simply linear and a few, like the pennywort, are orbicular. The rule is sufficiently constant to suggest strongly that there must be some reason for the shape of leaf in a particular group and the exceptions indicate some radical difference in the life habit of the plant.

Although botanists are familiar with this constancy in leaf shapes and regard it as important from a taxonomic standpoint, no attempt has ever been made, so far as I am aware,

to probe the reason for the immense variety of leaf forms and their constancy in a given species. Compared with some other aspects of Nature, the problem is not, I think, obscure, if we bring to bear on it what we know of the laws of life in general and of vegetable life especially.

Rudimentary forms of life, as everyone knows, are simple cellular organisms, living in a fluid medium. Many of them can be identified in stagnant water and the apparently simple cell, with its nucleus, is the unit from which all living bodies are built up, first by aggregation of cells and then by the evolution of co-operative and specialised cells. Organisms with a single cell, whatever potentialities they may have, are entirely unspecialised. They have no organs for special functions, no sex, and it may even be said that they do not belong certainly either to the animal or vegetable kingdoms. Living in water, and becoming, as the first stage in the evolutionary process, joined together, what is the natural shape for them to assume? It is obvious that, lacking any special directive circumstances, they must enlarge merely in a fashion retaining the original globular shape of the cell, but even in a world at present peopled by no other form of life, it is clear that early limits must be placed to increase in size of a sphere. The larger the globe, the more difficulty it has in obtaining nourishment, so that the size of this orbicular creature must be limited to the radius over which it can obtain food without moving about. This radius must be very small and, in fact, simple globular organisms are confined outside the single cell. Any which are more complex always have some means by which they can increase the radius of their activity. Some have long, thin, thread-like flagellæ, with which they can move about, while others are the simplest of the

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air, it must become, not globular, but flattened. In this form its inevitable position is on the surface of the water, where it will tend to float and where the circular surface will come into contact with the maximum light and air. This is not mere theory, for there exist for anyone to examine those simplest of plants, the duckweeds, which in summer cover the surface of still water in every part of the world. They are flat discs varying in size from one-twentieth to three-quarters of an inch across. About twenty species are known and they exhibit variation which throws much light on the causes of variation in the shape of leaves. The simplest duckweed of all is, in fact, almost globular, but the breadth is only about half the length and the plant is without roots. This is the smallest species and the larger the forms become, the flatter they are, the commonest and most widely distributed duckweed being quite flat above and only slightly convex below. The circular form assumed by these primitive plants is just what one would expect in the circumstances, but even without going outside the limits of this small group, we can soon discover reasons for some departure from this simple shape. Duckweeds are actually flowering plants, but this method of propagation is only feebly developed and their greatest multiplication comes about in a simpler manner. As the plant reaches its full size, it grows out on one or more edges, forming a smaller circle which ultimately breaks away and becomes a new plant. In some species the separation takes place while the young shoot is very small, but in one, known as the ivy-leaved duckweed, the young grow almost to size before parting, and as they are produced on the sides of the parent, the hastate form, suggesting a resemblance to ivy leaves, is produced.

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Although botanists are familiar with this constant difference in the life habit of the plant, strongly that there must be some reason for the leaves, which the majority have more or less orbicular, but some are simply linear and a few are orbicular. The rule is sufficiently constant in a particular group and the exceptions indicate some point, no attempt has ever been made, so far

usually have leaves different to enable them to grow in the same place. The ferns, for instance, have linear leaves, as in the case of the grasses, which are exceptions, as in the case of the ivy-leaved duckweed, the young grow almost to size before parting, and as they are produced on the sides of the parent, the hastate form, suggesting a resemblance to ivy leaves, is produced.

Before I leave the water forms, I will point out that this circular floating form of leaf exists in vastly greater development in the water lilies, which might well be regarded as legitimate descendants of the duckweeds who elected to remain in their native element. Whether this is, in fact, the case, or whether the water lilies, like the buttercups, have returned to their primal home, I do not presume to say.

Once established ashore, the duckweed's circular form would by no means serve as efficiently as in the water, where there is no obstacle to the persistence of a circular shape. However thickly the plants grow together, they can obtain all the space they require because the mass can expand outwards to the full extent of the pond or stream. Once rooted in the ground, no such expansion is possible, and if the plants grew anything like as thickly as they do on the water, they would soon crowd each other out. Such crowding means that they would deprive each other of the vital light and air. Which would be the most likely survivors? There are two alternatives. One is that some succeed in overgrowing their fellows, thus becoming larger. This probably happened to some extent and may account for the increasing size of terrestrial plants, but it is not the most likely development, for it would be a struggle in which equals would perish and only a few of the stronger survive. The likelihood of any possessing much greater spreading power than their fellows is remote. The other plan is for the plants to push out of their natural circular shape upwards towards the light and this seems the logical and necessary course, for it could be followed by all with equal chance of survival. Quite easily then, a simple linear form is developed and this form is actually that possessed by the largest number of terrestrial plants. The grasses and sedges, all of which have this particular shape, are far the most widespread and abundant of vegetables.

The next stage of development is complicated by many circumstances; primarily, it seems to me, by the necessity of countering the attacks of animal organisms which, as soon as if not before the plants, found their way out of the water. Animals cannot obtain food from the air. They must get it, directly or indirectly, from the vegetable, and such primitive forms as accompanied the plants ashore would feed on them and destroy many. Those least likely to be consumed would

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organisms of this kind
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be some with harder tissue and, without labouring the point unduly, it seems certain that this accounts, in the first instance, for the formation of stems of varying hardness, resistant to animal attack and protecting the life centre of the plant under adverse conditions. This is the story of the evolution of the great race of ferns which, in prehistoric times, attained immense development and still, in many parts of the world, hold their own under many varied conditions of life. It is significant that the further they have wandered from the water, the harder and more extensive their stem growth has become, as witness the bracken, which has a tough stalk and branches and lives in the driest places.

I cannot pretend to follow the intricate thread of vegetable life through its entire length. Let us turn to the extreme development and consider some of the things which bear upon the shape of tree leaves. Why has the ash pinnate leaves and the beech ovate ones? To understand this, one must remember that trees evolved and grew together in company relatively as densely as grass in the fields, and each must strive up to the light and grope down to the water. The two things are intimately correlated, for it would be useless for a tree to gain full access to light and air, if it could not at the same time obtain adequate water and vice versa. There must be an exact balance between root action and leaf growth, hence the luxuriant foliage of plants with abundant moisture available and the scantiness of the foliage of desert trees. Now the ash is a deep-rooting tree and can usually command as much water as it needs and so could make any quantity of leaf. It is indeed a leafy tree at all times, but in spite of the layers on layers of leaves which it bears, it will be seen that it allows the light to filter through from top to bottom. It is notable that the ash can grow up in the midst of a perfect thicket where any other kind of tree would be starved of light very quickly. Its pinnate foliage serves an important purpose then, in allowing leaves to be produced all the way up its trunk, whereas if the leaves were solid the upper ones would prevent the lower from functioning. The beech, on the other hand, is a surface-rooting tree, dependent for its water supply on casual showers. The roots spread widely and obtain in normal times all the tree requires, but if the leaves were broken up not only would light be able to penetrate through to the lower part, moisture would ascend

freely and the surface soon become parched and dry. The wide spreading branches with their compact broad leaves shade the ground and check evaporation.

This is a fascinating subject, worthy of prolonged study, not only for the mere shape of the leaves, but their position on the stems, as in wych elm, where the leaves, much larger than those of the common elm, are set further apart and allow light to play through them in even greater measure than the common elm. The pendulous quivering leaves of the aspen serve also to admit light through what would otherwise be a dense canopy. Compare the narrow thin leaves of the white and crack willows, growing always in marshy ground, with the thick and broad ones of their relative the sallow, which flourishes in dry places, and to take the extreme instance, the thick fleshy leaves of the cactus or our native sedums, which are able to retain the scanty moisture obtainable in their arid homes.

HERBERT MACE.

EXPERIMENT IN NEW ZEALAND: THE SECOND YEAR.

NEW ZEALAND elected to office its first Labour Government at the end of 1935. With an overwhelming parliamentary majority Mr. J. M. Savage and his colleagues of the Dominion Labour Party, in their own words, determined "to go on where Seddon left off." The time is now opportune to make a general survey of the work of this Government, with special reference to its second year. But first the outstanding features of that remarkable initial session may be recalled.

No fewer than fifty-eight public Acts were added to the Statute Book during the twenty-seven weeks' Parliament of 1936. These between them covered very nearly every department of economic and social life. They comprised a programme without parallel in modern times. A forty-hour week for all workers was introduced, and Saturday work was declared illegal. Depression wages cuts were restored by law, and minimum wages were fixed. Unionism was made compulsory, and union officials were given the right to enter employers' premises. The system of compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes was reinstated, and the scope of its operations was extended. Public works were begun on a large scale to absorb the unemployed, and a State Placement Service was formed to facilitate re-employment.

Since New Zealand's prosperity depended on the prices received by farmers for export produce, legislation was passed to enable the Government to purchase all butter and cheese at a guaranteed price, and then to sell the goods overseas at the best prices that could be obtained. So that there would be no difficulty in obtaining financial accommodation for this and other measures, the Reserve Bank was nationalised, and all restrictions upon Government borrowing and influence were removed. Such institutions as the State Railways, hitherto governed by a non-political board, the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation, and the Mortgage Corporation were deprived of their corporate independence and brought under Government control; and an Act was passed enabling the Government to establish "price tribunals" in the various centres, with the object of preventing profiteering. An Industrial Efficiency Act provided for the licensing of industries and the development of new enterprises.

Rates of relief pay for the unemployed were increased, as were pensions of old age, deserted wives, ex-soldiers and invalids. Income and land taxation was judiciously regraded to provide more revenue. Ministers of the Crown promised to share their salaries with ordinary members of Parliament who assisted them in specialised work, and arrangements were made for the broadcasting of Parliamentary proceedings, a microphone for this purpose being placed in the House of Representatives.

The activities of M. Blum's Government in France at about the same time probably had more publicity in England and America, but were scarcely so comprehensive and well founded. The French radicals had to make many concessions to their opponents and supporters, and were embarrassed by financial stringency and the hostile attitude of "big business," whereas Mr. M. J. Savage and his colleagues were returned to power with an open mandate, were presented by the retiring Government with a balanced Budget, and had the friendly tolerance if not sympathy of bankers and financiers both in the Dominions and Great Britain. How, then, has the New Zealand experiment fared during 1937?

The year has mainly been one of consolidation and revision. For several months the Prime Minister and other important members of the Government were absent in Europe, and comparatively little new legislation was introduced. But there has been great activity during the year among the various Government Departments, which have had to administer the novel laws and conditions. It is too early as yet to judge the success of these in practice, but it can be said that so far industry and agriculture have not suffered serious strain. During his Budget speech on September 28th the Minister of Finance (Mr. Walter Nash) was able to claim that "unemployment has been substantially reduced, and the wages and salaries restorations have been justified by the result of a 9 per cent. increase in purchasing power in two years." The Minister of Labour (Mr. H. T. Armstrong) declared a few months ago that the total wages of New Zealand workers had been increased by £14,000,000 in one year "as a result of the legislation of the Government." This, he considered, "was the real cause of the present prosperity—the increased purchasing power and

scheme to provide a guaranteed price for dairy produce. During 1937 the new Primary Products Marketing Department set up by the Government has worked with thoroughness and zeal to administer the scheme. Collecting agencies have been established to take over the produce from the farmers; contracts have been arranged with shipping and insurance companies; London selling organisations have been co-opted to serve. On August 30th it was announced that the estimated deficit for the first year of the scheme—the difference between the price paid the farmers and the price received by the Government for the sale of the produce in London—was approximately £650,000, but that market prospects were good, and the guaranteed price for the new season would be 13½d. per lb., against 12¾d. for the first year.

Most economists in the Dominion had to admit that these results were good in the circumstances, and the new price was a fair and wise one, but the reaction of the farmers themselves was not so favourable. They declared that the new price would be totally inadequate to compensate them for rising costs of production. One Farmers' Union in the South Island declared that they would need at least 1s. 6d. per lb. to make dairying profitable. Rapidly rising prices for butter in England since then have aroused still louder protests.

Despite the fact that the deficit on the first year's working of the guaranteed price scheme is a paper one only, in that the Government now controls the Reserve Bank, an examination of monetary developments during 1937 shows that little or no inflation has taken place. The loss on the dairy marketing scheme is actually the only possible credit creation that has occurred, and this may be regarded as no more than temporary accommodation, since prospects for this season are so good. Buoyancy of revenue and industrial prosperity have enabled the Government to finance their public works programme and expansion of social services from money lent by prosperous State Departments. The operations of the Government's monetary policy during the past year, stated a New Zealand economist recently, "fail to show any significant departure from what has always been regarded as orthodox and sound monetary practice."

Statistics impressively complete the picture. Funds held overseas by New Zealand were only £28,000,000 in December 1936, but had risen to £37,400,000 at the end of May 1937.

In June last total trading bank deposits were £68,500,000, and Government deposits at the Reserve Bank £7,600,000, making a total of £76,100,000, compared with total deposits of only £59,500,000 in June 1929. For the nine months ending September 30th, 1937, exports amounted to £55,284,000, as compared with £46,042,000 for the same period last year. Imports also showed a big rise, totalling £41,982,000 for the nine months, compared with £31,811,000 in 1936. Perhaps the outstanding fact that emerges from these figures is that the Dominion's prosperity to-day is primarily the product of improved conditions in her markets overseas.

Minor developments of 1937 include the invocation of the Industrial Efficiency Act to bring certain important industries under Governmental supervision; and the letting by the Government of contracts in twenty-six towns for 1,118 new houses, as a step to overcome the housing shortage. Moreover the new Mortgage Adjustment Commission has considered 6,000 applications during the year for readjustments based on present values of securities; and in pursuance of the Government's policy to co-ordinate rail and road transport, arrangements have been made for the State to acquire all road goods services competing with the railways over long distances. Finally a reorganisation of the Dominion's defence forces, unaccompanied, however, by any great improvement in their effective strength, has been planned and partly carried out.

It must not be forgotten, however, that during the year Mr. Savage and several of his colleagues attended the Coronation and the Imperial Conference, and that they all proved very good advertisements for their country. Few positive results attended their various missions, but Mr. Savage's firm stand at the Imperial Conference during discussions on foreign policy, Mr. Walter Nash's outspoken declarations of the Dominion's attitude towards Imperial trade relations, and Mr. W. J. Jordan's speeches at Geneva all served to enhance New Zealand's reputation, even with political opponents. Hitherto the Dominion had taken a small part in the counsels both of the Commonwealth and the nations, and it was good policy to send such a contingent to Europe at this period.

And it is interesting to note that if the Labour Government delegation left the Dominion with anti-Imperialistic views.

was made by Mr. Savage at a reception in his honour when he landed at Wellington in July :

We did not agree upon everything ; far from it ; but the objective was about the same right along the line, and if Britain were in difficulties to-morrow, I don't think there would be any division. I think about the same thing would happen as happened last time. (Applause.)

Two pieces of major legislation have been announced for 1938. The first will provide the Dominion with national health and superannuation insurances on a contributory basis, and, according to a spokesman, will be "the most far-reaching humanitarian legislation ever enacted in this country." The second will introduce several important changes in the State education system. An interesting piece of minor legislation, it is predicted, will provide that all newspaper articles and reports on political subjects should be signed, and that newspaper correspondence relating to politics should not be published unless accompanied by the name and address of the writer, this in response to demands by Labour members for disciplinary action against the almost wholly Opposition press. Finally, the Prime Minister has announced that, in accordance with his party's promise to revive the old system of triennial Parliaments, a General Election would probably be held towards the end of 1938.

If an election is held, then it may be predicted that the Government will go to the country with about equal chances of success and failure. The Dominion at present is more prosperous than it has been for many years. "By means of the increase in taxation and costs on the one hand, and the increased expenditure on social services, combined with the rise in hourly wages on the other," to quote an authority, the main effect of the Labour legislation has been further to redistribute the national income. The Government itself has not been responsible for the increase in the national income, but the working-class section of the electorate can certainly thank it for the diversion of a substantial part of the increment to their pockets. Average wage rates in the Dominion have increased by about 18 per cent. since 1935, whereas prices of retail commodities have advanced by only 10 per cent.

But farmers' and manufacturers' costs have mounted steadily since 1935, and it is doubtful whether industry and

agriculture would have been able to shoulder the burden this year had not those all-important produce prices shown such a substantial advance. Moreover, there has been a great increase during 1937 of political control over the economic life of the country. Although intended to secure the most rational organisation of industry and trade, this trend has by no means had the whole-hearted support of the commercial community. It is certain that a strong effort will be made next year to unseat the Labour Government, and it is a question whether the working-class vote will be greater than the combined votes of the commercial community and the farmers who are disgruntled with the guaranteed price.

New Zealand is a nation of individualists. There is no proletariat, as such, "no mansions and no slums," as one observer put it, and it can be stated definitely that Labour would not have been victorious in 1935 had not the small yeomen farmers been thoroughly dissatisfied with several years of inadequate produce prices. Now that conditions have improved it is fair to assume that these "key-electors" will not necessarily be disposed to maintain in power a party that is only representative of a minority of town workers.

A reasoned verdict as to the success or otherwise of Labour's particular policies cannot unfortunately be given at the present juncture. The test of these will come in the next period of falling prices. So long as the national income is maintained at a high level by good prices, it is possible for employers to carry the burden of higher costs, higher taxation and higher wages for shorter hours of work; and it is possible for Government to subsidise agriculture and also to spend more money on public works and social services. But once those vital prices fall then employers will find themselves working at a loss, and the Government will have to tap monetary reserves or add still further to the burden of debt.

The New Zealand experiment may well become an object-lesson. The economy of the Dominion is very simple; with a small population and a good income from a few simple kinds of production, it is possible to institute social and economic reforms that would be quite impracticable in older, more complex countries. Indeed, it will be a great pity if Labour is defeated this year, for the success or otherwise of its policy will then remain forever indeterminable.

DONALD COWIE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

EUROPE AT THE CROSS ROADS.

THE month of February in the present year will probably be found for good or bad to have been a turning point in the general affairs of Europe, perhaps of the world. On February 20th Herr Hitler made his delayed speech to the Reichstag, and, what was more interesting, on the same day Mr. Anthony Eden resigned the Foreign Secretaryship of Great Britain. A week earlier Herr Hitler had summoned Herr von Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden to inform him in effect that henceforth Austria was to be at Germany's disposal. Within a month of the Berchtesgaden intimation Herr Hitler had virtually annexed Austria.

The mere chronicle of these important events is in itself enough to show how they symbolised a climax that had been reached in European affairs. The doubt that was present in the minds of many serious people was whether the ideological division of so-called "dictatorship" against so-called "democratic" Europe was now to be accentuated and elaborated until it issued into open war, or whether peace could still be sought by the only available method, namely by the attempt to close rather than to emphasise the divisions. Even the pacific people were now some of them assailed by the doubt that it might be too late to close the divisions. It is one of the several contemporary paradoxes that the politicians who in the past have been identified with the pacific causes have in the present instance been driven by a blinding sense of indignation into a readiness, almost an eagerness, to make war. One of the peers who has lately resigned from the Socialist party gave as his reason for taking that step that "he cannot work for a party whose foreign policy involves so much hatred of other Powers, which is prepared to go to war on behalf of collective security—(whatever that may mean)—and whose attainment of office he would therefore regard as a menace to the peace of the world." The old-time pacifist has become a militarist, and the old-time die-hard who was traditionally inclined to accept the occurrence of war as an inescapable incident in his political technique has become the advocate of peace at almost any price. Mr. Eden was identified in the public mind

with the paradoxical idealists who insisted on suspecting Italy and on demanding a proof of sincerity before peace talks could be entered into ; while Mr. Chamberlain stood for the paradoxical realism which was prepared to take a risk for the cause of peace. But the paradox of the realists was less palpable than that of the others. If you want peace the obvious way is to seek peace. By an unfortunate chain of circumstances Europe had been split into two armed camps. Mr. Eden's resignation on February 20th had the effect of clarifying the real issue and the real danger. Let the facts be set down in their simple order.

1. *Germany and Austria.*

On February 12th Herr Hitler suddenly summoned Herr von Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. Though the summons was sudden it could hardly surprise anyone. In this section of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW last month, for example, the following passage could appear, having been written before any news of the Berchtesgaden interview became known : " The Halifax mission had failed to excite any disposition in the British Government to grant any measure of colonial satisfaction to Germany. From the point of view of prestige the alternative field of diplomatic success was the extension in some form or another of German influence to the Germans over the border, especially in Austria. It was no longer the opinion of any serious person in any country that Herr Hitler would send his troops either into Czechoslovakia or into Austria. But it certainly was the opinion of many serious people that the denial of colonial satisfaction implied an inevitable alternative ambition in south-east Europe. How that ambition was to be achieved no one could yet tell." In the event Herr Hitler did send his troops into Austria ; but he clearly had hoped that such a step would be unnecessary. He took it only after Herr von Schuschnigg had defied him.

Austria's " independence " has been a matter of general diplomatic interest, and the subject of several successive juridical compacts, ever since the ill-fated and even pathetic Articles 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain and 80 of the Treaty of Versailles prescribed that such independence was " inalienable " except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. It has been the focus of intensive diplomacy on the part of Great Powers and Danubian Powers

alike for several years, and has involved the assassination of an Austrian Chancellor. The murder of Dr. Dollfuss on July 25th, 1934, was an eloquent symptom of the raw tempers engaged and of the important issues involved. In its latest phase the problem constituted by the position of Austria is known to have been the subject of an understanding between Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini last autumn. When Signor Mussolini visited Herr Hitler at the end of last September he was given the choice (as there is ample, if unprovable, evidence now to know) between the continuance of the Berlin-Rome axis and his abandonment of interest in the fate of Austria. He chose to abandon Austria. When, therefore, Herr Hitler summoned Herr von Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden on September 12th the ring was clear so to speak for a direct trial of strength between the two men. Herr von Schuschnigg was presented with the draft of a new Austro-German agreement, drawn up by Herr Hitler, and was given two days for acceptance. The recent relations between the two countries had been strained because the agreement of July 1936, whereby Austria recognised her German character and Germany recognised Austria's independence, had satisfied neither the acquisitive designs of Herr Hitler nor the proud defiance of Herr von Schuschnigg. Herr Hitler now decided to force the issue by imposing upon Austria an arrangement whereby Austria should be closely associated with the Reich. Herr von Schuschnigg had worn the mantle of Herr Dollfuss as the defender of Austrian independence. Herr Hitler gave him two days to discard it.

The precise nature of Herr Hitler's demands was not revealed in the official statements simultaneously broadcast in Vienna and in Berlin on February 15th. What those statements revealed was that to facilitate the working of the agreement of July 11th, 1936, "both parties have decided on the immediate execution of measures which will ensure that a close and friendly relationship between the two countries shall be established corresponding to the history and common interests of the whole German nation." The measures thus hinted at were (1) the inclusion in the Vienna Cabinet and in a key position of a Nazi sympathiser, (2) an amnesty for Nazi prisoners in Austria, and (3) the grant of full political liberty to the Austrian Nazis. The cardinal point in Herr Hitler's ultimatum was the demand that Dr. von Seyss-Inquart, a

leader of the Austrian Nazis and a "pacification commissioner" appointed under the 1936 agreement, should be made Home Minister, with control of the police, in Herr von Schuschnigg's Cabinet. The importance of that demand could not be exaggerated. If accepted, it would mean that the organisation of law and order throughout Austria would be controlled from Berlin. Throughout February 14th President Miklas and Herr von Schuschnigg hesitated before the plunge; but on the following day it was made known that the demand had been accepted. Dr. von Seyss-Inquart was sworn in as Home Minister by President Miklas in the early hours of February 16th. That same evening he left Vienna for Berlin, where he stayed two days. We were thus given a spectacular illustration of the fact that the Austrian Home Minister was henceforth to take his instructions from Herr Hitler. He was to control both the police and the press in Austria. When in Berlin Dr. Seyss-Inquart is known to have discussed with Herr Hitler the full range of the collaboration now established between the two countries. In effective competence the new Home Minister superseded the Chancellor as dictator of Austria's policy. By the time Herr Hitler made his speech on February 20th the Nazi prisoners in Austria had been amnestied and the Nazis had been granted full liberty of speech, assembly and canvassing. It was made known in Rome on February 17th that the Italian Government regarded the new arrangement as the logical development of the 1936 arrangement and as an asset for European peace. In view of what had happened in Berlin five months before, Signor Mussolini could not be expected to take any other line.

All eyes were now turned upon Herr von Schuschnigg. Had he finally abandoned the stand he had always stubbornly made for full Austrian independence? He had always shown himself courageous and obstinate. The answer was given on February 24th when at a special session of the Federal Diet he made a long speech—running to more than 12,000 words—which was also broadcast. He is made of the stuff that martyrs are made of. Speaking of the Berchtesgaden meeting, he said: "We know exactly that we were able to go, and did go, to that boundary line beyond which, clearly and unequivocally, appear the words: 'So far and no farther.' We have not hesitated to go as far as that boundary line, because,

trusting in the word and in the personality of the Führer and Chancellor who successfully guides the destinies of the great German Reich, we have decided to walk a common road with him which, if it is trod consistently and conscientiously will, we are convinced of it, lead to the welfare of the Austrian Fatherland and of the entire German people and is in the interest of European peace." It is at least possible that Herr von Schuschnigg's speech of February 24th, 1938, will be as memorable as Engelbert Dollfuss' dying words on July 25th, 1934: "I have never sought anything but peace. We have never been the aggressors, and we had to defend ourselves. May the Lord forgive them!"

These passages of Herr von Schuschnigg's speech are in particular likely to be remembered: "If, at this moment, the Austrian people in all its component parts is called upon to rally to the flag of the Fatherland, and if we are ready to emphasise solemnly and before all the world, our unshakable determination to maintain the liberty and independence of our country, it is but meet that we render an account to show if there is any basis in fact for this policy of independence; in other words, if our country is able to live and if the possibilities for development it requires to live actually exist"; and "One thing, in this connection, ought to be established beyond peradventure: The Austrian who wishes to see his Fatherland free and independent has in mind everything rather than the Peace Treaty. In demanding recognition of our right, we certainly do not do so on the basis of that document dictated by the exigencies of a distant day. Authoritative for us remains the firm will of the Austrian people and the unchangeable conviction of its responsible leadership that our Austria must remain Austria!" The depth of emotion under which he spoke was well revealed in his concluding words: "Deep in my heart I carry the conviction that the memory of Engelbert Dollfuss and of all the martyrs of this country watch over and guard the feeble strength of those upon whom to-day's responsibility rests. And if you want to hear it, I trust in the good Lord who will not forsake our country. This trust, however, presupposes the knowledge that the Lord helps only those who are willing to stake their every effort and strength and to concentrate all of their will-power. And because we are determined, the victory is beyond a doubt! Until death: Red-White-Red! Austria!"

There was no longer any doubt either about the strength of Herr Hitler's determination to effect an *Anschluss* with Austria, or about the strength of the Nazis in Austria, especially in the provinces, or about the toughness of those Austrians who still stood by Herr von Schuschnigg. One highly placed Austrian who had been in close touch with Herr von Schuschnigg during the crisis that followed the Berchtesgaden meeting put the matter to me in this way: "After the Berchtesgaden conversations the impression began to gain ground that Schuschnigg's position had been enormously weakened and that the Ministers representing nationalist opinion in the Cabinet might use their influence in a way detrimental to the independence of Austria. Dr. Schuschnigg's fighting speech, which contained the sentence 'so far and no farther,' and which had the approval of the whole Cabinet, is a striking refutation of such assumptions. The opinion had recently been increasingly expressed that the Nazis in Austria represented a large percentage of the population, that the working classes were still antagonistic to the Government and holding aloof, and that the followers of Dr. Schuschnigg had become disheartened. Dr. Schuschnigg's speech makes it clear that these views are not correct.

"The rumours of pressure having been brought to bear on Schuschnigg in his conversations at Berchtesgaden, resented by all patriotically minded Austrians as a national humiliation, have had a far-reaching effect. A great revival of patriotism has manifested itself, and the spokesmen of the working classes have solemnly declared that they support Schuschnigg's policy and are prepared to defend to the last the independence of Austria. At the same time events have shown that the number and the influence of National Socialists in Austria has been greatly overrated. From various articles which appeared in the British press and from opinions expressed in political circles it could be seen that the feeling was growing that the *Anschluss* had become inevitable. This view is rejected emphatically in Austria, and Schuschnigg has declared his determination to defend the independence of Austria to the utmost. The comparative quiet which prevailed in Austria in the dark days of anxiety since Berchtesgaden shows how consolidated is the situation of the country. In his speech the Chancellor was able to point to the striking economic progress made by Austria in the last few years as

proof of the fact that economically also the country is well able to maintain its independence. He emphasised that the Austrian Government are determined to observe faithfully the provisions of the Agreement of July 1936 as amplified in the conversations at Berchtesgaden. He also promised that equal opportunity of co-operating in the task of consolidating the internal peace of Austria and of safeguarding their sectional interests shall be afforded to all Austrians whatever their political opinion or religion may be (thus also to Austrian National Socialists) within the framework of the Patriotic Front. Dr. Schuschnigg laid particular emphasis on the will of his Government to foster in every possible way Austrian friendship with Germany, a friendship inherent in the common history, language and culture of the two countries. The Austrian people ardently hope that this policy can be fully carried out.

The German Chancellor, on the other hand, has renewed his promise not to interfere in Austrian domestic affairs. There is therefore every reason to trust that the relations between the two countries will from now on be of the friendliest and closest nature. Some misgivings, it is true, have been aroused by articles which appeared in Dr. Goering's mouthpiece, the *Essener Nationalzeitung*. Immediately after the Berchtesgaden conversations that paper announced that the process of assimilating Austria to Germany (*Gleichschaltung*) would continue apace. On February 24th the *Essener Nationalzeitung* renewed its attacks on the Austrian Government, alleging that an attempt was being made from a popular 'front alliance' to keep the Nazis down, and hinting that such a course would certainly make it necessary for Hitler to take strong action. Such action would, however, be in flagrant contradiction to Herr Hitler's public declaration that although he cannot consider himself bound by treaties imposed upon him, he will always abide by agreements voluntarily entered into. The agreement of July 1936 and the understanding reached at Berchtesgaden surely belong to the latter category. As Dr. Schuschnigg has solemnly declared that Austria would, if need be, fight to maintain its independence, it is a matter of European concern that any development that might lead to such a catastrophe should be prevented.

Yet on February 27th the dispatch of troops from Vienna to Graz, the Styrian capital, where Nazi demonstrations

against the Government had taken place, symbolised the contrast between the strength of the Austrian Nazis in the provinces and in the capital. The Nazi minority outside Vienna was strong and had no apparent intention of abandoning the *Anschluss*. Dr. von Seyss-Inquart was the object of enthusiastic Nazi demonstrations in Graz and Linz. With the courage and incisiveness which had always distinguished him, Herr von Schuschnigg speaking at Innsbruck on March 9th made it known that a plebiscite would be held throughout Austria on the following Sunday (March 13th) to answer the simple question whether Austria wanted "a free and independent Austria." But before that plebiscite could be held Herr Hitler took a step which looked almost as if it might decide the issue between peace and war in Europe. On March 11th Herr Hitler delivered two ultimatums to Herr von Schuschnigg; the first demanding that the proposed plebiscite be abandoned, the second demanding Herr von Schuschnigg's resignation and his replacement by a government constituted by a two-thirds majority of Nazis. Herr von Schuschnigg did resign on March 11th and was succeeded by Dr. von Seyss-Inquart. German troops crossed the frontier on March 12th, and Herr Hitler himself made a triumphal entry into Linz. On March 13th decree laws were promulgated in Berlin and in Vienna declaring Austria to be a part of the German Reich. Herr Hitler made his own ceremonial entry into Vienna on March 14th.

2. *Mr. Eden's Resignation.*

What took place on February 20th constitutes one of the outstandingly dramatic disturbances even in a post-war Europe whose history has been full of disturbance. The effect of Herr Hitler's much-heralded speech delivered on that day, was rather overshadowed by the coincidence on the same day of Mr. Eden's resignation. Within one week we witnessed the initiation by the British Government of a new bid, perhaps the final bid for peace in Europe, symbolised by the emergence of Lord Halifax as the new Foreign Secretary. The unusual circumstance of a virtually continuous week-end session of the Cabinet drew a nation-wide speculation upon Downing Street. It was known that on February 18th, at Mr. Chamberlain's direct invitation, Count Grandi had twice conversed

with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The Cabinet met both on the Saturday (February 19th) and on the Sunday (February 20th) for more than three hours. Late on the Sunday evening Mr. Eden resigned. In his letter to the Prime Minister he gave as his reason "a difference of outlook between us in respect to the international problems of the day, and also as to the methods by which we should seek to resolve them." Mr. Chamberlain, in accepting the resignation, specifically mentioned Anglo-Italian relations as the immediate cause of the difference. Mr. Eden on February 21st made his apologia to the House. His points were that Italy could not be trusted genuinely to desire peace, that Italian propaganda was rife against us, that before new agreements were discussed, old agreements should be honoured, that in present circumstances Britain must "stand firm." Mr. Chamberlain, for the Government, explained that Mr. Eden had persisted in resigning despite an otherwise united Cabinet. He added that if we wanted peace, it was not enough to hope for it; we must go out and find it by exposing and remedying the cause of disagreement. The issue was now whether we should engage in talks with Italy or not. Mr. Eden said no; Mr. Chamberlain yes. Mr. Eden argued that Italy had "threatened" that the talks must be "now or never." It happens that the first agreement that the talks should start was reached on January 4th, 1937, in the form of the "Gentleman's Agreement." Mr. Chamberlain and Signor Mussolini last July reaffirmed the expediency of the talks. After fourteen months the talks had not started. Mr. Eden was not now ready to start them. It perhaps was a question of "now or never," but hardly in the sense alleged by Mr. Eden. The Opposition on February 22nd launched a motion of censure. It gave Mr. Chamberlain another opportunity of stating the bases of his political faith. Peace, he argued in his simple way, was the bridging of the differences between nations. The League of Nations was not the instrument they had hoped it might be. It must be reconstituted before it could serve its true purpose. At present its use was to delude ourselves and the small nations into a sham conception of collective security. The practical problem was to seek peace with the potential enemy.

The solution of that problem was indeed the object of certain movements already afoot. Lord Perth called on

Count Ciano in Rome on February 22nd before leaving for London. He reached London on February 24th, conversed with Lord Halifax, and lunched with Mr. Chamberlain on February 25th. He remained in London for another week to receive the full instructions for the projected talks with Count Ciano. Count Grandi, the Italian Ambassador, visited Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax on February 21st to convey his Government's desire that the talks should begin in Rome as soon as possible. To fill the gap made by Mr. Eden's resignation, Lord Halifax was on February 21st placed in temporary charge of the Foreign Office. On February 25th he was appointed Foreign Secretary. On the previous day he made an admirable speech in the House of Lords, such as confirmed an already established reputation for those qualities of tact, good humour, elasticity of touch, and sound good sense that are pre-eminently needed in the Europe of to-day. He gave a new and salutary emphasis to the great truth that the courage we need is the constructive courage of improving international relations. It was in the Kroll Opera House on February 20th that Herr Hitler completed, after his manner, a three-weeks' display of concentrated diplomacy. He postponed his anniversary speech on January 30th. He purged his army command on February 4th. He summoned Herr von Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden on February 12th. On February 20th he made his speech. In it he attacked the press of "democratic" countries and postulated press "control" in such countries before useful conversations could be held. He announced Germany's recognition of Manchukuo, renounced her claim to her pre-war Pacific colonies now under a Japanese mandate, reiterated her other colonial claims; and said little about Austria. It was an essay in routine propaganda, not helpful of any good cause in Europe.

In its barest outline such is the story of what took place on February 20th and during the week that followed. It would perhaps be fairer to quote more fully from the rival statements made by Mr. Eden and Mr. Chamberlain on that occasion, for the best of summaries may mislead. It is, however, possible to quote verbatim only one or two of the essential passages. In Mr. Eden's own words the main points he made were these: "The immediate issue is as to whether such official conversations should be opened in Rome now. It is my conviction that the attitude of the Italian Government to international

problems in general, and to this country in particular, is not yet such as to justify this course. The ground has been in no respect prepared. Propaganda against this country by the Italian Government is rife throughout the world. . . . Moreover, little progress in fact, though much in promise, has yet been made with the solution of the Spanish problem. Let me make it plain. I do not suggest, and I would not advocate, that the Government should refuse conversations with the Italian Government, or indeed with any other Government which shows any disposition to conversations with us for the betterment of international understandings ; yet we must be convinced that the conditions in which these conversations take place are such as to make for the likelihood, if not for the certainty, of their success. In my judgment those conditions do not exist to-day. . . . Recent months, recent weeks, recent days have seen the successive violation of international agreements and attempts to secure political decisions by forcible means. We are in the presence of the progressive deterioration of respect for international obligations. It is quite impossible to judge these things in a vacuum. In the light—my judgment may well be wrong—of the present international situation this is a moment for this country to stand firm, not to plunge into negotiations unprepared, with the full knowledge that the chief obstacle to their success has not been resolved. . . . It is certainly never right to [confer] because one party to the negotiations intimates that it is now or never.”

From Mr. Chamberlain's speech the following passages are quoted : “ It is not enough to lay down general principles. If we truly desire peace it is, in my opinion, necessary to make a sustained effort to ascertain and if possible to remove the causes which threaten peace and which now for many months have kept Europe in a state of tension and anxiety. . . . I cannot believe that with a little good will and determination it is not possible to remove genuine grievances and to clear away suspicions which may be entirely unfounded. For these reasons then my colleagues and I have been anxious to find some opportunity of entering upon conversations with the two European countries with which we have been at variance—namely, Germany and Italy—in order that we might find out whether there was any common ground on which we might build up a general scheme of appeasement in Europe.

“ The peace of Europe must depend upon the attitude of

the four major Powers—Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves. For ourselves we are linked to France by common ideals of democracy, of liberty and parliamentary government. . . . On the other side we find Italy and Germany also linked by affinities of outlook and in the forms of their government. The question that we have to think of is this : Are we to allow these two pairs of nations to go on glowering at one another across the frontier, allowing the feeling between the two sides to become more and more embittered until at last the barriers are broken down and the conflict begins which many think would mark the end of civilisation ? Or can we bring them to an understanding of one another's aims and objects and to such discussion as may lead to their final settlement ? If we can do that, if we can bring these four nations into friendly discussion, into a settling of their differences, we shall have saved the peace of Europe for a generation."

The adventure of seeking peace rather than war with Italy was duly begun in the second week of March, when Lord Perth in Rome began his conversations with Count Ciano. Herr Hitler, for his part had on March 3rd summoned Sir Nevile Henderson to see him in Berlin, and Herr von Ribbentrop, the new Foreign Minister, arrived in London on March 9th to resume with Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax the parallel Anglo-German conversations. It looked therefore as if the two sets of conversations, Anglo-German as well as Anglo-Italian, were to be conducted side by side ; when the general outlook was again clouded by the action taken by Herr Hitler against Austria on March 11th.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

March 14th, 1938.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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GERMANY IN TRAVAIL.*

Readers of Prince Hubertus Loewenstein's remarkable book, *The Tragedy of a Nation*, must have wished to know more of its youthful author and of the work on which he was engaged when the Nazi storm broke over his head. Their curiosity is satisfied in his new volume, which carries us from his birth in 1906 to his departure from Germany in 1933. Like most autobiographies there is perhaps a little too much detail in the earlier chapters. But as we advance the interest increases, and we close the book with a vivid impression of a striking and attractive personality. Both as the record of a spiritual pilgrimage and as a picture of a section of German youth during and after the war it is of enduring value.

The heir of emperors and kings was born into a world which crumbled to pieces while he was at school. Just at the period of life when growing boys crave for food there was not enough to eat, and some of the most poignant pages are devoted to the grim story of the semi-starvation of a nation. Whatever else may be said about the war, it made people think. What was the bearer of a historic name to do when the old landmarks were gone, when titles ceased to count, when the family fortunes were at a low ebb? Should he

* *Conquest of the Past. The Autobiography of Prince Hubertus Loewenstein.* Faber and Faber. 15s.

stand aloof in resentful disdain, a survivor from a vanishing Europe, or should he adjust his feudal traditions to the needs and opportunities of an age when the ideals of social justice and equal opportunity fired generous souls? With a young man so precocious and intelligent, so warmhearted and so richly endowed with the gifts of leadership, there could only be one reply. He must not only accept but welcome the new order, striving with all his might to make the German nation, and above all the German youth, worthy of the democratic institutions which were brought to them by defeat.

In his earlier book Prince Hubertus spoke with a blend of affection and exasperation of the Weimar Republic which he desired to preserve and which he longed to serve. Both in the narrative chapters and the extracts from his diary from 1930 onwards which conclude the present volume, he denounces the slackness, the cowardice, the lack of leadership, which helped to bring the democratic experiment to an end. There were some good men at the top, but not one of them fully understood the greatness of the hour in which the German people had to be weaned from its habits of obedience and taught to believe in its capacity for self-government. Our author would repudiate as a libel Prince Bülow's celebrated declaration that the Germans are an unpolitical people, for the response to leadership which he describes in narrating his own experiences suggests that the human material in Germany is as good as anywhere else.

Having found his mission and learned to speak, the Red Prince, as his enemies called him, chose the Reichsbanner for his instrument and stumped the country with untiring energy and apostolic zeal. Unfortunately, a very different sermon was being preached at the same moment by Hitler, whose growing influence was largely based on the cultivation of hatred for the Marxist and the Jew. In a brilliant passage our author describes a meeting in a Munich beer-hall as far back as 1923, when he saw the Nazi leader for the first time. With his words falling over each other, with sudden bursts of rage, with an elemental passion, he depicted a Germany trodden in the mire, surrounded by implacable foes, starving and suffering, paralysed by the weakness of a Government without the courage to say No. It was difficult to resist this tempestuous appeal, but as the evening advanced "something seemed to snap in me as I looked more closely at the man who

was speaking to us. Was he really our destined leader? Could it be he who would give us a new Germany? The contact between the speaker and myself was broken. His words slipped off me; there was nothing in me that responded while his gesture swept the rest of his listeners with him. From now on I was able to watch the intoxicated audience. They would follow anyone who made them promises."

The Nazi victory in 1933, our author believes, need not have come and should not have come. Without the apostasy of Hindenburg the Weimar régime might have survived, and Prince Hubertus might have found his proper vocation as one of its bulwarks. The key of the fortress was handed to its foes when the old President, talked over by his Junker neighbours in East Prussia, unceremoniously evicted Brüning and installed Papen and his fellow reactionaries who knew how to destroy but not how to build. A year later Prince Hubertus crossed the frontier. "All I take with me is the flag to which I have sworn fealty and a dream of German freedom that longs to come true." Whoever else makes his peace with the Nazis, Prince Hubertus, Catholic and democrat, will never haul down his flag. *Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*

G. P. G.

DR. SCHUSCHNIGG ON AUSTRIA.*

It is a unique thing for a statesman to publish something like his Memoirs while still in office, and most of the mistakes and distortions of facts may be explained by this reason. No doubt Dr. Schuschnigg could have spoken more freely had he waited for retirement, when this book might have become an extremely charming and unpretentious work by an art-loving connoisseur of Austrian politics, life and culture, instead of a tendentious description of Austrian affairs by a man who had not a free hand in what to say and what to conceal. Concealment is the chief means used in giving bias to the book.

A student of recent Austrian politics will find himself embarrassed by the superficial treatment of the events leading to the establishment of the authoritarian state. The author expresses his conviction of the incapacity and

* *Dreimal Oesterreich*. By Kurt von Schuschnigg.

impotence of the former parliamentary democracy in Austria in phrases fit for the average Nazi. The dismissal of the two Presidents of the Austrian Parliament and its approval by Dollfuss are only seen from the angle of its advantage to the establishment of the authoritarian régime. This *de facto* dissolution of parliament, closely resembling a *de jure* breach of constitution, is accepted without explanatory comment.

The second event where bias is expressed by means of concealment is his description of the socialist rising in February 1934. He has reason to criticise the Social Democratic party for their obstruction and non-co-operation with the majority which became part of their party creed, and nearly dead-locked the parliamentary machinery. He is also right to stress the revolutionary pathos used by many socialist leaders in their speeches, which surely had some evil influence on the discontented masses. But what he conceals is the discipline displayed by the *Republikanischer Schutzbund*—the militant socialist organisation sworn to the Constitution—at the time of the dissolution of Parliament. He has not a word to say about the incessant provocations of the Left by the *Heimwehr*—the Right military organisation which had Government seats at this time. Neither does he deal with the prejudicial treatment of everything calling itself socialist. For instance the *Arbeiterzeitung*, the official Socialist daily, was put under censorship and subjected to numerous confiscations from March 1933 onwards. Nor is there any mention of the strong opposition of the Left against Dollfuss's foreign policy, which tended towards an alliance with Italy. Last but not least there is no word about the infamous provocations of the *Heimwehr* leaders, the most important of which—being more or less a challenge—was uttered by Fey on February 11th, 1934. On the eve of the rising he declared in a speech in the Burgenland: "To-morrow we want to start with a clean sweep!" The declaration gave the signal for a general strike and the consequent fighting.

It would be almost impossible for the most impartial statesman to talk about this policy *sine ira et studio* while in office. The charm of this book lies not in its political part, but in the perfect frankness with which the author describes his political teachers and friends, Seipel, Dollfuss, Schober, Prince Starhemberg and Guide Schmidt. His short passage

on Mussolini discloses him as the sentimentalist he is : " The real impression is only conveyed by a factual and at the same time personal interview. Not that his eyes would have a different expression, but they show you that there is not severity alone, but benevolence and a great deal of humanity and very much culture in this typically Latin head." Two sayings of the Duce seem to me to be significant for him : " The most difficult and at the same time most important thing is to be so strong as to be able to remain good." " Force ? Yes. But force is nothing we teach, no system we want to build up, and, what would be the worst, no æsthetics we preach. The use of force is magnanimous, noble and a remedy in the surgical sense." In speaking of Dollfuss' death and his own Chancellorship, he talks about his office as a guardianship entrusted to him by his deceased friend. This book gives the author's deep and devoted love for Austria, and, by its complete absence of constructive ideas, explains the planless, unguided Austrian policy of these last years.

AUSTRIACUS.

THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.*

This noble work is a great contrast to most of the biographical literature which has of late issued from the English press. Too many of our biographies accept their facts from previous enquirers and dress them out with tricks of style and intimate details of the private lives of their subjects. Professor Brandi's work is founded upon long and original research and, though it is written in a bright and entertaining style, it makes no unscientific appeal to the general reader. He is mainly occupied with the Emperor's public life and gives few details of his private life. Twice he mentions his habit of drinking cold beer in the morning in defiance of his doctor's advice ; there is a good story of his retort to a Francophile Pope ; the recurrent attacks of gout are mentioned. But in the main we are presented with the statesman and the problems that he was concerned with.

One curious point may be noted. It is usually easy to tell at once whether a book has been written before or after the Great War. But that great tragedy and all its consequences for the world and for Germany especially have left no trace

* *Kaiser Karl V.* By Karl Brandi. (Bruckmann Verlag, München.)

on Professor Brandi's narrative. There is no allusion to the Führer or to German nationalism; though this period has provided some German writers with parallels with modern times. Professor Brandi is occupied with the sixteenth century and with its problems as they presented themselves to contemporaries. Gardiner wrote in one of his prefaces that parallels with modern problems and persons however attractive are really misleading and should be avoided by the historian; and Professor Brandi would appear to be of the same opinion. There are no footnotes or references and no bibliography; and yet it is clear that the narrative rests throughout on first-hand knowledge of original authorities and that in many cases Professor Brandi has discovered new and valuable sources of information. He quotes the Emperor's letters to the Empress "*bisher fast unbekannt*"; Gattinara's memoranda are constantly used in the first part of the book—"*bisher kaum benutzten Denkschriften*"; some apparently most useful letters from Queen Mary of Hungary to her sister; and many others. On the other hand no modern historian is alluded to or quoted from the beginning to the end of the work.

The book is a Life of Charles and Professor Brandi sticks to his subject with close fidelity. It is not a history of the time except in so far as it concerns the Emperor. There is for instance no attempt to reevaluate the Reformation; no new estimate of Luther; no account of the social and economic conditions of Germany and Spain; though clearly the financial problems of the government have been closely studied and understood. The book is not a eulogy of the Emperor; but as is inevitable after so long and thorough a study of him the biographer writes with great sympathy for his character and policy. The burden of Empire was too great to be borne; the problems raised by the Reformation were insoluble; the machinery of the Empire was crazy and worn-out and defied all attempts at reform. But Charles faced his task with the strongest sense of duty and with a judgment which ripened with advancing years. The charges of cruelty and fraud which used to be levelled against Charles find no support in these pages. He was deeply and sincerely Catholic and could not imagine any sufficient reason for leaving the fold; but he criticised Papal policy very sharply and worked continuously to find some means of conciliation.

The book is enriched with excellent portraits, four of them by Titian, and Professor Brandi's comments on them are particularly interesting and penetrating. Next to Charles himself the figures which come out most prominently are those of Gattinara, his first Chancellor and adviser, who did much to mould his political opinions, and Queen Mary of Hungary, who in her widowhood became Regent of the Netherlands and served her brother with the greatest devotion and skill. But everywhere the most intimate knowledge is shown of all the actors in the drama with whom Charles came into contact. The grandees of Spain come to life again; the princelings of Italy seem to be as well known as the greater actors; the leading men in the Netherlands, in France, and of course in Germany are touched with a masterly hand. It is curious that Professor Brandi nowhere handles any of the English contemporaries with the same fullness. He seems inclined to avoid the well-known incidents and devotes himself by preference to such as have not received as much attention from previous historians. The battle of Pavia is told in a manner that is disappointing, and there is no attempt made to elucidate Charles' puzzling failure at Algiers; the Flight from Innsbruck is not here the dramatic incident that it is in some books. On the other hand his dealings with the Cortes of Spain are given with admirable fullness, and the situation in Germany before and after the battle of Mülberg is explained as it has never been before. The book is not revolutionary. The main features of this great chapter in European history remain what they were. But Professor Brandi's work is and is likely to remain for long indispensable for all serious students of the period.

A. J. GRANT.

ECONOMIC ENGLAND BEFORE THE WAR.*

Professor J. H. Clapham has now completed his celebrated *Economic History of Modern Britain* in a third volume, which covers in detail the period 1887-1914. The salient features of the succeeding years up to 1929 are sketched in an epilogue. For the study of this period there is available, of course, an

* *An Economic History of Modern Britain*. Vol. III. By J. H. Clapham. Cambridge University Press. 25s. net.

immense quantity of material and the historian's basic task must be to distinguish the wood from the trees and to indicate the general flow of economic development. In this Professor Clapham has admirably succeeded while embodying much information upon special questions, relating for example to particular trades and industries. The work contains no bibliography but the ample footnotes will put the student upon the track of further knowledge.

The period 1887-1914 is aptly described as one of "machines and national rivalries." It witnessed a radical change in industrial enterprise in its relation to the outside world. The days of British monopoly were past and a pre-eminence which had justified free trade was now rapidly disappearing in face of foreign competition. With the turn of the century the terms of international barter were becoming less favourable to Britain. Although her trade progressively increased, her pace of development was slower than that of Germany or America. Foreign tariffs and subsidies played a predominant part in establishing the competing industries, often equipped with British machinery. It is significant that between 1880-1900 export of the latter doubled and that of coal quadrupled. Professor Clapham treats the argument that Britain was undermining her own foundations as correct "in a vague, general, but in practice unimportant way." Upon the question of stagnation, or relative inefficiency, in British industry after 1900, he is cautious. "Satisfactory evidence is not easy to get," but some of the primary industries, including coal, cotton and iron, "were almost certainly stagnant, or worse, at this particular time." Britain had lost her leadership in technological advance, and although British devices and methods were still often adopted abroad, most of the principal inventions were foreign. Professor Clapham notes in connection with British metallurgy and engineering between 1885-1905 that the reports of the factory inspectors "leave a continuous and deep impression of how many things they think are done better elsewhere, or very recently have been." By about 1905-10, however, Britain's "most deadly lag, that in electrical development, was being wiped out"; and in the years before the war a fresh stirring in industry became apparent.

Professor Clapham deals at length with the growth of joint-stock enterprise and with the movements during the

late 'eighties and 'nineties towards amalgamation and combines, at least partly influenced by the rapid propagation of the American Trust and the German *Kartelle*. There was also the swift development of the multiple shop enterprises. By the beginning of the century most of the great grocery concerns and catering firms, such as the A.B. Co. and Lyons, were widespread and expanding businesses. The departmental store had also become an established institution. In the North, particularly in the areas of highly organised industry, the co-operative store was firmly planted and spreading steadily over industrial Britain. In Barnsley, for instance, out of a population of 50,000, 34,000 were co-operative members, with aggregate purchases of over a million pounds in 1911. One of the most significant features of the period was the growing social-economic interference of the State. Professor Clapham points to the change in public opinion which accepted, in common with men such as Randolph Churchill, Joseph Chamberlain and Robert Blatchford, the view of Jevons that "the State is justified in passing any law, or even in doing any single act, which in its ulterior consequences adds to the sum of human happiness." In many respects the new approach was highly beneficial, as for example in the provision of old-age pensions, health insurance, workmen's compensation and the protection of children, while in others it was naturally cautious and experimental, as in the case of unemployment insurance. In town-planning Parliament failed, and the great progress towards a solution of the housing and overcrowding problem is largely post-war, though Professor Clapham does point to real improvements during the period, particularly 1901-11. But he notes the contraction in building after 1907 and the reduced demand owing to the general stagnation in wages from 1900; accompanied by an upward movement in the cost of living at first imperceptible and then rising more steeply to the climax of 1912, when food prices were 14 per cent. higher than in 1900. The wage-lag was, as Professor Clapham points out, "by no means the sole cause of industrial unrest." During the years 1895-1913 the unions increased their membership from 1½ to over 4 millions of militant workers oppressed by their conditions, goaded by legal decisions, determined upon union recognition and inspired by socialist theories. Moreover, they sought to share in the reviving trade prosperity.

In the course of a valuable and constructive sketch of the years 1914-29, Professor Clapham emphasises that with the exception of the decline in the export of coal "all the chief commercial and industrial expansions or contractions were predictable and most of them would probably have occurred—though some more slowly—had there never been a war. He stresses the continuity of economic development. Incidentally he is anxious to show that in no way did private economic interests, including manufacturers of armaments, contribute in any degree to the outbreak of war.

NEW LIGHT ON BISMARCK.*

The period 1848-71 contained the most important events in the history of Germany in the nineteenth century—the 1848 revolution, the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question, the wars of 1866 and 1870-1. This book gives the commentary and the attitude of the British Government to those events; it is an important contribution both to the study of British diplomacy and to the history of official Anglo-German relations.* Dr. Valentin had the permission of the Foreign Office to inspect all the British despatches from Germany during this period, and it is on this hitherto unobtainable foundation that his book is constructed. A selection of these documents is printed in an appendix.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the attitude of the British Foreign Office was based on the classic view that Germany's function was to preserve the stability of central Europe against aggression from the two great military Powers, France and Russia. British opinion, therefore, was favourable to any internal reconstruction that would strengthen the loose German confederation, but unfavourable to any debilitating cleavage between the leading states of Austria and Prussia or to any disturbing extension of German influence in Poland, Denmark or the Low Countries. The failure of British diplomacy in this period was due to the weakness of this dualism. No power, whether Liberal or Bismarckian, that was strong enough to reconstruct Germany could fail to be revolutionary in its effects on Europe. The

* *Bismarcks Reichsgründung im Urteil Englischer Diplomaten.* By Veit Valentin. Elsevier, Amsterdam.

hesitation of England in the face of this fundamental fact is the aspect which arises perhaps most clearly from Dr. Valentin's careful and detailed exposition.

Between 1848 and 1850 the peace of central Europe was preserved at the cost of continued German weakness. England endeavoured to guide the revolution in Germany to a constructive solution by encouraging a close understanding between the central authority at Frankfurt and the centre of real power at Berlin. But her influence was firmly used against the inclination of the Prussian Government, acting under the pressure of Liberal opinion, to take up the question of Polish independence and German claims to Schleswig-Holstein. It is true that Palmerston might have taken a more favourable view of the Schleswig-Holstein question if there had been an energetic attempt in Berlin to create a new federal system. But with the decline in Prussian initiative, he felt less inclined to sacrifice the traditional British interest in the independence of the Danish peninsula. By that attitude British diplomacy, while sympathising with Prussian leadership in Germany, dealt a blow at Prussian influence from which it took long to recover.

In the following years the other half of the picture was shown: Germany strengthened herself at the cost of three European wars. The first clear sign to London that Prussia had embarked on a revolutionary course was the Convention of Gastein. British diplomacy then realised that war with Austria was a necessity for Bismarck's position and policy, and by July 1866 it was beginning to reckon on a union of the whole of Germany under Prussia and the possibility of a French war as the best means of attaining that end. All that England could do was to delay and isolate the war, and protect her interests in Holland and Belgium against either of the two contending Powers. The centre of British influence in this period receded from Berlin to Munich; only in the weak and independent south was the British voice still authoritative. Yet though British diplomacy was powerless to halt Bismarck's progress, Bismarck himself failed to obtain the alliance of England against France. However great the distrust of Napoleon III, England could not assist Prussia in a war that would change the face of Europe. When the war finally came, the neutrality of England was a profound disappointment to Bismarck, and the new German Empire

began its career with strained relations towards England in spite of the fact that the strengthening of German unity had long been one of the objectives of British foreign policy.

Dr. Valentin's weighty study is rounded off by a brief and perhaps too condensed account of the earlier literary connection between England and Germany, followed by a pregnant analysis of the major considerations which govern the relations of great modern states. From the technical standpoint the book is excellently bound and printed, and the text pleasantly relieved by a series of diplomatic portraits. The book should soon be translated into the language of the country with whose diplomacy it is primarily concerned.

J. GASH.

BAKUNIN.*

This excellently written biography of the famous Russian anarchist, which reads like an exciting novel, is the first complete account in any Western European language of his very varied life. The actual instigator of Bakunin research, Max Nettlau, rescued numerous manuscripts and letters from oblivion; and himself compiled a life of his hero. This work, however, written some forty years ago, was of gigantic proportions; it was never printed and is only to be had in single photographic copies of the manuscript. It was indeed more fitted to be the fragmentary ruin from which artistically-gifted architects acquired their materials. Professor Carr, who is an able Russian scholar, could make use of Stekloff's massive Russian biography, as well as of all the rich and valued sources opened up by more recent Russian research since the Bolshevik revolution. His own earlier studies of Herzen and Marx served as a useful preparation for his later and more advanced character study.

According to Harold Nicolson every good biography should arouse the same interest as a novel. We doubt the truth of such a statement. The lives of many explorers, inventors, artists and statesmen were placid and uneventful. Bakunin, the romantic adventurer, never disappears for any length of time from the view of the reader behind the four walls of

**Michael Bakunin*. By E. H. Carr. Macmillan & Co. 1937. 25s.

domestic life. This aristocratic Bohemian moves continually on the stage of life, with its ever-changing background. He was in no sense a man of work. Intercourse with others filled his day. His one object was to touch the hearts of his fellows for his aims and the pockets of his neighbours for his needs. The idea of paying his debts never occurred to him. The author attempts to explain the psychology of "this figure at once sub-human and superhuman" by the fact that the primary potency of man was denied to this giant, in all other respects bursting with vitality. This thesis does in fact shed light on much that is not clear in his restless temperament. But it cannot provide the basis of a just estimate of his historical importance. Bakunin never initiated a movement which did not fail at once. He neither founded a society nor compiled any book which had far-reaching effects. Even as a conspirator he was a mere dilettante, who could not make his means achieve his ends. Yet his historical importance will seem greater to-day than before 1914. Marx and Engels, his opposites in everything, were scarcely troubled by the question of leadership. They awaited the social revolution as the result of an economic process which would itself call forth the necessary human tools, whereas Bakunin was for ever consciously preparing for a future revolution. In this respect the Marxist Lenin followed his example. Even by the cradle of the political parties, which to-day rule the totalitarian states, there stood these revolutionary "élite," as Bakunin understood them.

Small inaccuracies are sure to creep into a work of such magnitude. There were never 80,000 German emigrants in Paris; by far the greater majority of the Germans in Paris were artisans who resided there temporarily in order to complete their apprenticeship. The Hegelian school was, in no way, an out-and-out revolutionary body; there was a conservative and a radical wing. Stirner was not an opponent of the Young Hegelian movement: he was counted among their followers. "A certain Moses Hess," mentioned by the author, was by no means a person of no importance. He it was who first pointed Marx and Engels the way to Communism and who later gave to Zionism its still most famous work *Rome and Jerusalem*.

GUSTAV MAYER.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The List volume of an extensive work on *Westminster Abbey; its Worship and Ornaments*,* is the latest of Dr. Jocelyn Perkins' numerous publications relating to the Abbey. It is intended as a complete historical survey from the thirteenth century of Westminster ceremonial and ritual, of the "ornamenta or instrumenta of worship" and of the Abbey's interior furnishings. In this volume he deals in particular with the history of the High Altar, Presbytery and Choir. For nearly forty years Dr. Perkins has been Sacrist of the Abbey and, with his profound historical knowledge, is peculiarly well qualified to deal with a subject which has received minor treatment from other writers. The text sets out a quantity of new material and is illustrated with numerous old prints. Dr. Perkins, who combines enthusiasm with candour, is highly critical of many post-Reformation changes and regrets the medieval interior "ablaze with colour too glorious for words." He thus naturally applauds the recent revival of bright-coloured decoration in the Choir and elsewhere.

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Under the Pole Star. The Oxford University Arctic Expedition, 1935-6,† by Mr. A. R. Glen (leader and glaciologist), assisted by Mr. N. A. C. Croft (second in command), is the account of over a year's exploration in North-East Land. Actually, however, the book is the joint production of the ten members and thus is a more complete record of individual experiences than would otherwise be possible. The Expedition had the satisfaction of completing the whole of the scientific programme planned (and in some respects exceeded it), but the full results are not yet published. The work included surveying, geological investigations, meteorological and astronomical observations, and a general study of animal and bird life. A particularly important piece of work was the research on the ionosphere. A Central Station was maintained on the ice-cap from September 1935 to mid-June 1936, and a Northern Station from November 1935 to February 1936. This book, however, is not a mass of technical detail, but rather a careful record of life and work amidst all the rigours of the uninhabited Arctic and shows the appeal of such a land. The fine photographs add to the excellence of a fascinating book.

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Old Parish Life in London‡ is a valuable and painstaking book by Mr. Charles Pendrill, who is already known for his work on historical London. In this volume he describes various aspects of the Londoner's life and surroundings during the Middle Ages, and up to the sixteenth

* Alcuin Club Collections, No. XXXIII. Oxford University Press. 25s. net.

† Methuen. 25s. net.

‡ Oxford University Press, 21s. net.

and seventeenth centuries. For much of the material embodied in his narrative he has obviously made researches in the early records and particularly the fifteenth-century churchwardens' accounts. His book abounds with examples and quotations but his references are extremely scanty and inadequate, and there is no bibliography. This is the more regrettable because it is not a mere popular account, but a detailed and erudite work useful to students. Medieval life, which was impregnated with religious practices, in many ways radiated from the parish church. In London there were more than one hundred parishes and Mr. Pendrill is careful to describe the typical and elaborate ornaments and furnishings of the parish church and to give an account of its many services. He describes the religious influence on daily life, the position of the parish priest and the increasing duties of the laity which led to the gradual emergence of the vestry as a unit of local administration. The condition and relief of the poor, the parishioners' hours, and trading are also reviewed. Mr. Pendrill portrays with effect the radical changes wrought by the Reformation. After reading this vivid book, some readers, at least, will appreciate the iconoclastic motives of the reformers.

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*Edward Speyer: My Life and Friends** is an inspiring picture of musical people, composers and artists in Victorian and Edwardian days when the spaciousness of life allowed of improvised concerts, parties, informal suppers, much hospitality. There was apparently no preoccupation with war, politics, social questions. The whole life was to hear and make music and enjoy the friendship of such great ones as Joachim, Clara Schumann and Brahms, surrounded by fellow performers and pupils. There is a description of five years' stay in Frankfort, when Mr. Speyer's second wife, Antonia Kufferath, was in great request as a singer. Clara Schumann and her pupils (amongst whom were Leonard Borwick and Fanny Davies) figure very delightfully in this period. Later Mr. Speyer received his many musical friends at his house Ridgehurst in Hertfordshire. He promoted concerts, where new or little-known compositions and foreign artists were introduced to the London public, and English taste was much enlarged and encouraged by his imagination and energetic foresight. There are some interesting portraits in the book. Perhaps the most characteristic are the frontispiece of Edward Speyer and Donald Francis Tovey in conversation in 1931, and a pencil drawing of the broad back of Johannes Brahms playing the piano (1895). There are many brief life sketches of well-known people, there is a great fund of enthusiasm and appreciation, and real human affection for his many friends. Mr. Speyer lived to the age of 95 and kept up his musical interest to the end. The foreword is by H. C. Colles.

* Cobden-Sanderson. 12s. 6d.

Ludwig II of Bavaria: The Tragedy of an Idealist,* by Herr F. Máyr-Ofen, translated by Miss E. Goodman and Mr. P. Sudley, will perhaps be of more interest to musicians and to lovers of South Germany than to historians. The book is a psychological study of the so-called mad king, and the forces that had such vital influence on his life. The author does full justice, however, to the important part played by Ludwig II in the establishment of the German Reich and to his political capabilities. To him fell the task of offering the imperial crown to the King of Prussia. It is difficult to believe that the man who was held in esteem by Bismarck, and who also made Wagner's work possible, could be definitely mad. Early training, a love of introspection, loneliness, and an extraordinary desire to imitate Louis XIV did much to unsettle Ludwig's mental balance. Peculiar he certainly was and undoubtedly his friendship with Wagner had its unhealthy aspect, but there was also the true desire to give the master's genius to the world.

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Art and Understanding† is a penetrating work by Miss Margaret H. Bulley, who seeks to analyse the nature of true visual art and to assess its æsthetic values. In art lies the human approach to spiritual reality, compared with counterfeit art "the symbol of a false or material sense of things." She lays down her standards for artistic appreciation and emphasises her argument from the 276 illustrations of works of art which form a prominent feature of the book.

* Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. net.

† Batsford. 15s. net.

A Correction.

Mr. George Soloveytchik writes: "It would be churlish to express anything but gratitude for Mr. Reddaway's most generous appreciation of my biography of Potemkin. Yet since he accuses me of a few minor inaccuracies, perhaps he will allow me to say that his review demonstrates how easy it is to slip on a date. He writes: 'It is at least suggestive that between 1774, when at twenty-five he [Potemkin] became Catherine's favourite,' etc. In hard fact Potemkin was thirty-five in 1774. I plead guilty to having said that Paul was of age when I should have written that he was rapidly approaching twenty-one."

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MAY 1938.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

SPAIN is in flames. Austria has been wiped off the map. China is engulfed in slaughter. France is unable to reconcile her contending factions. The United States is in the throes of a prolonged economic crisis. The United Kingdom is overburdened with debt which it is idle to imagine she can ever repay. Germany and Italy have exhausted their gold holdings and have little if any foreign credit. Russia, so far as we know anything of her, has no hope of regaining immediate stability either political or commercial. Christianity with its humanising influences is at a discount in many if not most countries. Religion is banned alike in Orthodox Russia and Mahomedan Turkey, while in Germany the only brand of deist teaching permitted by the State is said to be distinguishable from paganism only by official eyes. Science is devoting much of its time and energy to the perfection of air warfare in all its branches, and levies a daily toll through its agency on human life and human achievement in the art and comfort whereby man has made life possible and even agreeable.

The contemplation of this threatened collapse of that civilised relationship of man to man and nation to nation which has been evolving for the last three centuries, and which survived the calamities of the Great War fills everyone, with the exception seemingly of the two or three persons mainly responsible for the present turmoil, with apprehension. The passivity and numbness of mind visible in every nation is astonishing. Let some self-appointed "Leader" call, and it is traitorous not to respond. The propaganda of a controlled Press, the hypnotic power of the personal broadcast, the repressive power of military mechanisms are indeed aids to an Executive which, if they had been even suspected as likely to exist twenty years ago, would have made a vast difference at Versailles. Boundaries and treaties would have been far otherwise fashioned than they were. Most alarming of all is the spirit in which leaders suggest the almost synchronous acceptance and repudiation of obligations, and the zeal with

which the followers applaud such morality. It dates from the imposition of insensate reparations imposed with the rapturous approval of peoples as well as Governments. It showed itself again in the inevitable repudiation of these impossible burdens. It spread as it was bound to from finance to diplomacy, and treaties went the way of loans. Now it has become part of the technique of international relations to accept and to violate obligations almost in the same breath. Here are the two most recent examples occurring as I write. *The Times* of to-day (March 28th, 1938) reports from *Rome* that "it is public knowledge that no reinforcements have been sent to Spain for many months and the Italian forces in Spain are much reduced in number. The engagements assumed in London are confirmed in the most explicit and loyal manner on the Italian side." But on March 26th *The Times* reports from *Spain*, "Nothing can save the Government in Spain except foreign intervention on terms equal to the help Italy and Germany are giving to General Franco . . . under the terrible punishment meted out by the newly arrived German and Italian air units." Then follows a statement from the Italian authorities of the Italian losses, and the information that the non-Intervention Committee was resuming its sitting—all this in the same week. Again : at the beginning of March Herr Hitler, in the Reichstag, vehemently attacked the British Press for asserting that he was preparing the 40,000 Austrian Nazis interned in Germany for a march into Austria. He declared it was "a malicious lie"—on March 10th he sent them on that very march. I do not quote these examples of diplomatic methods as illustrations of the *mala fides* of Italian or German rulers, but as showing the extreme difficulty of negotiations with Governments to whom truth and candour are strangers. Such Governments see, I imagine, no impropriety in their methods of diplomacy, which make it quite obvious why they cannot sustain or approve the semi-public consultations at Geneva or the round table statements of the League, necessitating comparative frankness.

The long-drawn-out continuance and now the resumption of the non-Intervention proceedings lead one to fear that our own negotiators have been the victims of assurances and pledges which were and are merely the weapons of antagonists to whom the end was everything and the means less than nothing. There can be no doubt that the precautions desired

by Mr. Eden as preliminaries prior to conversation were more than justified. At home, certainly, and abroad eventually, Mr. Chamberlain will pay dearly for his credulity.

By the absorption of Austria into completely unified Germany not only has an unbroken frontier of despotic government stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic been established, but a moral barrier transcending the material one has come into being. All intellectual contact between West and East is under control of the Dictators. The democratic ideals of Great Britain, France, the Low Countries or Scandinavia can be intercepted and denied on their way to Poland, the Balkans, and their neighbours. Trade, military assistance, political consultation, commercial relations, are at the mercy of a couple of successful adventurers who, having reduced their fellow nationals to submissive acceptance of their own political philosophy, are without doubt recuperating for the next effort. By the use of the word submissive I do not mean to imply that Germans or Italians do not applaud or appreciate the spectacular accomplishments of their respective leaders. I am certain that the great majority do applaud and it would be a great mistake to think otherwise.

But it is an applause without alternative, and that it is and must be so, is mutually accepted. It happens, however, to be within my own knowledge that German soldiers occupying Austria warned Austrian Nazis that there was another side to Nazism which they had had to put up with for five years, and which Austrians would be tired of in one. They had in mind not only the glamour of success embodied in glittering arms and spectacular efficiency, but the daily tribute of silenced anxiety which the nation pays to the Leader. No freedom to speak or write as ambition prompts, or curiosity invites, no power to worship as belief requires, no right to do anything except obey; no liberty to trade or to travel as profit or desire suggest. Moreover, while Nazis and those whom they control are cut off from free and easy companionship with their fellow-countrymen, they are no whit less separated from the outside world. The stories told and the beliefs current in Italy as to the economic conditions in Britain are incredible. They react by intention and by inference, to the glory of the Leader. Hard as life may be he has at least led them away from the privations which the English patiently and impotently, such is the legend, endure.

It is apparently less easy to deceive Germany as to the physical condition of the rest of Europe. But the distortion of facts and the misrepresentation of motives go in that country far beyond the mistakes caused in every land by the dissimilarity of mental outlook. It is part of the system by which modern oligarchy keep their places. It has been brought to a fine art, and is under a special ministry headed by one of the most important persons in the Government. It is intolerable that we should place reliance on conversations and negotiations conducted with governments brought up in such an atmosphere. A glance at the reproduction of the Berlin Volksbund map shows the racial and cultural barrier which now threatens all theory of life based on personal predilection being permitted to any of the East European communities.

It shows, moreover, how many and how spread are the regions in which may be found reasons, similar to the Austrian excuse, for intervention leading up to occupation and absorption. It bids us reflect how limited are the resources of those who desire resistance to the onward march of autocracy, and how slight can be that resistance if those menaced are cut off from all outside help. It may be argued that whatever be the dislike to foreign political domination, and not least when it takes the form of German domination of which Poland, Yugoslavia and Roumania have recent experience, that the difference between the actual methods of Government in the Reich and those at work in any of the Balkan States are hardly distinguishable. In considerable measure this argument must be accepted. It is, indeed, strange and disturbing that the spread of education and the advancement of science seem to incline man to accept at the bidding of individual adventurers a tyrannous exercise of power which his fathers have spent blood and treasure freely to snatch away from hereditary rulers. It may, of course, be due to nothing but the difference between swords and pitchforks, as compared with aeroplanes and machine-guns, the weighting of the scales in favour of organised government. Whatever the cause of the phenomenon it exists, and must be reckoned as one of the considerations to be taken into account in estimating the conditions in Europe.

The fact, however, is that the autocracy in the Balkans is held in check by the turbulent temper of the people and by adhesion to some of the forms of constitutionalism, while

Poland and Czechoslovakia are Republics in more than name, with Hungary a republic in all but name. In addition there is no person in any one of these States who can compare in force of character with the German and Italian dictators. These may or may not have built systems longer lived than themselves. Few would venture to say that their system will not last as long as they do. But who would insure the continuance of the personal rule in any of the East European kingdoms for more than from month to month?

The controlling forces in these States are not much less responsible than the framers of the Peace treaties for the present imbroglio, which had its origin in the mutilation of Austria. Accustomed to membership and even leadership in a great Empire, it was left adrift as an insignificant State without spiritual or material support. Had it been allowed a King and a Court at Vienna, these would have attracted the Austrian Germans as Berlin never could have done. It is arguable and believed that in those early days such a Vienna would have caught Bavaria as well. Since there was no such rallying point, and as there was justifiable alarm at the confiscatory tendencies of the then Government, Austria, apart from Vienna, turned outwards to Berlin. The policy of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg came too late, and its very success brought Hitler upon it. The net result of the natural fears and jealousies of the Eastern States and of their unfortunate lack of vision and experience is that for an impotent monarchy has been substituted an uncontrollable visionary who advances like Cromwell he knows not whither.

I have tried to indicate above that Europe has been cut in two by the German seizure of Austria; that the advance in knowledge and especially in science has been followed unexpectedly by the increase of power and exercise of tyranny by every Executive east of Luxemburg, and by the corresponding subservience of the individual citizen: that some two hundred million Europeans are deprived of all freedom of speech, knowledge, trade, or religion: and that whatever may be the nominal form of the despotism, Fascist, Nazi, or Communist, they all rely on the same methods of force, ruthlessness, and brutality comparable only to those of the Sicilian Bomba against whom Gladstone roused not only England but Europe. The effect of this return to the methods of barbarism on countries still attached to the principles, or

at least to the profession of democratic liberalism is likely to be serious. In unlucky Austria force has displaced law, in Czechoslovakia it openly threatens it. Is any country safe?

There are three main groups of States whose life is in jeopardy, first Scandinavia, Belgium and Holland, second the Balkan countries with Poland, Hungary and Greece, and lastly England and France. There are obviously wide differences of peril and of power in the case of each country, and it is only possible in this paper to deal very generally with their problems. Still a picture may perhaps be given which reveals the probabilities of the near future. Scandinavia has only two territories to forfeit to ambition: the Aland Islands and Schleswig. They would be ultimate rather than immediate spoils, to be garnered after a victorious campaign rather than to be the cause of an uncertain conflict. Moreover, Swedish commerce depends largely on Germany for a market, while the latter looks always for Swedish iron. There is not much danger of an immediate clash between the Reich and Scandinavia. The Low Countries are so plainly under British observation that designs on them can only be entertained as part of major strife with England, and for the immediate future can be laid aside.

Far different is the outlook of the East European countries. The obliteration of Austria has brought Germany to their very doors while Italy is their neighbour by sea and land. Collectively they number 60 to 70 millions, they have shown themselves skilful and resolute soldiers, habituated to war by tradition and practice, and having achieved freedom quite recently after centuries of servitude may be expected to value it and to defend it vigorously. They are ruled by dynasties who might welcome a Kaiser but hardly Dr. Goebbels, and who, fairly efficient as rulers, are not unpopular as monarchs. The Governments are now on correct, even friendly terms, and accustomed to consultation *inter se*. Their populations are not homogeneous, and there are deep religious dissensions.

Although Germany and Italy have done their utmost to create discord, contact and common action has so far been maintained in the Balkans. The weak point in their entente lies in the geography of Czechoslovakia as related not only to Germany but also to Hungary. The map alluded to shows how plain to-day is the invitation to Germany to move on Prague, and with the same technique as was adopted in the

case of Vienna. The rehearsals are proceeding apace. Expression of opinion or criticism of Government, repressed with every circumstance of brutality in Germany becomes an apostolic virtue in Czecho-Germans. Revolt of opinion is now being subsidised, rebellion in arms will not be allowed to linger by the way. Who can hinder Germany or rescue the Czechs? France has declared that she will, and possibly believes that she can. Now look again at the map of Europe. How is she going to get at Czechoslovakia? Does it not depend on her own relations with Poland and Yugoslavia? Even with a strictly neutral Italy, and reflection may create the strictest neutrality, could she reach Prague from either North or South in time to save it? She might avenge it on the Rhine, but at what a cost! If France declined the easier task in 1936, will she engage in the heavier one in 1939? Only, I suspect, on the one condition that all the eastern countries are with her, and that Italy is neutral. Is France equal to the diplomatic and military requirements? I should doubt her ability or willingness to shoulder the burden unless she was assured of British co-operation. Can we or ought we to co-operate actively?

The duty of co-operation must depend on the aims for the attainment of which co-operation is sought. There are two such principal objects to which France and England alike subscribe. The first is the maintenance, or should I not say the re-establishment, of a real peace in Europe. The second is the right of every country to settle its own form of Government free from the interference of any foreign power. That neither of these principles is maintained in Europe at present must be admitted by all. That their continual violation must lead to eventual chaos is equally admitted.

Two other things are beyond question. No nation will move to stop the practice of piracy unless England decides to lead, and the United States will, while laying down rules for the conduct of international relations by other countries, certainly never translate her words into action. Starting with this knowledge, what do we owe Europe as well as ourselves?

The flabby conduct of foreign affairs by successive British governments is one of the major causes of trouble. We speak unceasingly of a League of Nations policy and we never had the courage to force the League to fulfil its obligation to the world and in particular to Germany by carrying through

universal disarmament. Unilateral disarmament was an act of moral cowardice and of incredible folly. A clear understanding with pre-Nazi Germany would have brought French Cabinets to their senses. Collective security would be in existence and Hitler would not be in a position to endanger European tranquillity. Can we pay our debt to the smaller States of Europe who are our creditors indeed? I believe we can if we think sometimes in terms of our own power, which incidentally Mr. Chamberlain says "terrifies" him. It does not seem to terrify anyone else, though there is, I am sure, a misapplication of means to ends by our Government, which has mainly contributed to the confusion in which vainglorious dictators stride unrebuked.

Our means, save on the memorable occasion of Nyon, have been confined to "protests," the unavailing contents of which are the amusement of the German comic Press, to questionnaires which remain unanswered, and to "warnings" which are rudely ignored. (We have other means at our disposal better understood by Germany and better paid attention to. We have a navy officially nearly three times the size of the German navy.) I cannot find out that in practice it is any less. There are a German fleet, German commerce, and German ports all extremely vulnerable, and well known to this prancing Führer to be so. There is a large German population on the edge of scarcity of food and raw materials. There is a skilful and highly trained general staff the recent heads of which were very unwilling to risk an adventure by which the army might find itself committed to war. There is a German Treasury and, indeed, an Italian Treasury also, living on its own fat, and living only from day to day. (In spite of all these vulnerable factors in the German position our Government lets itself be cowed by propaganda which, ignoring all these weaknesses, concentrates on the irresistible powers of an air force, in truth tested only in combat with unorganised Spaniards.) In 1914 the British had to face a Germany, *on whom it had the resolution to declare war*, subject to none of the handicaps mentioned above. Why is the courage exhibited by Government and people then, lacking now? Is it not rather, as I am sure, that the people are rising to the emergency and the Government are hanging back? Few things are certain in ordinary life, nothing is more than "probable" in international life. But it is almost certain that if we hold back

now the Führer, emboldened, even justified, by long-continued impunity will spring on Prague as he sprang on Vienna. Eventually we shall have to stand up to him when enriched by the spoils of the Austrian and Czechoslovakian lands in minerals, in men, in commerce and in territory. We are perhaps at the turning point of Empire when our fate is still in our own hands, but if we do start down the wrong road control passes from us. It is as sure as anything can be sure that if we state a bold policy with firmness, and adhere to it, we shall not lack active and determined friends who will, for their own sakes, see the matter through. Beneath the crust of acquiescence they are many, both Germans and Italians, who would welcome a less drastic rule of life, a less challenging attitude to dissentients in Europe, less brutal to those at home. But nothing will be gained by climbing down in every conversation. The latest at Rome is finished but not yet officially acknowledged. *The Times* tells us that Italy's special position in the Mediterranean is to be recognised, and in turn she kindly recognises that free passage through is essential to us. We are to recognise the disappearance of Abyssinia, but are allowed to whisper it from under the umbrella of the League put up to hide our blushes. Our action in Palestine is to be so regulated that it will not prejudice Italy's position in the East. Italian garrisons in Libya are to stand at half what they were a month ago, i.e. after 30,000 men had been added to them six months ago. Then as a gesture of unexpected good will the Italian troops and material are to be withdrawn from Spain about the time when the purpose for which they were sent is accomplished. I suppose Mr. Chamberlain is proud of his Agreement, and will shortly ask England to be proud of it also. I hope for his sake that our Ambassador is to be allowed to edit Mussolini's speech on the pact which is to follow. I recall that about eighteen months after Lord Beaconsfield brought "Peace with honour" back from Berlin, he and his party were badly beaten at the election. What happens to a Prime Minister who produces peace without honour the electorate will tell us eighteen months hence.

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AFTER THE GERMAN COUP.

THE German seizure of Austria has, in the words of Mr. Chamberlain, created "a new situation in Europe," and all the Powers, but especially the small states in her vicinity, are anxiously taking stock of that situation and wondering who will be the next victim, and whether the Western democracies are permanently reduced to impotence. For sheer ruthless brutality there has been nothing like it since the days of Frederick the Great, who employed very similar methods in his seizure of Silesia from Maria Theresa. There is, however, a still greater defiance of treaty pledges: for in his famous Reichstag speech of May 21st, 1935, Herr Hitler had—quite voluntarily—announced that "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an *Anschluss*," and on January 30th, 1937, he had assured Europe that "the period of so-called surprises is now over." In July 1936 he had concluded a convention respecting Austria's independence, and had supplemented this as recently as February 12th, 1938. If none of these pledges deterred him from marching into Austria, what reliance can possibly be placed by other Powers on his plighted word?

His method is a combination of "Power Politics" and shock tactics, seemingly applied as part of a carefully calculated plan of advance. Everything shows that it had long been prepared, down to the smallest details, so that thousands of his supporters throughout Austria were ready at a sudden signal to seize control of key positions. The discovery of the Tavs plot and the decision of Herr von Schuschnigg to risk a plebiscite—in other words, to do what the Austrian Nazis had so long been clamouring for—undoubtedly precipitated the Coup. But we also know enough to be certain that everything save the actual date of attack had already been decided, and that what Hitler was above all concerned to prevent was the formation of a Government in Vienna in which the workers would once more be represented, and in which at last a large section of Labour and the Catholic Left wing would be united in a coalition backed by many of the most enlightened Conservative elements in the State (including the Episcopate, with the frank approval of the Vatican). It is essential for an

understanding of what has happened to realise that the dictatorial states are not merely concerned to maintain absolute uniformity at home, but to discourage, or even prevent, any democratic developments in neighbouring states. It is above all from this angle that the relations of Czechoslovakia with Germany have to be considered, for that little Republic's exposed position in the heart of Europe corresponds to its even more exposed position as the last free democratic State east of the Rhine.

Indignation at the outrageous manner in which Austrian independence was overthrown must not blind us to the strength of the idea behind the *Anschluss*—the union of all Germans in what Schmerling as long ago as the 'sixties used to call the "Seventy Million Empire." In an abstract and national sense almost all Germans on both sides of the now vanished frontier believed in this union as something natural and inevitable. It was the identification of this conception of German Unity with the totalitarian principle in so intolerant and pagan a form, that led an undoubted majority of the Austrian population to prefer independence (in a state that was every whit as *viable* as eight or ten other lesser European states), until the Nazi régime could assume a milder and less effervescent character. The Czechs, then, as closely interested observers, always had to reckon with the possibility of the *Anschluss*. When in 1918 the post-war Austrian Constitution (thanks mainly to the influence of the Socialists of Vienna) included a clause declaring Austria to be "a constituent part of the German Republic," Masaryk and Beneš accepted the incorporation of Austria in the Reich as inevitable, but they found no acceptance for this view at the Peace Conference. As late as March 1934 Dr. Beneš, as Foreign Minister, openly alluded to this episode, and allowed it to be inferred that Czechoslovakia, and the Little Entente as a whole, could not possibly oppose the *Anschluss*, if it came as the work of both peoples, and indeed would regard it as a lesser evil than the restoration of the Habsburgs in either Austria or Hungary. When at last the blow fell, any resistance on the part of Czechoslovakia or her allies of the Little Entente was obviously out of the question, especially in view of the negative attitude of the Great Powers, and above all of Italy. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that Hitler had the advantage of what might perhaps be called "moral strategy," in the sense that resistance

to the invading German troops would have been felt as a *civil war* between Germans (this feeling was at the back of Herr von Schuschnigg's parting exhortation of non-resistance), and that the only quarters from which armed help could have come were *non-German* countries—a fact which would at once have placed the native defenders of independence in an equivocal light. Unless the three Western Powers were ready to go to war for Austrian independence (and the Germans could reckon almost with certitude on their bluff not being called), the lesser Danubian states had absolutely no alternative save acquiescence in the accomplished fact.

The strategic results are tremendous, and for none more so than for Czechoslovakia. Not merely does the Reich acquire 6½ millions of additional population, with many valuable mineral and material resources, but it acquires well-nigh impregnable frontiers in the Alps and control of all the open doors leading to the great Hungarian plain. All the upper reaches of the Danube now belong to Germany: her troops are on the Brenner, looking down the path trodden by many medieval Emperors, looking down too upon her oppressed kinsmen in South Tirol, and dreaming of Trieste, as the natural outlet of German commerce and political influence to the south. Once and for all, there is an end of the projects of Danubian economic union, in the many varying forms put forward and discussed during the last eighteen years. In particular the idea of some special economic co-operation between Vienna, Budapest and Prague (on lines not incompatible with the Rome Protocols, and taking due account of German economic interests) has been blown sky-high; and it may well be that the distinct progress towards such a goal which the last twelve months had witnessed in the three capitals was one among a number of reasons for Hitler's action. Incidentally, Italy, who has been forced to show *bonne mine à mauvais jeu*, loses at a blow all her network of commercial arrangements with Austria, and sees her economic interests in Hungary also endangered, if only because the main communications between the two countries, now lie through Jugoslavia.

Czechoslovakia now finds herself in very much the same position as in the first quarter of the fifteenth century, when, as champion of the Hussite faith, she had to defend her frontiers on four sides from the invading armies of the Reich

and of Sigismund of Hungary, who stood for dynastic and religious orthodoxy. Then, too, there was a strong German minority within the state, which (as in the dispute at the University of Prague) sided with the council of Constance, against the followers of Huss and Wycliffe. In those days Bohemia held crusading Europe at bay, but at a heavy price of fanaticism and impoverishment: the strain was too great, and laid the seeds of national downfall amid the horrors of the Thirty Years' War. To-day there is this great difference: the forces arrayed against Czechoslovakia may be more formidable, but the Czechoslovaks themselves are infinitely more united. There is no longer a religious feud: indeed, not the least remarkable feature of these two post-war decades has been the recovery of the Catholic Church, the dying down of anti-clericalism, and the *modus vivendi* between the Republic and the Vatican, which is increasingly conscious that in very few Continental states is the Church so free and untrammelled. This is a factor of very great importance in the background: and it is the best answer to persons ill-informed enough to accept the comic German propagandist charge of Bolshevism levelled against this essentially bourgeois Liberal state.

In one aspect, the seizure of Austria would seem to mark the end of the series of treaty repudiations: there is nothing of much importance left to repudiate, unless, of course, the questions of Alsace-Lorraine and the western provinces of Poland are again to be raised in the teeth of solemn renunciations or conventions. An attack upon Czechoslovakia by Germany would be in an entirely different category: for hitherto Germany has had no territorial claims against Bohemia, whose present frontiers are 6-800 years old, and which has never formed part of the ancient Reich save in the purely nominal sense that the Habsburgs were already Kings of Bohemia in the fifteenth, and uninterruptedly since the sixteenth century. If Germany were now to advance a territorial claim as legatee of the Austria whom she has now swallowed up, this would apply to all the lands of the Bohemian Crown, as part of the former Empire of Austria:—it could not possibly be restricted to German racial fragments, nor could it be applied to Slovakia, which belonged to the Holy Hungarian Crown of St. Stephen. But it would involve partition and the end of independence: it would be a new and

revolutionary act in the public law of Europe and would be entirely without precedent.

Officially, however, Germany has not merely not advanced such a claim : she has given assurances to the Prague Government that she entertains no aggressive designs against Czechoslovakia. This promise was conveyed by the German Minister in Prague to the Hodža Government and by Marshal Göring to Dr. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin. This fact was quoted with approval by Mr. Neville Chamberlain in his speech in the House of Commons, and it is known that he had instructed Sir Neville Henderson to explain to Marshal Göring the British Government's satisfaction and the importance which it attached to such pledges. It is also not without significance that the Yugoslav Premier, Dr. Stoyadinovitch, in reply to questions in the Skupshtina, announced that similar assurances with regard to Czechoslovakia had been readily given to him by Berlin, and that he was satisfied with them.

These verbal pledges are good as far as they go : they are worth as much, or as little, as the endless pledges which have been torn up in the last few years. Much more important were the public and official announcements, on behalf of the French and Russian Governments, that they would strictly fulfil their treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression against her, and again the speech of the Premier, Dr. Hodža, affirming his Government's resolve to resist if attacked (" We shall defend, defend, defend "). This reflects the wonderful mood of calm but unflinching resolution that inspires the whole Czech and Slovak people : and let no one fall into the error of supposing that the Slovaks (whose material and moral progress in these two decades has been even greater than that of Czechoslovakia, because it began at a far lower level) will not defend the Republic to the very last.

A lively controversy has raged round the question whether Britain also would do well to give an explicit pledge to help Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression. Some held that this was the best, perhaps the only, practical deterrent, others that it would arouse opposition in this country and perhaps a revolt among the Government's supporters. To my mind the most surprising feature of the whole discussion has been the widespread character of the demand for such a guarantee on behalf of a country so much more remote and less familiar

than Belgium : it only shows how responsive British opinion is to a moral issue, and how indignant and alarmed it has become as a result of the treatment of Austria. In any case, it may reasonably be affirmed that the middle course adopted by Mr. Chamberlain was a wise compromise. To announce a promise of unconditional and "automatic" support, thereby risking a volley of criticism from various quarters, might merely encourage German opinion in the calculation that it was not seriously intended or would not stand the test of war : whereas by emphasising the existence of a more general pledge under the Covenant (which so many people are inclined to overlook or ignore) and making clear his own scepticism as to the possibility of holding aloof under "the inexorable pressure of facts," especially in any dispute that affected France, he contrived to retain a certain freedom of movement till the last moment, and yet to convey a grave warning in courteous terms. No one can read the speech without realising that it throws over the last shreds of the "Isolationist" illusion which some of his less discerning followers have been fondly commending, and recognises the virtual impossibility of separating "east" and "west," if once it comes to the arbitrament of war. Implicitly, too, it means that while the idea of "fighting for Czechoslovakia" is a sentimental overstatement to which this country cannot commit itself, that little country's continued independence is quite as much bound up with vital "British interests" as were Belgium or Serbia in 1914, and that we cannot, if we would, disinterest ourselves in its fate.

Europe, and Germany, now know that in the event of aggression Czechoslovakia will have the military support of two Great Powers, and that Britain, to say no more, cannot regard with indifference an event that would utterly alter (or rather, utterly destroy) the whole Balance of Power, which must always be a vital British interest in a world where "Power Politics" are again substituted for the Genevan Order. What then of Czechoslovakia's other allies, of the Little and Balkan Ententes ?

The realist will at once remember that these two formations exist for the double purpose of maintaining the *status quo* on the Danube and in the Balkan Peninsula, as achieved by the Peace Treaties, and, in the former case, of preventing any restoration of the expelled Habsburg dynasty. In other words,

Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Jugoslavia have always been united in opposing Hungarian revisionism, but there has never been any question of active opposition to Austria, who accepted the position created by the Treaty of St. Germain, or to Germany, who has not yet challenged the legality of any of the frontiers of the three Little Entente states. But to-day more than ever neither Jugoslavia nor Roumania would find it easy to defend their ally against attacks from the north: the most they could do would be to immobilise Hungary, while Turkey and Greece in their turn took steps to insure that Bulgaria would remain neutral on the Danube. Neither Power could allow Hungary to seize Slovakia, without risking the loss of some of their own border districts to Hungary; but neither Power is in a favourable position for becoming involved in armed conflict with Germany. For Jugoslavia in particular this would be quite impossible if Italy were on the German side: for she would then have against her both the Great Powers who are now her neighbours, and Italy's control of Albania would increase the danger. On the other hand, Jugoslavia shares with Greece and Turkey very definite Mediterranean interests, and if Italy were at war with the two Western Powers there is little doubt where the sympathies of these three smaller states would lie, but that their interest would lie in maintaining neutrality as long as they possibly could—in fact, until it was pretty certain on which side victory would lie.

Roumania is in a much more delicate position: for if Czechoslovakia were attacked by Germany, the natural route for Russian military help would be across the north-west corner of Roumania's territory. It would be a choice of evils, for in case Roumania refused access Russia would probably act as she did in 1877, and confront Roumania with the alternative of joining in or being invaded, while if she resisted the Russians she would be risking the downfall of her ally to whose aid they were coming. In either case the Roumanians would fear that the invading troops might refuse to withdraw afterwards, at any rate from the Ukrainian districts of Bessarabia. On the other hand, if she complied with the Russian request, she would probably be confronted with a German ultimatum: and if by that time Hungary had entered the German sphere of influence, Roumania might find herself

invaded from two sides, with her oil, timber and wheat as a coveted objective for both invaders.

Poland's attitude in such a contingency would probably remain doubtful till the very last moment. Her whole policy rests upon three facts—her uneasy position between two Great Powers, her lack of easily defensible frontiers either on the east or west, and her desire at all costs to avert the danger of another general war being fought out upon her soil. Soviet Russia may be relied upon not to violate Polish territory, since that would force Poland into a defensive alliance with Germany; but the dispatch of military help on a large scale from Russia to Czechoslovakia would place her in a most awkward predicament, the more so since, for all her supercilious attitude to the Czechs, she would be running a terrible risk in allowing Czechoslovakia to be overrun, since she would not only incur the opposition of Russia and lose her own alliance with France, but be exposed to fresh dangers on her western frontiers, such as no unholy bargain for the partition of Slovakia between herself and Hungary could possibly make good.

That these and similar speculations are exercising the minds of every continental country to-day, is the measure of the shock administered by Hitler's latest coup. There are, however, grounds for thinking that the main centre of European strategy is for the immediate future to be sought in Spain rather than on the Danube. And indeed it may well be that the Führer and his advisers hold that a policy of naked conquest towards Czechoslovakia has been rendered unnecessary by events, and that peaceful penetration offers prospects of speedy success, with a minimum of danger. This penetration might take three forms: (1) for Germany to establish political control of Hungary (economically she is already Hungary's chief customer), in which case the strategic circle round Czechoslovakia would be virtually complete; (2) to strangle her economic development and bring her to her knees by trade restrictions on those frontiers by which most of her exports to the outside world must pass; and (3) to use the large German minority inside Bohemia as the Trojan Horse.

Of these three methods the first might seem specially promising, in view of the Czech-Magyar feud over Slovakia and the persistence of revisionist aims in Budapest. At the

same time the *Anschluss* and the method of its enforcement has been at least as great a shock to Hungarian as to Czech opinion: for the "70 million Reich" now marches with Hungary with her 8½ millions, and her Italian alliance thus becomes of very little protection to her, while the menace of imported Nazi doctrines to the ancient Hungarian constitutional tradition is very real and disturbing. While there undoubtedly is a section of opinion which only sees in recent events an opportunity for recovering Slovakia, all really responsible politicians in Budapest are well aware that, once the Bohemian fortress fell, the vast might of the aggrandised Reich would soon burst the feeble barriers of the Hungarian state, and make of it the merest vassal. In short, Hungarian independence would be far better served by an honourable understanding with the Little Entente, but, of course, only on the basis of making Magyar minority rights a reality (and the obstacle to this lies not so much in Slovakia as in Roumania).*

Of the second method it is impossible to write within the framework of this article. It is, however, only necessary to glance at a map in order to see what powers of economic pressure could be exercised by Germany against Czechoslovakia, now that Austria has been absorbed, and that the Czech export trade loses a valuable customer in Vienna. Czechoslovakia's access to western countries now lies mainly across German territory. It is true, however, that so far the Reich has expressly refrained from tearing up the convention which secures to Czechoslovakia trading facilities down the Elbe to Hamburg. On the other hand, there are signs that Poland is not averse to profiting from the new situation, by offering facilities for a new trade outlet at Gdynia: and there of course still remains the Danube, with two notable post-war creations, the Slovak ports of Bratislava and Komarno. Meanwhile economics complicates the delicate problem of the German minority: for *Deutsch-Böhmen* was already over-industrialised even before the war, and therefore suffered more severely than the more agricultural Czech districts from the world depression. Equally disastrous in its effect upon the

* There has been a belated resumption of conversations between the new Roumanian Government and Mr. Bárdossy, the Hungarian Minister in Bucarest, but though there are hopeful signs, it would be mere folly to ignore the growth of chauvinist opinion among the Roumanians.

German districts was the Reich's new policy of autarky and currency restrictions.

It is the third method, however, which is likely to prove the most effective and the most dangerous. The 3,250,000 Germans of Czechoslovakia are, since the absorption of Austria, the largest single German unit outside the frontiers of the Reich; and no reasonable person can blame the Reich for interesting itself in the fate of this or any other group of *Auslands-Deutsche*. They have been there for at least seven centuries, and after being so long "top dog" in the old Austria, they cannot be expected to rest content with any status short of full legal equality. No one conversant with the facts can regard them as in any sense an oppressed minority, though they undoubtedly have grievances which still await adjustment. They have due political representation, a complete educational system, cultural and press institutions: and there is no other German minority in Europe which enjoys anything like the same rights (it is only necessary to compare their position with that of the Germans in South Tirol, in Poland or in Hungary).

Their most serious ground for complaint is that they have considerably less than their share of official posts; but this has its origin in their stubborn opposition in 1918-20 to the idea of the new Republic—an attitude which was natural enough in the circumstances, but which had the inevitable effect of most of these posts being assigned to Czechs. In 1926 a majority of the Germans adopted an "activist" policy, and had their Ministers in all successive Cabinets; but their demands were as yet only partially fulfilled, when the economic crisis and Hitler's advent to power in Germany led to a recrudescence of the old Pan-German tendencies which had always been stronger among the Sudetian than the Alpine Germans. A new party, the *Sudetendeutsche Partei*, under Konrad Henlein as extra-parliamentarian "Leader," won forty-four seats at the last elections, and showed a growing taste for authoritarian methods; and Hitler's Austrian coup has naturally enough stimulated this party's self-confidence and stampeded the Activist groups out of the Government. The agreement of February 1937, by which the Hodža Cabinet pledged itself to extend German minority rights, worked too slowly and did not satisfy impatient appetites. To-day the Czechs stand committed to a speeding up of concessions, in the

form of a National Charter, and have no choice save to negotiate with Henlein, despite their suspicion that he is an agent of Hitler. The Henlein party is profuse in its professions of loyalty to the State, but there is no escape from the fact that its totalitarian views mix with the democratic tenets of the Czechs as fire mixes with water, and that apart from domestic questions they aim at detaching Czechoslovakia from her French and Russian alliances and so making of her the political vassal of Berlin.

Here lies the crux of the whole problem. (If Berlin really desires peace in Central Europe, an honourable compromise between Czech and German is attainable; and it is a happy omen that Prague, through the mouths of President Beneš and Dr. Hodža, should have genuinely welcomed the good offices of the British Government as an informal mediator. But if Berlin is only waiting an opportunity for launching another coup—this time with the object of establishing a Danubian and Balkan hegemony—then of course no amount of concessions will avail, and there will be infinite openings, in so tense an atmosphere, for the picking of a quarrel.)

For British opinion the first essential is to realise that what is at stake is not "help for Czechoslovakia," but the question whether the Danubian and Balkan countries, as a whole, are to preserve their independence, or to become mere annexes to a Great Power of eighty millions, dominating the whole centre of the Continent.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

FRANCE FACES THE FACTS.

WITH something like anguish the vast majority of Frenchmen appealed for the cessation of party politics—the end of the disunion brought on France by the Front Populaire—and the formation of a National Ministry, a Ministry of Public Safety, a Ministry which would endeavour to undo, while perhaps there is yet time, the evil of the unnatural electoral combination of Radicals, Socialists and Communists, backed up by Syndicalists and by mysterious associates. For of the utter failure of the Front Populaire not even M. Blum has been in doubt for more than a year. When he, alarmed at the flight of capital, the agitation of the workers, the economic collapse largely produced by ill-considered legislation, the depreciation of the currency, and the external threat to an enfeebled France, appealed twelve months ago for a “pause,” he showed that he was already aware of the bankruptcy of a governmental system which dared not, on pain of dissolution, react against the tyranny of a small minority. The extremists of the Left could behave illegally; they could not be brought to book, they could not be called to order, they had to be placated. In monetary, in social, and in foreign affairs, the Front Populaire, at the mercy of its most revolutionary elements, has had a disastrous career, and has left France impoverished and without due authority in the counsels of the nation. But though M. Blum suggested a halt a year ago, things went from bad to worse. Forces had been let loose which could not be controlled. It is difficult for the Front Populaire to blame the Opposition, for the Opposition gave it a good run, in the hope that the people would awaken to the consequences of extravagant spending, of partisan legislation.

Nevertheless, the parliamentary machine seemed to forbid a reversal of the majority; though, in fact, the Radicals at any time could have joined hands with the Moderates and beaten the Marxists. There was, considering the serious circumstances, an unbelievable jockeying for position. Everybody agreed that drastic changes were necessary. Everybody demanded a National Government; but the Socialists thought they should lead it, while the Radicals looked on themselves as the saviours of France. Thus when M. Chaumets asked for special powers of a semi-dictatorial character

in the financial field, M. Blum threw him down ; only to ask, a month later, for the same sort of dictatorial powers. It is fair to say that M. Blum was anxious to get the Moderates into his Cabinet ; but they were to be balanced by Communists in the Cabinet ; and the Blum formula was taken to mean that the Front Populaire would continue, but this time with the active support of the Opposition. The Opposition naturally replied that M. Blum was not qualified to repair his own blunders ; and, besides, there was no appearance that a real attempt would be made to repair the blunders. Pathetic letters were written to President Lebrun, pleading for a more representative Government ; in the lobbies of the Chamber the deputies acknowledged the need of Ministerial strength and stability ; resolutions were voted in favour of a non-party Directoire ; the newspapers were filled with adjurations to M. Blum to abandon his pretensions for the sake of the country's welfare ; the Senate plainly invited him to resign ; but he clung to office in order to prepare a vague financial project which had little chance of acceptance, and which he proposed to apply in detail by decree. Between the resignation of the Radical M. Chautemps, provoked by the Socialists and the Communists, and the appearance of the Socialist M. Blum with his scheme for a capital levy, more inflation, the suppression of bearer shares, the suspension of the amortisation of the public debt, and so forth, a month had been allowed to elapse, during which France was virtually without a durable Government.

And yet the clamour for a durable Government was deafening ; and in the meantime European destiny was shaping itself. It was felt, in many quarters, that France had abdicated at a particularly critical moment ; and that party politics had betrayed the country into an almost inexplicable weakness. To talk of a series of " crises " is scarcely accurate ; the crisis in March which saw the downfall of the Chautemps Cabinet and the advent of the new Blum Cabinet, and the crisis in April which brought the Blum Cabinet up against realities, were the same ; and that crisis has, in fact, lasted ever since M. Blum discovered last year that the hasty Front Populaire legislation had gravely reduced French production, had hopelessly set workers against employers, had rendered normal borrowing more and more difficult, and had given to the dictators precisely the conditions which they would have

wished for the fulfilment of their ambitions. There has been a single crisis—the death agony of the Front Populaire, but it has been an unconscionable time in dying, and in the meantime the substance of France and her moral prestige have been sadly diminished. The franc touched its lowest point under the Blum Government ; and the influence of France suffered correspondingly.

To put all the blame on the Socialists—or on the Communists—or on the Radicals—or on the Front Populaire as a political combination, would doubtless be unjust, since the post-war history of France is an unbroken record of political blunders ; but it should be stated plainly that the unhappy union of 1936 vastly accelerated the swiftness of the fall. The best friends of France—and I trust my long association entitles me to a place in their ranks—are those who are most afflicted by the lamentable spectacle of partisan ineptitude and sectarian incompetence shown since the elections, now nearly two years ago. One has only to compare the popular enthusiasm which greeted the formation of the first Blum Cabinet with the alarm which marked the announcement of the second Blum Cabinet in March—the fourth government of the Front Populaire—to realise the total failure of the *expérience*. The franc stood in 1936 at seventy-five to the pound : it has steadily dropped to 160. After repeated assurances that the budget was balanced, we are now informed that the Treasury requires more than 36 milliards more this year, and that the raising of an adequate loan will be impossible in the existing “ climate.” The forty-hour week, imposed without proper consideration, has, with other handicaps to industry, dealt a grave blow to commercial exchanges, which show a growing deficit. Gold has fled from the Bank of France, and the “ war-chest ” has been depleted. Strikes which are usually unjustified, without economic reason, sometimes revolutionary in character, were constantly declared, despite the vaunted “ labour code ” ; and it is obvious that they cannot be controlled by the Socialists, nor even by the Confédération Générale du Travail, and are inspired by invisible leaders. The workers are no better off with their higher wages, because the cost of living has shot up, while the middle classes are being crushed out of existence. A spirit of hatred has been fostered, a class war, of which the result is disaster to the whole community. There is, in all this, no

question of taking sides with the Left or the Right ; it has, indeed, nothing to do with Socialism or Capitalism, with Syndicalism (which is essentially anti-parliamentarian in France) or with "democracy." The simple truth is that France has been badly governed, though national unity and economic solidarity may be necessary for France's very existence.

Why the Socialists of M. Blum should suddenly have refused to support the Radicals of M. Chautemps in March, when another and genuine attempt to straighten finances was being made, would be hard to explain on rational grounds. For the only Ministry M. Blum could possibly form was obviously insufficient, and could exist merely on sufferance for a few days, a few weeks, scarcely a few months. From the first day it was believed it would expire immediately, and it would have been better had it been stillborn. It is true that M. Blum offered to take into his Cabinet Conservatives and Communists, but it was equally clear that M. Blum was not the man to restore "confidence," after his two years' unfortunate record. Moreover, the inclusion of the Communists, who take their instructions from Moscow, and who were pressing for open intervention in Spain with its deadly risk of a general European conflagration, was utterly unacceptable ; and as for the Conservatives, it was asking too much from them to cover and condone the desperate errors of the Socialists—to serve as a screen, and to provide an alibi. Some less marked, less unsuccessful politician, was called for to lead the overdue National Government. Nevertheless, M. Blum insisted on presenting an incredibly poor team to the Chamber, and for nearly a month, during which the gravest events were happening in Europe, he refused to give way, sticking to office, though the Government, doomed to a speedy demise, could possess no authority. Yet this interim Government, holding on against the whole weight of enlightened public opinion, was the Government which had to handle such tremendous problems as the accomplishment of the *Anschluss*, the approaching victory of General Franco, perhaps the installation of German and Italian forces in Spain and their command of French communications, the conclusion of an accord between Italy and England, and the menace to Czechoslovakian independence. Probably France has never been more tragically impotent. The best that M. Blum could do

was to ask for immediate resources by the easy but fatal method of inflation ; and when the Senate declined to give him more than five milliards to effect payments due, he still refused to step down, and prepared, with perpetual postponements, a financial " plan." It would be foolish to attempt to analyse the financial situation in France ; for it depends largely on the political situation, which has not, as I write, yet crystallised. Suffice it to say that it is deeply regrettable that it should have taken so long for France to discover the inopportune fallacies by which the Front Populaire won the elections two years ago ; for while Germany, Italy and Japan have all been free to pursue their policies at the expense of the rest of Europe and Asia, it is chiefly for the *Roi de Prusse* that the Front Populaire has unconsciously worked.

When M. Laval, who was found too tepid by the British Government in the matter of " sanctions " against Italy, was thrown down, his successor had the bitter task of reaping the first-fruits of " sanctions." Germany, as a few of us had safely enough predicted, took advantage of the feud of Italy and England, which immobilised England in the Mediterranean, to reoccupy and remilitarise the Rhineland. Perhaps if the provisional Prime Minister, M. Sarraut, and the Foreign Minister, M. Flandin, who succeeded M. Laval, had decided to act, Hitler would have beat a quick retreat. But they could not count on England ; and soon it was too late. Germany was strongly entrenched in Rhineland, and could not be dislodged. An iron curtain was let down between France and her allies in Central Europe. This was the most momentous episode of the after-war ; it completely changed the diplomatic possibilities in Europe. Henceforth, the realisation of German hegemony along the Danube was practically certain. It was perfectly clear that the Little Entente would soon turn away from France and turn towards Germany. It was indisputable that the system on which France (and indeed, at second remove, England) had relied in Europe, was now completely shattered. How important was this direct outcome of " sanctions," is not yet understood in quarters which ought to have instantly seized its implications—and, in fact, should have foreseen the coup. M. Flandin, at least, did what he could when the Italians, to the astonishment of the ill-advised British Foreign Office, reached Addis-Ababa ; he proposed to accept the irreparable, and to recognise at once

the Italian Empire. Had this been done, and the losses been cut, Europe would have been spared much perturbation. But he felt obliged to consult M. Blum, who was shortly to succeed to the Premiership. According to his recent statement the response was negative. It was, indeed, difficult for the Front Populaire to escape from its own propaganda, to fly in the face of its own *mystique*. So began that long denial of realities which created and consolidated the Berlin-Rome "axis," and the Rome-Berlin-Tokio "triangle"; and that lost for the white race its influence in the Far East, and that eventually made possible Greater Germany by the incorporation in the Reich of Austria—a violation of territorial integrity of far greater consequence than the change of rulership in Abyssinia, but which was accepted and "recognised" without loss of time by France and England.

The retrospective fixing of responsibility is a poor pastime, and assuredly it is not my purpose to attribute Europe's present ills to the Front Populaire. It would be grossly inaccurate to do so; for there were many other factors and there was an astonishing lack of diplomatic foresight in England. Yet it is surely permissible now to regret that, at this crucial hour for Europe, France swung to the "Left," and had Governments which were compelled to live on the "ideology" of a struggle of "Democracy" against "Fascism," to the exclusion of practical considerations. The relations of France and Italy had been fairly good during the period of "sanctions"; Italy understood that France was, against her will, reluctantly carrying out her duties as a member of a coercive League of Nations. But now that "sanctions" were over, France seemed gratuitously to provoke Italian resentment. On the ground that the Ambassador to Rome had reached the retiring age, he was unnecessarily withdrawn; and it was, of course, impossible to send another unless his papers were made out to the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia! After a year of French Ambassadorial absence from Rome, Rome in turn withdrew the Italian Ambassador from Paris. Could any diplomatic muddle be sillier than this?

Thus when Hitler decided to effect the *Anschluss*, the French were badly placed to ask Italy to stand by them in accordance with the pledges of Stresa. There is no doubt that Italy was distressed at the high-handed action of Germany; but as she was still on bad terms with England and France,

it was impossible for her to protest at Berlin. A gradual diplomatic "shift" might eventually be effected; but she could not throw over her chief associate without a restoration of her former friendships in Europe. It was grotesque to expect Italy, after all that had happened, to spring to the side of France against her only friend among the European Great Powers. Therefore, though the more foolish French newspapers gloated over Italy's "defeat," and tried to ignore the utter wreck of French policy since the war, the more sober elements of the French political press took this lesson seriously to heart. "Sanctions" had brought Strasbourg under the menace of German cannon; now the continuance of a futile quarrel had enabled the Reich to achieve her ambition of forming a Greater Germany, which would be an irresistible magnet for many of the European countries hitherto more or less in the French orbit. In a word, Germany had at last won the war.

I do not think I exaggerate when I say that there is an almost unanimous hope of an instant reversal of policy. With the exception of a few fanatical and incorrigible "ideologues," it is seen that the past two years have brought French fortunes to their lowest ebb. The sentiment in Parliament, if one makes abstraction of the impenitent Communists, is that France should at once follow England's lead and come to terms with Italy. It was foolish to break the Stresa Front; it will soon be criminal to maintain Italy as a potential enemy on the Alps and in the Mediterranean. There are, indeed, no vital outstanding questions to settle between Italy and France. There never have been. There has simply been a clamorous *mystique*, a resolute "ideological" antagonism, fortified by systematic lying and organised propaganda by foreign agents. The phase is nearly over; France cannot afford, for electoral or partisan purposes, to give herself another frontier to defend, and to make war, in the most unfavourable conditions, absolutely inevitable.

Austria must go. There would have been nothing for the Blum Government to do, even though it had been ten times solidier than it was. Indeed, the French Socialists would have found themselves hampered by former declarations which seemed to envisage the *Anschluss* as just; and, in any case, whatever the future consequences of the annexation may be, France was, in no sense, prepared to fight to prevent Germans

from joining with Germany. Even the new threat to Czechoslovakia finds France in two minds. While M. Blum and M. Paul Boncour seemed to renew the French pledges (though the assurances are perhaps qualified by references to the League, which notoriously would not call for collective action) a number of newspapers flatly expressed the view that France would not fight for the existence of an artificial State composed of heterogeneous populations. They pointed out that France could not, if she would, lend military aid to Czechoslovakia. The French troops would have to break down the Rhineland fortifications and traverse Germany first. They urged that instead of threatening it would be better to negotiate. And it is absurd to treat the Czechoslovakian problem in isolation. It is related to the Polish problem, the Hungarian problem, the Italian problem; it depends on the possibilities of a general understanding of the Great Powers—of France and Germany, of England and Italy. It is the height of folly to multiply one's "enemies," and so reduce one's diplomatic influence to zero and one's military potentialities to a minimum. Here, too, common sense, I am inclined to think, will still prevail, though the twelfth hour is about to strike.

France cannot disguise the unpleasant truth that Belgium is lost as an ally, that Poland is at best neutral, that Rumania and Yugoslavia cannot be counted on as they could have been a few years ago, and that all the little nations are, in alarm, contracting out of the obligations of the League of Nations. Nor can the inconvenience of the Franco-Russian Pact, which has furnished a powerful pretext to Italy and Germany, and has given a certain immunity to Moscow emissaries in France, be overlooked. Nevertheless, even the Right believes that the Franco-Russian Pact possesses a military value, in spite of the wholesale executions in Russia, of generals as well as of officials, and would preserve it if it can be divorced from Communist propaganda in France—in other words, if the Front Populaire, which the Communists have used for their special purposes, is now broken up. The chief danger-spot in Europe for many months has been Spain. There have been repeated attempts at vital intervention. The sympathies of the Front Populaire have naturally been with the Frente Popular, and if Socialists, Communists and Syndicalists had been listened to, France would have been committed, long

ago, to war with Germany and Italy. It would be futile to deny that a good deal of aid has gone to Barcelona from France. Yet the official attitude was one of non-intervention. The peril of the past month has, however, been real. Even in the Government there were heard voices in favour of the despatch of troops to the frontiers—and, in certain contingencies, beyond; and circumstantial stories have circulated of the opposition of French Generals to contemplated action which they considered imprudent, and even of counsels of prudence from the British Government. Whatever the facts, it is certain that while unofficial help for Barcelona was never dangerous, the smallest official intervention would have had to be accompanied by mobilisation on three fronts—that is to say, there would have been, almost certainly, the European war which the Spanish Government, and its supporters, and presumably the Moscow Government, would have welcomed to redress the defeat in Spain. I will risk no predictions on a ticklish situation; but I will express the hope that, with the political changes in France, there will be an abatement of the furious and unreasoning partisanship which might easily have provoked a devastating and universal war. If it be true that Hitler and Mussolini expect advantages in Nationalist Spain, it is argued that the best way to counteract them is by diplomatic methods; that is to say, by the representation of France in Nationalist Spain. The worst way is to bluster, to refuse to face facts, to leave the dictators a free field, and to enter into no relations with Spanish rulers because we do not like them or approve of them. Our liking or approval has nothing to do with diplomacy; indignation is not a sound counsellor to policy; and it is high time that France—and Europe generally—should abandon these “ideological” passions, which divide classes and separate nations in a spirit of hatred, this *mystique* of the Front Populaire, national and international, which has bedevilled the world and brought us to the very verge of bankruptcy and red ruin.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

Later. Edouard Daladier, who refused to sign the impossible Blum financial project, and who has confined himself to the technical task of Defence Minister for the past few years, is well qualified to rescue France from the quagmire

into which the Front Populaire led her. His Ministry is not one of National Union—for neither members of the Extreme Left nor of the Right are included—but it may properly, perhaps, be regarded as one of Public Safety, since every day a restricted Cabinet of six will meet : the Prime Minister, the Vice-President Camille Chautemps, the Minister of Justice Paul Reynaud, the Minister of the Interior Albert Sarraut, the Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, and the Finance Minister Marchandeau. They are all Moderates, whatever their party label ; and they may be trusted to call a halt to disastrous follies. Happily, the Socialists, after showing their hand, barred themselves, with their allies the Communists, from office. They left the country the prey to strike agitators, who refused even to deliver aeroplanes to the army, while clamouring for a policy which spelt war in the worst possible conditions. Of course the Parliamentary situation of M. Daladier might be rendered untenable if the deputies were permitted, in their ignorance of realities, to pursue their intrigues ; and some kind of dictatorial powers are essential in such a crisis. So low, in the esteem of the average Frenchman, has fallen the Chamber, that a sigh of relief goes up when the Palais Bourbon closes its doors. The real problem is not financial—though severe penitence must now be done for the years of prodigality and falsification of the national finances. The real problem is social. There must, unless France is to decline in status, be a return to discipline, to order, to legality. The gospel of idleness, preached and practised with such lamentable effects, the policy of hatred and of the clenched fist, must efface themselves before the needs of production. In short, France must again submit to non-sectarian government. And unless France is to abdicate her place in Europe, to surrender to irresistible external force, there must be an immediate Franco-Italian reconciliation with diplomatic representation at Rome, and an understanding between France and Nationalist Spain. To imagine that it will be easy to repair the ravages of the Front Populaire would be to betray complete incomprehension of the political malady of France ; and the Daladier Government must be judged by its works. Yet I may truly say that it starts, after a distressing period, with the world's good wishes and a reasonable hope of some measure of success.

S. H.

concentration camps or exile. My own expulsion on March 28th was only the latest in a series of removals of independent witnesses from Vienna. Before me the *Daily Herald* and *Manchester Guardian* correspondents had been ordered by their papers to take refuge abroad. How necessary this was in view of Nazi methods is shown by the fact that three days before my own expulsion, S.S. guards raided the home of the *Daily Herald* correspondent in search of him "or his wife" who were abroad, in default arrested for twenty-four hours his partner in a profession in no way connected with journalism, and finally declared that the correspondent's two-year-old daughter would be kept as a hostage in Austria to force the correspondent or his wife to return and face arrest. Such are the Nazi methods. Douglas Reed of *The Times* (whose book, just out, *Insanity Fair*, ought to be reprinted in an *edition de luxe* and presented by their admirers to all the members of the British Cabinet) had been ordered abroad by his paper, thus saving the Germans the embarrassment of expelling him. The correspondent of the International News Service of Mr. Hearst had been arrested, deprived of his passport, and only released and turned out of the country after the most energetic representations of Mr. Hearst to his friend, Adolf Hitler. Christopher Holme, the Reuter correspondent, declared the Nazis, had been expelled, but Reuter's have since explained that he left the country on their orders. Other correspondents have been warned and may even have had to flee—it is impossible to-day to find out just what is going on behind the safety curtain. I myself heard the Nazi press chief, de la Trobe, announcing my expulsion to my colleagues, declaring that it should be a lesson and that those unprepared to accept it had better leave the country before they were also expelled. I know of at least two press photographers working for Anglo-American agencies who are now in prison. It is therefore pretty clear that to-day no news can be expected from Vienna, except such as the Nazis desire to see published. Nothing much seems to be done by this country to defend the right of great newspapers and newsagencies to independent reporting. When I arrived in London I was told that the Home Office had urged upon Lord Halifax that my expulsion offered the long-desired opportunity to rid Britain of the presence of three dangerous German secret police agents masquerading in London, by way of retaliation, and received from our

Foreign Minister the reply that he still preferred the methods of the New Testament to those of the Old. So that the warning of the German police chief was really unnecessary which was given me in Vienna when I asked whether my wife would be in need of police protection during the time she remained to see to the removal of my furniture and effects abroad.

"It would be inadvisable," he said, "for any of your colleagues to take any kind of strong line about your expulsion and thus to arouse feeling in England. That might have unpleasant reactions here. I advise you to let no one know that you have been expelled but merely to tell your colleagues that you have been transferred to another post. In such case your wife will be in no danger."

The man was fatuously out of date in his ideas about England, who now expects that every man this day will turn the other cheek. As Douglas Reed has just written in his righteously angry book :

Norman Ebbut . . . was expelled from Germany amid torrents of abuse and anonymous threats on his life. . . . Delmer and Panter expelled. . . . British correspondents, less staunchly supported by their Government than their American and French colleagues, have become fair game for anyone who wants to vent a little bad temper. . . . Not even the domiciliary rights guaranteed to British citizens under the treaties with foreign powers are upheld for British journalists. They can be kicked out at will, without any specific charge, just as a propagandist stunt. Doing the job for which they are sent out, they are coming to be treated rather like spies in wartime."

My "domiciliary rights" ensured me a Saturday and Sunday in Vienna only, after thirteen years' residence, before I was "kicked out" at ten o'clock on Monday morning, having been given my expulsion order the previous Friday at six p.m.

No one who has read any of the independent articles which I have written about Austria during the last five years in this publication, the *New Statesman* and other periodicals wherein I have expressed my purely personal views, which naturally do not commit in any way the great newspaper which I have the honour to serve, could accuse me of undue sympathy for the Schuschnigg régime and its methods. To-day no one can withhold personal respect from Dr. Schuschnigg in the gallantry with which he has tried to do his duty to the hundreds of thousands now under the terror because of their support of

him, by refusing to flee. By standing on the bridge of his sinking ship after that farewell speech on Friday, March 11th, and declining the suggestions of the friend who had betrayed him, Dr. von Seyss-Inquart, that he should leave the country by special aeroplane, by subsequently demanding that he should be sent to a German concentration camp with the first of his followers to be transferred to Dachau, and by insisting that before all others, he himself should be put on trial, Schuschnigg has done all that lay in his power to stand by his supporters, and has seriously embarrassed the Nazi conquerors. But respect for his personal gallantry, that of the best type of Austrian gentleman—which at all times he has shown he possessed in full measure—need not hinder criticism of the mistakes of his policy.

The present writer, both in these pages in the past and in other articles, particularly in his regular contribution for the past thirteen years on Austria to the *Annual Register*, has never disguised his view that Dollfuss and his successor, Schuschnigg, would go down to history, not as the men who saved, as most of the British press suggested, but as those who destroyed Austria's independence. Such melancholy satisfaction as anyone may reap after a great tragedy in saying "I told you so" would be as much mine to claim to-day as it was in 1933 when I saw fulfilled all my prophecies written from the Rhineland from 1922 onwards. I started my post-war writing career by insisting day in, day out, that persistence in the stupid and humiliating brutalities of Versailles towards the democratic German Republic which was struggling to escape from the control of Prussian militarism would drive the nation insane and elevate a ruthless dictatorship into the saddle. There is no room for satisfaction in face of either of these tragic fulfilments of warnings, only for regret at the incredible obtuseness of those who by training, position and opportunity should have been far better informed and possessed of far better judgment than I and the many other simple journalists who saw things as clearly as I did. Leaving aside the tragedy of the German people's surrender of its own freedom to the Nazi dictatorship which is now ancient history, let us look back five years to the beginning of the struggle in Austria against the Nazis and the British attitude towards that struggle. In March 1933 Dollfuss signed the death-warrant of his country's independence by suppressing

parliament by a legalistic trick, and thus committing 42 per cent. of the population of Austria and two-thirds of the population of Vienna (the Social Democrats) to the sharpest opposition—an opposition in which a further large proportion of liberals and democrats with no close political ties joined. Had not the Austrian Marxists had clear vision, Dollfuss might even have united them with the Nazis, who for their own purposes were for the moment opposed to the suppression of parliament, but the Marxists sharply rejected all advances from that camp. In February 1934 Dollfuss sealed that death-warrant by the destruction of the great Social Democratic Party, the shelling of the workers' houses, the suppression of their trades unions, the confiscation of their property and the hanging of their leaders. In all that Schuschnigg, as Dollfuss' right-hand man in the Government, played the fullest part. Austrian clericalism, remote from realities, hating blindly without understanding what Socialism had done and what it meant for the workers, really believed that by a show of brutal violence and the hanging or exiling of the brains of the movement, it would be able to enrol the masses of the workers under its own banners in the fight against Nazism. The aristocratic or bourgeois adventurers who led the *Heimwehr* really believed that with the financial and military aid of the Italians, whom the unschooled Austrian masses were accustomed to think of as "dagoes" and "cat-eaters" who had broken every treaty in history, they could, amidst a largely germanic people, fight the ruthless fascism of Germany modelled to appeal to the German race by members of that race, with a fascism taken straight from the "cat-eaters" and touched up with feeble and belated imitations of the German fascism. And our own country? In their innate distrust of the working classes in power, our own ruling classes eagerly committed themselves to sharing the illusions of the Austrian clericals and *Heimwehr*. Instead of trying to check the burning patriotic but bigoted little Austrian clerical peasant's son in his suicidal course, they let Dollfuss go full steam ahead and invited Mussolini to become its patron. How often was I myself lectured by interpreters of British policy in those days on my folly in not recognising the "necessity" for Dollfuss to suppress the Socialists in order to "unify" the nation in the fight against Nazi designs on the country's independence.

"Look at the map, my dear Gedye," I was implored. "Don't you see that we must back Dollfuss through thick and thin, not in his interests but in our own? What happens if Austria goes? The little States will be got on the run, Czechoslovakia will be surrounded and made indefensible, German propaganda will undermine Hungary and open the way for Germany's economic possession of Rumania and her oilfields and finally land her at the Suez Canal, with her hand on the jugular artery of the Empire." The argument, save for the one obvious fallacy which urged the backing of Dollfuss and his suicidal policy instead of supporting Austrian democracy, was true enough, and one would like to hear it to-day in the same quarters in which it was being laid down as axiomatic four years ago. But when I recalled it last month, and asked "Of course we are going to swallow the annexation of Austria without protest?" I was told, "Well, if we are, let us do so with as good a grace as possible. It is to be hoped that you journalists are not going to make a fuss about it. Why not dwell on the enthusiasm which you have seen in Austria, where the streets seem to have been packed with cheering thousands and hundreds of thousands for Hitler"—did these wiseacres believe that the hundreds of thousands behind drawn curtains, on the run, in prison or exile were in a position to come out into the streets and shout before the 100,000 *Reichswehr*, the hundreds of thousands of armed Nazi guards and the imported Prussian police '*Pfui, Hitler*'—"and agree that this was inevitable?"

"And that map of Europe," I replied, "and that well-known jugular artery and that Empire? Have either or both ceased to exist to-day?"—and got only the reply, "Well, what would you do if you were the P.M.?" My answer to that had best remain unrecorded, save that I remarked that there might be a stronger defence imaginable of the policy of Napoleon than to ask what a stray journalist would have done in his place. And to my further question, "And the subjection of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria" (not the absorption of all of them into the German Empire, for we may take it that Hitler is at least sincere in his professed desire to break up all countries with a German minority in order to acquire that minority for his all-German Empire which is to include no non-Germans) "and the acquisition of complete control over these non-German

peoples' economies, are we to swallow that too? ", I got the same reply—"What would you do?"

Are we, then, to assume that Mr. Chamberlain's policy consists of nothing but the replacing of the "Nelson touch" by a helpless shrugging of the shoulder as Germany progresses from strength to strength at the expense of the smaller nations, or merely in efforts to deprive these smaller nations of the help which their friends are pledged to accord them, as Spain was by British influence deprived of the help of France to combat a military revolt and the Italo-German invasion? I do not think that this is the end, but that it is incidental to Mr. Chamberlain's policy. I find in the *Sunday Times* of April 3rd, in an article by the well-informed "Scrutator," what seems to me to be a well-sugared pill containing the essence of that policy for those who can do a little simple analysis and read between the lines. First of all we are told that Mr. Chamberlain is trying to impose his personal policy, which is directed against the peace treaties, "against the resistance of departmental inertia"—which can presumably only mean against the advice of the Foreign Office. Then we are told that the League and collective security means barbarous air raids, the massacre of French peasants or the violation of Belgian neutrality—no word here, you see, about the violation of Austria's frontiers by the flower of the German army or the threat to the independence of Czechoslovakia. Then we are told that the conflict between fascism and democracy (which any child can see lies at the root of the war-danger to-day) is only an illusion cloaking "power politics," and that France's eastern frontier is "as secure as the Brenner Pass." (That will hardly reassure the French who have seen the German "language maps" now prominently displayed in Vienna, wherein the territory to which Germany "has a right" is shown as stretching far below the Brenner into present-day Italy beyond the Gorge of Salurno and incidentally into Switzerland as far as Freiburg.) Then we are told that "the further Germany commits herself in the East the safer France becomes in possession of what before the war were her lost provinces. . . . France's interest in the Austrian succession and in the bridgeheads into Russia and the Balkans is mere looking for trouble. . . . There are good judges who believe that France would draw back from her commitments in Central Europe if she had a good excuse." We are

told that Britain's abandonment of Czechoslovakia to the forthcoming rape by Germany really helps her to preserve her liberty. "Our refusal therefore to commit ourselves in Czechoslovakia is in itself a very considerable victory for peace. . . . It removes us from any suspicion of wishing . . . to hinder an expansion which . . . might be for the advantage of all directly affected and to ourselves too." Then we are told that war would be inevitable if there were question of territorial changes affecting the Narrow Seas and the air above them, and that there is a clear distinction between a defensive alliance between ourselves and France on this basis and a "general alliance irrespective of political circumstance and occasion." The conclusion is drawn that it is our strong duty "to bring France's policy into line with ours."

Without the sugar-coating, what is the contents of this pill? I think it is not unfair to regard this able exposition of Chamberlainism to mean that the governing classes in Britain wish to break France's ties by solemn treaty to Czechoslovakia and Russia, to abandon Czechoslovakia and the Balkans to Germany, and to encourage Germany to attack Russia when she has thus acquired the necessary reserves of petrol, grain and minerals which she now lacks, in the hope that she will choose the East for attack, instead of ourselves. The ground for this hope seems to be the idea that we will hold France in check from that support of Russia, fear of which might prevent Germany from going to war at all, thus deflecting the *furor teutonicus* eastward, since if it were turned against ourselves, Germany would know well that Russia would invade her in support of the Western democracies. Then, our rulers presumably hope—for some hope at least must sustain them in their otherwise inexplicable policy of constant surrender—the spectre of working socialism in our time in Russia would be laid for ever, and Germany and ourselves settle down to divide the world between us. It is a hope which can only be sustained by those who know nothing of Nazism at close quarters, nothing of Nazi literature, and nothing of such convincing exposure of German psychology as it affects ourselves as is contained in the new book by Douglas Reed to which I alluded before. For it is in rich, cinema-going, popular-press-drugged England that hungry Nazi Germany sees the real country to be sacked. And it is our policy to let her gain strength for that sack by further

conquests such as that of Austria which has just taken place, and all those which loom ahead right up to the acquisition of the cornfields of the Ukraine. Without more than a word of reproach from us, some even suggest with our implicit agreement, she has now been able to invade Austria with 100,000 troops and to prevent the Austrian people from recording their free verdict on the question of their own independence, within three days of the announcement that Schuschnigg was going to afford them such an opportunity. By this invasion and annexation she has acquired the man-power of a population of six and a half millions, four hundred million Schillings in gold and gold devisen with which to replenish the depleted coffers of the *Reichsbank* and import fresh war materials, an addition of at least 5 per cent. to her annual production of iron ore, and the raw material for cellulose for explosives, of which she stood in bitter need, from 95 per cent. of Austria's forests, which cover 38 per cent. of the whole of Austrian territory. More than one-third of the whole of Austria's soil will henceforth yield cellulose for German shells and aerial bombs; there are many other material gains in Austria. Furthermore, she acquires the economic possibility of forcing Czechoslovakia into full submission without the invasion which would be a simple matter for armies standing like a pair of pincers closed around Czechoslovakia's slender waist. When that submission has been made, Germany will acquire the great armament works of Skoda in Pilsen and elsewhere, and ensure that their products are available for use against us as they were in 1914. (Thereby is removed the last barrier between herself and the Rumanian oilfields and the vast food-producing plains of Rumania. The day after the occupation of Vienna, one of the Nazi newspapers carried a German airline advertisement, "Berlin to Baghdad, 24 hours." It was only a coincidence, but not uninteresting.)

What would you have done if you had been Prime Minister ?
 (I suggest that you might perhaps have considered Germany's obvious inability to face a major war at this moment, have remembered her present food-rationing system and her present shortage of petrol and rubber, both essential to mechanised warfare. I suggest that when warned of the inadequate state of our own defences, you might have laid stress on Germany's own unpreparedness for a major war.)
 (Despite the thorough preparation for the invasion of Austria,

months ahead, revealed in the so-called "Taws Plan" of Herr Rudolf Hess—which the Austrian police seized in the Vienna Nazi headquarters at the beginning of this year, one thing could not be prepared—an adequate petrol supply, so that Munich was denuded of civilian petrol for three days when the Army moved.) I suggest you might have said that we could not afford to see Germany acquire the additional strength of Austria and subsequently of Czechoslovakia, who has the most efficiently equipped small army of any in Europe. And I suggest that after Berchtesgaden, you might in conjunction with France, Czechoslovakia and Russia, have warned Germany that serious consequences would follow any attempt to put into effect the threats there uttered by Herr Hitler to Chancellor Schuschnigg. I was in the *Ballhausplatz* when the Nazi press chief announced the annexation of Austria on Sunday, March 13th, saw his extreme nervousness and heard his plea to the journalists to calm down the inevitable international excitement which this step must arouse. The annexation was one more magnificent bluff by Hitler and the forces of German power politics which use him, and like its predecessors, it came off.

You may be told, "But this union of Austria and Germany was inevitable." If that is so, why did Hitler fear the plebiscite and put his forces into motion on Friday to prevent its being held two days later? Why had the trade union leaders come to full agreement with Schuschnigg to support independence on Sunday against the Nazi threat—an agreement unfortunately delayed in its final conclusion during two critical days by the opposition of job-hunting subordinates, but not by Schuschnigg himself? It was this agreement, and the knowledge that it would range almost the whole of that 42 per cent. socialist vote behind the cause of independence, which finally set the *Reichswehr* in motion and caused the Nazi conspiracy dating back to 1934 to be unfolded. "Between us and the clericals stand the gallows and the guns of February 1934," said melodramatically a dozen rank-and-file workers picked at random, to me during the last fatal fortnight, "but if Schuschnigg restores to us control of our own unions, our workers' clubs and our social welfare organisation, we will fight these things alongside him as free men, not slaves, when our leaders give the word." And that word they were to give on the Friday when Germany's brutal ultimata rained in

at intervals of a few hours on the Chancellor who at the eleventh hour had found the courage to repair the stupidities and crimes of his predecessor and himself. Not the invented "*Volksfront*" but the pending restoration of democracy made Hitler pounce.

[It was a death-bed repentance on which the curtain fell. Behind it the Nazis are busy changing the scenes. Thousands of Jews are being plundered discreetly day after day and night after night by Austrian stormtroopers and S.S. guards turned loose upon them by the German authorities who are in full control of the situation. Austrian aristocrats, legitimists and prominent Catholics in dozens of improvised and regular prisons have been herded together in cells so full that not all their inmates can sit on the floor at the same time, half-starved and choking in the stench of the single bucket provided in the centre of the cell for sanitary purposes. At night English residents in Hietzing and other suburbs hear the shots of the secret executions by firing squads. The anatomical institute carts are busy removing the bodies of Jewish suicides who have been—despite unconvincing official denials—averaging over 100 per day. In the prison courtyards aristocrats whose only crime has been to have supported too loyally and too long the cause of their country's independence are performing for long hours the most menial tasks, and presumably the world will finally be told of their "suicide" as it was that of the brutal but fearless Major Emil Fey, who is said to have committed suicide so determinedly that he shot himself in twenty-two places! In the streets, Jewish men and ladies of good position are conscripted to wash Schuschnigg electoral propaganda from the pavements or to scrub motor-cars for lounging S.S. guards.

In the Synagogue in the *Seitenstättengasse*, Jews have been forced by the S.S. to do "physical jerks," knee-bending and stretching, while holding chairs in either hand, and those who stumbled kicked, beaten and spat upon. They have been forced to put the sacred *Twilim* bands on their wrists and with them to clean out with their naked hands the lavatory bowls, sacrilege, the Jews say, equivalent to making a Catholic use the Host for the same purpose. Their relief stations have been closed down at this time of utter distress. I have watched them day after day in the *Seitenstättengasse* forced to don the ceremonial top hats of the synagogue officials and

the sacred *Yarmikl* or praying-caps and amidst the jeers of the mob to sweep the streets of rubbish which the S.S. threw out for the purpose. In their shops and offices, Nazi commissars are being installed. The jeering mobs, incited by the anti-semitic speeches of Gauleiter Bürckel, are crying at the Jews "Away with every one of you to Palestine—there is no place for a single Jew in Austria to-day," while hundreds besiege daily the British consulate and passport office, as well as the consulates of half a dozen other powers, begging in vain to be received *somewhere* abroad, while German troops with field-glasses and telescopic rifles watch every mile of the frontier to ensure that not one person escapes from the vast prison that smiling Austria has become. The Nazi crowds, mostly young men of the lower middle-class, jubilantly sing their aggressive anthems in the streets, German aeroplanes roar overhead, the gramophone press runs off daily the same Nazi propaganda records, the angry scarlet and menacing hooked cross of the Swastika banners dominate the street scene from archducal palace to socialist worker's model dwelling. The scene shifters will have finished their work before this appears in print. The curtain will have arisen to disclose no trace of Austria's tolerant, easy-going, happy-go-lucky capital, but in its place a regulated, prussianised German provincial city, completely harnessed to Nazi Germany's great war machine.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND THE COMMON LIFE.

IT is many centuries since the Christian Church in the western world has been in the position in which it finds itself to-day. In some parts of what once was "Christendom" it is persecuted and derided ; in others it is virtually ignored as effete. In Great Britain the situation is different, but not so radically different as we easily suppose. It is true that in all classes of society the traditional codes of behaviour have been deeply coloured by Christian influence, and shrewd continental observers note that there has been much less breach with the past here than abroad. But it is a serious question whether we are not living on our capital and whether these traditional patterns of life will long survive when the faith out of which they sprang is no longer widely active. The Coronation was avowedly a dedication, in the person of the King, of the whole national life to God. But it has been asked whether this is more than a gigantic make-believe, "the dedication of a power which no longer exists to a faith in which we no longer believe." This question cannot be answered with a plain "yes" or "no." But, more and more, particularly among the young, Christianity seems to be becoming a minority movement. This change is aptly symbolised by the contrast between the old English village in which the church is commonly the central building, the visible focus of unity, and the modern housing estate on which churches are small and inconspicuous, serve the needs of few people and make little or no impact on the main body of communal life.

Partly owing to circumstances beyond their control, the Churches have lost contact with important areas of the common life, such as schools and hospitals which once were under Christian inspiration and control, but which now are managed on secular lines by the community itself. The common assumptions of social and industrial life, of education and social service, are secular. So, as Mr. Christopher Dawson has pointed out, the atheist, that is the man who in practice leaves God out of his life, can be perfectly at home in the world to-day even in Great Britain. It is rather the Christian who is slightly peculiar, as being bound by special obligations which others do not recognise, like the man who eats no meat on Fridays. Thus the task of the Church to-day, at home as

abroad, is primarily a missionary task. But a mission can only succeed if it is preached in a language which its hearers understand. However new its message, it must meet men first where they are and demonstrate the impact of its message on the major interests and preoccupations of their lives.

The Archbishop of Canterbury did well to recall the nation to religion. But, in an important sense, it is we Christians who have first to be recalled. It is largely Christians who have discredited Christianity; and this is not mainly by conscious insincerity or disloyalty, but because outsiders do not discern in us or in our contributions to social life anything specially distinctive or impressive. A taste for religion they regard as being, like a taste for music, a private interest of like-minded people, an extra embellishment perhaps, but as irrelevant to the common life where we meet them on the same plane and with similar working assumptions. The Christian railway director or shareholder, the Christian miner or shop assistant, the Christian banker or magistrate or city councillor is not visibly different from his non-Christian colleague in his conduct of affairs. Yet "to keep religion out of public life is to shut it up in a stuffy Victorian back drawing-room with the aspidistras and the antimacassars while the streets are full of life and youth." In public life it is the world which has imposed its standards on the Church rather than the Church which has imposed its own standards on the world. In some countries the Church is persecuted. But in Great Britain Antichrist is more subtle; he domesticates it.

There is a larger measure of truth than we care to admit to ourselves in the critic who, like many communists, says: "What really counts is not the principles you profess, and very likely suppose yourself to believe, but the things you take for granted, the half-unconscious assumptions which you never formulate but on which you act during two-thirds of of your life. Your 'Christianity' never gets down below your surface beliefs to the subconscious springs of action which determine your habitual conduct. The standard you actually apply may be the current business code or the sportsman's or the gentleman's or the 'good pal's,' but it is certainly not that of Christ crucified."

This is not simply a question of moral fault. So far as, in the past, any Christian ethic has been worked out, it has a very restricted application to the contemporary world. The

real problems of conduct to-day are conditioned by the new large-scale organisation of society. Personal responsibility is now so widely diffused that it easily appears to be non-existent. Our life is moulded by "systems"—financial, industrial, political and educational—of such dimensions that the power of any individual to modify them seems almost negligible. They are machine-like in their operation, yet they are not really machines but the result of an interaction of myriads of human purposes so intricate that it is immensely difficult to predict or to control them. These are the conditions in which people have to live and act to-day.

The unconscious semi-paganism in which most of us, ostensibly Christian people, are living our working lives is largely responsible for the estrangement from the Churches of great numbers whose service they can ill afford to lose. Attached very loosely if at all to any Christian body, very hazy as a rule in their theology but having a genuine reverence for Christian moral standards and not infrequently a clearer apprehension of some of them than many who still go to church, they are yet incompletely surrendered or integrated and they are missing the enlightenment and the power of conscious prayer and worship. But they would respond quickly to a real lead founded on a genuine attempt to vindicate Christianity in action; and they might bring a magnificent reinforcement to the life and work of the Church in the world. The question then is whether some new and bold attempt to relate the Christian gospel more directly to the problems of the common life is not necessary, not only for the conversion and upbuilding of the man in the street, but even for the integrity of the religious life of the man in the pew.

But how, in practice, are the Churches to make decisions or to take action with regard to issues social or political or economic? Occasionally, no doubt, formal pronouncements by Church leaders or assemblies may be required. But these already occur from time to time and they seldom impress the world very much. It is probably undesirable that they should be greatly multiplied. There are several reasons for this. First those who make such pronouncements are not, as a rule, those who will have to implement them. Thus we are told that even in the Middle Ages the Church's teaching about usury was ineffective, and Dr. Lindsay suggests that this was "because one set of men, the clergy, were laying down laws

for another set of men instead of teaching these men to lay down laws for themselves." Neither the Archbishop of Canterbury nor the President of the Free Church Council, nor the assemblies over which they preside, are really competent to direct Lord Halifax or Lord Nuffield, the Lord Chief Justice or the Governor of the Bank of England or the Editor of *The Times*, Sir Josiah Stamp or Mr. Ernest Bevin or Sir Walter Citrine how as Christians they ought to conduct affairs. For it is only so far as moral questions are involved that the Christian Church is directly concerned; but in practice moral and technical questions are commonly intertwined and it is only those who are themselves involved in the situation who can disentangle them. Moreover, even the answers to the moral questions may depend in part on insight into the technical situation. Secondly, authoritative direction in advance is incompatible with the rightful freedom of the Christian man. No two situations are exactly similar, and, in the last resort, responsibility for a decision must remain with the individual concerned.

Unfortunately the only practical alternative at the moment is to leave everything to the unaided judgment of the individual at the moment of action; and in the complex conditions of modern society, this is usually to lay on him an impossible burden. In default of any guidance from the Church he can hardly help falling back in practice on the current secular traditions of his class or calling. Undoubtedly the individual layman is the spearpoint. It is through him as a rule that the Church must act in the affairs of the modern world, if it is to act at all. But he can only be expected to carry this burden if, in future, he can be given help by the Church which is now not given at all. If he is to come to a right decision as to his Christian duty he needs the support of some informed Christian public opinion. To-day this seldom exists in the different spheres of the common life in which decisions are required. The crucial question for the Churches is: How can such help be provided?

From its inception this has been the concern of the "Life and Work" movement. The World Conference on "Church, Community and State" held in Oxford last July marked an important stage in this. It was led up to by an intellectual preparation of quite exceptional thoroughness. It has produced a most salutary ferment and it has an enormous

potential value. How far that value will be realised remains to be seen. All depends on how it is followed up. If it remains the affair of a few hundred theologians and thinkers, it will have missed its mark. If the questions it discussed are to be answered and if its recommendations are to be implemented, they should become the concern of every Christian congregation throughout the country; and that work has hardly yet begun.

As is well known, the Oxford and Edinburgh conferences approved preliminary proposals for uniting and strengthening the two œcumenical movements by setting up a single advisory "World Council of the Churches," and these are still under consideration. But whatever may be their fate, it is urgently necessary that something should be done in Great Britain. In this time of confusion and crisis the Churches in Great Britain have peculiar advantages and a special responsibility seems to be laid on them towards their fellow-Christians throughout the world. For the moment at least they are sheltered from the storm. They are free to deliberate and to teach, they enjoy a fair measure of goodwill, and they have opportunities of easy access to representative members of the general community in all spheres. Accordingly a small informal conference, including leaders of all the chief Churches in Great Britain, has been meeting at Lambeth during the last few months under the presidency of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and has prepared a set of proposals for a forward move which will be laid before the assemblies of all the Churches concerned at their meetings this year.

It is proposed that the Churches in Great Britain should forthwith set up a new Council on "The Christian Faith and the Common Life" to supervise the carrying forward of the Life and Work Movement and particularly of the investigations begun at Oxford. There are two main reasons why this work should be undertaken by the Churches themselves rather than by any private associations of those specially interested. One is that only so can it be demonstrated that the Churches really "mean business" in this sphere; and this is essential if the interest and co-operation of outstanding representatives of the lay world are to be secured. The other is that it is only through the machinery of the Churches that any results of thought or experiment can be made available to Christian people generally.

Hence it is proposed that the nucleus should consist of fourteen members representative of the larger Churches ; and it is essential that they should be representative not only in form but in reality ; that they should be leaders who really have the confidence of the bodies they represent. But because their chief function is to build bridges between the Churches and the life of the nation, they are to co-opt ten others who will be laymen having experience of public life in different spheres. This Council will work mainly through a permanent whole-time staff of at least half a dozen picked men and women. This may seem ambitious, but it is really a minimum. The enterprise is one which it is futile to undertake at all unless it is done on an adequate scale. While much faithful work has been done in recent years, the visible results of the piecemeal efforts of the Churches in this field have been disappointing, because they have been undermanned and under-financed and have not commanded the whole-hearted interest and confidence of the leaders of the Churches. In future, if the proposals are accepted, all these will be co-ordinated and a single budget will be presented.

Such a minimum of organisation is indispensable. But it is intended that the method by which the staff will work shall be the very opposite of formal and institutional. Their main task will be the establishing of a multitude of personal contacts in many different directions. First and foremost it is hoped that they will gradually enlist perhaps one to two hundred of the best Christian thinkers, so as to carry further the study of the issues raised in Oxford and, in different fields of life "to subject the assumptions of social practice to searching examination in the light of the Christian revelation." Presumably these thinkers will continue to produce books, articles and addresses much as they do now, but their work will gain enormously in richness and relevance to actual life through their being brought into touch with one another and developing perhaps a common programme and a common sense of direction.

The fields in which such searching inquiry is needed are limitless. For example, there is in this country no agreed or clearly understood policy or philosophy of education ; we are confused and divided as to the bearing of Christianity upon the conduct of industry, on the implications of Christian brotherhood in regard to differences of class and prestige ; or

again as to the status for Christians of secular culture—science, art, letters, the theatre; above all, perhaps, as to international relations and Christian duty in relation to war. Probably the staff will only have resources to initiate work on one or two of these in the first instance; but even to make a start will be a great advance.

But besides this central attack there should be formed local groups in every area—e.g. of clergy and ministers—for the study of these issues. The Oxford Reports alone provide ample material. Most important of all perhaps, there are wanted small groups of workers and professional men, engaged in the same occupation, having some relevant experience and some responsibility for action, who try by common prayer and discussion to gain some new insight into their Christian duties and opportunities in their own calling and neighbourhood. Further, apart from study, there is room and need for all kinds of local experiments by small groups in ways of Christian living and Christian service; for instance in help to the unemployed, in the treatment of delinquents, in the improvement of health and housing, in the use of money and in simplicity of living. All these things are happening now somewhere or other, but are unknown outside their own immediate circle. It will be the business of the staff to discover these little outbursts of Christian endeavour and to relate them to one another, to study them and to make the lessons gained from them generally available and to foster them where they do not yet exist. There is no reason why in time there should not be hundreds and thousands of such Christian “cells” all over the country. That would be a true lay ministry and a means by which the national life might gradually be permeated by Christian influence.

It would not be the function of the Council to speak or act publicly on behalf of the Churches, but rather to supply Church leaders with a body of information which would enable them to act, or to refrain from acting, more wisely. But it might also serve two subsidiary purposes. It would provide a means of consultation between the Churches, and thus would facilitate common action by the Churches themselves where they desired it. And, if and when the World Council is formed, it would naturally be the body in Great Britain charged to co-operate with it and to keep before all Christian people here

the conception of the Church as a universal society committed to the evangelism of the world.

Such a programme cannot be carried out without substantial financial provision. The funds at the disposal of the Churches are notoriously small, and, such as they are, there are many claims on them. So the greater part of the sum required can only be provided, if at all, by the Council itself, through individual donors whose imagination may be stirred by the greatness of the venture; yet some exceptional financial effort by the Churches will be the necessary basis. But finance can hardly be the determining factor in the decision which the Churches will be called to take. This project is either a mistake or it is of quite outstanding importance. If the Church leaders who are launching it are right in holding that the need and the opportunity are unprecedented, they can claim and will get an unprecedented response.

The real obstacle is the proneness of all Englishmen to distrust as "nebulous" or "abstract" an enterprise in which "study" plays so large a part. To repair the structure of a particular church or a school seems practical: to aim at a fundamental change of ideas, and to do so by methods which cannot be formulated with precision in advance, is apt to seem fanciful. But the real question is: What sort of action is likely to be required of the Church? Is it such as might be undertaken with our present spiritual and intellectual resources? Or is it something so radical as to make imperative a vast replenishment of those resources? If the second is the true answer, the genuine realism is with those who want the Churches to address themselves to the task of replenishment. Here the children of light have a good deal to learn from the children of this world. Who could have seemed less practical in 1850 than Marx, sitting down in the Reading Room of the British Museum to work year after year at very abstract studies? Or, sixteen years ago, than Hitler, with a few unpromising associates, redrawing the map of Europe and making a programme for his coming into power? But, for good or evil, what apparently "practical" activity has compared with theirs in its real effect on the world? It is a fateful step forward which the Churches are now being invited by their leaders to take, and it is the eleventh hour.

WALTER MOBERLY.

LIGHT AND SHADE IN GERMANY.

WE often find it difficult to understand why Germans tolerate a system under which so many people—pastors, priests, Communists and Jews—are in prisons and concentration camps ; but it must be remembered that as a result of the very strict censorship of every form of news, the persecutions of which we hear so much are in great part unknown to the average German except where someone he knows is affected. We can see the whole picture : their view is not only restricted but seen from a different angle. They are living in a new form of society and the pressure is not always where we should expect to find it. To see the Hitler Youth, Labour Service and other organisations in working and to have their aims and ideals expounded by ardent Nazis gave me personally a new perspective, not more favourable but differing in some important respects from my previous conceptions.

All these Nazi institutions are organised in pyramid form, each with its Reich leader answerable only to Herr Hitler at the top, and numerous small units, each again with its own leader, at the bottom. Each organisation has many different departments and together they employ countless officials, paid and unpaid. As a whole they form a machine by means of which the Government controls workers and employers, production and distribution, and moulds opinions and beliefs.

The Hitler Youth takes in boys from 10 to 18, girls from 10 to 21. In 1933 Herr Hitler issued an order under which Baldur von Shirach was "appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich, head of all youth sections of adult associations. The foundation of youth organisations requires his sanction." The aims of the Hitler Youth are described in *German Youth in a Changing World*, Terremare Office, 1936 edition :

The Hitler Jugend stands for a new type of German youth . . . they are endeavouring to develop a new style of life for the German people. They are well informed on the political situation in Germany and the world around them . . . they are determined to maintain peace in Europe and throughout the world . . . they recognise very clearly that . . . a strong leadership is necessary . . . to work for this one ideal, which is Germany. For that reason they formed themselves into a solid phalanx under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and through their own leader they have declared that

outside the Hitler Jugend any other league of youth will be opposed by the spirit of the community which is the spirit of the state. . . . The principle of service is the main consideration and through it are eliminated the old-time distinctions of class and position, profession and education, birth and money. In excursions, camps, home parties and school lectures a new Germany is being constructed as a free community on the basis of thorough-going equality in social comradeship.

In theory entrance to the Hitler Jugend is voluntary : in practice it is almost impossible for a child to stay outside, especially now that all other youth movements are officially banned, and boys have been imprisoned for attempts to re-form disbanded associations. An enthusiastic youth leader in the early 'twenties told me that "the first task of every leader is to hold his group together, make them feel as one." All leaders, he said, had to teach *Weltanschauung* and "sport" leadership was a very important principle. Any boy might become a *Kamaradschaftsführer*, with only ten boys under him, and rise by promotion to a very important position. *Gebiet* and *Reich* Leader Schools provided special training for the higher ranks. So valuable was the training and experience of the higher leaders that on retirement, at twenty, their age limit, "they would be fitted for any position in the State."

In the *Reich* Girl Leader School I visited there were about twenty girls between 18 and 23. All except one had over 2,000 girls under them. The three weeks' training consisted chiefly of lectures on *Weltanschauung*, physical exercises, and games. They looked, on the whole, apathetic and not very intelligent, and I found even their community singing spiritless and depressing. A map showing the Nazi conception of the distribution of the "German" race in prehistoric times half filled a wall. On another occasion when a friend of mine asked one of these same girls why she joined the movement, the reply was "Because the Leader wished it." Questioned as to why the Leader wished it she said it was "to make a better Germany." "What kind of Germany do you want to make?" "What the Leader wishes." The good points in the Hitler Youth are common to other youth organisations: its distinctive features such as the extreme emphasis on leadership, the element of compulsion and the cult of hatred of Jews and Communists, seem to me thoroughly bad.

The Labour Service is another factor in the creation of a

new Germany. "Its first task"—according to *German Labour Service*, Terremare Publications, No. 6, 1937—"is to unite the youth of the nation into a real community irrespective of class distinctions . . . each of them seeks only to serve the good of the whole" and they return home "with a clear consciousness that work is not only a means of earning money but the moral basis of intellectual life . . . its second task is to free Germany from the necessity of importing food supplies," and another "is to inculcate a true concept of the dignity of labour and above all a respect for manual labour." The friendly, smiling young man in Labour Service uniform who took a party of us to see some camps between Berlin and Hamburg was extremely enthusiastic about the Labour Service. He preached his simplified version of *Weltanschauung* with fervour. They were creating a splendid new society while other countries struggled with their Communists. The Labour camps brought people from all parts of Germany together and taught community feeling. Each unit of ten youths had a leader whose duty was to keep them always together, "they must act and live as one, we want them even to think as one." Their day was well filled so that "they had no time to think" (individually!). For intellect our guide had small respect. "*Wir brauchen gefühl, nicht wissenschaft*," he repeated many times.

I found the camps quite a shock after his glowing descriptions, though in justice it must be said that I saw them in the late autumn, soon after the bi-annual change-over when all the youths leave every camp and new recruits take their places. The camps are built of wood and accommodation is good on the whole. The work is heavy manual labour, such as making canals, or clearing and digging virgin soil. The daily time-table allots fifty minutes to "instruction in civic duties," i.e. *Weltanschauung*. I was very struck by the poor physique and bad colour of the youths in the four camps I visited, due probably to general conditions in Germany. But it was the more remarkable as they were principally peasants who could not be spared from the land in the summer. Out of ten boys questioned in one camp eight were peasants or land-workers, and the only bright-eyed rosy-cheeked youth came from Berlin! But what shocked me most was the military atmosphere. Orders were rapped out and youths ran like rabbits. There was no sign of equality or friendliness but

much military drill—forming fours and presenting arms with a polished aluminium spade instead of a rifle.

The contrast between boys' and girls' camps was remarkable. A decree making the six months' service compulsory for women has been passed but not put into force owing to the difficulty of establishing enough "camps." So the girls serve voluntarily and those I saw were certainly very happy. They had themselves composed a long song in praise of *Arbeitsdienst* which they sang with great fervour. The routine was strict, but there was a very friendly co-operative atmosphere. They were the only really joyous young people I met. Conditions might be better. The girls help peasants' wives in the garden and on the land, or in the house. But though much of the work must be dirty, there was no bath, no running water. Each girl had her tin basin neatly set out in what might have been the old dairy, and at midday, but no other time, there was a little warm water which, like the cold, had to be carried along a passage. They slept eight or nine in a room with bunk beds in two tiers, no room for clothes, and several rooms had only one window about 3 ft. square. As the test for the peasant's wife who receives help is not her ability or experience but the size of her family, the value of their work as practical training is doubtful. But despite these drawbacks the girls' camps as I saw them are interesting examples of voluntary co-operative effort in the service of the State.

The German Labour Front "is the organisation of Germans at work with brow and fist, and includes former trade unionists, former employees' and employers' associations, all united on an equal footing . . . its aim is the formation of a real community of Germans in community of achievement." (*Hitler's Ordinance*, 1934.) Membership of this Nazi version of a trades union is compulsory for all Germans in trade or industry. Contributions, rising with wages and salaries, are deducted by employers when paying wages. The workers are no longer free agents; strikes and attempts to form other unions are illegal. But the employer's freedom of action is also curtailed. He can be made to pay six months' wages as compensation for dismissal of a worker who has been with him for a year. If for any reason a number of workmen are to be discharged, the employer has to send a detailed list a month before to the Labour Trustee, an independent State official, who can double the customary four weeks' notice or take other steps. Wages

below the agreed scale are prohibited except with the consent of the Labour Trustee. If "employers mischievously exploit the work power of their men," or "men working in business endanger its peace by mischievously exasperating employees," the Social Court of Honour can impose a fine of 10,000 marks, disqualify a man for any position of trust or dismiss him. Employers can be heavily penalised. In a case of which I heard a workman appealed to the local People's Court on the ground that his employer, a small business man, was not justified in refusing him a rise in wages. After inspecting the firm's books, the Court upheld the workman's claim and the employer was sent to a concentration camp.

The *Kraft durch Freude* (Strength through Joy) organisation allays discontent and promotes health among thousands of the lower-paid workers by providing cheap tickets for entertainments; cheap week-ends and holiday trips to other parts of Germany; and cruises abroad. Last summer hundreds of workers had a fortnight in Bavaria or a seven days' cruise to Norway for 50 marks. But about as much again is necessary for incidental expenses, and these cheap tickets are issued on condition that 800 or more people go in one train. I was told that peasants benefited by boarding the K.D.F. tourists, but I also heard from another source that they only received one mark per visitor per day!

An important factor in the relations between employer and employed is the influence of the 100 per cent. Nazi, particularly if he is in the privileged position of a party member. The fear of denunciation for "anti-social" views or behaviour gives even an unskilled workman very real power in such a case. Propaganda is carried on ceaselessly. Employer and employees attend meetings in factories and offices on *Weltanschauung* at which, among other things, they are all told they must work not as individuals but as a community, not for themselves, but for Germany. It was a Jew, with every reason to dislike the present régime, who told me that one could not deny that these new conditions had in many ways improved the spirit in industry. And from all that I saw and heard any large-scale revolt of the workers is improbable if only because it would threaten their present relative security. Wages are low and the compulsory deductions large, roughly 15s. weekly out of £3 for a single worker, but there is no longer fear of unemployment or inflation. Here again the

But there is another very different side to the picture. As an Englishwoman, with many German friends, who has worked for years to promote better relations with Germany, I must say that my paramount impression after seeing all these National Socialist institutions in succession was one of dismay. The control of everybody and everything is so absolute. Feeling is glorified at the expense of intellect. Herr Hitler is in process of deification among the simpler people. The masses are spoon-fed with catchwords: facts are suppressed or distorted to fit Nazi policy and ideas, as we have just seen in the German version of the reasons for their advance into Austria. Many young Germans believe that we in England have desperate and bloody fights with Communists daily, from which our brave Fascists are about to save us! My attempts to dispel these and other illusions about this country were markedly unpopular. National Socialists sing and talk of freedom, but it is freedom in their new sense of the word—defined by Professor Tirala as “action harmonising with the demands of the race.” Everywhere I was told that no German wanted war, but the soldier is the great ideal figure; the old Prussian military outlook is continually extolled. In spirit and in form this totalitarian state is ideally adapted for purposes of coercion or war. Criticism of the régime is treasonable and it is the duty of loyal Germans to denounce offenders, even near relatives, to the ubiquitous Secret Police. The fear of exposure is frequently exploited. “Anti-social conduct,” such as too low a subscription to the *Winterhilfe* funds, has had most unpleasant consequences. By the use of propaganda and persecution, palliatives and police, the National Socialist Party is moulding the entire German nation to its will. The remarkable feature in such circumstances is not the apparent acquiescence of the mass of the people but the courage of those who dare to protest.

W. GLADYS RINDER.

THE PROSPECT IN INDIA.

SINCE the Congress agreed to form Governments in the half-dozen provinces where it secured a majority in the elections, the outlook in India has seemed much more hopeful than it was a year ago. After all the talk of "ending the new Constitution," the Congress has apparently agreed to work it, and is working it well. As this has happened with regard to the provincial part of the new Constitution, will not the same happen about the Federal Centre when it comes to be inaugurated? Are not the denunciations of the Federation, which resound from the platforms of Congress and Moslem League alike, to be regarded as popular electioneering? When the elections to the new Central Legislature are through, shall we not find that, after a few months of discussion and bargaining, and demands for guarantees and assurances, those who are denouncing the proposed Federation will accept it and work it? The attitude expressed in these questions seems to be widespread in England at the moment. It may be doubted, however, whether it is sound. (The objections felt by Congressmen especially, and by Indian Nationalists generally, to the whole new Constitution, including the provincial part of it, were genuine and serious, and they have not yet been met. They have only been postponed, and soon they will have to be faced.

Let us see what these objections are. The Indian popular attitude to the new Constitution, apart from dislike of a number of details (some of them important), may be summarised thus: First, it is a Constitution imposed on India, the work of alien hands and brains, and therefore sooner or later it must be set on one side and an Indian-made Constitution put in its place. Next, it is undemocratic in character. The British Government was so anxious to induce the Princes to come in that it has given them a position and power in the Federation far in excess of anything they can fairly claim. Also, under the Communal Award, the minority communities, religious and racial, are put in watertight compartments, so that national parties can hardly hope to get fair representation. Thirdly, such a large proportion of finance is reserved to the discretion of the Viceroy and his ministers that the nation-building services under popular control are bound to be starved. It is this that makes the position of

concerned to make up the revenue immediately. On the contrary, Mr. Gandhi's first concern is to save unnecessary expenditure, and, wonder of wonders, he begins with education.

Most of us would have supposed that India, where adult literacy is still barely 10 per cent., was in urgent need of much more expenditure on education. That does not seem to be Mr. Gandhi's view. He sees (as official education reports have again and again recognised) that there is an appalling wastage in Indian education to-day. He sees, as many others see, that Indian education is top-heavy, so he comes forward with a daring plan for making education—especially children's education—largely self-supporting. A committee of Indian educationists has produced a report on this subject (the so-called Segaon Report), which makes fascinating reading. There is only space here to give the barest summary. The main idea is that education for every child should be closely linked with some craft—agriculture, gardening, spinning and weaving, carpentry, leather-work, and others. It is not specially designed for the purpose of being self-supporting, and it is not even claimed that it will be, but it is intended to "relieve the child from the tyranny of a purely academic and theoretical instruction." The curriculum will include, besides the basic craft, instruction in reading, speaking and writing the mother tongue, in simple mathematics and book-keeping, social studies, including for instance "a broad human interest in the progress of mankind in general and India in particular," the development of "mutual respect for the world's religions," and so on. There will be a study of animal and plant life, of the weather, of maps and map-making, of personal hygiene, food values, common diseases, instruction in "purity of conduct as a preservative of health." Drawing and music are given an important place. The time to be given each day to the manual work, and the suggestion that the produce of the school-children's labour will be marketed for an average of twelve annas a week, seem open to grave criticism, but they do not necessarily destroy the value of the scheme as a whole.

The present educational system in India is condemned, not only as wasteful, but also because "it does not train individuals to become useful productive members of society" and "it has no conception of the new co-operative social order which education must help to bring into existence."

"Our children," says the report, unlike the children of the west, "will need to be taught the superiority of non-violence over violence." Whether or no a system of compulsory education can be built up through all the villages of India on this basis at less cost than the present educational system, or whether in fact it will need more, surely it would be a tragedy if noble projects such as these were held up chiefly by an obstinate out-of-date military machine turning blindly round and round in Delhi.

Brief reference must be made to other features of the Congress Ministers' policy. In the United Provinces and Bihar, where the socialistic tendency is strong in the Congress, measures are already being taken—suspending the collection of arrears of land rent from the peasants, for instance, and new tenancy laws—to meet the intense agrarian misery. It should be noted, however, that in Bihar the Congress Provincial Committee has itself issued a sharp warning to the Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Society) against measures of revolutionary violence which some of its branches seem to have attempted. As so often happens where reforms are long overdue, as soon as they are attempted by moderate reformers, revolutionaries try to take things into their own hands. By contrast with these social reform provinces it is curious to note that in Bombay the Congress Ministry is itself being castigated by that organ of Indian moderate nationalism, the *Servant of India*, for taking action against strike leaders of a more drastic nature than would have been expected from the British authorities.

There is evidently a good deal of healthy difference of view within the Congress itself, and the new ministries are likely to be subjected to healthy criticism by such groups as the Servants of India and perhaps even more by the sympathetic but independent Indian women's movement, whose influence on the side of social reform is one of the most hopeful features in India to-day. Surely it is remarkable that Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Nehru, and their colleagues are trying to do so much in these and other ways, within the limits of the Constitution they so much dislike. If they had been bent on conflict they might have said, "Now we are in office and we need the money you are using on your 'army of occupation' and your 'imperial training ground of the north-west frontier.' Well, we control Bombay, Madras, Karachi, and other

ports. We hereby give you notice that we shall not allow the customs and levies of those ports to go to support your Imperial Government in Delhi until you scale down your present central budget to one-half its present size." Instead of that they are seeing what can be done, not so much perhaps through the Constitution, but in spite of it.

This is no doubt due in large measure to the influence and the genius of Mahatma Gandhi. He is fond of saying how many things he has learnt from the English, such as punctuality, care in the keeping of accounts, and so on. Perhaps one of the things he has learnt from the English people is love of self-reliance, of voluntary activities, of doing things for ourselves instead of leaving things for the slow-moving and often inhuman machinery of government. He has been teaching self-reliance to his fellow-countrymen for the past twenty years. And still he is teaching it. "Give up your bondage to drink," he says, "and you will be the better for it—stronger to resist disease and poverty and exploitation and natural disasters." "Don't wait for more teachers or money, or better buildings, but use your native wit to begin schools: pool your resources, find the most skilled local men, appeal for volunteers and offer them their food and maintenance. Thus can we begin to build our system of national education." And so, too, month by month, he has been preaching and teaching the possibilities of a better use of the natural resources of the country, by the development of all manner of village industries. "Our salvation," he seems to say, "is in our own hands. If we do these things the alien government will lose its power over us. It will disappear like a dream."

But it is not only to the people of India that he brings this message of hope. Mr. Gandhi is not an easy man for the West to understand. Perhaps that is partly because we are living in an industrial age and in a sceptical age, so that we are divorced from mother-earth and from the sense of the mystery of the natural world which is near to the heart of religion. All through history the townsman seems to have tended to become too sophisticated, too intellectualised, too sceptical. The countryman, the producer of man's food and clothing, lives near enough to earth and to nature to know that man is not all, he must keep in right relationship with the rest of creation and with the unknown Creator.

If we will take the trouble to attend to the voice of India's great son, in the pages of his weekly paper, *Harijan*, for instance, where his almost rude, blunt, practical, common-sense peasant mind blends with his high spiritual calls to sacrifice, to prayer, to the practice of the presence of God, we may realise that our nightmare western world of violently conflicting ideologies—fascism, communism, socialism, anarchism, individualism, and other "isms"—is not the only possible life. Inevitably India, like every other country, will have many difficulties to surmount on her road to a new commonwealth. Communal tensions, social conflict, problems of law and order—they are visible already. But if we can stand aside, watching with the humble attitude of those who know they have much yet to learn of the art of life, we may learn from India things that will contribute to the healing of our western nations. The generation that has drunk deep of Gandhi's teaching, though it may not accept all his political judgments, knows that a sound national life must be built on firm moral foundations of universal significance. National or sectional expediencies, even the immediate interest of the proletariat, of the dumb millions, can never be allowed to override the universal human values.

HORACE G. ALEXANDER.

ANDRE GIDE ON SOVIET RUSSIA.

THE philosophy of Marx suffers from a fundamental incoherence, which has become so much the commonplace of criticism that it may seem unnecessary to refer to it. Indeed it would be so if it were not for the uncritical attitude of so many people towards communism. But André Gide's new addition to his notes on Soviet Russia gives so striking an example of the results of this incoherence, that it is certainly worth our while to consider it once again.

The Marxian interpretation of history has the virtue (if it be a virtue) of simplicity. Man is a function of the material order (processes of production, division of wealth, etc.) into which he is born. "This sum of forces of production, capital resources and material circumstances, which each individual and each generation finds already in existence as something given, is the real foundation of that being and nature of man which the philosophers idealise and dispute over." * Man is a product of the economic process and this process is not static. It serves the interests of some, not of others. When the dispossessed are sufficiently strong, they will overturn the existing order in their own favour. Feudalism replaced the ancient world of slave labour, modern bourgeois society in its turn triumphed over feudalism. Marx is scornful of those who try to eliminate those aspects of a society which cause friction and therefore lead to its overthrow. To do so, he says, would be "eliminating history," destroying social change. So we have the picture of an ultimate inevitable cycle of economic change which society at any given moment reflects but is powerless to influence.

Such a theory, even if it is unlikely, is coherent ; but Marx fails to carry it to its logical conclusion. His Jewish origin and unconscious heritage from Christianity give his thought an ethical bias impossible to reconcile with his thoroughly materialistic view of reality. It is obvious that where man is nothing but the product of a particular economic situation, notions of good and bad have no place at all. The merchant was not "good" when he ousted the baron, nor was the baron "bad." The economic process of change had reached a point at which the material interests of the new trader were stronger than those of the old feudal lord ; the trader triumphed

* *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, p. 28.

and that was all. But when Marx turns to his own epoch, he deserts his own interpretation of history to do exactly what he had mocked at others for doing. He tries to "eliminate history."

Instead of the contrast between a proletariat, unconscious product of an economic process which is gradually being modified to its advantage, and on the other hand the equally unconscious exploiters of a system whose days are already numbered, Marx abruptly brings in an ethical comparison quite incompatible with his premises. The workers are heirs of the future, not because the inevitable wheels of change are grinding in their favour, but because they are morally entitled to supersede the old order, because their coming is the coming of the reign of perfect peace and justice, of the millennium, which has haunted men's dreams from the beginning of time. The capitalist is not the unconscious instrument of an indifferent economic process, he is the enemy of mankind, consciously exploiting the defenceless worker, consciously opposing the powers of light. Naturally such an interpretation shatters the logical coherence of Marx's view of history, in which there is no place for "good" and "bad," since worker and capitalist, like capitalist and feudal lord, or feudal lord and Roman patrician are bound alike to the "melancholy wheel" of economic change. If you hold to Marx's interpretation of history coherently (as for example did Sorel) you may believe that the worker will replace the capitalist, but you have no right to believe that the resulting state of affairs will be "better" than the one it superseded. It will be more comfortable for the worker, that is all, just as it was probably easier to trade in Europe after the Reformation than before. If you are a worker, naturally, inevitably, you will fight for the change. You are "eliminating history" if you do not. But once the change has come, you have clearly no right to contend that the new state of affairs is absolutely "good." Materialistically such a contention is simply meaningless. It will be different, but probably not as violently so as you would at first expect. An aristocratic tradition modified the new trading classes. A capitalist tradition—a "bourgeois" tradition—will be carried over into the workers' state. Instead of a bourgeois owner-employer, you may have a "bourgeois" state bureaucrat. Materialistically, logically, coherently, you cannot expect more.

But the Communist does expect more. That is the whole point, the real driving force, of the revolutionary movement. What the Communist is trying to do is not to put an end to one economic period and begin a new one—the miserable economic cycle will do that for him in any case, so why worry?—he is fighting in the cause of social justice, he is fighting for the workers who are down-trodden, miserable, oppressed, and he believes passionately that the coming of the workers' power, the classless society, will mark the beginning of a paradise on earth. He believes, indeed, that it will not only be "better" than the existing state of affairs, but absolutely good, the ultimate goal of humanity, the final fruition of the historical process. Like Godwin, the father of anarchy, he looks forward to a millennium; like Fox, like Wordsworth in the first days of the French Revolution, he is standing in tense excitement, in a species of awe, before the ultimate dawn of triumphant humanity.

Europe at that time was thrilled with joy
France standing on the top of golden hours
And human nature seeming born again.

If we substitute Russia for France, Wordsworth's words are not entirely inapplicable to a certain modern attitude of mind.

Now there is only one way to combine a coherent belief in materialism with the ethical enthusiasm and indignation which gives communism its revolutionary strength. If the evils you attack are entirely due to the system of capitalist production, in other words, if there is only one sin and that is exploitation, then (although you have not explained why it is ethically worse to exploit than to be exploited; materialistically speaking it is only more uncomfortable) you can argue that to change the existing system is equivalent to establishing a "good" society. Since they do not exploit, the workers are "better" than the capitalists. Give them no chance to exploit and they will remain better. Establish a society in which there is no exploitation and you will have good citizens. Some such argument as this justifies revolutionary ardour, and at the same time keeps the revolution firmly anchored to the economic system.

But for inconsistent and consistent communists alike, the crux of the problem is the establishment of a society in which classes, and above all, exploitation, are abolished. Hence the

breathless excitement, the fascinated interest, with which millions have been following the fortunes of Soviet Russia. We gather that exploitation in the cursèd sense, the employment by the few of the many in the interests of the few, has disappeared. As André Gide writes: "There is no more exploitation and this is enormous." The state, the instrument of the masses, the guardian of their interests, is developing the resources of the community to the advantage of all. Now if vice, if wickedness, is—as materialists *must* believe—simply a function of the economic process, the establishment in Russia of state socialism as a step towards a socialised stateless society must have bred a new race of men, for if it has not, we must look somewhere else for "wickedness" and throw its economic basis overboard. But in the view of many writers, and not least of André Gide, a new type has indeed been created, but one which cannot be said *ethically* to differ in anything from his parent clay, the capitalist entrepreneur. The bourgeois bureaucrat, the Stalinite conformist does not, cannot, exploit in the old sense. But can the revolutionary look at him with any more satisfaction on that account?

The emergence of the communist bureaucrat should not trouble anyone who is concerned only with Marx's interpretation of history. State socialism like any other economic process will produce certain groups which profit by it, while other groups, probably a greater number, will not. To deny this is, in Marx's own words, to eliminate history. The group which happens under the new Soviet dispensation to profit most is apparently the state bureaucrat. Why not? He is as inevitable as the Railway King of the 'eighties, the predatory baron of feudal times. In time, perhaps more quickly than in the past, since science has speeded up the process of change, the discomforts inherent in state socialism will lead to another revolution, out of which a new type will arise, differing from, yet resembling, the communist bureaucrat. Such is the inevitable cycle. Who shall ask whether one epoch is better than another? Indeed it is an improper question, for "good" and "better" are without meaning.

There are, however, few consistent communists. Most of them are sufficiently inconsistent to think of capitalists as bad in themselves; but even if they are coherently materialistic to the extent of thinking capitalists bad merely as exploiters, they are at a loss to explain the new state of affairs in which

exploitation has disappeared and the millennium has turned out to be the privileged prosperity of a vast body of state officials, but not of the proletariat. The new age has produced the old man. This is not what they meant at all. And here is the crux. When they talked of the new age which was to dawn for humanity once exploitation had been done away with, either they were consistent materialists and believed that an economic system without exploitation automatically produces a society without friction and men without vice, or—though unconsciously—they did not define goodness and evil in terms of economics at all, in which case they may be good revolutionaries, but they are not consistent materialists. Once you leave the safeguard of a self-regulating materialism, of automatic change, of a mechanical revolution, you are back in the old hedonistic dilemma of explaining why it is better to be a dissatisfied philosopher than a satisfied pig, you are compelled to define your values and your ends; to define above all the meaning you attach to the concept of “good,” the reef which has shipwrecked generations of moral philosophers.

This is the dilemma in which André Gide finds himself. He writes : “ I believe that it is an error to expect and hope for a profound change in human nature from a mere change in social circumstances . . . it is necessary, it is enough that they leave room for it . . . but they will not be the force behind it. For in this there can be nothing mechanical, and without interior reform we shall see the re-establishment of the old bourgeois society, the ‘ old man ’ will reappear and flourish.”*

But if “ nothing is mechanical ” and you admit the need for an “ interior reform,” where is your materialism ? You have to admit that for the establishment of the kingdom, a proletarian triumph is useless, unless the proletarians are “ good ” men. André Gide does not deny it. “ One often has the illusion that the people are made up of better men than the rest of deceptive humanity. I simply believe they are less spoiled, but that money would corrupt them like the others.”† Yet to a materialist, are money, sensual satisfaction and cheap pleasure less worthy than books, fine paintings and the delights of the mind ? Gide is uneasily conscious of this difficulty. He relates how an “ excellent Marxist ” pointed out to him that a communist can be as rich as an opera singer so long as this wealth is the result of his own work. Communism opposes

* *Retouches à Mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 61.

† *Ibid.*, p. 61.

nothing but the exploitation of one man by another. The Marxist continues : " Your scorn and your hatred for money and possessions is a regrettable survival from your former Christian ideas." Gide admits the possibility. " And you must agree," the other continues, " that they have nothing to do with Marxism." Gide replies "*Hélas!*"*

The truth is of course that by his historical materialism Marx threw dust in his own eyes as a social reformer. Historical materialism did not merely involve him in incoherencies, it frustrated his fine revolutionary ardour, his pity for the outcast and oppressed, his incomparable championing of a forgotten class. For since Marx believed, from his historical bias, that in destroying the productive system he could automatically destroy the vices which the system produced, he failed to realise that it was the vice which had produced the system. He was right to cry out against employers who sent children to work in the mills, who lived for profit, who defrauded workers of a just share in the products of their labour, but he should have attacked them as men, not as capitalists.

Here we see the confusion in Marx's thought in clear and tragic relief. He saw the real evils of the existing system. The cure he proposed was to alter the system. This can be a solution only if the evils are a product of the system, that is to say if capitalists are despoilers of the poor simply because unconsciously and inevitably they conform to the productive process which is the only final reality. But Marx is stirred to holy anger against the personal evil of these men, in other words he recognises evil for which men—capitalists in this case—must bear personal responsibility, evil which lies in their hearts, not in the productive system.

This is the painful lesson which many men are learning to-day from the Russian revolution, among them André Gide. When they find that a Soviet state official can display exactly the same unlovely qualities—which are lumped together under the convenient and perhaps misleading word " bourgeois "—as the capitalist entrepreneur, they cry out that the revolution has been betrayed,† but they are wrong. The revolution has betrayed them. A change of system has not produced a change of heart, and the saddened revolutionaries are

* *Retouches à Mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 60.

† Cf. Letter from Marcel Martinet, *Retouches à Mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, pp. 124-5.

surprised not because they are good Marxists but because they are bad materialists. Marx's materialistic interpretation of history logically promises nothing more than that at each change in the economic system the profits of the system will pass to a new set of men. There is therefore nothing un-Marxian in the Soviet official riding in his American car, while millions toil in silence. It is only repellent to the Communist if he is, as the Marxian realist does not fail to point out to André Gide, a Christian idealist.

For Marx's interpretation of history is a melancholy picture of a world without the Christian revelation. Man reduced to his bare elements is incapable of anything greater than a never-ending cycle of economic change based on the avarice of some and the envy of the rest. The "bourgeois" in the Marxian sense is not a class, he is an eternal type, the lowest common denominator of humanity, who in the person of the Pharisee was denounced as strenuously by Christ two thousand years ago, as is the capitalist by the Communist to-day.

But the bourgeois is a spiritual, not a material, product. He is possible in any material surroundings, and the solution to the problem of the "bourgeois" is not Communism but sanctity. The Communist tragedy—try and picture the infinite sorrow and disillusion underlying André Gide's "*Hélàs*"—is that for all its real and vivid social idealism it carries in its very nature the bourgeois quality which it sets out to fight. The basis of the bourgeois attitude to life is contentment with material things. A revolution, therefore, which is based on materialism is anti-bourgeois only so long as it is unsuccessful. Once it has triumphed it must inevitably decay. Materialism cannot fight materialism, hatred does not destroy avarice, envy is only another form of greed. With such weapons you may bring about bloodshed, but you will not renew the face of the earth. "The old man is born again and flourishes," for, as Gide points out, although material circumstances can permit a change in human nature they cannot bring this change about. Re-creation is the work of the spirit, and the kingdom we seek is to be realised first in the heart—Gide's "interior reform"—before it can be restated in terms of society.

BARBARA WARD.

ADDISON AS A SOCIAL REFORMER.

IN offering* his famous periodical, the *Spectator*, to the world, Addison was doubtless concerned for its success as a commercial enterprise; but he also saw in it an effective instrument for the task which he had so much at heart, the correction and improvement of public taste and morals. For this task he had special qualifications. The earlier part of his life he had devoted to literary studies and exercises, in order to equip himself for his rôle as a man of letters. In 1704 he was appointed a Commissioner of Appeals, and for the following six years was engaged in public affairs. These years were by no means without influence upon his literary and critical training. Entering public life at a time when literary genius enlisted itself, as a matter of course, in the service of politics, Addison was brought into contact with the foremost minds and characters of his day. In his double rôle of author and politician, he had ample opportunities for gaining an insight into the changing needs and temper of his age in the first years of the newly formed régime. Political power had now definitely passed from the throne to the people, and the people's will, or so much of it as could find expression through its representatives, was henceforth to control the destinies of the nation. With this change in political conditions came a corresponding change in the position of men of letters. Their function was no longer, as before, to be merely the mouthpiece of policy; they had to create opinion and to inform it. To those who used their powers conscientiously this was a gravely responsible task. The public, or that part of it into whose hands the control of affairs had passed, was grievously lacking in the simplest qualifications for the exercise of its new authority. It possessed no clearly defined standards either of social or political conduct. In all ways it stood in need of education, and no man was more alive to this need than Addison.

Through the medium of the new periodical he aimed at correcting all that seemed to him false in prevailing notions in manners, morals and taste. In taste not least; for he realised fully the importance in the citizen's life of a right use of his leisure, and of a wise choice of the means of relaxation and amusement. Thus he sought to cultivate in his readers a

* Conjointly with Steele.

sense of beauty and power of æsthetic discrimination, by awakening in them an interest in critical problems. Of these problems the one which concerned him most, both as a thinker and reformer, was that of the relation of art to morality. Since he wished to improve and instruct his readers while at the same time diverting them, he had, in order to satisfy himself, to show that the pleasures of art (using the term in its widest sense) have an educative and not a detrimental effect on the character. This led him to a consideration of the wider problem of the end or function of art : and though he gives us no complete discussion of the problem, it is possible, from his various utterances in the pages of the periodicals, to arrive at some conception of his attitude towards it.

This problem indeed was one which no Renaissance or neo-classical critic could afford to overlook, if only for the reason that Aristotle and Horace had definitely pronounced upon it. But Aristotle's views upon this, as on many another crucial point of æsthetic, was often misconceived, while Horace's famous aphorism "*omni tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci*," accepted without due reflection upon its meaning, led generations of critics astray. The conclusion of the whole matter, as drawn by critical thought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is that art must instruct morally, and, if it please as well, that the pleasure must be a means to the instruction. Occasionally a writer is bold enough to assert that pleasing is the sole business of art ; occasionally, too, pleasure and instruction are admitted as co-ordinate ends ; but the general standpoint is definitely an ethical one. All critics, however, agree in the tacit assumption that if both pleasure and profit are present in a work of art they are present as unrelated factors, whose association is external and mechanical. Never is the view consciously adopted, their art profits us because it pleases, or pleases because it profits.

In seventeenth-century England this divorce of æsthetic pleasure from ethical value in the work of art is no doubt largely the outcome of the Puritanical spirit, which, though we associate it chiefly with one portion of society, had in reality permeated the national consciousness. The unrestrained licence of Restoration drama and Restoration manners did not spring merely from a revolt of the senses : they were also the deliberate expression of the conviction, then general, that to be witty and amusing it is necessary to be immoral. Here,

of course; we have the extreme form of prejudice; the critics who, like Dryden, consented to the degradation of art in practice, were content as critics to maintain that wit must supply what is diverting in a poem or play, and virtue what is moral. They must indeed have been hard put to it to reconcile this ideal of art with the reality of it in their own day, and this may in part account for Dryden's shifting attitude to the problem.

To Addison the divorce of wit and virtue seemed, as is well known, the great stumbling-block to social reform, and his own influence on contemporary manners was largely due to his skill in exposing its inherent fallacies. He made it his object to show that mirth and the capacity for mirth are in no wise inconsistent with the love of virtue, and that the humour which appeals to the baser elements in human nature is not merely ethically, but even æsthetically, indefensible. He triumphed, in fact, over his opponents by affirming a wider conception of morality than theirs. He it was who first definitely reasserted the ethical value of the imagination, and gave to man's æsthetical activities an integral place in the scheme of his moral life. He does not, it is true, as did Hutcheson and afterwards Shelley, rest his defence of imagination upon its power of enlarging the human sympathies; nor does he connect it with the doctrine, already developed by Shaftesbury, of the organic relationship of virtue and beauty. To Addison it is sufficient that man is a being endowed with imagination, and that to his complete welfare the exercise of all his normal faculties is indispensable. "We cannot question," he writes in the last number of the *Spectator*, "but that the happiness of a soul will be adequate to its nature, and that it is not endowed with any faculties which are to lie useless and unemployed." For "as the whole soul acts in the exertion of any of its particular powers, the whole soul is happy in the pleasure which arises from any of its particular parts."

In thus insisting on the solidarity of man's higher nature, Addison takes a step in advance of his age; but in much of his actual criticism he defers to established tradition. Not merely does he leave unchallenged the old rule that art must edify by pleasing, but he professes to make it the basis of his own literary method. "I would not willingly laugh," he writes in explaining the plan of the *Spectator*, "but in order

to instruct." His object "is to enliven wit with morality and to temper morality with wit." "I must confess," he adds, "that were I left to myself I would rather aim at instructing than diverting, but if we would be useful to the world, we must take it as we find it." In practice, however, he is often truer to his own instinct; he writes with the sole object of diverting, as if he were confident that such diversion is in itself morally profitable.

The narrower interpretation of the ethical value of art, for which the French critics were chiefly responsible, is certainly foreign to Addison's way of thinking. Though he seems to defer to le Bossu's dictum that a poem "should be founded upon some important precept of morality," he shows elsewhere how his position differs from theirs. "Though I can by no means think," he writes apropos of *Paradise Lost*, "that an epic writer first of all pitches upon a certain moral, as the groundwork and foundation of his poem, and afterwards finds out a story to it; I am, however, of opinion that no just heroic poem ever was or can be made, from whence one great moral may not be deduced." This moral lesson, however, must be implicit in the work itself. In *Paradise Lost* it is "the soul of the fable." It must not dominate the poet's mind as an abstract scheme, to which he moulds the framework of his story. A poem, in short, is not a parable. To fit a tale to a moral, or to extract the moral from a tale, is the work, not of the imagination, but of the reflective intellect; and Addison, as we have seen, demands something more than this from the work of art.

Yet the intellect, as we have also seen, plays an important part in Addison's analysis of æsthetic pleasure; and his respect for it may explain why at least one form of moralised art found especial favour with him. It has frequently excited question that the allegorical conception of art, which the Middle Ages passed on to the Renaissance, should have survived the new critical outlook and persisted throughout the seventeenth century. Perhaps one reason is that the pleasure in allegory *qua* allegory is largely of the intellect. Addison's own fondness for allegory is well known. He was, moreover, himself a master in this species of composition; and although the charm of his own allegories may reside largely in the delicate play of fancy which informs them, his motive in writing them is undoubtedly didactic rather than æsthetic.

Most commonly they are introduced at the end of a set discourse or series of discourses, to relieve the tedium of the sober argument, but at the same time to point its lesson. And Addison's objections to the allegorical figures of Sin and Death in *Paradise Lost* imply no disapproval of allegory; they are advanced in the name of *decorum*, which demands that a work of art should be a self-consistent whole. In spirit, therefore, they are part of the same attitude on criticism which favoured allegorical art.

To the whole question of art and morals Addison's attitude is temperate, conciliatory, and self-corrective. By nothing is this attitude better illustrated than by his handling of the delicate problem of poetical justice. In one who, like Addison, sympathised with Bacon's conception of poetry as a thing to lift us above the depressing realities of life, the theory of poetical justice might well have found a zealous advocate. But common sense steps in to correct Addison's idealism. Art may embellish and beautify nature, but must not misrepresent her. At the same time Addison cannot but respect the motives of those who uphold poetical justice, and when Dennis falls foul of him for his ridicule of this "absurd doctrine," he contrives an apology which satisfies the claims of religion without violating those of art.

Yet, when all is said, and however Addison may have conceived the exact nature of the social value of art, there is little doubt that this value carried more weight in his critical judgments than purely artistic excellence. The distinction may itself be fallacious; but it is one which Addison would himself have drawn, and, *cæteris paribus*, he would have preferred a work of art which he found morally stimulative to one which left him indifferent or depressed. It was by the matter rather than the manner that he judged, and he failed to see that such a way of judging was ethical rather than æsthetic. No doubt, too, his literary preferences were largely coloured by this conviction. In Shakespeare he admires not more the consummate genius than the man "whose mind is thoroughly well-seasoned with religion," while he expressly commends the study of *Paradise Lost* for the vital importance of its religious and ethical teaching. In comparing modern tragedy, again, with that of the ancients, he conceded the superiority of the latter in regard to "the intricacy and disposition of the fable," but adds, "what a Christian writer

would be ashamed to own . . . it infinitely falls short in the moral part of the performance." On the relation of æsthetic and moral qualities in the character of the artist himself Addison does not in any place discourse, though without doubt, had he done so, he would have upheld the dictum of Jonson, Milton, and of others before and after them, that to be a great artist it is necessary to be a good man.

Living when he did, it is extremely creditable to Addison that he did not allow his zeal as a reformer to cloud his critical insight, and push him into the ranks of the extremists. Not Collier himself, indeed, could have deplored more earnestly the corrupting influence of the kind of drama most popular in his day. "It is one of the most unaccountable things in our age," he writes, "that the lewdness of our theatre should be so much complained of and so little redressed." But Addison's voice is given, not for abolition, but for reform. It is against the abuse of a great civilising force that his protests are directed; and it is in the same spirit that he inveighs against the "writers of great talent, who employ their parts in propagating immorality and seasoning vicious sentiments with wit and humour." These "are to be looked upon as the pest of society and the enemies of mankind." His plea is for an art which, if it does not consciously serve the interests of morality, is at least without moral offence, and he explodes the prejudice that only vice can be diverting. It was unfortunate, indeed, that his own dramatic efforts provided an illustration in favour of rather than against this prejudice. For this, however, the dramatist was more to blame than the thinker; just as the general weakness of post-Restoration comedy is rather to be ascribed to the failure of dramatic impulse under the attacks of the Puritans, than to the restrictions which their triumph imposed upon the artist.

Thus while Addison is guilty to some extent of that confusion of æsthetic and moral values which vitiates the criticism of his age, he is saved from its worst consequences by his more liberal conception of human nature. If he does not admit the complete autonomy of art he at least assigns to it a province of its own. If any sanction is required for the exercise of this activity, so undeniably normal to man, Addison would seek it rather in religion than in morality. The necessary cause, he declares, of our pleasure in the things of imagination is hard to find; but the final cause is "to quicken and encourage us in

our searches after Truth." And he proceeds to show how the pleasure attached to certain classes of objects and ideas (those possessing grandeur, novelty and beauty) is expressly designed to strengthen man's sense of the greatness and goodness of Deity. But though Addison's humanism (in his case sincerely enough) thus speaks the language of rationalistic theology, it is his humanism rather than his theology that counts. The teleological argument, though few English æstheticians in the coming century ignored it wholly, has little or no bearing on the general theories which they formulate. The conviction that the definite moral or religious teaching of a work of art is incidental to its main purpose establishes itself slowly but surely as a commonplace of criticism. And Addison may fairly be counted among the first of those to teach the artist that his business is "to lay aside the presumptuous office of instructor, and to speak as the heart directs him."*

Addison's views upon this and kindred subjects may seem to have little interest or value except for the student of literary criticism. But it may be well to emphasise in conclusion that his aim throughout was largely a practical one, and that the task which confronted him is not dissimilar to that which faces the social reformer in our own day. In both cases there is the growth of a large semi-literate reading public anxious for instruction and diversion : in both cases there is the problem of instructing without tediousness and of diverting without injury. It is true that his public, compared with that of to-day, was a mere handful ; but whereas to-day the means of communication between writer and reader is unlimited in variety and extent, Addison had to rely upon a single periodical, an undertaking almost solitary of its kind, and for which he had almost the sole responsibility. All honour to him, then, for the high aims which he associated with his office, and for the high standards which he set for English journalism to follow.

I. SHAWCROSS.

* Shelley. Letter to Leigh Hunt, describing his own method in *The Cenci*.

SMALLHOLDERS IN BELGIUM AND ENGLAND: A COMPARISON.

IN these days it is acknowledged that the essential "soul of a people" is to be found in the countryside rather than in great cities. At the same time, the urgent necessity of diverting Britain's unemployed into new localities and ways of existence has brought into being a network of schemes for land settlement. For these reasons it was well worth while to make a comparative study of aims and conditions in England and in Belgium—not only a near neighbour, but one with a similar climate and having, like ourselves, "densely populated and heavily industrialised" areas. The small book* which sets forth the result of the investigation is full of practical suggestions to all who are interested in questions of agricultural labour or rural life. Nor do the writers leave ideals out of account; for they are equally concerned that the settlers should be healthy and contented, useful members of the community and on good terms with the rest. Miss Blundell herself has learned and carried out all the work of such a smallholding as she recommends; and the Comtesse de Meeûs describes the widespread *Boerenbond* of Belgium from twelve years' intimacy with "that little country's magnificent agricultural organisation."

The Peasants' League began as a local guild in Flanders. Various attempts made in the later part of the nineteenth century to start a co-operative agricultural movement had dwindled away; but when the right leader appeared, his efforts achieved extraordinary results.

The beginnings were small and humble. The Abbé Mellaerts, curé of the rural district of Goor . . . found recreation amid the labour of building the church and school of his newly created parish, in the care of his large garden and the study of plant nutrition. He was the first in that locality to employ artificial manure. Enchanted by the success he thereby obtained, he was anxious to impart the knowledge to his parishioners. The Fleming is, however, proverbially obstinate and suspicious. The peasants looked askance at the strange powdery compound . . . offered them by their pastor. It could be no good, they averred, for it did not smell bad enough.†

* *Happy Families*. By M. L. de Meeûs and Margaret Blundell. The Sheldon Press. 1936.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 79.

One farmer obligingly made trial of it on a worthless field of young wheat, and the effect was so remarkable that the curé embarked on larger schemes. He aimed at nothing less than "an association of the peasantry, for the improvement of their religious, social and financial condition"—thus going back to the principles of the early guilds. In spite of considerable opposition to his ideas, he became president of the first Peasants' League, with a total of seven enrolled members, in February 1886.

Within three months the benefits of the Abbé's methods had been demonstrated to other growers, and the membership rose to eighty-six. By combining orders, he was able to purchase chemicals, plants and seeds for them at wholesale rates. He set up a small credit bank for the poorer farmers, and began to introduce the newest agricultural machines. When ill-health compelled him to give up his parish he retired to Louvain, where he devoted himself to pleading the cause of the League, especially in the press. A series of articles written for *Het Land* attracted the notice of M. Helleputte, a professor of the University, who asked to be introduced to the writer, and was astonished to find that "the remarkable innovator was an invalid priest, living a stone's throw from his own lodging!" The professor and the Abbé were in complete accord, and a large meeting was arranged on July 20, 1890. Some of the chief farmers from the provinces of Brabant, Antwerp and Limbourg were present; and the gathering, persuaded and convinced by the leading spirits, voted for "the formation of peasant guilds in all rural districts, united in federation under a central League, whose headquarters should be at Louvain."

When Miss Cicely Hamilton was collecting material for her book, *Modern France*, a few years ago, she observed small farms and peasant holdings standing derelict here and there in agricultural districts. The land about them lay waste or overgrown with weeds; and she realised sadly that even the French peasant, who had formerly cultivated his own ground with so much loving diligence, had yielded since the war to the attractions of the town. The faithfulness to the soil shown by Belgian cultivators is one of the most remarkable fruits of the League's great work of inspiration, guidance and support, persisting through times of crisis and social or political upheavals.

The *Boerenbond* statutes provided that each local guild should have its own bank and credit system for the members' use. These banks, "like the other activities of the *Boerenbond*, are dependent on and responsible to a central organisation, which fulfils the dual function of advancing money to the branch offices, when needed, and receiving and dealing with their surplus for the benefit of the whole group." Interest on savings is paid at the rate of 3 per cent., and the bank charges 4·60 per cent. on loans, which are granted for periods of from one to ten years. The Countess de Meeûs claims that the most daring feature of the League's financial administration—"the unlimited liability of all the members for every loan granted to any among them"—has proved the safeguard of the whole system. The effect was to create "a true solidarity among the people, the prosperity of each being the interest of all."

The organisation of the Peasants' League, we are told, "has been forced, by its own success, into enlargement unforeseen at its inception." The economic growth now includes an insurance company and co-operative buying and selling centres, having large blocks of warehouses at Bruges, Alost, Brée, Hasselt and Louvain. The League owns three experimental farms for the improvement of stock and seed. Its press maintains and extends a constant influence in the country; printing four editions of *The Peasant* weekly, one for men and one for women members (*La Ligue des Fermières*) each in French and in Flemish—thus providing a Sunday newspaper of a very different type from those popular in England. Other periodicals, dealing with different aspects of the *Boerenbond*, are also published in both languages. There is a junior branch for boys and another for girls, which are training children "to take their place later as efficient agriculturists."

These youth-sections are specially important. Seizing the new generation at the threshold of active life, the *Boerenbond* inspires them with its own ideals. By filling their days with interest—educational, practical and recreational—it binds them to the soil, not in the old narrow sense, but of their own free and happy choice.*

Although the subscriptions paid by members are small, the number of local guilds in Flanders and Wallonia brings these

* *Happy Families*, p. 85.

contributions to a large total. Men pay 15 francs (equal to about 2s. 6d.) and women 8 francs yearly. The rate payable to the Youth Guilds is still less ; and League publications are supplied freely to members in their respective sections.

Because the whole income of the *Boerenbond*, from all sources, flowed back to it for its own use, administered by the Superior Council, it rapidly gained wealth and power. "Lasting proof of this is afforded by the fact that the League was able to restore, and even to rebuild entire villages complete with church and parish hall in the devastated districts."

But in recent years the *Boerenbond's* financial advisers, wishing to make the accumulated funds profitable in new directions, ventured into investments which lay outside "the land and its immediate interests," with dire results.

For hitherto the virtue and glory of the *Boerenbond* had been its exclusive devotion to the land. But when it took up mortgages other than agricultural, advanced money for urban developments such as blocks of offices and flats, when it even acquired interests in foreign countries, it lent itself to a policy incongruous by its very nature to the aims and ideals of Peasant Leagues.*

A crisis was reached in 1934. Its credit was already seriously lowered, and the Socialist extremists, who had long been bitterly opposed to the League, seized their opportunity to attack it violently, and particularly the Central Credit Bank. They succeeded in producing a panic among some of the investors, who made large withdrawals, almost exhausting the funds available at the moment. Fortunately for the Belgian peasants, the Socialists' own savings bank was in difficulties too, and "only saved from collapse at the eleventh hour by Government intervention."

Such aid could not be given to the thrift association of one political party, and withheld from the *Boerenbond*, with its different tenets and honourable history. Investigation showed that the whole structure of the League was fundamentally sound. State protection enabled it to weather the storm, and to reorganise the functions of the Credit Bank ; and led to affiliation with the prosperous Belgian Welfare Co-operative Society. Capital is again being built up, and it is hoped that, within a few years, the League will actually be in a stronger position than before. The source of danger was

* *Happy Families*, p. 94.

recognised in time ; and " even during its period of difficulty, the *Boerenbond's* efforts for the religious, social and professional well-being of the agricultural class were never relaxed." The story of the Peasants' League suggests that, given the same aims and spiritual forces, and equal perseverance, it might be possible to adopt the *Boerenbond's* principles in a far larger sphere of human life and work.

So far, only the origin and constitution of the League have been described. The normal methods by which its members obtain a livelihood on the land must be considered in making any comparison with smallholders, old or new, in this country. At once we are confronted with different standards and values ; and the complexity which arises from the fact that England, in spite of all the good wrought by County Associations, Young Farmers' Clubs, the Allotments Movement, and Women's Institutes, yet lacks the one great union of agricultural interests, ways and means, which the *Boerenbond* represents.

Since 1934, however, a comprehensive body, the Land Settlement Association, has been at work ; and, as the authors of *Happy Families* declare, has " changed the situation completely." It started with Government support to the extent of £1 for each £1 collected privately, up to £75,000 a year for three years ; acting with, and as the agent of, the Commissioner for Special Areas in all English land settlement schemes. The Carnegie United Kingdom Trust granted £26,500 to the Association in 1936 ; the British Legion gave £500 for Part Time Group Holdings ; and other generous gifts were made by individuals keenly interested in the new enterprise. Sir Percy Alden, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, published an excellent summary* of the Association's origins and purposes, from which I am allowed to quote.

It was not expected [he says] that the work of the Association could be more than experimental. Never before had unemployed industrial workers, who had been physically impaired by years of idleness, been able to find full-time occupation on the land. . . . It was felt that in order to make small holdings for unemployed men successful certain conditions must be fulfilled. In the first instance, the land should be suitable, i.e. good land for the special purpose required. Secondly, the men must be carefully selected,

* In *Progress*, the quarterly organ of The British Institute of Social Service. April-June, 1936.

and in order to make sure that there would be no failure, the wife of the man selected must also be suitable for country life. Thirdly, the men selected must have preliminary training ; if possible they should have worked on some allotment, and . . . for the first six months of the year, at least, the endeavour should be to restore them to perfect health, both physically and psychologically. . . . Fourthly, their actual work on the land must be under skilled supervision ; and, fifthly, both the buying and selling must be on a co-operative basis ; otherwise the smallholder would not be able to compete in the open market with men of much wider experience and more capital.

The establishment of colonies at Pottton, Bedfordshire, and at Andover, was followed by the Special Commissioner's invitation to set up twenty similar schemes for men and their families from Durham, Cumberland and Northumberland. The Association, with the financial help of the Carnegie Trustees, next extended the plan of group holdings to unemployed men outside the special areas. By the spring of 1937 twenty-four estates had been acquired, having a total area of 10,806 acres, and capable of providing 1,233 full-time holdings, each of which includes a Central Farm for help and guidance. To these estates 379 families had been transferred ; and 230 men were still working as trainees, not yet joined by their families. The Commissioner's schemes account for more than two-thirds of the estates given up to full-time holdings ; but seven are being worked under other schemes. On March 1st of last year twenty-nine men had completed their training and had become fully accredited tenants of their holdings, from three to ten acres in size, with a dwelling-house. The Association's outside staff consists of five Executive Officers, each responsible for a number of settlements ; three superintendents in charge of a group of estates in Bedfordshire, Sussex and Cumberland ; sixteen Wardens, each directing one estate ; also a number of assistant instructors in special subjects. To meet the rapid development of poultry-keeping and market gardening on the estates, Advisory Officers in poultry and horticulture have now been appointed to supervise these two branches throughout the country.*

The organisation of full-time holdings provides a careful process for selecting and testing applicants ; the result has

* The particulars referring to the position of the L.S.A. at the end of 1936 are taken from the Second Annual Report, published March 1937.

been that nearly all the men who have withdrawn, after voluntarily entering the scheme, "did so during the first few months of residence, that is to say, before any considerable time and expense had been incurred on their training." These withdrawals represent only 17 per cent. of the men transferred to holdings since the Association began its work.

The scheme of Part Time Group Holdings has grown out of a considerable number of "central allotments," taken over from the Society of Friends by the L.S.A. in 1935; and has been extended to over a thousand holdings. The standard arrangement is for groups of ten to twenty men each occupying from a quarter to half an acre. Although these holdings cannot make the unemployed altogether independent of public assistance, they provide healthy and profitable occupation for those who are ineligible as full-time settlers; they are useful in districts suffering from under-employment for men working only two or three days a week; they offer valuable experience to town-bred men, and help to fit them for full-time tenancy; the unemployed man and his family all benefit through his new interest, and the crops he raises.

The latest undertaking of the Association is the establishment of Cottage Homesteads for older men (over fifty), living with their adolescent families in Special Areas, and having little prospect of future employment. The Homesteads, to the number of 250 as an experiment, are being built, at the request of the Commissioner and financed by the S.A. Fund, near industrial centres in the Midlands and South of England, in order that the younger members of the transferred families may find regular daily employment, while sharing the comfort of the Homesteads. These consist of a detached house, modern and convenient, with half an acre of land for growing fruit and vegetables; also a poultry run. The L.S.A. further undertakes to help the tenant to obtain seeds, plants and tools; and will give advice in all questions of cultivation and care of stock. The prospective owner is encouraged to make the venture by definite assurances:

The rent of the Homestead, including the house and land, and repayment for advance for stock will be easily within your reach. In return you will have . . . eggs, fruit, and vegetables for immediate use and enough fruit over to preserve for the winter. You should have, too, a surplus for sale. And so long as you are unemployed you will continue to draw your appropriate unemployment allowances.

SMALLHOLDERS IN BELGIUM AND ENGLAND. 599

All the schemes described briefly here aim at bringing new settlers from the towns to the land ; they might even be regarded as provision for the refugees of industrial failure—in contrast with the Belgian *Boerenbond*, which has evolved naturally among countrymen by tradition, breeding and choice. But, as was pointed out by the late Mr. F. N. Blundell, in his Foreword to *Happy Families*,

It is important not to lose sight of the large number of smallholders, especially in the West of England and of Wales, who have either been born on the land or have found their way to their holdings without help from any outside authority or body.

He admits that settlers who begin as converted industrial workers need different treatment from the independent cultivator, who "owes his success to his own personality, initiative and energy." And he deprecates over-elaboration and rigidity in the schemes launched by the L.S.A.—for the very reason that "it is incomparably the most encouraging attempt to promote land settlement on a considerable scale which has yet been undertaken."

In everyday details of management Belgian smallholders appear to have some advantage over English ones—even those who need no recall to the land—and Miss Blundell pleads for a more thorough policy of skill and economy in this country. She particularly favours the "subsistence holding" which absorbs the labour of the whole family, and yields a livelihood for all—if it is accepted here, as in Belgium, that "the real profit of the holding would be contained in the food produced and eaten on it. . . . Thus the physical well-being of the family is assured and the glutting of the provincial markets is avoided." A wonderful degree of thrift is practised on a Belgian subsistence farm. Even the children share its interests and have their part in caring for the livestock ; and the housewife constantly helps with outdoor matters, besides making the most of every resource in providing for her family ; "No Belgian countrywoman," we are told, "considers it too much trouble to tend one or two sheep of utility breed." A full-grown ewe, at shearing, gives her owner eight to nine pounds of splendid wool, which is washed and used to stuff the mattresses, or sent to a weaver to be made into blankets for the family. The ewe's milk is of much greater value, amounting to at least three quarts a day for two or three months, and

making excellent butter and cheese. This supply supplements that of the small cow kept by a Belgian peasant and used also for light haulage—for instance, drawing the little cart loaded with hay which has been cut by his scythe, and tossed, with the help of his family and friends, by pitchforks.

Miss Blundell discusses the vital question of "Woman Power" with wisdom and sympathy. She holds that "the part of the woman of the family farm is *primarily* in the house," and that her work in garden or field should only be of the lighter kind. But she recognises that success or failure on the land, here as in Belgium, depends mainly on the settler's-wife; on her readiness to adapt herself to "the rhythm of natural life"; to prepare nourishing food for her family, from home produce as far as possible, instead of the tinned stuff abhorred by the economist; to enter wholeheartedly into co-operation with her husband, and with her fellow-settlers.

The great constructive system of the *Boerenbond* was based on a common faith and purpose, expressed in its motto, "Each for all and all for each." Whether the principle of compulsory co-operation, which is one of the conditions of full-time tenancy in the L.S.A. schemes, can be made to serve the same end, only time—and the new settlers—will show.

MURIEL KENT.

PORTSMOUTH THROUGH A THOUSAND YEARS.

“**P**ORTSMOUTH is the town where the Navy lives . . .” Such information was offered me *gratis* by an important young person dressed in sailor’s clothes and wearing his cap at the jaunty heel his gallant naval forbears would have thought disrespectful to His Majesty’s uniform. But the angle at which the late Earl Beatty wore his cap was good enough for this potential admiral. We were standing on Sally Port, Old Portsmouth, the spot from where Nelson and many other naval heroes of sailing-ship days embarked, and rowed out to their ships lopping in a slack tide off the narrow entrance of the famous harbour awaiting orders to sail away in the service of old England. One can sit on the bench at Sally Port and call up the past by mingling imagination with retrospect and re-living a thousand years of thrilling naval story. One can keep watch and look-out, indulge in the enthralling pastime of peering seawards, and in imagination piece together the romantic episodes of our maritime history. Kipling, who spent part of his early life in Portsmouth, during a meditative mood in later years wrote :

We have fed the seas for a thousand years,
And she calls us still unfed,
Though there is never a wave of all her waves
But marks our English dead.

Watching the ever-changing seascape of Spithead, I remembered Kipling’s haunting reflection. The general contour of the scene, with the beautiful Isle of Wight a few miles seawards, has changed very little since A.D. 501, the first recorded date of the beginning of this ancient port. Geologists have compiled the story of these parts before history had made any records, transporting us back a hundred thousand years when the Isle of Wight was part of the mainland, and Spithead, the Solent, and Southampton Water were covered by a vast primeval forest. During the year A.D. 501 one could not possibly have stood here, because Sally Port came into being only in the Middle Ages when Portsmouth had grown into importance and required fortifications. From the foreshore at that time two tiny galleys could be seen coming up over the rim of the horizon off Bembridge Ledge. According to

the *Saxon Chronicle* these were commanded by Porth and his two sons, Bieda and Maegla, who landed somewhere along this beach and founded the settlement called Portes Mutha.

Long before this time, however, the Romans had established themselves at Porchester at the top of the harbour on the western shore, and built a fort there about the year A.D. 375. The picturesque ruins of Porchester Castle stand well preserved to-day. As early as the third and fourth centuries Portsmouth Harbour attracted numbers of ships, and history recalls a Belgic seaman, one named Carausius, arriving off the Isle of Wight in the year A.D. 286 with a fleet and staging a fight with the Roman galleys that were coming out of Portsmouth Harbour to meet him. A dense fog, a not uncommon visitor to these waters, was apparently the deciding factor in this so-called naval battle. The invading fleet lost its bearings, we are told, whilst the Roman galleys drifted ingloriously back into the shelter of the harbour.

Hundreds of years after this event Spithead was destined to become the scene of many stirring sea battles against invading craft from Europe. King Alfred, the first monarch who realised the necessity of a navy to guard our shores, set about building ships in A.D. 875, and in a few years constructed a fine fleet that gave him confidence to seek battle with the marauding Danes and win a stirring fight in A.D. 897 at the northern end of the Solent, somewhere off old Castle Point. Looking out from Sally Port, imagine a fleet of Danish long-ships propelled by twenty oars a side, and assisted by square sails set amidships, coming up Spithead in battle formation. Alfred's stout ships of South Hampshire oak meet them and engage in an old-time fight, at first with bow and arrow, then gradually drifting together until the opposing craft collided, with the battle-axe, taking its toll with the strongest arm. Alfred's victory created in our island race a new confidence in her navy. Portsmouth and Spithead became famous in the naval history of England when the Norman invasion was threatened. King Harold fitted out a small fleet of ships in the port and sailed up Channel, but he was too late to prevent the Conqueror's army landing on Pevensey Marshes and fighting the Battle of Hastings in 1066. Since those days the naval port's connection with the throne has always been one of intimacy, and outside London there is no other city in England visited more by Royalty.

Though not mentioned in the Domesday Book, Portsmouth began to feature in the country's maritime progress even then, and received its Charter from Crusader King Richard on May 2nd, 1194. Three other monarchs had used the port before Richard. William I collected his fleet here and sailed for Normandy on an errand of conquest; a few years later, in August 1101, Robert, Duke of Normandy, sailed up Spithead with a large fleet and entered Portsmouth Harbour, landing a powerful force with which to challenge his claim to the throne. During the following seventy-five years the port became more firmly established, and Henry I spent much time here and was responsible for the rebuilding of Porchester Castle on the Roman settlement. His namesake, the second Henry, always landed at Portsmouth from his expeditions in Normandy. In March 1170 the King experienced one of those rough Channel crossings which are dreaded by seamen of every nation. Recently Captain Walters, of the famous Canadian fishing schooner *Bluenose*, confessed that the storms he encountered in the Channel outrivalled anything he knew on The Banks in the North Atlantic.

The first big fleet to leave Portsmouth is said to have sailed under Richard I in 1194. Gathering a hundred ships under his command, the King headed for France to settle a difference with the French monarch, and afterwards sailed to the Mediterranean to fight in the Crusades. Richard never returned; the Portsmouth Borough Arms in which the Star appears above the Crescent is emblematic of the victorious Crusades, when the Star of Bethlehem finally triumphed over the Crescent of the heathen Turk.

Through the mouth of the harbour on the north shore is the Royal Dockyard, the first naval base of the world, and one scarcely realises that its early beginnings were in the reign of King John who, in 1212, ordered the first dock to be dug. From that time John visited the port practically every month to superintend his navy, and also enjoyed the hunting provided in the neighbouring forests of Porchester and Bere. King John's dock was a primitive tidal creek, the mouth of which exists to-day in the Royal Gun Wharf and is still in constant use for naval auxiliaries. Compare the docking described by a writer of that day with the great dry docks of our day: "A dock is any creek, a place where we may cast in a ship out of the tideway into the ooze, and then when a

ship hath made herself a place to lie in, we say the ship hath docked herself." In other words, a ship was run up a creek on top tide, pulled ashore as far as possible by the crew and propped up by means of rude tree trunks. The entrance of the creek was also blocked up as much as possible by damming in the mouth with brushwood and loads of clay and stone.

From the time it became known on the continent that Portsmouth was a naval port favoured by kings, the place came into the news. It was a centre for attack, for suppression, even in those early days, for he who conquered England's navy commanded the Channel and its trade. In spite of the vigilance of the Cinque Ports fleet, pirates burnt the port in 1266; and again in 1357 a French fleet landed sailors who sacked the town and killed many of the inhabitants. During the ten years from 1370 to 1380 the French repeated their ravages on three occasions. The French were not allowed to have it all their own way, however. Five years after their last onslaught a fleet sailed past old Sally Port, through Portsmouth Harbour, and crossed the Channel to give our enemy neighbour a dose of its own medicine.

Armed neutrality brought a lull in our quarrels with the French, when constant overtures of friendship were made. From the wooden steps of Sally Port on April 9th, 1445, one would have witnessed a more friendly, more romantic episode. A French fleet came up the Channel, crossed Spithead and dropped anchor off the harbour entrance. It guarded a fair cargo, Margaret of Anjou, who landed at Sally Port, and with her courtiers spent the night at the *Domus Dei* (God's House), founded in 1212, now the Royal Garrison Church. A few days later, on April 18th, she drove to the Priory of Southwick (over Portsdown Hill), where she was married to Henry VI.

Onwards from this period there was a gradual growth in the fortifications of Portsmouth, parts of which exist to-day in a good state of preservation. In the matter of the coastal defences of South Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, our authorities were negligent even in those far-off days, and hesitant over the business of adequate defences. Wolsey was warned by a writer who knew of forces gathering again in Normandy. "If war be intended against England, the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth are too feeble for defence. Our manner is never to prepare for the war till our enemies be right at our doors." That was an opinion in the year 1518—

we still, apparently, display the same lethargy in regard to matters of adequate national defence. Little heed was given by Wolsey to this warning. Once again there was friction with the French, who now seemed to be our traditional enemy, and we fought a naval battle in Spithead on July 18th, when a fleet of 200 French ships attacked Portsmouth. Happily the affair, as a fight, was somewhat tame, for with little wind neither side could manœuvre into position. But the French captured a number of the English galleys after a bit of skirmishing amongst our ships that were drifting listlessly in the tideway from Sally Port to Southsea Castle. The King was watching from the Castle and the only thrill was the sudden heeling and sinking with all hands of the 500-tonner *Mary Rose*. She was in the line of battle at Spithead when a slight squall caught her with all her portholes wide open, and as these were only sixteen inches above the waterline she filled up and sank in full view of the people watching the battle from the Portsmouth shores. A fine model of the *Mary Rose* hangs in Portsmouth Cathedral to-day.

The French scare gave the impetus to strengthen the navy and the coastal defences, and subsequent monarchs followed the example of King Henry VIII of adding to the navy's strength. Not all Royalty, however, abode strictly by tradition and raised the money for national defences out of taxation. Elizabeth had an idea that a public lottery, like the present-day Irish sweep, would be a novel means of raising money, and the tickets of Elizabeth's lottery were ten-shilling lots. This State lottery was actually used in building the present square tower adjoining Sally Port. The dockyard was more firmly established during the early part of Elizabeth's reign, and there was an amazing revival of general seafaring. Being of a forceful personality the Queen got things done, and in consequence ship-designing and building showed marked progress. But towards the end of the gracious Lady's reign the port began to decline again, mainly on account of the work being taken to London and elsewhere according to the vested interests of some of the Queen's Ministers and Advisers.

In those days a sailor's life was in every respect a dog's life. Underfeeding, scanty clothing, and shockingly bad pay led to many mutinies. During one of these disturbances when an expedition was preparing to sail for La Rochelle under the Duke of Buckingham, there was some trouble in the High

Street, not far from Sally Port, which ended in Buckingham Palace, being assassinated by Felton. These were the beginnings of real stirring times, and for many years it was not possible to calm the mutinous seamen who stoutly revolted against the gross injustices they suffered. The splendid fare provided for the ordinary seaman to-day, aboard any of the men-of-war in Portsmouth Harbour, makes it impossible to believe that such degrading conditions could ever have persisted up to mid-Victorian times.

In 1662 old Sally Port once again became the official landing-place of a Royal bride. On May 14th of that year Catherine of Braganza landed there and was married to Charles II a few days later at the Domus Dei. The navy prospered during the reign of Charles, and many large craft were built in the dockyard, the *Charles Royal* being amongst the biggest, and the pride of England then. With a reasonable appreciation of our naval history of the seventeenth century and a lively imagination, one can actually see these great ships sailing past Sally Port, in and out of the famous harbour.

During the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries when the naval prosperity of Portsmouth was secure and progressive, the harbour and Spithead were busy scenes of shipping. The naval port played a major part in building ships which laid the foundations of Empire overseas. The title of "Mistress of the Seas" we acquired in the eighteenth century when our race had had several hundred years apprenticeship in seamanship and shipbuilding, the two arts that have kept us in the forefront of the world ever since. Came a day when Captain Cook's barque *Endeavour* arrived back from a world cruise, sailing into harbour on July 31st 1775. A few years later H.M.S. *Foudroyant* sailed out of harbour as convoy to three hundred merchant ships, many waiting at Spithead. The *Foudroyant* is now still serving in Portsmouth Harbour, acting as a hostel for the training ship the 74-gun *Implacable*. These fine old vessels are moored next to each other in Fareham Creek. The *Implacable* is the last ship afloat of those that took an active part in Trafalgar.

In imagination watch the sinking of the *Royal George* on August 29th, 1782, between Southsea Castle and Ryde Roads. She was being prepared for a voyage to the Mediterranean and was heeled for repairs to some planking on the waterline. The Admiral and the crew of nine hundred were aboard

working at their stations when they heard a splitting of timbers ; the bottom of the ship fell out and she sank like a stone with most of the crew drowned. The accident, it is said, was due to corruption prevalent at that period ; the ship had never been adequately repaired, although lying continually in Admiralty yards for that purpose. Another sight was the burning out, and the subsequent blowing-up, of H.M.S. *Boyne* off Southsea Castle on May Day, 1795. The Boyne buoy, marking the site of the disaster, is now a seaward mark for small racing yachts.

The early nineteenth century was Nelson's day. Into this harbour he sailed after every commission, landing at Sally Port from successful naval expeditions overseas. Old Portsmouth always presented a lively scene then—press gangs, bull-baiting, and the stage coach rattling down Broad Street to pull up at the "Old Blue Posts," whilst just opposite a ship goes out of harbour. As she passes the Round Tower, a man jumps his ship, swims ashore and runs for dear life around the alley-ways until he finds shelter in a friendly "pub," where, securely locked behind panelled walls, he eludes the police. Under cover of darkness, when the deep shadows in the narrow streets of the old port afforded ample protection and the only human being abroad was the prowling night-watchman on his rounds, our fugitive sailor made good his escape, after handing over most of his pay to the "pub" landlord as the price of his freedom. Then came a day, September 14th, 1805, when Nelson escaped through the backyard of the George Hotel, evading the crowds that blocked the High Street at the main entrance, and walked down Penny Street on his way to the beach where he embarked on H.M.S. *Victory* for Trafalgar. Three months later the *Victory* was sighted on the horizon at the eastern end of the Wight, leading a triumphant fleet ; aboard the flagship was the body of her gallant Admiral, Lord Nelson.

On June 9th, ten years afterwards, a most unwelcome craft came into Portsmouth Harbour. She was a vessel of 75 tons, doing 8 knots, and the first steamship to enter the port. The sight upset the traditional sailors and so shocked the Navy that it broke up a court martial sitting at the time in H.M.S. *Gladiator*. The doom of sail had arrived! To-day the 41,000-ton super-battle-cruiser H.M.S. *Hood*, a grown-up sister of this first steamship, is accepted as a matter of course,

and only once caused the local folk a thrill when she missed the fairway of the narrow harbour entrance, stuck her large grey nose into a sandbank, and sat on the doorstep of old Sally Port awaiting the next flood tide.

The twentieth century finds Portsmouth still the most romantic meeting-place of ships. On February 1st, 1901, witness the sad homecoming of the Royal Yacht *Alberta*, carrying the body of Queen Victoria from Cowes through a great fleet assembled at Spithead, to Portsmouth Dockyard. Thirteen years later one midsummer day the Grand Fleet is reviewed in Spithead and then steals away silently to keep watch during four grim years in the grey North Sea; the most powerful fleet the world has ever known disappears over the Channel horizon in a smoke-cloud. A year or so later many members limped back into harbour, the worse for Dogger Bank and Jutland battles. But there were more reviews at Spithead in the calm after war, the most remarkable occurring during the Silver Jubilee, when our beloved late King reviewed his fleet for the last time. Then came the picturesque Silver Jubilee Royal Regatta of Cowes Week, King George's last race in *Britannia*, and the Sailor King's last sea voyage back to Portsmouth, through historic Spithead into the fairway off Southsea beach, past Sally Port to make the last landfall of a noble, unforgettable reign.

ARTHUR LAMSLEY.

THE DRIVER ANT OF AFRICA.

AMONGST many useful scavengers which roam the velt and forests of Africa the Driver Ant, ferocious and inexorable, must be included. Over the sun-warmed earth of tropical and sub-tropical Africa ants of all sizes and species swarm everywhere, receiving scant attention from the grazing animals. Not so the Driver Ant. This insect is well known and feared by every animal that roams the velt, horsemen coming upon a stream of Driver Ants crossing a road find it impossible to force their steeds over it ; the sight, perhaps the scent, of an army of these ants stampedes all animals from their neighbourhood and when they enter a house or hut all vermin hurry from it on the opposite side, leaving their callow broods at the mercy of these ants, to be devoured. Even man, when these ants encroach upon his habitation, hastens from it and leaves everything to them until they have scoured it of every other insect and living thing and have left the neighbourhood. Their scavenging is extraordinarily effective and not a crumb will be left! The Driver Ant is respected by man but a terror to all animals, great and small.

I have encountered the Driver Ants in the jungle of West Africa and on the velt in Bechuanaland in South Africa and studied them as they travelled and as they worked through a house, with deep interest, but the resolute manner of their advance, the speed at which they stream over the ground and over every obstruction opposing them, altering their direction this way and that in an instant, has sent a thrill through me on more than one occasion!

This species of ant appears to have been studied individually and in their life and activities below ground to a lesser extent than have other members of the family, which is perhaps easily understandable. Like other insects living underground in the dark they appear to be blind or nearly so, exercising other faculties such as touch, hearing and smell to an unusual extent. They have, however, a single small eye, deep set in their heads, which is of simple construction, instead of the usual cluster of eyes found in other insects more dependent upon vision. They appear to communicate with each other by means of their antennæ, a touch with which is interpreted and responded to instantly and passed down a long line of ants on trek with extraordinary rapidity.

The Driver Ant is black in colour and is encased in chitin which gives him protection from the sun and resists a good deal of pressure. As seen on the surface an army of Driver Ants consists of thousands, even millions; of sexless workers, three-eighths of an inch in length, provided with strong mandibles; they travel in long lines eight or ten abreast, every worker in touch with those on each side and with those behind and in front so that no interval is apparent anywhere in the line throughout its length. On each side of this advancing line of workers a single line of soldier ants, half an inch in length, armed with a formidable pair of pincers, always travels, guiding and protecting them; at the sound of a step or perhaps the smell of an intruder, a few soldiers will leave the column and at great speed circle round in that direction and if an intruder is discovered a few of them streak back to the column, touch them and, the intimation being passed on, the column *instantly* bulges out in the direction of the threat without the line breaking. Directly the threat is removed the line straightens again and proceeds on its way.

Some years ago I visited Old Calabar, on the Calabar River in West Africa, and walked up to the Mission on the hill above the river to pay my respects to the Missionary in residence there. The old gentleman had been there for "nearly forty years," he told me. I found him interested in natural history as well as in the native welfare, and learning, as we sat in the shade of a tree, that I was collecting insects and keen on entomology, he said:

"Well, to-morrow morning I shall be able to show you the Driver Ants at work in my house! You see those big ants scurrying about out there?", pointing to some black ants literally streaking about in circles on bare ground, so rapidly that it was difficult to follow them, "Those are the soldiers of the Driver Ants, skirmishing round to see what is to be had in this vicinity; by to-morrow morning they will be here with millions of smaller ants and swarm all over my house, inside and out. We shall have to move out of it in good time and wait until they have cleaned the whole place up!"

The house was raised about a couple of feet above the ground on piles. I asked him to send me a message to my ship lying in the river if they came as I should be glad to come up and see them at work.

"They'll be here all right!" he assured me; "They have been here several times since I arrived and cleaned up the Mission, the last time nearly two years ago now. You never saw such a house-cleaning! Not a rat or a mouse, not even a cockroach was to be seen in the neighbourhood when they finished their job. I know them! When they come we just move out of the house with a table and chairs under this tree and live here until they've gone! Everything eatable in the house they'll clean up and won't leave a crumb or an insect of any kind! At their approach, rats and mice leave their young and scamper off pell-mell! Last time they came a sick goat lay in the shade of a bush near by and in three days nothing was left of it but clean bones!

"When I first came here about forty years ago it was the horrid custom of some of the neighbouring Chiefs to peg down their criminals in the road or a clear bit of ground and leave them to be devoured by the Driver Ants, and whilst going round my district I came upon a skeleton of a human being pegged out in the road. One of my Readers accompanying me told me all about it. I pulled up the Chief who was responsible for that and accused him of murder; I made him compensate the man's wife and children. Thank goodness we've altered all that and stopped such barbarous customs."

Next morning I was again at the Mission and witnessed a sight I shall never forget! From a number of small holes in the bare ground in front of the Mission House thousands upon thousands of Driver Ants poured out in orderly, serried ranks and streamed across the intervening ground into and under the house. They streamed round the doors and windows, and gaining admission through cracks and crannies continued their course up to the ceilings and through them to the roof; other columns hurried beneath the house and appeared through the floors into bedrooms, kitchen and pantry. In the latter they hung in black festoons, many ants deep like a swarm of bees, round the top of used saucepans, on an opened tin of condensed milk and a pot of jam, round dishes and plates which had contained remnants of food. Not a vestige of the tin and the jam pot was visible, they were so covered with swarming ants. Wherever I looked columns of ants were streaming along close to the walls, disappearing behind skirting boards and wainscoting, behind window frames loose in the walls. Here and there columns of ants, their bodies distended with food, were flowing out of the house to disappear down holes by which they had arrived whilst others were still

arriving from other holes, always in the same orderly formation and accompanied by soldiers who never left them. I had to move about with much circumspection lest I approach a column too closely, for when I did so soldiers rushed towards my feet with heads raised and pincers agape, followed immediately by a bulging column of workers! No materials, curtains, cushions were interfered with; only foodstuffs and insects of any kind they met with.

A few years ago, whilst motoring from Gaberones to Molepolole in the Bechuanaland Protectorate one afternoon, I stopped to have a look at an ancient dump heap of quartz, evidence of prehistoric mining, which rose close to the road. They abound in that neighbourhood. I had nearly reached the dump when I was stopped by a broad column of Driver Ants crossing the bare ground in front of me; they emerged from the bush on one side and were streaming up the mound. As I approached the column, and was still eight or ten feet away from it, the soldier ants conducting it became very excited and came streaking towards my feet with raised heads and gaping pincers, followed closely by the column of workers; when I stepped back the column straightened and the soldiers returned to their places to continue their journey almost automatically. I was anxious to see what each worker carried in its mandibles but every time I approached the column they rushed to attack me and drive me away; any other ant would have scurried from my path but these were Drivers. I accompanied the column up on to the dump heap where, right on the top of it, they disappeared into a hole beneath a large block of quartz. I was able to make out, however, that each worker carried a larva of a smaller species of ant and that they had been raiding a nest, but it may be that they were moving their own larvæ to a new home though they looked so very small to be larvæ of this species. A number of soldiers mounted guard at the entrance to their home until the last worker had disappeared, when they followed them out of my sight. It was a very long column and it took fifteen minutes for them to flow beneath the block. They were the same colour and size as the Drivers seen in West Africa . . . and behaved in a similar manner!

H. A. SPENCER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

POST-ANSCHLUSS EUROPE.

AUSTRIA'S disappearance from the map of Europe, the greatest single incident in the post-Versailles unrest, has had, as it was bound to have, as one of its effects the gathering of all the diplomatic forces and an awakened popular speculation about the general stability of frontiers in Central and Eastern Europe. It was hardly an accident that on March 17th—four days after the promulgation of the decrees incorporating Austria in Germany—Poland delivered an ultimatum to Lithuania. A wise restraint on the part of the Lithuanian Government and a prompt satisfaction of the Polish demands prevented a serious emergency in the east of Europe; but there can be little doubt that the danger had resulted from an emulative association of ideas on Poland's part. Prague became a centre of general European concern. A new importance was given to the Anglo-Italian talks that were taking place in Rome. These several manifestations of what did amount to a climax in the affairs of Versailles Europe were, however, interesting, not so much for the disturbance they caused, as for the resilience they illustrated in Europe's resistance to shock.

1. *The Greater Germany.*

It was on March 13th that decree laws were promulgated in Berlin and in Vienna declaring Austria to be a part of the German Reich and announcing that on April 10th the union would be submitted to a "free and secret plebiscite" of all Germans, including those of Austria, over the age of twenty. Two days earlier (March 11th) the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin had been informed by Field-Marshal Göring that the occupation of Austria was in no way directed against Czechoslovakia. The *Anschluss* decrees had been preceded on March 12th by an official German Government statement issued to other Governments, including the British, which were thought to be interested, in these terms: "In concluding the Berchtesgaden Agreement the Chancellor once again tried to assist in the appeasement of the political development in Austria which from day to day had become more dangerous. It will be remembered that this agreement

was necessitated by the fact that the Agreement of July 11th, 1936, failed to serve its purpose. In that sense the Berchtesgaden Agreement was to be a means to put the Agreement of 1936 on a working basis. The essence and the spirit of the Berchtesgaden Agreement was to grant complete freedom and equality to all Austrian citizens. Had the Agreement been executed in a loyal way a quiet development would have resulted. On March 9th, however, the Austrian Chancellor, entirely on his own initiative and without consulting his colleagues in the Cabinet, announced unexpectedly, and in open contrast to the letter and the spirit of the Agreement, his decision to hold a plebiscite within three days. This in itself was a breach of the Constitution. Article 65 provides that a plebiscite shall be held only after a formal decision of the entire Cabinet has been reached. The Constitution further provides that a plebiscite has to be announced by the President, and not by the Chancellor. The purpose of the plebiscite became apparent as soon as the provisions under which it was to be held were announced. No voting lists, no possibility of inspecting the lists of those who were entitled to vote was provided for. There was neither a guarantee of a secret ballot nor of an impartial supervision of the voting, nor any safeguard to ensure a proper counting of the votes. It is only too natural that the announcement of such a plebiscite could be nothing but a biased stirring up of the feelings of the German population in Austria. The general situation became grave and a civil war was impending. Furthermore, the steps taken by Herr von Schuschnigg were opposed by members of the Austrian Cabinet. The result was the resignation of Herr von Schuschnigg, and after the formation of a new Government under the leadership of Herr von Seyss-Inquart the German Chancellor was requested by the new Austrian Chancellor to dispatch army and police units to assist the Austrian Government in maintaining peace and order. The German Chancellor, wishing to prevent any development which might lead to chaos, complied."

Field-Marshal Göring, after his exuberant manner, made a public speech on March 13th in which he said that "Germany does not desire and will not interfere in the affairs of any other nation. It must, however, be established that the German Reich considers itself in every respect the protector and patron of all Germans, including those outside the frontiers. Anyone

who attacks Germans, and therewith Germany, comes up against German guns ready to shoot."

The event of March 13th constituted a clear test of the strength of the Berlin-Rome "axis." Everyone remembered that the former attempt at the *Anschluss*, which involved the assassination of Herr Dollfuss (July 25th, 1934), had been thwarted mainly by Signor Mussolini's prompt opposition, expressed in his moving his troops to the Brenner. What was now known was that when Signor Mussolini visited Herr Hitler in Germany last September, he had committed himself to accepting an absorption of Austria by Germany in return for Germany's support of Italy in the Mediterranean. Signor Mussolini's present reaction was therefore a foregone conclusion. On March 12th it was officially stated in Rome that the Italian Government had refused a French suggestion that Italy should take part in action concerted with France and Great Britain to restore the independence of Austria.

Herr Hitler had himself forestalled the French suggestion by writing to Signor Mussolini on March 11th a letter in which he said, "I have now decided to restore order and tranquillity in my country [Austria] and to give the popular will the chance to decide its own destiny in an unmistakable, clear, and open manner according to its own judgment. May the Austrian people then be able to forge its own destiny for itself!" He added an assurance and an intimation, both unambiguous, in these words: "(1) Do not see in this act anything more than an act of legitimate national defence, and therefore an action which any man of character in my position would perform in the same way. . . . (2) At a critical hour for Italy I demonstrated the strength of my sentiments to you. Do not doubt that in the future also nothing will be changed in this respect. (3) Whatever may be the consequences of the coming events, I have drawn a definite German frontier with France, and I now draw one equally definite with Italy. It is the Brenner. This decision will never be touched or questioned. I did not take this decision in the year 1938, but immediately after the Great War. I have never made a mystery of it."

In answer to Herr Hitler's communication the Fascist Grand Council on March 13th announced its view that the events in Austria were "the outcome of a pre-existent state of affairs and as the expression of the will of the Austrian

people." On hearing that decision Herr Hitler telegraphed to Signor Mussolini that he would never forget that service to him : "*Ich werde Ihnen dieses nie vergessen.*"

In London as in Paris the expansion of German influence in Central Europe at first caused something like alarm. The conversations for an Anglo-German understanding were on the very point of being started, Herr von Ribbentrop having arrived in London on March 9th for the purpose, and having on March 10th held a preliminary interview with Lord Halifax and with Sir Robert Vansittart. But the actual conversations never started. On March 11th the British Ambassador in Berlin was instead instructed to deliver to the Reich Government "a protest in the strongest possible terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence." The French Government on the same day delivered a like protest in Berlin. The German Government promptly (March 11th) rejected the British and French protests as "inadmissible" and based on wrong information. The Note maintained that Herr von Schuschnigg had been driven out by pressure from within Austria. Mr. Chamberlain on March 14th made a long statement in the House of Commons in which he declared that the method adopted by Germany called for "the severest condemnation" and had administered "a profound shock" to the cause of peace. He at the same time announced that the British Government would forthwith embark upon an enlarged programme of armament and national training for war.

While Mr. Chamberlain was speaking at Westminster, Herr Hitler was driving in triumphal procession from Linz to Vienna, now the declared capital of Deutsch-Oesterreich. On reaching Vienna he addressed a jubilant crowd from the balcony of the Hotel Imperial. Herr von Ribbentrop and Herr Himmler arrived in Vienna on that day and by an intensive process of reorganisation German-Austria was constituted a National-Socialist State. Before leaving Vienna for Munich on the following day, Herr Hitler, speaking at the Austrian War Memorial, made what he called "the greatest report of my life of a task carried out." He enlarged on the theme that Austria, "the old East March of the German people," would now resume her mission as "bastion of the

German nation." He referred to Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Reichsstadthalter (Provincial Governor), whereby he ranged Austria beside Bavaria or Württemberg in status.

The achieved absorption of Austria by Germany at once excited the elemental instincts of French diplomacy. After an initial and precipitate effort to disengage Italy from the Berlin-Rome axis, the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ostentatiously assured the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris that France would honour all her engagements to Czechoslovakia (March 14th). On the following day a governmental spokesman in Moscow informed the press that Russia would go to the help of Czechoslovakia in the event of an aggression against her, provided France would do the same. The ideological stage was thus set. It remained only to know whether Great Britain would also take the stage.

As in 1914 the question was, would the British Government in advance commit itself to declare war on Germany if Germany attacked (this time) Czechoslovakia. As in 1914, the British Government duly refused to make the commitment, despite a continuous pressure from the French Government. This matter of a British commitment against an hypothetical European contingency is one of the most interesting, most important and potentially the most dangerous in the whole field of world diplomacy. The argument of those who in 1938 as in 1914 maintained that if the British Government would only commit itself irrevocably to make war against Germany in the event of a German aggression, then Germany would not commit an aggression, is at least understandable. The argument and the counter-argument are familiar almost to the point of nausea. It is one of the cases where proof is impossible.

To the minds of the most realistic people, however, there never has been, nor could be, a convincing answer to the chronic "snag" about the very essence of the commitment to meet hypothetical aggression in advance. It has never yet in any of the international discussions of that subject been found possible to achieve agreement on a definition of what constitutes aggression; nor is there any tribunal competent to decide whether in fact an aggression has been committed. The attempt made at Locarno to create a machinery for establishing the case of aggression never impressed any practical person. The practical argument is that such a

commitment would be at least as likely to precipitate war as to postpone it. It is notorious in diplomatic history that nothing can be so readily stage-managed as an alleged act of aggression. If, runs the argument, the British Government were committed to war with Germany in the event of a German "aggression" against Czechoslovakia, the war could be produced at any moment by any interested party to whom the contingency of an Anglo-German war might appear advantageous to itself. According to that argument a British commitment might constitute, not a form of protection even to Czechoslovakia, but a positive danger to Czechoslovak as well as to British security.

In the present instance Mr. Chamberlain, addressing the House of Commons on March 24th, gave the central reason, as effective in 1938 as in 1914, why the British Government cannot thus commit itself. In democratic practice the Opposition mostly talks with its tongue in its cheek. It is an Opposition's business to oppose. If in the present instance the positions had been reversed and a Labour spokesman had had to give a pronouncement as a responsible Prime Minister rather than as an irresponsible Opposition Leader, he would probably have used much the same words, to much the same effect, as Mr. Chamberlain used on March 24th. Mr. Chamberlain said: "I think it is right that I should here remind the House what are our existing commitments which might lead to the use of our arms for purposes other than our own defence, and the defence of territories of other parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They are, first of all, the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression, in accordance with our existing obligations under the Treaty of Locarno, as reaffirmed in the arrangement which was drawn up in London on March 19th, 1936. We have also obligations by treaty to Portugal, Iraq and Egypt. Those are our definite obligations to particular countries. There remains another case in which we may have to use our arms, a case which is of more general character, but which may have no less significance. It is the case arising under the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was accurately defined by the former Foreign Secretary when he said: 'In addition our armaments may be used in bringing help to a victim of aggression in any case where in our judgment it would be proper under the provision of the Covenant to do so.' The

case might, for example, include Czechoslovakia. The *ex-Foreign Secretary* went on to say : ' I used the word " may " deliberately, since in such an instance there is no automatic obligation to take military action. It is, moreover, right that this should be so, for nations cannot be expected to incur automatic military obligations save for areas where their vital interests are concerned.' His Majesty's Government stand by these declarations. They have acknowledged that in present circumstances the ability of the League to fulfil all the functions originally contemplated for it is reduced ; but this is not to be interpreted as meaning that His Majesty's Government would in no circumstances intervene as a member of the League for the restoration of peace or the maintenance of international order if circumstances were such as to make it appropriate for them to do so. And I cannot but feel that the course and development of any dispute, should such unhappily arise, would be greatly influenced by the knowledge that such action as it may be in the power of Great Britain to take will be determined by His Majesty's Government of the day in accordance with the principles laid down in the Covenant.

" The question now arises whether we should go further. Should we forthwith give an assurance to France that, in the event of her being called upon by reason of German aggression on Czechoslovakia to implement her obligations under the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty, we would immediately employ our full military force on her behalf ? Or, alternatively, should we at once declare our readiness to take military action in resistance to any forcible interference with the independence and integrity of Czechoslovakia, and invite any other nations which might so desire to associate themselves with us in such a declaration ? From a consideration of these two alternatives it clearly emerges that under either of them the decision as to whether or not this country should find itself involved in war would be automatically removed from the discretion of His Majesty's Government, and the suggested guarantee would apply irrespective of the circumstances by which it was brought into operation, and over which His Majesty's Government might not have been able to exercise any control. This position is not one that His Majesty's Government could see their way to accept—in relation to an area where their vital interests are not concerned in the same

degree as they are in the case of France and Belgium ; it is certainly not the position that results from the Covenant. For these reasons His Majesty's Government feel themselves unable to give the prior guarantee suggested."

Yet in the abiding spirit of British diplomacy Mr. Chamberlain went on to confess that though we could not commit ourselves to be involved in a situation resulting from a German aggression we should without doubt now, as in 1914, in fact be involved in such a situation. He said : " But while plainly stating this decision I would add this. Where peace and war are concerned legal obligations are not alone involved, and if war broke out it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations. It would be quite impossible to say where it would end, and what Governments might become involved. The inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements, and in that event it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries besides those which were parties to the original dispute would almost immediately become involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty and determined to uphold them."

The last part of the statement quoted above was reproduced with great emphasis and with equally great satisfaction in the French and Czechoslovak press ; for both those countries, having expected nothing, were all the more pleased to receive something. That particular speech of Mr. Chamberlain's deserves to find a place among the best political utterances of all time. He had the courage to cut across the shallow traditions of the patriotic heroics by arguing that common sense was the eternal argument for peace and that " in war there are no winners." " Our object," he said, " must always be to preserve those things which we consider essential without recourse to war if that be possible, because we know that in war there are no winners—nothing but suffering and ruin for those who are involved, and even if we ourselves were not involved, with our world-wide ramifications of trade and finance, we could not fail to be involved in the consequences of war, in the destruction of life and property which sooner or later must react upon ourselves."

A DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ?

One of the really surprising effects produced by Mr. Chamberlain was that while on the one hand he was miraculously approved alike in France, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Italy (though least warmly in Germany), yet no notice was taken in any country, not even in Great Britain, of what was surely the most practically interesting thing he said. Towards the end of his speech he made this short, glancing observation : " His Majesty's Government do not differ from those who feel that the increase of armaments alone is no sure guarantee for peace. They earnestly hope that it may yet be possible to arrive at a reasonable balance of armaments by agreement rather than by free and unlimited competition." The astonishing position presented by present-day Europe is that Germany, Italy, France and Russia are armed as no country in the history of the world was ever armed before. Without age limit every man in those countries is virtually mobilised for war. They have their marching orders and their kit, all complete. At any time, within a few hours, they are ready to report at the headquarters of which they have been notified. Their Governments have piled up armaments on a scale so colossal that not only can history present no analogy even approximating to it, but the imagination can hardly grasp it. Great Britain, having by the very fact of such a circumstance been obliged to abandon the position of comparative disarmament inspired by belief in the pretensions of the League of Nations, has in her turn, but last in the race, begun to rearm.

The British programme, estimated last year to cost £1,500,000,000, is now more likely to cost £2,500,000,000. It is in every sense the very madness of midsummer, mainly in the sense that it simply cannot be paid for. If the additional expenditure were to be met out of income in one year it would mathematically involve an addition of 42s. in the £ to the standard rate of income tax. It is hard for an income of 20s. to yield a tax of 42s. If the expense be divided over four years, the addition to the standard rate of tax becomes 10s. 6d. in the £. The existing rate is 5s., plus, say, 6d. in the form of National Defence Contribution. Even apart from the automatically increasing annual cost of the " social services " we are thus invited logically to believe in the possibility of an income tax

of 16s. in the £ as the standard rate. It cannot be. Can the Government borrow the huge sum involved? The amount of War Loan resulting from the last Great War, raised under the spur of actual war, and out of the ebullient resources of a century's accumulated reserves, is £2,000,000,000. And it had to be raised at 5 per cent. Can the British Government (which at the present moment is in effect nearly as bankrupt as the German, Italian or French) hope in present circumstances to raise an even greater sum, namely £2,500,000,000, at no matter what price in interest?

Moreover, the prevalent collapse of all Stock Exchange business, resulting mainly from the recognition that the rake's progress in finance as in other matters has only one end, piles Pelion on Ossa as an obstacle. The Government's device of prohibiting the Bank of England from raising its rediscount rate above the 2 per cent. to which it was driven down in June 1932 constitutes a further dislocation of the general financial activity on which the Government must depend. It is absurd to imagine that the Government could raise such sums at any price; but to imagine that by interfering with the normal operation of the bank rate the money could be raised at 3 per cent. is to go over the edge into the blind abyss. But suppose, to keep the game alive, that the Government could raise £2,500,000,000 at 3 per cent. The interest would add 1s. 3d. to the standard rate of income tax *for ever*. The redemption of loans of such astronomical dimensions is out of the question.

What then? The world is faced with three alternatives; (1) universal bankruptcy and repudiation of debt, (2) universal war, revolution, chaos, and (3) a disarmament conference. The third alternative is so obvious as to be almost inevitable, if only because no country can continue on its present course of expenditure. Mr. Neville Chamberlain saw what was obvious. He hinted at it as a possibility. And was totally ignored, because the world has sunk to such a depth of depravity that it no longer even remembers the light of day. Yet it is possible that Mr. Chamberlain may be proved a true prophet on a quite short view. When Governments are all embarked at top speed on a course they cannot keep, it is certain that they will have to stop; and what Mr. Chamberlain on March 24th called "a reasonable balance of armaments by agreement rather than by free and unlimited

competition" is the only way to stop unless the world is to come to a violent end. By the commonest of all miracles, however, the world has a way of surviving.

2. *The Anschluss Plebiscite.*

Das germanische Reich deutscher Nation in its entire manhood and womanhood went to the poll on April 10th. The event had been preceded by a campaign conducted by Herr Hitler and his men in mixed tones and confidence, exaltation, bluster and bellicosity. In Germany they know the result of these things in advance. When on the eve of the poll Field-Marshal Göring, speaking in the Berlin Sportpalast, prophesied a 100 per cent. vote throughout the Reich, including Austria, he knew what he was talking about. When he added that "the sharp sword alone can achieve peace," he was wandering away from his facts and getting a little muddled. The ceremonies were completed in the early hours of April 11th by the triumphantly established "yes" for the Führer. Curiously the figure for the whole Reich, including Austria, was 99.08 per cent. in favour of the union, and in Austria alone it was higher, 99.75 per cent. Herr Hitler called it "the highest justification of my whole career and the proudest moment of my life."

There was an interesting and harmonious contribution made to the ceremonies by the Germans living in England. Two thousand five hundred German men and women boarded the German ship *Wilhelm Gustloff* at Tilbury that morning to vote in the plebiscite. The ship is named after the murdered Nazi leader in Switzerland. It is a 25,000-ton ship specially built by the German Government to provide holiday tours for the German working classes in the "Strength through Joy" campaign. It berths 1,400 people, has a crew of 400, and can do 16 knots. The voyage to Tilbury was its maiden voyage. The procedure was that the ship picked up the voters at Tilbury, steamed down the Thames and out beyond the three-mile territorial waters, and then brought back the voters to Tilbury. Outside the territorial limits the ship became technically German territory. Owing to the fact that it could not navigate the Thames except at high tide, the voting and its attendant ceremonies had to be prolonged for twelve hours. Two special trains left St. Pancras station for Tilbury early in the morning to enable the voters to be on board by 10 a.m.

High tide was at 10.51 a.m. The *Wilhelm Gustloff* could not return to Tilbury till after 11 (high tide was at 11.28 p.m.), when the two trains took the party back to St. Pancras. As the total number of Germans resident in Britain amounted to 34,000—it is estimated that there are 25,000 German girl servants in this country—the German Embassy adopted the principle of accepting applications from would-be voters in strict rotation. The twelve hours that were spent outside territorial waters were made the occasion of a typically merry German “spree,” with good food, beer, music, dancing, at the expense of the German Government. A nominal charge of 3s. per head was made as a small contribution to the expenses, just as in the “Strength through Joy” cruising holidays the workers and clerks are asked to contribute a minute nominal sum towards the costs. It was understood in advance that the voting, though very secret, would reveal a 100 per cent. solidarity, or thereabouts, in favour of the Führer’s Austrian policy.

The union of Austria with Germany had become an accomplished fact. Europe quickly acclimatised itself to the nearer prospect of Herr Hitler’s 100,000 Germans one day becoming the dominant fact in Central Europe. On April 2nd, less than three weeks after Mr. Chamberlain had “severely” condemned the *Anschluss*, or the method used in effecting it, and had recorded the “profound shock” thereby administered to the cause of peace, Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, that the British Legation in Vienna would be converted into a Consulate-General. Thereby the *Anschluss* was “recognised” by the British Government. Four days later the State Department in Washington announced that the German Ambassador had been informed of America’s decision in the like sense. European concern was now concentrated on Czechoslovakia’s attempt to satisfy the Sudeten-deutschen.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

April 12th, 1938.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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UNEMPLOYMENT: THE HUMAN PROBLEM.*

Numerous books on unemployment have been published during the last few years, and the problem has been surveyed from many standpoints. A very noteworthy addition to this literature has now been made by the publication of *Men Without Work*. The book is a Report made to the Pilgrim Trust, which, with wise public spirit, bore the entire cost of an investigation the results of which are embodied in this volume. Set on foot by the Archbishop of York's Unemployment Committee, the Enquiry has been carried out under the direction of Miss Eleanora Iredale, who has been assisted by a very competent staff, consisting of Mr. W. F. Oakeshott, Mr. A. D. K. Owen, Dr. H. W. Singer, and towards the end by Dr. Wagner. The importance attached to the investigation is shown by the fact that Mr. Oakeshott, a master at Winchester College, was given a year's leave of absence by the Head Master in order that he might take part in the work.

The Enquiry has been carried out in a very comprehensive way. The survey embraces facts and figures and includes the

* *Men Without Work*. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d. net.

physical, psychological and moral problems, particularly of long unemployment. Particular issues raised by the wage problem, the older men and the younger men are dealt with, while an important section is concerned with unemployment among women. A careful study of the Social Service Movement has been made, dealing with the general problems of the unemployment clubs and with the interesting schemes that are being carried on in Wigan, Lincoln and elsewhere. Certain special information is conveyed in a series of Appendices, which include carefully compiled statistical tables.

The method adopted for the Enquiry, which was personally conducted by the members of the staff, was to select six "sample" areas, namely Deptford and Leicester as comparatively prosperous, the Rhondda in South Wales and Crook in Durham as representing the depressed areas, and Liverpool and Blackburn, which, although not classed as depressed areas, have suffered and are suffering severely from unemployment. These "samples" have revealed a good many features which are common not only to them all, but to the country as a whole, while distinctive features that are due to differences of background, environment, and of differentiating industrial conditions, are described in each case.

While economic and other practical considerations are carefully dealt with, the great distinction of the volume is that it concentrates attention on the human side with a thoroughness and insight which have not hitherto been approached, at all events on so extensive a scale. With the help and encouragement of local officers of the Unemployment Assistance Board and of others charged with responsibility in the matter, the investigators found entrance into the homes and received the confidence of many of the unemployed themselves. Visits to their homes enabled the family aspects of unemployment to be appreciated and described. This is indeed a *human* document, and its results are conveyed with a lucidity and vividness which make the volume an impressive appeal to the conscience as well as the sympathies of the nation as a whole.

It is impossible within the limits of this notice to give details either in respect of the facts or of the valuable criticisms and suggestions with which the Report is enriched. It must suffice to say that while the volume makes a moving appeal to

the sympathies of its readers, it is precise in its statements, and these are summed up in valuable statistical tables which are to be found not only in the Appendix but scattered throughout the book, and that sum up the results of all the special enquiries.

Very high praise indeed must be given to the survey as a whole. It exhibits not only indefatigable work and thorough exploration but wise reflection and balanced judgment. Controversial issues are skilfully avoided. Precision is given to general impressions. Generalisations are founded on the evidence and characteristics of particular but typical cases. The whole Report is presented in an admirable literary style which carries the reader along with sustained interest from beginning to end. The book demands, and will undoubtedly receive, the careful attention and gratitude alike of public authorities, administrators, and social workers. To the attention of all these the Report must be highly commended.

A concluding tribute must be paid not only to the investigators and to the Pilgrim Trust, but to the Cambridge University Press for the way in which the volume has been produced in so attractive a style and at so low a cost as to make it easily accessible to all those who are concerned with the momentous problems of which it admirably treats.

J. S. L.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.*

Mrs. Hamilton's life of Arthur Henderson is a little masterpiece. It is neither too long nor too short. It is the work of an admiring friend and a political comrade. It is written with considerable literary distinction. It should be widely read, both as a contribution to the history of our time and as a portrait of one of the most attractive figures on the European political stage during the present century. Unlike most prominent politicians, he had critics but no enemies. Here is the story of a Scottish Puritan who knew hunger and unemployment in his youth, who worked for many years as an iron-moulder at Newcastle, who served his apprenticeship as a member of the Town Council, who organised the Labour Party, who made

* *Arthur Henderson*. By Mary Agnes Hamilton. Heinemann. 15s.

his mark directly he entered Parliament at the age of forty, who sat in the War Cabinets, who held the posts of Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary in the two Labour Governments, who ended his career as President of the Disarmament Conference. "Uncle Arthur" remained throughout the simple, kindly, wholesome, helpful, cheerful human being, whom success could never spoil.

What was the secret of this astonishing ascent? He was not brilliant, he had no contact with the intellectual life, he was not an orator. His strength lay in his character, his absolute reliability, his shrewdness, his power of managing men whether as individuals or *en masse*, his mastery of the arts of conciliation, his immense power of work, his instinct for organisation. He knew his powers, but he was also modestly conscious of his limitations. Nothing in this volume is more interesting than the story of the co-operation between Henderson and MacDonald, and nothing shows the former in a more favourable light. There was never real intimacy or affection between the fastidious Intellectual and the trade unionist, but each realised the importance of the services of the other. So deeply convinced was Henderson that MacDonald was the best leader of a party which was struggling for recognition and which aimed at being more than the spokesman of the manual workers, that he refused all appeals from discontented members to assume the leadership. When it came to him unsought in 1931, after the tragic breach in the Labour ranks, it brought him no joy; for the party was routed at the polls and he never recovered from the shock of the sudden collapse of the second Labour Government.

From the point of view of history as opposed to biography, the most valuable parts of the book are the chapters on Stockholm, on the two years at the Foreign Office, 1929-31, and on the Disarmament Conference. The mission to Russia in 1917 was his official initiation into the intricacies of foreign affairs. He saw that the only chance of keeping Russia in the war was to work out a reasonable settlement. Lloyd George accepted the plan of a Socialist Conference at Stockholm before Henderson, and then ran away from it. Henderson, once convinced of its utility, continued to champion it, and for its sake lost his place in the Coalition Cabinet. Once out of office he drew closer to MacDonald and the other opponents of the war in the common effort to shorten the struggle by

formulating a programme of peace. The loss of his eldest son brought home to him the realities of war, and the memory of the great catastrophe coloured the remainder of his life. He asked for the Foreign Office in 1929 because he believed he could there best serve the cause of peace. The acceptance of the Optional Clause of the Hague statute and of the General Act of Arbitration and Mediation showed that a new spirit had entered Downing Street. He believed in the League with all his heart and soul, and his policy was to make it work. He liked Geneva, and Geneva liked and respected him. The greatest compliment he ever received was the unanimous invitation to preside over the Disarmament Conference. That it failed was not his fault. He retained his faith when others lost it, but it was a sore trial to watch the fumbling futilities of the National Government. Whether a strong lead from Great Britain at the opening of the Conference in February 1932 would have saved the situation cannot be proved or disproved. All that we know is that it was never given. He lived just long enough to witness the attack on Abyssinia and the gathering of the dark clouds in Central Europe. He found consolation in the tranquil happiness of his home, in his unchanging belief in human nature, and in his simple Wesleyan faith.

G. P. G.

THE PROBLEM OF RAW MATERIALS.*

The prime object of this important book is to discover and register the facts relating to the distributing of those raw materials which are vital to the consumption and industry of peoples. The statistical account of these facts occupies a large space and for economic students may constitute the most valuable part of the work. Mr. Kranold does not pretend to a complete exactitude. Measurements in some countries, and for some classes of materials, are not attainable. But his results are of great importance in their political as well as their economic bearing. For when he comes to "weight" his distribution figures, so as to measure the relative needs of the various countries, he reaches conclusions that are utterly

* *The International Distribution of Raw Materials*. By Herman Kranold. Routledge. 15s. net.

opposed to the commonly accepted views of politicians and the man in the street. "One inference we may certainly draw with safety from our figures : i.e. that our enquiry into the existing distribution of productive wealth among the fifteen countries and empires possessing more than thirty millions of population explodes the myth of the division of mankind into 'have' and 'have-not' nations. It does not abolish the assertion that some nations are much better off than others in respect to those attributes which interest us here : but the composition of the unfavoured group turns out to be quite different from what we hear so often stated, namely, that Germany, Italy and Japan are those unhappy nations which need a redistribution of raw materials in their favour."

The author divides the nations into four groups in the matter of distribution. First come the "Plutocrats," consisting of the United States, the Union of South Africa, Australia and Canada. The highest place is given to Canada. Next comes the Upper Middle Class, including Russia, Great Britain and, curiously enough, Italy. The Lower Middle Class comprises Holland, Brazil, Japan and France. The "Proletarian" nations are Poland, India and China. Of course, a good deal depends upon the climates of colonial empires, the size of their populations, and the availability of raw materials in respect of price and transmission.

Two diverse policies are open to countries whose soil has reached a low level of fertility. One is that adopted by England of letting the inferior land go out of cultivation, trusting more and more to foreign foods and materials purchased by exports from the urban industries. The other is that adopted by Germany of keeping up her country population by artificial aids. A blend of both policies has recently come to the front under the name of isolationism, partly for military security, partly for social reasons, including considerations of health and vigour. The entrance of the chemical and biological services into land policy is visibly modifying the earlier tendency towards division of labour upon a statical consideration of natural resources. The decline of the birth-rate in most white countries has an obvious play in determining land policies. Nationalism in its various aspects is opposed to what was formerly deemed the "natural" economy of international co-operation for the maximum productivity of the earth.

Mr. Kranold gives due attention to the new political problems which have arisen, concerning not only the exportation of materials, but the migration of relatively excessive populations to lands where they can be more productively employed. He would favour an International Planning Authority, set up either by the League of Nations or some other combination, so as to smooth existing conflicts and misunderstandings and to take a really scientific, far-sighted view of the best use and further development of world resources, with the necessary free trade and stable finance. He recognises that some cession of existing sovereignty may be required for the achievement of such a scheme. But he is not dismayed by the political barriers which insane super-nationalism presents to what can be demonstrated to make for the common benefit of all the co-operating nations.

J. A. HOBSON.

PSYCHOLOGY DOWN THE AGES.*

The history of science is not studied to-day merely for the sake of curious interest, or to add a feature to the portrait of an age; it is itself a science and a discipline, because of its bearing on methodology and on the interpretation of results. The programme of a school is determined in the historical movement by preceding failures and successes, but the dialectic of the movement does not itself assure a rational progress: without the light of history, wandering is mistaken for advance. Professor Spearman in this work has not himself written a history of his science (he disclaims the intention), but he has effectively used the materials of history as of contemporary value for a general survey of the present state of psychology. He finds that the demolition of the old faculty psychology and of atomic associationism, a work in which modern psychologists rejoice, far from having cleared the ground for the foundations of a science, has heaped it with linguistic litter. Tracing down the ages the use of terms, he shows how confusion has become obscurity, to the defeat of analysis and description. Much that passes for new theory is but old fallacy writ large. Further, "the course of mental

* *Psychology Down the Ages*. By C. Spearman, F.R.S., Ph.D. Macmillan & Co. Two volumes. 30s. net.

science has to a great extent been one of discovering, forgetting, and rediscovering." Indeed, the truth of the old doctrines (or at least their virtue) is revealed by their historical persistence: faculties are there; the summation of atomic sensations does take place. But a science requires laws, and therefore experiment and measurement.

Defining the accepted logical criteria of scientific laws, Professor Spearman goes on in his second volume to detail the achievement of the London school, which is gaining in influence and makes far-reaching claims. His exposition gives an account of the three exhaustive principles of cognitive faculty by whose operation, it is claimed, the mind is furnished; and, in the last part, the quantitative statistical study of the factors involved in mental performance is described—the famous discovery of *G*, and recent investigations of what qualities go with what in character and personality. His account, viewed in relation to the scope of the whole book, gives the orientation of the school in the total context of history and contemporary work, and indicates its ultimate limitation.

The impressive range of the book, at some expense of depth and sufficiency, makes it a repository of suggestive references on all the vital topics of psychology. But it must be remarked in qualification that the chapter on the laws of "*orexis*" is woefully inadequate. There are references to Paulhan, Shand, and the psycho-analysts, but no mention of Urban's careful study of the laws of valuation or of other classical work in this field which has attracted so many able minds in recent years. Indeed, the author's handling of the topic is made fruitless by his own special preoccupation with cognition.

Professor Spearman's lucidity of exposition, his sanity, playfulness, and freedom from prevalent superstitions serve the cause of his science perhaps as much in this book as does the original work published in his others. The desperate need of sound logical criteria and exact methods in a new science is brought home by the depressing thought that it is perfectly possible in the first phases for eminent talent and prodigious industry throughout a generation of work to produce negligible results dissolved in a sea of publications. Professor Spearman has done as much as any man to force his science beyond that stage, and his book confidently challenges judgment on that impressive line of effort which he has initiated and still inspires.

H. J. BLACKHAM.

MARY SHELLEY.*

"Shelley and Mary were so blended in their lives that I do not well see how their biographies can be separated." So wrote Hogg, when preparing his *Life* of the poet. But Mary was a woman of originality, intellect and charm in her own right, who, after that brief radiant morning of union with her "Elfin Knight," had to live through a long day till eventide: Miss Grylls' description of her during this less-known period adds special interest to her book—a romance and a recession. No reader of it can doubt that Mary was Shelley's true soul-mate, loyal, loving and beloved to the end, whatever passing clouds may have dimmed their happiness, such as the loss, deeply felt, of their infant children, the perennial tiresomeness of Claire, or Shelley's platonic infatuation for Emilia Viviani. Reference to the unfortunate Harriet is inevitable. Miss Grylls shows that Shelley knew her to have been unfaithful, and believed her willing for a separation on a promised allowance, and that he thus considered himself free. This view he impressed on the seventeen-year-old Mary, whose mind and heart he had captivated, and so won her consent.

After Shelley's death, all must admire the courage with which the young widow sought to defend his memory, to be loyal to his and her friends, and to eke out the small allowance she received from Sir Timothy by supporting her boy and herself by her pen (she was already known as the author of *Frankenstein*); all will rejoice that her son and his wife amply repaid this devotion in her later years. The development in Mary's rather complex personality is well brought out and the sketches of subsidiary characters are revealing.

Miss Grylls has had access to family records, some never published before, some quoted only in garbled or inaccurate form by previous biographers. They include a number of important letters, and the *Journal* in five MS. volumes, of which the first three contain entries by both Shelley and Mary, the two latter by her alone. The Appendix gives a full account of *Frankenstein* and of Mary's other writings. Two of the illustrations, one of Mary at nineteen, one of her father, are here reproduced for the first time.

E. G. S.

* *Mary Shelley: a Biography*. By R. Glynn Grylls. Oxford University Press. 18s. 1938.

THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTION.

In the first nine volumes of his monumental *History of English Law** Sir William Holdsworth dealt largely with the course of legal development up to the end of the seventeenth century. He has now begun his final Book which, when completed in six volumes, will carry the History to the passing of the Judicature Act of 1875. The three volumes now published relate almost entirely to the eighteenth century, and deal in particular with public law, the character and significance of legislation and the influence of lawyers upon the direction of legal growth. These volumes cover an immense ground and will be of value to others besides the legal historian, because at so many points they touch on, and explain from a legal angle, questions of political, social and economic history.

Although the Revolution of 1688 had established the predominance of the House of Commons, the outstanding characteristic of the eighteenth century was the division of power between the Crown, Lords, Commons and the Courts, which as autonomous units developed in their own way and checked each other. This was the "efficient secret" of the constitution rather than Montesquieu's theory of a functional division of legislature, executive and judicature which was patently false in fact. Sir William stresses the importance of the patronage and influence of both the Crown and the Lords in checking the Commons and also providing the co-operative link necessary for stable government. Only by means of this system was it "possible for the Crown and the House of Lords to maintain their independent powers; so that it was the final and effective cause of the maintenance of the balance of power and the constitution." This "link of influence" was gradually weakened as organised parties developed and collective ministerial responsibility emerged and was finally snapped by the Reform Bill, 1832, which substituted the link of a Cabinet wholly subordinate to the Commons.

The theory of divided powers was well represented in local government where administration and control were split among various autonomous bodies, each independent of the Crown and Parliament and only subject to partial supervision

* *A History of English Law*. By Sir William Holdsworth. Volumes X, XI and XII. 32s. 6d. per volume. Methuen.

by the Courts. The justices inherited a wide range of administrative and judicial duties, which a reluctant Parliament in some respects modified or increased, as for example in regard to poor law, vagrancy and liquor licensing. But Sir William emphasises that such legislation was subsidiary in importance and significance to the mass of local and private Acts which imposed special powers on existing bodies and more particularly upon *ad hoc* authorities, such as improvement commissioners, commissioners for sewers and turnpike trusts. The new public services demanded by industrial expansion and growing urban life were considered outside the province of the Crown or Parliament. *Ad hoc* legislation was thus especially significant since it introduced "modern ideas into important departments of the local government and which could have been introduced in no other way." In other spheres also Sir William shows the importance of the private Act in testing new ideas and suggesting the lines of subsequent general legislation, as for example in the various public utility Clauses Acts and law of divorce and of naturalisation. Although general legislation in the eighteenth century covered a wide area, as Sir William's detailed analysis shows, particularly in the field of industry and commerce, it created few fundamental changes in private law. Private legislation freed a reluctant legislature from the necessity of much interference and this, argues Sir William, permitted the judges to develop the law with unbroken continuity in accordance with the changing needs of the age. The author discusses in particular the enduring work of Lord Hardwicke in founding the modern rules of equity and the achievement of Lord Mansfield in expanding and rationalising the common law. In some respects Mansfield's reforming zeal was premature and his views were rejected, as in the enforceability of a written promise unsupported by consideration. It is interesting to note that on this point Lord Mansfield's opinion has been recently followed in a recommendation by the Law Revision Committee.

The historical importance of colonial constitutional law in the eighteenth century is well appreciated by Sir William, who deals at length with colonial expansion and government in both America and India. Incidentally he treats Warren Hastings as, "with the exception of Chatham, the ablest statesman of the eighteenth century," and justifies fully his

administration. While it was settled that the Crown could no longer legislate for a colony invested with representative institutions, a colonial assembly was regarded in English law as a mere by-law making body, somewhat similar to the Corporation of London. To enforce such a narrow view when in practice the local legislature had largely acquired, by methods analogous to those of the English Commons in the preceding century, control of the colonial government was to invite revolution.

In the nineteenth century this view steadily enlarged so that the colonial assembly came to be regarded as an independent legislature with plenary powers within its jurisdiction. The formal conferment of sovereign authority by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, was but the natural and logical culmination of this growth.

THE FAITH OF LIBERALS.*

Mr. Walter Lippmann, by stressing the principles which reformers should observe, has written a stirring defence of Liberal faith. He shows how *laissez-faire* halted Liberal progress by falsely assuming a realm of freedom, i.e. natural law in the exchange economy of divided labour, apart from a realm of law where the state had jurisdiction. Liberals also erroneously assumed that this natural law could be formulated in the first stage of an economic enquiry, which they should have interpreted as a searching criticism of their social order. So they became "helpless apologists for miseries and abuses" and thereby allowed Collectivists, whether Communist, Democratic or Fascist, to impose their fallacious remedies. But the application of the latter and their results enable Liberals to apprehend afresh the ideal which is implicit in the Industrial Revolution; for Adam Smith was substantially right in asserting that "the wealth of nations proceeds from the division of labour in widening, and, therefore, freer, markets," which "destroys the self-sufficiency of nations, localities and individuals, making them deeply and intricately interdependent." "No Gandhi can withstand this tide in men's affairs." The Good Society is inevitably a world society, not a "mould in which human life is to be shaped"; and to realise which men must transform their customs and

* *The Good Society*. By Walter Lippmann. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.

institutions or "sink into squalor and servitude." Yet Collectivists in order to escape the ruthless dictation of an open market have sought to replace it by coercive, centralised authority, instead of trying to maintain and improve markets and accomplish those vast and beneficent reforms which the division of labour entails. The author gives an agenda of such reform in which the State is envisaged as judicial rather than administrative, protecting individuals and associations against those who are stronger than they. Even Liberals will accept certain of his conclusions with reservations, and regard his suggestions as applicable by those future generations to whom he looks for confirmation of his thesis.

But more important than any suggested reform which may or may not prove feasible, is the author's passionate vindication of Liberal faith, of its spirit rather than the letter. How ironically he reveals the omnipotent pretensions and plight of dictators, who are forced to militarise their impoverished subjects and stultify their minds, in order to regiment them; or of planners, who are obliged to prove their foresight by ignoring the needs and purposes of those who will not fit into their plans. He shows that Liberal faith is essentially religious, being founded on a law which transcends attempts to formulate it, and on the conviction that men are "inviolable persons" who cannot be treated as "things." By proclaiming this truth the Christian Gospel has "anchored the rights of man in the structure of the universe"; and Liberalism exists to maintain these rights by accomplishing men's freedom, and opposing all that "perverts, sterilises and corrupts" the little freedom which they have so far attained. "It stakes its hopes upon the human spirit released from and purged of all arbitrariness."

D. P. H.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Sir Charles Firth's *Essays, Historical and Literary** will be welcomed by friends, pupils and admirers of the great scholar who gave his life to the study of England in the seventeenth century. The seven massive essays which compose the volume deal with Ballads and Broad-sides in the age of Shakespeare, Raleigh's *History of the World*, Milton as an historian, Clarendon, Bunyan, Burnet as an historian, the political

* Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.

significance of *Gulliver's Travels*. All have appeared before, but not all are easy to find. The vast learning is lightly borne, and Firth is much more readable than Gardiner. That he wrote very few large works is regrettable, but his minor writings are of such high quality that we are in some degree compensated and consoled.

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Mr. Marvin's *The New Vision of Man** combines the buoyancy of perpetual youth with the mellow wisdom of age. Its theme is the ascent of man, as revealed to us above all by the progress of our knowledge during the last hundred years. He looks back with pride on the stages of the long climb, on the manifold obstacles overcome, on the experiments which have succeeded, on the ideals which have been wholly or partially realised. Unlike the professional historians, who inevitably confine themselves to the historic period, Mr. Marvin pays tribute to our prehistoric ancestors who laid the foundations on which our civilisation has been built. Knowing as well as anyone the perils of the hour, he refuses to despair. The forces which bring us together seem to him stronger than those which drive us apart. Man has created civilisation and he will not let it fail. This is a brave book. If we need a tonic in these anxious times, here it is.

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Richard Porson† is a short biographical essay by Mr. M. L. Clarke of the great classical scholar, who is now chiefly remembered for his textual emendations and metrical discoveries. While the author appreciates his lasting, if limited, contributions to classical learning, he deals in particular with the events of his life, his contemporary reputation in the second half of the eighteenth century as scholar and conversationalist and his character. That he drank is not denied, but "it would not be correct to call Porson a habitual drunkard." Mr. Clarke points particularly to his lack of ambition and consciousness "of an incapacity for original composition on a considerable scale." In his own chosen field of textual criticism he was unsurpassed and comparable only with Bentley. He showed a passion for accuracy and truth. Indifferent to money, he displayed an intellectual honesty remarkable for his age. His scrupulous conscience was exemplified in throwing up a Cambridge fellowship rather than take Holy Orders, being "something of an anti-clerical," perhaps "a conscientious agnostic." Mr. Clarke's little book is a welcome sketch of this great scholar's life.

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The Information Department at Chatham House has published a Paper on *China and Japan*‡ which will prove invaluable to those who seek an impartial analysis of the Far Eastern struggle set accurately

* Allen & Unwin. 5s.

† Cambridge University Press. 6s. net.

‡ The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. 2s. 6d. net.

in its historical background. The Paper traces the principal events in the Far East from the Treaty of Peking, 1860, to the outbreak of fighting in July 1937 and the subsequent course of hostilities with their international repercussions. In discussing the political factors at work in both countries, the Paper stresses the effect of actual hostilities, once begun, in uniting the whole Japanese nation, formerly divided, behind her military leaders, and on the other hand in strengthening the coherence and solidity of a nascent Chinese nationalism. While not weighing the relative importance of economic conditions, strategy against Russia and prestige in determining Japanese policy, the Paper deals at some length with the economic factor. Japan's population of some seventy million increases by one million annually, and the Paper takes a common view that only a fraction of this yearly growth can possibly be counterbalanced by emigration. The "only real solution" lies in industrialisation. An economic *bloc* including Japan, Manchukuo and China could not be self-sufficient in all basic raw materials and would be definitely weaker in resources than the British Empire or the United States.

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Two new volumes in *The World's Classics* series have made easily and cheaply accessible a useful collection of *Speeches and Documents in International Affairs, 1918-1937*.* The selection is edited by Professor A. Berriedale Keith, who starts with President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the Treaty of Versailles and concludes with the Imperial Conference Resolution on foreign policy in June 1937. The Sino-Japanese conflict is thus altogether excluded. Non-intervention in Spain is dealt with up to the Bilbao blockade debate in the House of Commons on April 14th last year. Inclusion of all important documents and speeches is clearly impossible in the space available and the difficulties of selection are apparent. There are, however, a number of omissions which may be particularly regretted, such as the subsidiary Peace Treaties, Sir Samuel Hoare's speech to the League Assembly on sanctions in September 1935 and the Austro-German Agreement of July 11th, 1936. Professor Keith has contributed a valuable introduction in which he outlines, and briefly gives his interpretation of, the course of events.

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Conditions in Soviet Russia are considered from different angles in two recent books which reach most divergent conclusions. *Russia in Chains*† is "a record of unspeakable suffering" by a Russian emigré, M. Ivan Solonevich, who with his son and brother escaped in 1934 from a concentration camp in the White Sea region and is now editing in Sofia an anti-Soviet journal. They were sentenced in 1933 by the

* Oxford University Press. 2s. net each volume.

† Williams & Norgate. 12s. 6d. net.

G.P.U. for attempting to leave the country and in this volume M. Solonevich describes the appalling conditions of starvation, deprivation and brutality which characterise these huge settlements of penal labour. This book is based not only on personal experiences but on a wide knowledge, gained through lucky employment in the camp administration. Before his arrest the author had travelled extensively over Russia as an official sporting journalist, and he concludes that conditions outside the camps are little better in a country "suffocating beneath unspeakable oppression." On the other hand, a much more pleasant, though extremely drab, picture is drawn by Mr. Sidney I. Luck, who spent his youth in Czarist Russia and returned in April 1936 for three months as a lay member of the British Eclipse Expedition which observed the event at Omsk, a great agricultural centre in Western Siberia. In *Observation in Russia*,* Mr. Luck has published his daily diary which, apart from some account of the Expedition's work, is largely an observer's record of Russian life. He insists that no restraint was placed upon his movements and he certainly mixed and talked with many types of people. He was much impressed by the widespread energy, keenness and faith in the existing régime. His view of living conditions may be summed up when he declares that the Russian worker and landless peasant fare as well as their Polish counterparts. In a Foreword Professor J. A. Carroll says something of the technical work of the Expedition.

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Modern Painting in England† is a short and instructive appreciation of English art and painters from Whistler to the present day by Miss Mary Chamot. The author, who is an old Slade student, tends perhaps not unnaturally to emphasise the importance of new movements. Very properly, for example, she stresses the influence of the New English Art Club. On the other hand she depreciates the standing of the Royal Academy. She is sympathetic, though not enthusiastic, toward the surrealists. Her criticisms of the principal painters of the period will be read with interest if not always accepted. The book includes a useful biographical index of over 250 artists and some seventy illustrations.

* Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

† Country Life Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JUNE 1938.

SIR JOHN SIMON'S BUDGET.

THE ARMAMENTS RACE INTENSIFIED—TAXABLE CAPACITY
AND NATIONAL CREDIT—THE DEMAND FOR ECONOMY

A YEAR ago, in commenting on Mr. Chamberlain's sixth Budget, I pointed out the mischievous consequences of diverting a vast volume of industrial energy into unproductive channels. I prophesied that the fictitious prosperity of an artificial boom caused by enormous Government orders for armaments would be "temporary and disastrous"; I referred to the havoc wrought within a week or two by the Budget on the Stock Exchange; I dwelt on the increasing extravagance of public departments and the general laxity in regard to public money which prevails not only among Ministers but among Members of the House of Commons, who have raised their own salaries from £400 to £600 a year, while they have raised the income tax from 4s. 6d. to 5s. 6d. (standard rate) besides clapping the equivalent of another shilling on business profits.

As the financial situation and the business outlook—judged by trade reports and unemployment returns—are much worse in May 1938 than they were in May 1937, and as taxation and debt are still rising with armaments at an accelerated rate, I cannot pretend that the provisions of Sir John Simon's Budget (presented on April 26th) are calculated to relieve the prevailing pessimism. On the contrary, the best feature of the Budget is its candour in acquainting Parliament and the public with economic realities and with the financial results of the Government's policy. It was hoped, I think, by most of his supporters that in view of the relatively good results of last year's Budget Sir John Simon would have felt able to abstain from any further additions to taxation. In last year's financial statement Mr. Chamberlain announced that he would borrow £80 millions for armaments, and having removed that load from his Budget he counted on a revenue of £863 millions, leaving a small prospective surplus. He also provided a tax on business profits, which would expand so

much that it would be unnecessary, he hoped, to add further to taxation even though the cost of armaments would rise. In two respects Mr. Chamberlain's Budget turned out to be much better than he had anticipated. In round figures the revenue amounted to £872 millions and the ordinary expenditure to only £843 millions, leaving a surplus of nearly £29 millions. Secondly, of the £80 millions borrowed for expenditure on armaments, only £65 millions were spent, so that here also there was a surplus (or rather a reduced deficit) of £15 millions. As a result of these two improvements the real deficit on the financial year which ended March 31st was not £80 millions but only about £37 millions. Therefore, argued the optimists before the Budget, there was an unused borrowing from last year which would cover an anticipated deficit for the current financial year of about £30 millions.

In approaching this problem—the real problem of his Budget—Sir John Simon referred to the National Debt. Last July Parliament authorised an addition of no less than £200 millions to increase the resources of the Exchange Equalisation Account. Against this, of course, gold and other assets are held, and the Account still shows a profit, though what that profit is and how it is arrived at we are not informed. Speaking of the National Debt as a whole the Chancellor said: "Allowing for the application of about £10,500,000 to the contractual Sinking Funds, the net increase in the Debt is £257,750,000 nominal, of which £203,000,000 is covered by assets." But for technical reasons, which he explained, last year's increase of the Debt shown in the published accounts is only £229 millions nominal, or £26 millions in reality. He added that he has decided to raise the Fixed Debt Charge, which has stood at £224 millions for the last five years, to £230 millions, an act of prudence which will certainly be approved in view of the growth of interest on the long-term debt and a possible increase in the cost of Treasury bills.

Before coming to the main question, the Chancellor described several new devices for preventing evasions of income tax, from which however he does not anticipate very much additional revenue. Then came the usual survey of the yields which were to be expected from existing taxation. I need not enter into particulars. Unless there is a severe slump in trade, the total estimated revenue of £914 millions on the basis of existing taxation seems reasonably cautious.

If the estimates had been no higher than last year there would have been a very large surplus which would have absolved the Chancellor from the duty of increasing taxation. Unfortunately the cost of the three Defence Services, in so far as they are paid for out of revenue, has been raised to £253 millions, which is £55 millions more than last year, and the expenditure on the Civil Votes has been raised to £439 millions, which is £20 millions more than last year's Budget Estimates. The total Defence expenditure, including £90 millions borrowed, is over £343 millions, and is likely to be raised by supplementary estimates due to a further acceleration of armaments. In consequence of these enormous additions to expenditure the estimated revenue of £914 millions fell short of the estimated expenditure by £30 millions; leaving a prospective deficit of £30 millions; and the gap had to be closed by resorting either to fresh taxation or to further borrowing, or by a compromise between the two.

I have already remarked that the best feature of the Budget was its candour. In discussing the deficit Sir John Simon reminded the House that the Budget was already unbalanced to the tune of £90 millions. That was the real deficit. The gap therefore was not £30 millions but £120 millions. The Government had already decided that the £90 millions should be borrowed, and secondly it had already announced its intention of accelerating rearmament and increasing the production of munitions. That would mean more supplementary estimates for Defence, and these would be met by further borrowing. Thirdly, looking forward to next year, it is anticipated that there will be another increase in expenditure on armaments, and that the total expenditure for five years will exceed the original estimate of £1,500 millions. Even when the peak has been passed, the cost of maintenance and replacements will be substantially higher, and there will also be an increased charge for debt. The passage in which, after stating these three considerations, Sir John Simon announced his conclusion, deserves to be quoted :

Nothing would contribute so much to the ultimate reduction of the burden as the increase of international good-will and the general reduction of armaments which would flow from it. The policy which we are pursuing—the actual achievement of the Anglo-Italian Agreement is a striking and encouraging example—

is aimed at this end. But until the end is more fully achieved, we are bound to pursue the plan of rearmament which we announced and which the country has so generally approved. In these circumstances, I have had to meditate long and anxiously to decide whether I should be justified in taking what for the moment, but perhaps only for the moment, would be the easier course of covering this £30,000,000 by loan money. I have come to the conclusion that I should not be doing my duty if I followed that easier course.

Seeing then that expenditure has mounted and is still mounting, we ought to reduce our future difficulties, assist our further borrowing, and "show the world that this country does not quail" by filling the £30 million gap with extra taxation.

I agree that the course adopted, though bad, was better than the easier course of borrowing. If the Opposition had done its duty on the Estimates, and had been supported, as it probably would have been, by a substantial minority of Conservative Members, the £30 millions could have been saved without loss to efficiency, by cutting down needless extravagances and wholly unnecessary additions to national expenditure. Taking only the last two years, how can it be argued that it was indispensable to double the cost of the Foreign Office, to add more than a million to the expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture, and another million to the Colonial Services, or seven hundred thousand to public buildings in Great Britain, another hundred thousand to public buildings overseas, nine hundred thousand to stationery and printing, and seventy thousand to Royal parks and gardens in years of desperate emergency? I say nothing of the reports that the country is not getting value for its money in many branches of expenditure on the Defence Services. The pity of it is that the House of Commons has neglected its duty to taxpayers. There has been little or no effective criticism of the Estimates and therefore no encouragement to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the exercise of Treasury control. I dare say the Treasury watchdogs have barked at intervals; but it is quite certain from the record of the last two years that they have not bitten. The old Roman maxim that a great revenue is to be found in economy was proved after the war, when the income tax was reduced from six to four shillings in the pound with corresponding relief to taxes on consumption; and it has

never been truer or more applicable than to-day. I had hoped that, when the Government accepted Captain Balfour's economy resolution on February 8th, it meant that a brake was to be applied to expenditure, and that at last the social evils of excessive taxation were to be recognised and as far as possible remedied. Captain Balfour's resolution ran :

This House, while recognising the great measure of economic recovery and social progress achieved during the last five years, and the exceptional expenditure entailed by the necessity for rearmament, views with concern the continued growth of expenditure by the Central Government and by local authorities, and is of opinion that His Majesty's Government should do everything in their power to lighten the burdens imposed on all classes of taxpayers and ratepayers.

Sir John Simon did not even mention the word economy in the whole course of his financial statement, and as yet we have to learn whether the Government has done, or is doing, anything "to lighten the burdens imposed on all classes of taxpayers and ratepayers." That the Labour Party should have voted against a resolution for reducing taxes and rates by means of economy (the only possible method) was to be expected ; but I must confess to surprise and dismay that the same course was adopted by the Liberal Opposition, though I can understand their refusal to recognise "the great measure of economic recovery and social progress" achieved since a Customs tariff was imposed on practically all imports. What Liberals who have been brought up in the Lloyd George school of economics fail to recognise is that wasteful expenditure, high taxation, unbalanced budgets and enormous debts, are social evils which depress business, promote unemployment and threaten public insolvency. A time will come, I feel sure, when the independent Liberal Party will have to revert to Gladstonian principles or sink into the position of being a mere appendage, a despised and ineffective Right Wing, of the Labour Party.

Having decided to tax, the Chancellor of the Exchequer rightly decided to avoid vexatious novelties. Last year's experiment with the business tax has not been encouraging ; an increase of the protective duties, besides reducing our foreign trade, might result in a loss of revenue ; so he decided to rely on three existing taxes. By raising the standard rate of

income tax by sixpence to five shillings and sixpence in the pound, with certain concessions to small incomes and an increased deduction for machinery and plant under Schedule D, he will get over £22 millions this year and over £26 millions in a full year. By adding one penny per gallon to petrol and to heavy oil used for road transport, as well as to power alcohol, he expects only £350,000 in the current year. Thirdly, an addition of twopence per pound on all tea, Empire and foreign, will bring him in this year £2,750,000, and in a full year £3,250,000. The principle that all citizens, rich and poor, should contribute something to the defence of democracy, seeing that practically all their representatives in Parliament have voted for rearmament, has thus been acknowledged and carried into effect in a simple and intelligible way. The shock which has thus been administered to the people's representatives should be salutary.

Nobody who heard and nobody who has read the Budget statement can any longer be in doubt that unpopular taxation attends on popular extravagance, or that the unbalanced budgets with which the National Government is winding up its career will prove as disastrous as those which it was created to overcome. But there is at least one ray of hope in the reiterated statements of the Chancellor that "this necessary outlay on rearmament is being accompanied by an active policy for promoting reconciliation and good-will with other nations." We cannot expect other nations to accept the British formula that our armaments promote peace while theirs promote war; but we can perhaps get them to agree that the mad competition in armaments, or rearmament, is leading to insolvency and general ruin.

In the House of Commons the Financial Statement was listened to in glum silence. It was received with rather gloomy acquiescence by *The Times* and *Daily Telegraph*. The *Daily Express* shouted disapproval, and the *Daily Herald* was as angry as the Labour leaders that any working man should be asked to contribute a penny or twopence a week to the defence of the country. Strange to say, the *Daily Mail* and the *News Chronicle* agreed in commending the Budget. The *Manchester Guardian* admired its "simplicity and severity," adding truly enough that "the financial picture the Chancellor presents is a desperate one and calls for desperate remedies." The City Editor of the *Evening Standard*

called it an "honest old fashioned Budget" which would give confidence. "The Chancellor, however, did not mention the word economy in his whole address. The word has gone into disrepute but it will come back again one day." The *Star* described it as a grim Budget with a bleak East wind blowing through it; "but it is a fair Budget with one or two exceptions; and we think the country will accept it."

Shortly before the Budget an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Horne, who after the war knocked a shilling off the income tax, pleaded on various grounds for borrowing the whole deficit. He and others argued correctly enough that a taxable reserve should be maintained against the contingency of war. For this reason a low rate of income tax was always deemed an essential element in our financial system. In 1875 it was reduced to twopence in the pound by Disraeli's administration. In 1913 the standard rate was fourteen pence. The war raised it to six shillings, and at the same time multiplied the National Debt elevenfold. The cost of the debt service alone is now more than the whole cost of Government in 1913. In commenting on these facts, Dr. Pollard has observed in a letter to *The Times* that "the next war, if it resembled the last, would by a much smaller increase of income tax deprive every man and woman in the country of all income except the allowances conceded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer," and added: "another war like the last bids fair to turn the whole world communist." Labour members, who want to finance costly schemes of what they call social welfare and armaments for an anti-Fascist crusade by "soaking the rich," ignore the fact that comparatively few millions could be obtained by regraduating a surtax which already takes nearly fourteen shillings in the pound from the highest incomes. But while it is true that the reserves of taxable capacity have been dangerously depleted, it is equally true that the reserves of borrowing capacity have been reduced as much. Sir John Simon is at least extracting enough new money from the taxpayers to provide interest and sinking fund on the four or five hundred millions which the Government is planning to borrow for rearmament.

A perusal of the Budget debates is not encouraging. Though many of the comments were instructive, the only important member of the House who stated effectively any part of the case for economy was Sir Archibald Sinclair. He reminded

the House that two years ago our naval predominance in Europe was greater than in 1914. Yet in the scramble for armaments the Admiralty has actually contrived to double our naval expenditure. He also supported Mr. Stokes, the new Member for Ipswich, who has made practical proposals for diminishing waste and profiteering in the air service ; and finally he urged the appointment of a committee on national expenditure which might save millions of pounds. Mr. Hely-Hutchinson poured contempt upon economy, declaring that "no major economies are politically possible," but having proved this to his own satisfaction he asked how the country with taxation at a war-time level is to finance another major war, and left the conundrum to a House of Commons which as he has discovered "is not interested in finance." Another Conservative member, Mr. Loftus, showed an unusual insight into the new protective and monopolistic system under which cartels and other combinations are fixing prices and fleecing consumers with the assistance of the Government and of the tariff board. He said :

We have to recognise that the old political economy founded by Adam Smith is dead. . . . It was based on flexible prices, flexible rates of interest, flexible wages ; and at the cost of a good deal of hardship and injustice it did function. It did automatically correct excess production and under-production. It did more or less automatically increase national production and utilise labour and capital ; but it is dead to-day and it is dead for these reasons.

In the first place we have no longer flexible prices. . . . There are the old flexible prices in such things as textiles and agricultural produce ; but the modern corporation has established a system of inflexible prices in certain manufacturing industries. Instead of reducing prices they reduce production. . . . During the slump in America makers of agricultural implements reduced production by 80 per cent., but reduced prices by only 15 per cent., while makers of cement reduced production by 65 per cent. and prices by only 17 per cent. On the other hand prices of textiles dropped by 45 per cent. and agricultural prices by 65 per cent.

Here we have a part of the story which explains the present depression of British textiles and many other staple industries including British agriculture. Under the protective system, monopolies like the steel cartel have grown up. Free markets have been restricted or abolished. Many manufacturers are victimised, and the whole body of consumers is mulcted by

a tariff which provides little revenue in comparison with the burdens it imposes. From this situation the only escape is that which was adopted by Peel and Gladstone more than ninety years ago—a restoration of Free Trade.

Sir Waldron Smithers, a member of the Stock Exchange—which after a year of heavy losses is one of our most peaceful institutions—congratulated the Chancellor on having produced a good sound Treasury Budget, with taxes easy to collect for which no new bureaucrats would have to be invented. He was followed by Mr. Richards who, like Sir Arthur Salter, pointed out that money spent on armaments does not produce a saleable commodity. It diverts energy and capital from industrial production and raises the price of useful commodities. Borrowing affords no escape from this evil. Sir Arthur Salter put the scientific argument for taxation as against borrowing better than anyone else. Expenditure on armaments, he said, is not in any real sense capital expenditure. The things bought—guns, aeroplanes, etc.—do not represent any revenue-producing asset. On the contrary, their existence involves increased expenditure for maintenance, and even if a sinking fund is attached to the loan they are obsolete long before the loan has been redeemed. Sir Arthur is to be congratulated on having persuaded the Government to include among its defence measures a provision for the storage of food supplies instead of relying merely upon the Navy. He has demonstrated that for less than 5 per cent. of the cost of the Navy the country could be insured against famine for a year. It would seem from the Chancellor's statement that a considerable provision has already been made by secret and effective purchases of wheat, sugar and whale oil. It is to be hoped that this policy will be followed and judiciously extended. Still more is it to be hoped that the Government will listen to Sir Arthur Salter's sage and sound advice to consider the whole problem of appeasement and make sure that any advantages and opportunities resulting from our own rearmament shall be so used in negotiations with other Powers as to secure a limitation of armaments and if possible an agreement to abolish altogether the infamous practice of air bombardment.

FRANCIS W. HIRST:

THE ITALIAN AGREEMENT AND AFTER.

ON April 16th last there was signed in Rome an agreement between the Italian and British Governments which may be proved by future developments to have been a landmark in the general relationships of the European Great Powers. As a diplomatic transaction it was interesting as giving us still another illustration of the fact that the actual content of treaties, pacts or other forms of agreement is often of less importance than the feelings they canalise. In this case it would not be easy to say precisely what practical problems needed to be solved, nor what practical arrangements of any consequence were in fact made by the agreement. Moreover, the agreement itself is not to come into "operation" until such time as certain conditions relative to the war in Spain have been fulfilled. Yet in its diplomatic consequence the agreement did begin to operate at once. The fact is that wars spring from persistent bad feeling rather than from tangible difficulties or problems. When problems are conditioned by good feeling, they are easy to solve, or even disappear. During the past two years, although British opinion has been badly split in its feelings about Italy, most people would agree that what poisoned Italo-British relations and even insinuated the sinister fear of war was not a firm or diagnosable issue in rival interests, but an emotional sense of resentment and moral indignation. The resentment and the indignation were mutual; while many people in Great Britain deeply resented Italy's conquest of Abyssinia and her defection from the League of Nations, still more people in Italy resented what they genuinely regarded as British hypocrisy about colonial conquest. The moral differentiation that was made between colonial conquest done before, and that done after, the establishment of the League of Nations had none but an irritant effect upon Italian opinion.

Little is to be gained by raking up the past bitterness felt on both sides. By the autumn of 1936 that bitterness was so strong that the possibility even of war was present in many minds. That was why the two Governments on January 2nd, 1937, signed what came to be known as the Gentlemen's Agreement whose only object was to dispel suspicions and misunderstandings. Tempers being still too raw, that agreement

failed of its purpose. Indeed, the mutual mistrust was rather intensified. Last July another attempt of the like kind was made on Signor Mussolini's initiative. He sent a friendly message to Mr. Chamberlain, who responded to it by suggesting that the two Governments should engage in conversations with a view to improving the relationship. Again the project went wrong. In the autumn of last year what may be called the Nyon phase of antagonism, arising out of the Mediterranean "piracy" and the Spanish war, made any such conversations impossible, and the mutual recriminations grew in volume. On December 11th last the cleavage seemed to be symbolised by the Italian Government's announcing its decision to secede from the League of Nations.

But the third attempt succeeded. On February 21st last Mr. Chamberlain announced the intention of the British Government to begin, not conversations, but negotiations, with the Italian Government with a view to reaching a formal agreement on outstanding causes of ill feeling. Lord Perth, the British Ambassador, conducted the substantial negotiations in Rome with Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. The Foreign Office in London sent Mr. George Rendel, Head of the Southern Department, to help in the expert details, more particularly in relation to the Middle East, of which his knowledge is probably unrivalled. After two months of negotiation the agreement was duly formulated. There can be no doubt that Herr Hitler in this instance indirectly did his bit to encourage a work of appeasement. By effecting the *Anschluss* with Austria on March 12th he gave an incentive to Signor Mussolini to see that the Anglo-Italian agreement was signed, sealed and delivered before Herr Hitler visited Rome at the beginning of May. High diplomacy works on much the same principles of "power politics" as most other manifestations of nature in the raw. If Herr Hitler had conquered new fields, why so had Signor Mussolini.

What, then, exactly did the British and Italian Governments agree about on April 16th? Still more precisely, when is the agreement in its practical sense to come into operation at all? No settled indication was given (nor in the circumstances could be given) in the texts issued on April 16th as to when the provisions therein made were to operate. It was reserved for the two Governments subsequently to decide that date ("The said instruments shall take effect on such

date as the two Governments shall together determine"). From the instruments themselves it followed that the Governments would be guided in their decision on the one hand by the Italian pledge (1) to accept the British plan of proportional evacuation of the foreign troops from Spain and (2) not to leave any troops nor to entertain any political designs upon any Spanish territory; and on the other hand by the British postulate that "a settlement of the Spanish question" be a pre-requisite of the entry into force of the agreement.

It follows that the agreement will come into force either when the war in Spain is over and Italian evacuation is complete, or when Italian evacuation is complete, whether the war is over or not. That seems to be the logical deduction from the actual wording of the texts. But logic perhaps is not necessarily decisive. When the agreement was submitted for approval to the House of Commons on May 2nd Mr. Chamberlain, referring to the proposed recognition of Italian East Africa, said: "The justification for recognition *de jure* would be that it was an essential factor in getting back to a general appeasement. I do not think that we could feel that we had got back, or that we were taking steps towards general appeasement; unless at the same time we could see that a Spanish settlement was within reach. That is the reason why we have made this Spanish settlement a pre-requisite of the entry into force of this instrument and a pre-requisite therefore of the recognition of the Italian conquest." Mr. Attlee asked: "What does the right hon. gentleman mean by a settlement?" Mr. Chamberlain answered: "I prefer not to give a definition of it. At this stage it would be wrong to try to define the circumstances in which one could say that a settlement had been arrived at. It may be that later on we shall get nearer the time when we can give a definition."

From the beginning of his attempt to make an agreement with Signor Mussolini, Mr. Chamberlain has based his defence—for an arrangement designed to substitute good-will for ill-will had in this case to be defended at the bar of British opinion—on the simple argument that the only hope of averting general war was to cultivate general peace and that the Anglo-Italian agreement was a step towards general peace. His equally simple premise was that general peace was preferable to general war, if war at almost any price could be

averted. "There are no winners in war," he has said. Indeed, on May 2nd he went so far as to state roundly: "For my own part I repudiate the idea that it is impossible for democracies to come to terms and to understandings with States where authoritarian ideas prevail."

The agreement was designed to cover the whole ground of Anglo-Italian relations in the Mediterranean, the North East corner of Africa and the Middle East. It contained four separate but correlated sections. There was a protocol and eight annexes; an exchange of notes; a *bon voisinage* agreement to which Egypt was a party so far as her interests were affected; and an exchange of notes between Lord Perth and Count Ciano on the one hand and the Egyptian Minister in Rome on the other of which the effect was to associate Egypt with the two declarations in the main agreement which dealt with Lake Tsana and the Suez Canal.

The Protocol itself in general terms affirmed "the desire to place the relations between the two countries on a solid and lasting basis and to contribute to the general cause of peace and security." It prescribed that when the instruments had come into force negotiations would be begun to try and arrive at certain definite agreements about the boundaries between the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland on the one side and Italian East Africa on the other, and about other matters such as trade.

The first annex reaffirmed the declaration signed in Rome on January 2nd, 1937, regarding the Mediterranean and the Notes exchanged between the two Governments on December 31st last regarding the *status quo* in the Western Mediterranean. The second annex provided for an exchange of information about any major prospective administrative movements or redistribution of naval, military and air forces in the overseas territories in or bordering upon the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Gulf of Aden, or in Egypt, the Sudan, Italian East Africa, British Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda or the northern part of Tanganyika. That arrangement certainly ought to prevent the type of mischievous suspicion based upon a misrepresentation of the facts, such as indeed has been one of the fruitful sources of evil.

The third annex ought to give particular satisfaction to the more imperially-minded Britons—from which category ironically enough one cannot exclude those Britons who most

deeply resented the more recent achievements of the imperially-minded Italians. It dealt with certain areas in the Middle East, in a way eminently sympathetic to British strategic interests rather than, indeed in rivalry to, those of Italy. The two Governments bound themselves to respect the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and agreed that it was to their common interest that no third party should interfere with such independence and integrity. They further agreed about certain islands in the Red Sea and about British and Italian rights in certain parts of Southern Arabia which for a long time have been under the "protection" of the British Government, particularly in the Aden Protectorate, where certain rights were now guaranteed to Italy.

The fourth annex disposed of the somewhat silly matter of propaganda—a form of mutual mischief which merely symbolised the bad relationship and which was automatically disposed of when the relationship improved. None the less the two Governments formally and solemnly assured each other that they would stop saying unpleasant things about each other.

The fifth annex in its turn made good reading for the British imperialists aforesaid. By it the Italian Government "were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them." In other words Great Britain after all is to have her share of the spoils. Before Italy annexed Abyssinia it had been agreed by the two Governments that Italy should have an economic sphere in the south of Abyssinia and that Great Britain should have the waters of Lake Tsana, for the exclusive benefit of Egypt. Before the war in Abyssinia started the British Government had already received the competing tenders for the barrage works to be constructed at Lake Tsana. Those tenders may now be taken from the files in readiness for use when the present Anglo-Italian agreement begins to operate. The British and Italian Governments had not, it is true, simply or crudely agreed to give each other something that belonged to Abyssinia. They were more correct. They each undertook to invite the Emperor of Abyssinia to give the other what she wanted; invited him, that is to say, to exercise his sovereign independence by doing voluntarily what

they asked him to do; and they were so confident that he would do it that they made their agreement and divided the spoils before asking him. Of course the bargain had now to be reshaped. There was no longer an Emperor of Abyssinia. Italy had got what she wanted, and more. She had incidentally got the waters of Lake Tsana. What, therefore, she did in the agreement of April 16th was to promise the British Government that it should still have the waters of Lake Tsana.

The sixth and seventh annexes reaffirmed Italy's assurance to the League of Nations that the Abyssinian natives should not be compelled to undertake military duties except those of local policing and territorial defence, and added an assurance that there should be a free exercise of religion in Italian East Africa. The eighth and last annex reaffirmed the two Governments' intention always to abide by the provisions of the Convention of October 1888, which guaranteed at all times and for all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal. The subject of Palestine was not included in the formal annexes, but the Italian Government gave a verbal assurance that it would not create difficulties or embarrassments for the British Government in its administration of Palestine.

The second section of the agreement consisted of three exchanges of Notes. By the first exchange Count Ciano informed Lord Perth that the Italian Government had given orders for a diminution of the forces in Libya, that withdrawals had already begun at the rate of 1,000 a week and would continue at that rate until they had been reduced to peace strength. Mathematically that promise involved the halving of the forces stationed in Libya, as measured by their strength when the negotiations began in February. The third exchange of Notes gave an Italian promise to accede to the naval Treaty of London as soon as the present agreement came into force and a further promise in the meantime to act in conformity with the provisions of that Treaty. The second exchange of Notes dealt with the question of Spain and the recognition of Italian East Africa. Count Ciano made these promises: "Your Excellency will remember that, in the course of our recent conversations, I gave your Excellency certain assurances regarding the policy of the Italian Government in connection with Spain. I now wish to reaffirm those assurances and to place them on record. First, the Italian Government have the honour to confirm their full adherence

to the United Kingdom formula for the proportional evacuation of the foreign volunteers from Spain, and pledge themselves to give practical and real application to such an evacuation at the moment and on the conditions which shall be determined by the Non-Intervention Committee on the basis of the above-mentioned formula. I desire secondly to reaffirm that if this evacuation has not been completed at the moment of the termination of the Spanish civil war all remaining Italian volunteers will forthwith leave Spanish territory and all Italian war material will simultaneously be withdrawn. I wish thirdly to repeat my previous assurance that the Italian Government have no territorial or political aims, and seek no privileged economic position, in or with regard to either metropolitan Spain, the Balearic Islands, or any of the Spanish possessions overseas, or the Spanish zone of Morocco, and that they have no intention whatever of keeping any armed forces in any of the said territories."

It was in acknowledging that Note that Lord Perth reminded Count Ciano that "His Majesty's Government regard the settlement of the Spanish question as a prerequisite of the entry into force of the agreement between our two Governments." In the same Note Lord Perth gave the British undertaking about Abyssinia and the League of Nations. The exact wording of that undertaking ran thus: "I have further the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government being desirous that such obstacles as may at present be held to impede the freedom of member States as regards recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia should be removed, intend to take steps at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of clarifying the situation of member States in this regard."

Mr. Chamberlain elaborated the meaning of that Note on May 2nd when he said in the House of Commons: "Let me make one or two points clear. First of all our action does not mean that we condone or that we approve the methods by which Italy obtained control of Abyssinia. Secondly, it does not mean that we are going to ask the League to modify any resolution or any decision which it took during the period of the conquest. The League has expressed its judgment on the whole affair in the plainest possible terms, and there will be no going back on that. In the third place, we do not intend

to ask any other State to take any action which they might deem incompatible with their obligations. There is something further. Neither any action which we have taken, nor any action which we may ask the Council to take in itself constitutes recognition. It neither binds us nor anyone else to recognition. The act of recognition remains within the sovereign rights of each individual State. In other words, in so far as this country is concerned the time and circumstances of recognition remain within our own discretion. I have always maintained myself, and many I think agree with me, that the only circumstances in which recognition could be morally justified would be if it were shown to be an essential feature of a general appeasement. That is the position of the Government to-day." The *bon voisinage* arrangement which constituted the third section of the agreement was designed to prevent the evasion of anti-slavery laws during the interim period between the signing of the main instrument and the completion of negotiations dealing with the specific East African matter referred to in the Protocol mentioned above. It provided for co-operation in that sense between the British, Egyptian and Italian Governments.

How far the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian accord was likely to affect the now long-standing cleavage of Europe into its two camps, that of the so-called democratic and that of the so-called dictatorship states, became an immediate subject of speculation. Hardly was the ink dry on the signatures than M. Daladier the Prime Minister of France and his Foreign Minister M. Bonnet came to London to consult with Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. They arrived on April 27th and stayed two days. Immediately thereafter M. Blondel, the French Chargé d'Affaires, began in Rome the negotiation with Count Ciano of a parallel Franco-Italian agreement.

High diplomacy had indeed started to stage one of its spectacular bouts of activity. Mr. Roosevelt, on April 19th, had publicly given his blessing to the Anglo-Italian agreement by emphasising America's "sympathetic interest" in what he called this "proof of the value of peaceful negotiations." On May 2nd Herr Hitler set out from Berlin to Rome. On May 9th the League of Nations Council met in Geneva to pave the way—on a British initiative, supported by France—for a general recognition of Italian East Africa, by the method hinted at by Mr. Chamberlain on May 2nd. The Daladier

visit to London on April 27th and the Hitler visit to Rome on May 2nd both obviously constituted a conscious contribution to the renewed movement in high diplomacy that had been started by the German-Austrian *Anschluss* on March 12th and the Anglo-Italian agreement on April 16th.

In both cases no public disclosure was made of what took place. A colourless official communication was issued on April 29th after the Daladier-Bonnet visit, recording simply that "the two Governments decided to continue as might be necessary the contacts between their General Staffs reached in London on March 19th, 1936." The important new thing implied, but not expressed, in that statement, was that Great Britain and France had decided now to include their air forces in the scope of the co-ordinated military plans, before confined to the army and the navy. The question of the unified command in the air was not raised, for the simple reason that nothing was to be gained by raising it now. If the hypothetical emergency should ever arise—which God forbid!—that question would at once arise and would at once be decided. What was involved in the Staff talks now to be begun without delay was the pooling of air force resources in craft, bases and supplies. Food supplies, oil and other material attributes of war equipment were also included in the new co-ordinated plans. But not finance. During the two days' talks no mention was made on either side of any contemplated financial arrangement. The financial experience of the last great war is perhaps too vividly remembered for the soreness to have yet worn off. But apart from finance we were for the first time presented with the settled prospect, in the event of war, of a joint Anglo-French military organisation.

On the political side the consideration that was present in all minds was the uncertainty surrounding the position of Czechoslovakia. That small country had become the very centre and focus of the diplomacy that now engrossed the five European Great Powers—Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Russia. The official statement issued in London on April 29th merely declared that the two Governments "found themselves in general agreement on the action that might most usefully be taken to find the basis of a peaceful and equitable settlement" of the Central European problem. The word "action" did not, of course, imply any new commitment on the part of the British Government. It referred to

diplomatic action. More precisely it became known that what it implied was that the French Government had undertaken to urge upon President Beneš and Dr. Hodža the expediency of making still further concessions to the Sudeten Germans while the British Government had undertaken to urge upon the German Government an answering spirit of conciliation.

What Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini were saying to each other on May 7th at the end of a week of gigantic celebrations in Rome, though for the most part colourless, did reveal one interesting thing. The Duce in his speech confined himself to generalities about "the unchangeable friendship of our two peoples." The Führer went further. After placing some emphasis on the conception that "there has been created in Europe a *bloc* of 120,000,000 people [that is of Germany, Austria and Italy] who are resolved to safeguard their eternal right to live and to defend themselves against all forces which might venture to oppose their natural development" (a somewhat obvious point for him to make in the circumstances) he went on to speak of the Brenner. "Now that we have become immediate neighbours," he said, "taught by the experience of 2,000 years we both acknowledge those natural frontiers which Providence and history have visibly drawn between our two peoples." He gave this pledge: "It is my irrevocable will and my bequest to the German people that the frontier of the Alps, which Nature has erected between us, shall be regarded for ever as unchangeable." The ardour of Herr Hitler's words, his ostentatious presentation to the world of the "120,000,000 people," his pledge to Italy about the frontier, were the clearly intended answer to the Anglo-Italian agreement and to the Franco-Italian conversations. Did he mean that he thereby forswore his claim to the Germans of South Tyrol? At this stage it perhaps does not matter whether he had such an intention. What is more interesting is to notice the contrast between the spirit of what the two leaders said. Herr Hitler spoke of his Central European *bloc*, determined to defend itself *against* a body of enemies not specified. Signor Mussolini said: "Germany and Italy have turned their backs on the Utopias to which Europe had blindly entrusted her fate in order to seek between them *and with others* a régime of international comity which may restore *equally for all* more effective guarantees of security, and peace" (my italics).

Within a few weeks of the German-Austrian *Anschluss* Europe was presented with a spectacle of diplomatic activity in which these were the main elements : (1) Great Britain and Italy reached an agreement which put an end to more than two years of antagonism ; (2) France and Italy were negotiating a similar agreement with every prospect of success ; (3) the League of Nations, under the joint leadership of Great Britain and France, was formulating the position that League members were free, without disloyalty to the League, to recognise Italian East Africa as a step towards the general appeasement of Europe ; (4) Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini were toasting each other in Rome, protesting to each other the continuing solidarity of the Rome-Berlin axis, but with the difference that the former gave it a belligerent value, whereas the latter featured it as a stepping-stone to general conciliation ; (5) Great Britain and France were urging upon Prague the granting of the fullest possible concessions to the Sudeten Germans in order to avoid a possible emergency such as might threaten the general peace of Europe.

To this recital must be added the fact (which was not public but for which there was adequate evidence of a more private kind) that Signor Mussolini in Rome had refused a commitment to Herr Hitler to fight on Germany's side in the event of a German coup in Czechoslovakia leading to general war, but had undertaken to be neutral in the event of the Czechoslovak problem solving itself in Germany's favour by internal evolution. What deductions are to be drawn ? It is clear that the vast accession to German power achieved through the *Anschluss* had necessarily modified Signor Mussolini's general policy, not only because a German *Mittleuropa* had thereby become a fact and Italy's ambitions in Central Europe by the same token frustrated, but also because in the eyes of the world (an important consideration for the prestige of dictators) the balance of the axis had shifted in a way that made Berlin more, and Rome therefore less, important to it.

The remaining uncertainty was the future of Czechoslovakia and its possible effect upon the peace of Europe. There were many realist students of affairs in London and in Paris alike who now recognised that the peace of Europe depended almost wholly upon Herr Hitler's policy in the next few

months. There was on the one hand an apparent issue between Germany's case, that it was impossible for the Prague Government to satisfy the Sudeten Germans so long as it maintained an alliance with Russia, which logically postulated the possible contingency of the Sudeten Germans marching against the Germans of the Reich, and the case argued by certain thinkers in Paris, London, Prague and Moscow, that if there was to be a war in Europe, it would inevitably be the same old war as before, in which case the existing alliances might just as well be maintained for what they were worth. On the other hand it was regarded as probable even by those same students of affairs that the accomplished fact of a German *Mitteleuropa*, with Hungary certainly as an ally and with the resultant certainty of a surrounded Czechoslovakia being in an economic sense at the mercy of that grouping, would lead to the inclusion of Czechoslovakia itself within that grouping. There was at any rate the possibility that in the very spirit of self-preservation Czechoslovakia might be driven into that group. If such a thing were to happen then the Czechoslovak alliances with Russia and France would automatically lapse by a process of natural decay, for Czechoslovakia herself would neither need nor want them.

If, therefore, Herr Hitler were content to allow the natural forces now afoot to lead to their own probable end, the end would be reached without war. If on the other hand Herr Hitler had now become so insensitive to any consideration except that of the armed power of Germany, and had become so attracted by the method of spectacular action as distinct from the quiet evolution of logic as the means to his end, then there would be war. As terrible a responsibility rested upon Herr Hitler as ever rested upon any individual in the history of the world. Was it conceivable that he would deliberately invite the combined hostility in active war of Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Russia—and Italy?—in order to achieve certain objects which he was much more likely to achieve if he left events to work themselves out in peace?

GEORGE GLASGOW.

May 12th, 1938.



SPAIN IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

By foreign aid, and mainly by foreign aid, he (General Franco) will be the victor. His vanquished fellow-countrymen will lie prostrate beneath his feet.—Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, P.C., M.P., *Evening Standard*, April 5th.

This is a peculiar war. One side has no men: the other side has no arms.—*Daily Telegraph*, April 20th.

THE war in Spain has been described as the preliminary manœuvres for strategic position preceding the launching of a final knock-out offensive. Perhaps it is not necessary to recapitulate at length the strategic importance of Spain. The British fleet recently carried out exercises off the north-west coast to test the possibilities of protecting convoys of merchant ships from air attack. The density of British shipping is greater here than in any other part of the world. Similarly, the loss to our merchant shipping during the Great War, due to submarines, was greatest in the Mediterranean, that happy hunting-ground for submarines; and whether the harbour at Gibraltar would be tenable in the event of a hostile Spain making use of the guns mounted on either side of the Straits is a debatable question. The security of France is no less affected. As early as May 1935 Herr Reder, Press Director and Nazi propagandist in Spain, wrote:

A glance at the map will suffice to show what would be the strategic importance of Spain in a Franco-German war.

French communications with North Africa are threatened by Italy's control of Majorca. The munition works and aircraft factories recently established in the south of France are little less vulnerable than Barcelona itself from air attacks across the Pyrenees. In a recent article in the *Catholic Herald*, a paper that has exhibited no "Red" tendencies, it was stated:

To us as Englishmen, the triumph of Franco at this present hour must inevitably be a source of some anxiety. *That it is so is entirely our own fault.* We fear that Nationalist Spain, in gratitude for the help given her by Germany and Italy, may join in a close understanding with Berlin and Rome. A glance at the map of Europe is sufficient to show the *appalling danger to France and Britain of a close military alliance from Hamburg to Genoa and from Genoa to Cadiz.* (My italics.)

For these and other reasons it is odd that no spokesman of the British Government in the recent debates on foreign affairs has taken the ample opportunity provided of allaying the fears—by no means confined to one party or one section of political thought—that on strategic grounds alone a victory for the friends of Germany and Italy may be a threat of the first magnitude to France and England. Perhaps the occupants of the Government Front bench have so studiously avoided that aspect of the subject for good political, if not strategic, reasons. Maybe any such discussion provokes doubts and uncertainties in the minds of those whose duty at the present time is merely to vote (not die) for the Government. After all, no satisfactory explanation has yet been given of Mr. Eden's phrase that "agreements worth making were never made on the basis of a threat." Was the threat that Italy and Germany would make use of the positions they have won in Spain to threaten France when the next European crisis arises?

We all know that it is Czechoslovakia's turn next. When in March rumours reached London that the date was already fixed for June, the strategists wondered whether the blackmail was not on a grander scale than even the worst pessimists had suggested. Indeed, it is arguable that Mussolini's pledge to withdraw his troops and air force after their work is done in Spain may be of more importance than most of us at first thought. Europe is a small continent. It is true that Berlin may be bombed from Prague. It is equally true that Bordeaux can be bombed from Bilbao and that the "German colony" at Bilbao, who voted first in the recent Austrian plebiscite, may be occupied in preparing permanent aerodromes and munition stores for the 750 foreign aeroplanes which are present to-day in Spain.

While Mr. Eden was negotiating the "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Italy in January 1937, Italian troops were embarking for Spain. As he himself reminded the House of Commons on February 21st, 1938:

In January of last year, we signed the Anglo-Italian Agreement, but within a very few days, almost simultaneously, the first considerable consignment of Italians left for Spain.

British policy towards Spain has been influenced by continuous attempts to arrive at an understanding with Italy,

in order to prevent the consolidation of the Rome-Berlin axis. Various approaches have been made since the first Gentlemen's Agreement, including personal letters from Neville Chamberlain to Mussolini and a personal approach by Delbos at Geneva, and a final effort to draw Italy into tripartite conversations on Spain on September 25th. This desire to detach Italy from the arms of Germany has been an important factor in preventing the British Government from taking any more active steps with regard to Spain. But in spite of these efforts, the consolidation of the Rome-Berlin axis progressed and culminated in the inclusion of Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact and her withdrawal from the League of Nations.

The Anglo-Italian Agreement has now finally been signed, but, as I write, the radios of every country in Europe are broadcasting the complimentary speeches exchanged between Hitler and Mussolini in Rome. Time alone will show, possibly a short time, whether the Italian agreement has or has not weakened the Rome-Berlin axis. Great Britain has paid a heavy price in making the attempt. After all, the axis has been cemented by something more than speeches. German-Italian co-operation in Spain has been more practical than the mere exchange of compliments, and while we may be a little horrified at the open Italian exultation at the part their legionaries have played in the war, public opinion in Italy regards these victories as a solid achievement.

Can anyone believe that the very substantial expenditure of men and munitions by Italy has been made solely in the cause of ideology? After all, the Italian forces in Spain are admittedly an expeditionary force under the direct control of Rome. Is the object merely an experimental use of modern equipment or a demonstration to improve the morale of the Italian people? Will no payment be accepted from General Franco? Is there no understanding that "Nationalist" Spain will join the Anti-Comintern Pact? Is there no undertaking of future co-operation, and is General Franco to grant no economic or strategic concessions? What reason is there to suppose that the assurances so frequently given verbally and now in writing (though not included in the actual text of the Agreement) that :

The Italian Government have no territorial or political aims, and seek no privileged economic position, in or with regard to

either Metropolitan Spain, the Balearic Islands, any of the Spanish possessions overseas, or the Spanish Zone of Morocco, and they have no intention whatever of keeping any armed forces in any of the said territories,

will be kept, any more than Hitler's assurances that the independence of Austria would be respected?

Supposing, last September, when Mussolini visited Hitler, an understanding was arrived at by which the former would not resist the occupation of Austria, in exchange for German co-operation in Spain, the recent meeting of the two dictators on May 6th must have been more than superficially cordial. The Anglo-Italian Agreement falls in this light into its proper perspective, as merely an incident by which British and French opposition was finally neutralised, during what was intended to be the last stages of the Spanish campaign. When Mr. Eden's resignation was followed so speedily by the incorporation of Austria in the German Reich, public opinion in France and Britain became dangerously vocal in its attack upon the policy of non-intervention, which may have made sense in the early stages of the war, but which has only become a ridiculous farce, in any realistic view of British and French interests.

But, in addition, military developments in Spain prevented any change of British policy. General Franco's offensive in Catalonia met with unexpected success. It was well timed to follow Hitler's invasion of Austria—perhaps a mere coincidence! But after all, the invasion of Austria was prepared in meticulous detail and must have been contemplated for a considerable period. Is it unreasonable to suppose that General Franco's offensive, intended to finish the war, was prepared with equal care? Arms were provided in advance, arms in quantities which it was known would be overwhelming. The timing was prepared so that "to Germany Austria and to Italy Spain" should be an accomplished fact, before the slow-moving democracies had realised what was afoot. Further, the Spanish Government may have been known to have expended too large a proportion of its munitions upon the offensive at Teruel and having, moreover, a Government which is reported to have quarrelled with Russia, it received no munitions to speak of from that source for six months. And so diplomacy and military action went hand in hand. It was said to be too late to save Spain, and a disunited and

impotent Opposition in England, instead of making every effort to do so, spent their time in fruitless discussion of the Popular Front.

The moral leadership of the world may pass from Europe to the United States. Already my constituents in lonely farms on the Pennines take the trouble to tune in to Mr. Roosevelt. But at by-elections electors hardly bother to attend meetings. They make up their minds in their own homes between two unsatisfactory alternatives. It may be that the mass resistance of the Chinese and the almost incredible pertinacity of the Spaniards have won the sympathy of an American people who are nevertheless unwilling to be entangled in the tortuous procedure of a Geneva controlled by the Hoares, the Laval, the Simons of Europe. If the United States were to modify their neutrality policy in favour of the Spanish Republic, the grim foreboding of the uses to which a victory for General Franco would be put by his principals in Berlin and Rome may never come to pass.

The war in Spain is not yet finished, in spite of Count Ciano's reported assurances to Lord Perth during the Anglo-Italian conversations that Barcelona would have fallen by April 15th. The Spanish Government's army fights on. *The Times* correspondent, writing from Hendaye on March 26th, expressed the view that :

Nothing can save the cause of the Government in Spain, unless foreign intervention comes to their rescue on terms approximately equal to the help Italy and Germany are giving to General Franco.

Whether or not this "curious war," with the man-power and the munitions so unevenly distributed will be ended this summer depends less upon the capacity and the courage of those who are engaged than upon international and diplomatic events. I am confident that, if and when the truth of intervention is ever established, it will be found that this intervention has been overwhelmingly in favour of the insurgents. Impartial observers in Spain have estimated that Franco's superiority in numbers in the air was in March approximately seven to one, whereas at the beginning of the war the Government was superior in air strength. Only with difficulty was the information recently extracted from the British Government that Italy had handed over four destroyers to the insurgent

navy. I cannot help wondering what Sir Henry Page-Croft would have said if the Russians had put four cruisers at the disposal of the Spanish Government! But after all geography still counts for something. Mexico and Russia find themselves at a very great disadvantage in sending arms to the Republicans, a disadvantage which has been fully exploited by the two European dictators, who, whatever else their faults, do not engage in hazardous international enterprises in a half-hearted or hesitant mood.

But any discussion of the breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement merely amounts to a skilled method of obscuring the fundamental issue. I have stated previously in the *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* the reasons why I do not regard a victory for the Spanish Government as one for Communism. Ultimately the issue in Spain is simply this: whether a democratic government, disposed, even after previous disappointments, to appeal to the League of Nations and the moral sense of the democratic governments, is to be replaced by a dictatorship inspired and armed by international fascism.

WILFRID ROBERTS.

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR.

AFTER nearly fourteen years Messrs. Gooch and Temperley have completed the task which the Secretary of State, Sir Austen Chamberlain, committed to them in the autumn of 1924. As soon as the World War started, the European belligerents all published small collections of documents. These were issued for purposes of propaganda and are, accordingly, to be used by the historian with extreme caution. They were all put together in one volume by the British Government and were issued, with a discerning and beautifully written introduction, under the name of *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, in 1915. This was, and still is, as the "synoptic bluebooks" of the belligerent Powers, a valuable source for any historian of the immediate preliminaries of the World War.

Almost immediately after the Armistice, the German Republican Government opened its archives and Karl Kautsky, the Socialist, produced at high speed a four-volume collection of documents: *Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegausbruch*, 1914, covering the period June 13th to August 6th, 1914. Kautsky was not interested in placing the Hohenzollern Government in a good light, and he had an internationalist outlook. As an editor he was free from national bias, and his collection of documents is probably as fair-minded as in the circumstances of that extraordinary time was possible. The Weimar Republic followed up the Kautsky documents with a magnificent collection of forty volumes, *Die Grosse Politik der Europaïschen Kabinette*, edited by A. Mendelssohn-Bartoldy, J. Lepsius and F. Thimme, and beginning with the year 1871. Since then, all the European Great Powers have followed the example of the Weimar Government. The United States did not require to make a new departure for it had a series of volumes of State Papers, issued regularly since 1862, reproducing its diplomatic correspondence very liberally.

The British Government was rather a late starter, but, as is its way, once started it pursued the undertaking in a spirit that was both thorough and generous. The decision to publish a British collection was made by Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in

the Labour Government of 1924. The decision was not known at the time. On November 24th, 1924, *The Times* published a letter from Dr. Seton-Watson urging that the existing rules regarding publication of the national records be relaxed. By this time the MacDonald Government had fallen. Mr. Baldwin was Prime Minister and Austen Chamberlain Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Any historian who has had anything to do with the Foreign Office at this time knows how magnificently fair-minded and liberal Austen Chamberlain's administration was. He at once replied to Dr. Seton-Watson with a letter in *The Times*, stating that he had confirmed Ramsay MacDonald's instructions, and that Mr. Gooch and Mr. Temperley would edit a collection of documents for the Foreign Office. As it happened, however, another historian, Headlam-Morley, who served in the Foreign Office during the war and was retained afterwards as Historical Adviser, had already to a large extent edited a collection of documents on the period from the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to the outbreak of war, June 28th to August 4th, 1914. Messrs. Gooch and Temperley, accordingly, asked Headlam-Morley to complete it and let it be issued first of all as Volume XI of *British Documents on the Origins of the War*. Thus the last, eleventh, volume of documents in the series came out first. The present volume is No. X. There is still to come a General Index volume, referring to the whole series.

It is a rule of the British Foreign Office that each dispatch drafted there or in the British Embassies shall be confined to one subject only. The editors have, accordingly, grouped related dispatches together, and have in nearly all cases printed each dispatch in full—here and there in a lengthy dispatch they have omitted a paragraph or two at the end which seemed to add nothing material to the subject. In doing so, they have always indicated the omission.

The Headlam-Morley volume contained a complete series of the dispatches and telegrams bearing on the war crisis, June 28th to August 4th, 1914. Drs. Gooch and Temperley could not have printed all the documents bearing on, for instance, Fashoda, the formation of the Anglo-French *Entente*, Agadir, without swelling the series to an inordinate size. Yet, although they have inevitably followed a process of selection, no reader can fail to appreciate how wide the selection has been. The editors believe that, at any rate in the later

volumes which they have made much bigger than the earlier, they have omitted no document which throws any light on the circumstances that they are investigating. And they likewise feel sure that no document has been deliberately withheld from them. They stated in the preface to the first and second volumes that no objection had been made by the Secretary of State to the publication of any document. Later, in Volume III, they declared, and repeated the declaration in subsequent volumes, that if they suspected the withholding of any document they would at once resign.

Certain collections of private letters, deposited in the Foreign Office, particularly those of Lord Sanderson, Lord Carnock and Lord Grey, have been laid under contribution. The editors have also on occasion given brief extracts from newspapers. They have added to many of the documents terse, explanatory notes of their own. Finally, they have boldly printed the minutes made on the margins of the documents or written supplementary to them by statesmen and officials who read them. In this policy they were anticipated by the editors of the *Grosse Politik* who printed *marginalia*, including the now celebrated interjections of the Kaiser Wilhelm II.

It is not going too far to say that the volumes are models of editing. No praise is too high for the technique applied to the selecting and arranging and the supplying of explanatory notes and bibliographical references.

The first ten volumes (some in two parts) issued by Gooch and Temperley contained a good many surprises and aroused considerable controversy. The editors have even taken the opportunity to clear up certain obscurities in diplomatic history before 1897, for instance Lord Palmerston's objects in helping to make the Maritime Declaration of Paris, 1856; the controversy between Count Karolyi, Austrian Foreign Minister, and Mr. Gladstone in 1880; "Salisbury's very obscure attempt to evade the Belgian guarantee during 1885-7"; and the British-Italian-Austrian Mediterranean Agreement, 1887.

In view of recent controversy over the question whether a Great Power ever negotiates under "now or never conditions," a remark—obviously deliberate, not casual—of the Emperor Wilhelm II may be quoted. To Lieutenant-General Grierson he said at Berlin (November 6th, 1899): "I know

that if this Samoan matter is not settled before it is time for me to leave for England, my Ministers will recommend me not to leave the country." The Samoan matter was settled shortly afterwards. Thereupon the German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed to the British Ambassador, Sir F. Lascelles (February 16th, 1900), "his great satisfaction at the conclusion of the Samoan question," and added—a *quid pro quo* for this concession—that "I need not be uneasy about the action of the German Government with regard to the war in South Africa" (Vol. II, pp. 130-1).

The minutes of King Edward VII are all very brief. As far as they go, they display intelligent interest in foreign affairs and shrewd comment, but they do not indicate that he exercised or wanted to exercise any control whatever. They entirely dissipate the legend that he was the maker of the *Entente Cordiale*. In Volume II, p. xiii, a list of minutes by King Edward is given, so that any reader can judge for himself.

The memoranda printed in these volumes are as illuminating for the general public as for historians. One in particular, written in 1906 by Eyre Crowe, at that time Principal Clerk in the Foreign Office, is quite a treatise on German foreign policy and on Anglo-German relations. It is over twenty-two pages long, and contains over 16,000 words. The editors print it in full in Volume III. Those who charge Crowe with having been actuated by anti-German bias should read this profound historical study, which certainly does not minimise the objectionable aspects of German policy but also contains much generous appreciation. It should be compared with Crowe's very decided and strongly expressed memorandum, dated July 31st, 1914, printed in the Headlam-Morley Volume XI. With this should be read Sir F. Lascelles' magnificent, large-scale character-sketch of the Emperor Wilhelm II, in the Annual Report from the British Embassy in Berlin in 1906 (Volume III, pp. 434-8). Lascelles warned the Government against taking the Emperor's language too seriously. The Emperor once himself said to Lascelles: "You surely know me well enough to translate what I say into diplomatic language." *Metaphorically*, the Emperor might twirl his moustache and rattle his sabre, but Lascelles had never seen him actually do either of these things. The whole sketch is admirable. From time to time Lascelles reports conversations with the Emperor. It should be noted in general that

conversations form one of the most interesting and dramatic features of the whole series. Hardinge's reports of his conversations when he accompanied King Edward VII on visits to the German Emperor or to the Tsar make splendid reading. Volume IX, Part 1, is a great conversation volume—the Kaiser, Bethmann-Hollweg, King Charles of Rumania, Venizelos, Mahmud Shefket Pasha, all speak.

It would be impossible to name any important affair in diplomatic history in which Great Britain was concerned, between 1897 and 1914, which is not illuminated by important documentary material in these volumes. For some things, for instance the making of the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, the documents here published are really the only authority. Besides diplomatic history, the contemporary political and social history of foreign countries is treated informingly in the Annual Reports of the British Ambassadors, instituted in 1906. In Volume V copious extracts are given from the Annual Reports on Turkey for 1906 and 1907. These provide the fullest and most authentic account available of the political structure of the Sultanate on the eve of the Young Turk Revolution. They contain unique sketches of the character and duties of the high officials of the Turkish Court and Administration—among them an unforgettable picture of Tashim Pasha, Chief Secretary of the Palace, a Turk aged 47 in 1906, who with only one day's holiday had served Abdul Hamid throughout a period of twelve years, day and night, Sundays as well as week-days, classifying and submitting to the Sultan the voluminous correspondence of the Sublime Porte, transmitting and receiving all communications to or from the Sultan, dealing with all comers, embassy dragomans, ministers of state, heads of religious communities, naval and military officers, concession hunters, mendicant dervishes, "and getting rid of them all when no order or reply is forthcoming" (Volume V, p. 7).

The scrupulous impartiality with which the documents are left to speak for themselves gives some unexpected results. The German Government, for instance, obtains no mitigation of its responsibility for the gravity of the "Bosnian Crisis" in 1909, but its conduct in the Agadir affair of 1911 produces a less unfavourable impression than is generally accepted in Great Britain. There is a remarkable chapter devoted to the celebrated speech of Lloyd George, July 21st, 1911. This was

a fateful year. The editors print for the first time the frank and impressive speech on foreign affairs made by Sir E. Grey in 1911 to the Dominion Premiers assembled at the Imperial Conference (Volume VI). Readers may ask themselves whether the Governments and peoples of the Empire overseas in 1914 would have rallied to Great Britain with the speed and conviction which they displayed, had it not been for Grey's timely and full exposition in 1911.

Nothing in the whole series has aroused more controversy than the publication of the Hardinge minute appended to a memorandum of Eyre Crowe written in 1908 on the obligation of Great Britain to defend the neutrality of Belgium. Crowe advised that the British Government was liable for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality whenever either Belgium or any of the guaranteeing Powers should need and should demand assistance. Hardinge minuted: "The liability undoubtedly exists as stated above, but whether we could be called upon to carry out our obligation and to vindicate the neutrality of Belgium in opposing its violation must necessarily depend upon our policy at the time and the circumstances of the moment. Supposing that France violated the neutrality of Belgium in a war against Germany, it is, under present circumstances, doubtful whether England or Russia would move a finger to maintain Belgian neutrality, while if the neutrality of Belgium were violated by Germany it is probable that the converse would be the case" (Volume III, pp. 377-8). This was only the opinion of an official. Some critics said that its publication gave a misleading impression of British policy. Others said that its publication would deter officials in the future from really declaring their minds in secret minutes.

Some of the new information in the present volume (X, Part 2) might be called startling or at any rate arresting. The first item of the volume is the facsimile of a letter, in clear, resolute handwriting, from George V to the Foreign Secretary, dated from York Cottage, Sandringham, December 8th, 1912. It begins "My dear Grey," and ends, "Believe me, very sincerely yours, George R.I." It is about a conversation of the King with Prince Henry of Prussia (brother of the Kaiser Wilhelm II) "with regard to the present situation."

He asked me point blank, whether in the event of Germany and Austria going to war with Russia and France, England would come

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or Agreement concerning the Portuguese colonies, in place of the Convention of 1898, was discussed and negotiated patiently in 1912-13, and was initialed on October 20th, 1913. It provided for joint participation of the British and German Governments in any loans that the Portuguese Government should require for its colonies; and also for a clear division of the interests of the British and German Governments in case the Portuguese were willing to cede any colonies. Sir Edward Grey looked forward not to cessions of territory by Portugal but rather to concessions to British and German companies for development of the colonies. The prospects for British and German relations were good, and were, consequently, according to information supplied by Mr. O'Beirne of the St. Petersburg Embassy, regarded with some anxiety by the Russian and French Governments. The Agreement was secret, but its contents were known or shrewdly guessed at. Grey "told M. Cambon roughly the provisions of the Agreement" (Grey to Granville, November 28th, 1913). Grey wanted to publish the Agreement, but felt that he could only do so if he published the Windsor Treaty of 1899, guaranteeing the Portuguese Empire. To such publication the German Government objected, and so Grey, accordingly, agreed to defer publication "for the present." Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, when informed of this by the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, "seemed very grateful." This was on April 21st, 1914. Things were going very well between the two countries.

A very significant conversation, January 6th, 1913, of Sir R. Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, with this same Herr von Jagow, on the point of leaving the German Embassy at Rome for the Secretaryship of State at Berlin, is printed on pages 659-62. Von Jagow felt uncertain about Austria: "She is very difficult to manage because there is a total lack of leadership there." Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister, was, according to Von Jagow, "one of Aehrenthal's mistakes." Von Jagow thought that he saw in the Austrian Empire, rapidly maturing, "all the elements of dissolution." Yet the Austrians were "the only friends we [the Germans] have in Europe." Von Jagow frankly admitted that the bad mutual relations of the British and Germans were largely due to the Germans never having let Great Britain know "what Germany really wants; and to a great extent the reason of

this is that Germany does not know herself." As regards the naval question, Tirpitz was not a politician, and did not want to be one; "but it had become an obsession with him to make his fleet the most perfect instrument that organisation and concentration of purpose could devise." The German Emperor, Von Jagow said, "was more English than the English." His outbursts were really *dépit amoureux*. He told the British Naval attaché at Berlin that the balance of power in Europe was upset "when you ranged yourselves on the side of Russia and France. It was due to my poor Uncle who in a misguided moment was persuaded to sign the Reval agreement and join England to an alliance of two Nations who had offensive agreements against Germany" (p. 701).

In view of the present absence of Japan from concert with the Western Powers, the proposal in July 1914 of Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, for a Triple Guarantee is significant. According to this, the Russian, British and Japanese Governments were to guarantee each others' possessions in Asia. This would have relieved British apprehensions concerning Russian designs in India and possibly in Persia; and it might have proved to be a mutually acceptable substitute for the alliance between Great Britain and Japan to which the United States so much objected. Headlam-Morley first disclosed this proposal in his original volume (*British Documents*, XI). The papers included in Appendix I of the present volume show that the British and Russian Foreign Offices were dealing with the proposal as late as August 9th, 1914, when, presumably, it was set aside on account of the all-absorbing pressure of war affairs.

Some documents which will be very useful to the historian of the Arab movement are contained in Appendix II. The now familiar names of the Sherif Hussein and of his sons Abdullah and Faizal occur. Their attitude towards the Turkish Government and towards Ibn Saud of Nejd is to some extent clarified, as is also that of the British Government towards the Porte and the Arab Movement. Clear proof that Lord Kitchener, in his conversation with Abdullah at Cairo on February 5th, 1914, did not "wink at" the possibility of an Arab revolt is furnished by Abdullah's own account of that conversation, printed on page 832. Abdullah says: "When I asked him to tell me whether, in the event of a rupture, the Sherif could count on any support from Great Britain,

served no useful purpose whatever. When appeals were made to the police authorities they declared that the looting was done by "Communists in Nazi uniform," and that if they were summoned to anybody's help they would quickly respond; but when this advice was acted upon the police delayed their arrival until the looters had time to get away, and then they fined the distracted victims upon the spot 20 schillings for bringing them on a fool's errand. If a Jew declared that he had handed over all his money and jewellery, and the storm troopers, after a reckless search, discovered something more, they carried him off as a punishment. Even large department stores were completely sacked by hordes of uniformed Nazis, who brought motor-lorries to transport their vast booty to their depots.

The methodical and expeditious manner in which this looting was carried out simultaneously in various districts of Vienna and its suburbs, as well as in provincial towns, showed that the raiders must have had prepared lists of names and addresses in advance. Motor-cars belonging to Jews were seized without ceremony, and their owners even received a demand from the garage at which they were kept that they must continue paying the garage and petrol costs as well as the usual tips. The total value of the money and goods stolen throughout the country must have amounted at least to hundreds of thousands of pounds.

The treatment of the authorities of the Jewish Community of Vienna and of Jewish institutions was particularly outrageous. The President and other members of the Executive of the Community, as well as the heads of the lodges of the "Bnei Brith," a purely fraternal organisation, were imprisoned, and three of them were sent to suffer all the torments of the Dachau Concentration Camp. The central offices of the Community were closed, after a sum of 35,000 schillings (about £1,300) was seized by Nazi officials, and thus the administration of a large number of religious and social welfare institutions (hospitals, orphanages and soup kitchens) was paralysed. The entire library of the Jewish Theological Seminary, comprising 10,000 volumes, has been confiscated and removed to some unknown place. The offices of the Zionist Federation, including the Palestine Emigration Office, as well as those of all other Jewish organisations were closed. A Jewish girls' orphanage was evacuated in order to make room for "Aryan" children.

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Kitchener replied negatively, on the plea that British relations with Turkey were friendly, and that in any case the dispute was an internal matter in which it would not be proper for a foreign Power to intervene."

Perusal of the documents in this volume does not give the impression that the international situation was especially dangerous in the first six months of 1914 or that any Government wanted war. Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office are seen as incessantly working to ease tension in every direction. Monarchy, which existed in all the Great European Powers except France, was a helpful source of international contact. An instance of this is a letter printed in the present volume (p. 801-2) from King George V to the Tsar Nicholas II, June 16th, 1914. It must have been written on the advice of Grey, and was obviously meant to reinforce regular negotiations which Buchanan, ambassador at St. Petersburg, had been instructed to open with Sazonov concerning Russo-British relations in Persia. Royal letters had a certain elasticity, friendliness, personal aspect, which official despatches, naturally, could not attain.

While it is clear that the Foreign Office was alert and energetic in working for the removal of tensions wherever it could, a criticism—perhaps the only serious criticism of its method—may be suggested in so far as this peace-keeping method was a *piece-meal* one. This is not to depreciate the effort. Relief of tensions wherever opportunity can be found, line upon line, line upon line, here a little, there a little—is obviously of enormous value in international affairs; yet, unless what is vaguely but not altogether inaccurately called a "general settlement" can be from time to time achieved, tensions are apt to break out in unexpected places and may ruin the whole situation. In 1913-14 the Anglo-German problem was, in its many aspects, in a fair way to being settled: the breakdown came from an entirely unexpected quarter—a semi-domestic Austro-Serbian affair.

The present volume concludes what must be recognised as a great series of documents, conceived on the grand scale, and edited with the most admirable scholarship. Besides the documents themselves, the notes, which are brief but numerous, provide in their references a guide to the diplomatic literature of the whole period.

R. B. MOWAT.

THE DOOM OF AUSTRIAN JEWRY.

THE catastrophe that has befallen the Jews of Austria is only one of the fateful consequences of the German annexation, but it is the one which most fully exposes the Nazi ideology in all its stark barbarity. No sooner had the Germans become masters of the country than they began to vent their hatred of the Jewish population by all the methods that they had perfected during five years of continuous practice in the Reich. When Hitler first became Chancellor he sought to justify his policy of oppressing the Jews by accusing them of having been the rulers over Germany and causing its downfall; but when he invaded Austria and spread terror among its Jewish inhabitants he invented no such pretext, for their political impotence under the prevailing conditions of anti-Semitism was known only too well. Nor was any pretext necessary, for the persecution of the Jewish race is such a cardinal feature of the Nazi programme that, as soon as Dr. Schuschnigg announced his resignation, the Austrian Nazis immediately proceeded to celebrate their triumph by an orgy of violence against the Jews not only in Vienna but also in all other parts of the country. What appeared at first to be a mere outburst of lawlessness owing to the overthrow of the Government continued on a much larger scale and in a much grosser form after the arrival of the German troops and police, and it soon became clear that the Jews were to experience all the afflictions and indignities that had been imposed upon their brethren in Germany. Indeed, their ill-treatment, as of a foreign and vanquished foe, is far more brutal.

With the hoisting of the Swastika there began an organised campaign of Jew-baiting, in which no device calculated to terrorise, injure, impoverish, and humiliate has been left unused. Thousands of Jews have been imprisoned and many sent to a concentration camp for no other reason but that they are Jews. Thousands have been robbed in their houses, flats, shops and offices by storm troopers, who seized whatever money, jewels, and other valuables, as well as any articles of use that could be carried away. The plunderers generally came in gangs of four or more, so as to overcome any resistance and ensure a maximum haul, and they gave a semblance of officialism to their robberies by scribbling a receipt, which

served no useful purpose whatever. When appeals were made to the police authorities they declared that the looting was done by "Communists in Nazi uniform," and that if they were summoned to anybody's help they would quickly respond; but when this advice was acted upon the police delayed their arrival until the looters had time to get away, and then they fined the distracted victims upon the spot 20 schillings for bringing them on a fool's errand. If a Jew declared that he had handed over all his money and jewellery, and the storm troopers, after a reckless search, discovered something more, they carried him off as a punishment. Even large department stores were completely sacked by hordes of uniformed Nazis, who brought motor-lorries to transport their vast booty to their depots.

The methodical and expeditious manner in which this looting was carried out simultaneously in various districts of Vienna and its suburbs, as well as in provincial towns, showed that the raiders must have had prepared lists of names and addresses in advance. Motor-cars belonging to Jews were seized without ceremony, and their owners even received a demand from the garage at which they were kept that they must continue paying the garage and petrol costs as well as the usual tips. The total value of the money and goods stolen throughout the country must have amounted at least to hundreds of thousands of pounds.

The treatment of the authorities of the Jewish Community of Vienna and of Jewish institutions was particularly outrageous. The President and other members of the Executive of the Community, as well as the heads of the lodges of the "Bnei Brith," a purely fraternal organisation, were imprisoned, and three of them were sent to suffer all the torments of the Dachau Concentration Camp. The central offices of the Community were closed, after a sum of 35,000 schillings (about £1,300) was seized by Nazi officials, and thus the administration of a large number of religious and social welfare institutions (hospitals, orphanages and soup kitchens) was paralysed. The entire library of the Jewish Theological Seminary, comprising 10,000 volumes, has been confiscated and removed to some unknown place. The offices of the Zionist Federation, including the Palestine Emigration Office, as well as those of all other Jewish organisations were closed. A Jewish girls' orphanage was evacuated in order to make room for "Aryan" children.

The imprisonment of the Jewish leaders was believed to have been due to their having organised a subscription of 800,000 schillings (about £30,000) in aid of the Schuschnigg plebiscite, an act that was perfectly legal and loyal at the time it was done. In order to expiate their sin, the Nazi authorities demanded that the Community should raise a further contribution of 800,000 schillings as proof that the Jews were just as well disposed towards them as to the former Government, and they refused to permit the reopening of the Community's offices until this monstrous ransom was paid. But after receiving half of this amount, the collection of which took a few weeks, the Gestapo allowed the offices of the Community and of the Zionist Federation to be reopened.

For several weeks the principal synagogue in the Seitenstetten-gasse, where the offices are also situated, was occupied by storm troopers, who desecrated its interior. They dragged Jews who happened to pass by into the building, compelled them to don the silk hats of the wardens, as well as praying-shawl and phylacteries, and, thus attired, to scrub floors, clean windows, brush top-boots, scour lavatories, and sing the *Horst Wessel* song. In other synagogues there were even worse acts of desecration, the interiors being defiled and scrolls of the Torah mutilated or burned. Many Jews were forced to scrub the Schuschnigg crosses that had been painted with some indelible substance on the pavements amid the jeers of the assembled crowds; others had to clean barracks or motor-cars. Such "scrubbing squads," consisting both of men and women, and numbering about a hundred, were formed up in fours and made to march across the bridges of the Danube, with their escort of Nazi bullies yelling at them to do the goose-step. Even a bridal couple coming out of a synagogue were forced to scrub the pavement for hours.

The Jews in Styria and other provincial districts were subjected to similar acts of extortion and humiliation, but worst of all was the fate that befell those in the Burgenland. Over 400 Jews were expelled from Frauenkirchen, Kittsee, Eisenstadt, and other towns, after having been robbed of all their possessions and made to sign statements that they had acquired them dishonestly and surrendered them voluntarily for the benefit of the State. Most of these families had been settled in the Burgenland for generations, many for over 300 years, and at least one for 600 years. Their expulsion was due

to an order from the military authorities in Berlin, that all Jews living within 50 kilometres of the frontiers of Czechoslovakia or Hungary must be removed. But as all frontiers were closed to them, many of those who were unable to flee to Vienna were driven by storm troopers, either on foot or in motor-lorries, into the adjoining territory, from where many of them were forced back again by the gendarmes. Some of these refugees, including greybeards and infants, were hounded like beasts of prey from Austria into Czechoslovakia, from there into Hungary, and then back again into Austria, where they were once more seized by the storm troopers and carried off to some unknown place. One party of refugees was left stranded on a perilous breakwater in the Danube at Theben, in Czechoslovakia, from where they were rescued, but while some found refuge on a French tugboat the greater number were handed back to their original tormentors. Hundreds who had succeeded in reaching Vienna were afterwards arrested and flung into jail.

The Jews of Austria have been doomed to extermination or expulsion, but, before either fate overtakes them, they must submit to pauperisation and degradation. All those employed in any kind of official or public position, whether at universities, law courts, schools, or hospitals, have been dismissed. Only those doctors who are absolutely indispensable have been retained on the insurance panels; pharmacists have been warned that they must transfer their businesses to "Aryans"; and lawyers are afraid to appear in the courts. Theatres and concert-halls, cinemas and cabarets, newspaper offices and publishing houses, have been "purged," for culture in Austria, to which the Jews have hitherto contributed so greatly, is now to become purely "Aryan." All non-Jewish firms have discharged their Jewish employees, numbering tens of thousands, though some of those who could not be replaced were reinstated. All large Jewish industrial establishments and shops have been ordered to employ Nazi "commissars," who control the incoming correspondence and all money affairs; and many business enterprises have already, under compulsion, been transferred to "Aryans." Every non-Jewish shop displays a swastika and a printed notice with the words "Aryan business" or "German-Aryan business," while all Jewish shops, and cafés too, are obstructed by pickets holding placards with the wording "Don't buy from Jews!" Adding

insult to injury, the storm troopers compel Jews themselves, in some cases the very shopkeepers, to act as pickets, while they keep watch ; and for a brief spell even the Chief Rabbi of Vienna was compelled to do picketing duty until relieved by another Jew. All Jewish businesses are eventually to become "Aryanised," and the compulsory transfer will entail heavy losses.

There is no affliction too painful, no indignity too humiliating, no exaction too mean, that the paladins of Nordic *Kultur* do not impose upon their helpless victims. No wonder that hundreds of them have sought refuge in suicide, while the number of supposed suicides that were really murders will never be known. The Nuremberg laws have not yet been formally enacted, but in practice they are being applied in many instances : pressure is being brought to bear upon Christians to divorce their Jewish husbands or wives, and countless tragedies are occurring daily. As in Germany, the Jews are stigmatised as a pest. They are forbidden to visit the public baths in Vienna, they must no longer walk in the Prater (where they were made to do knee-bending exercises), and if they venture to enter a café, whose windows are besmeared with the word "Jude" in large red letters, they risk being ordered by storm troopers to scrub the floor or wash the walls.

The German Government, as Goering and Goebbels have proclaimed, wish the Jews to evacuate Austria, and especially Vienna, within four years. The Jews will require no persuasion to leave ; indeed, they would all flee at once from the Nazi plague. But whither and how ? For weeks past dozens of consulates have been besieged daily by crowds of Jews anxious to obtain visas for other countries : at least 80,000 applications have already been made—for the neighbouring countries in Central Europe, for the free lands of the West, for the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Palestine, and even Paraguay. Over 10,000 applications have been made for Australia alone ; Palestine at present seems to afford little hope owing to the unreasonable restrictions imposed by the Mandatory Government ; and Paraguay is trying to exploit the despair of able-bodied Jews by offering them free land for farming on condition that they are willing to fight in any renewed war with Bolivia. But the Government at present will not allow any Jews to leave. It has enacted a decree

requiring all Jews in Greater Germany to register all their property above the value of 5,000 marks, so that "the Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan can take measures necessary to ensure that the property subject to the special declaration shall be used in harmony with the needs of the Germany economy." The comment of the *Angriff*, the official Party organ, upon this decree, violation of which entails punishment ranging up to ten years' penal servitude, was: "All Jewish fortunes of 5,000 marks or more will now be seized (*Times*, April 28th)." A more liberal interpretation, also derived from an authoritative source (*Manchester Guardian*, May 2nd), is that the Jews will be compelled to sell their businesses, in order that they may be completely eliminated from economic life, and the proceeds will be invested in State bonds, which it will not be permissible to sell abroad, and would, therefore, have to be left behind—or realised at a loss—by those who emigrate. Thus, in either case the effect will be that the Jews will be fleeced before they can quit the country.

According to the census of 1934 there were 191,000 Jews in Austria. There are now about 185,000, of whom 170,000 are in Vienna. They have for years been a dying community, for in 1923 there were over 200,000 in Vienna alone. A high death-rate, a low birth-rate, increasing unemployment, growing poverty, and a steady emigration, have produced their effect. Before the Nazi invasion there were 25,000 Jews in Vienna unemployed and about 60,000 dependent upon the Board of the Community, which spent 40 per cent. of its budget upon their relief. Over half of the Jews were engaged in trade and one-fifth in the liberal professions and similar vocations. Owing to their practically total exclusion from the Government and municipal services, their intellectual class was largely attracted to the liberal professions, in which they numbered 1,300 lawyers and 1,500 doctors.

The problem of finding new homes for all these prospective exiles, whose numbers will be increased by the addition of tens of thousands of "non-Aryan Christians," will therefore prove far more difficult than was the task of settling the Jewish refugees from Germany, especially as the capacity of some countries to absorb more intellectual workers is doubtful. And the process of impoverishment, due to looting, forced contributions, compulsory sale of business, surrender of property for the benefit of the Four-Year Plan, and

"flight-tax," will certainly cripple the Jews in their efforts to secure admission to other lands, and throw an added burden upon Jewish relief organisations abroad. The International Conference which President Roosevelt is convening to consider the problem cannot, therefore, meet too soon or act too generously. The States taking part must set an example of hospitality; and Palestine, in regard to which the Jews were officially assured years ago that they were there "as of right and not on sufferance," must open its gates wide despite the opposition of the Arab terrorists.

The Jews of Austria have deserved a better fate, for they have served their country well and loyally, with all their talents and industry. For the past two hundred years they have played an important part in its national life, and made valuable contributions in every field of activity. They have helped to create its culture, to further its economic development, to advance its fame. Although less than 3 per cent. of the population, they have received four of the eight Nobel prizes awarded to Austrians. They have made Vienna celebrated as a school of medicine, with names like Baranyi, Neumann, Pick, and Neuburger. They have given to philosophy the genius of Freud, to literature Schnitzler and Stefan Zweig, to music Mahler and Bruno Walter, to the theatre Max Reinhardt and Hugo von Hoffmansthal. They developed the Vienna press and were among the leading publishers. They were also pioneers in the economic sphere, for they introduced a number of leading industries, built the first railway, from Vienna to Brünn and Cracow, and initiated the transport of goods by steamships on the Danube.

But all their manifold labours have been in vain. The Nazi Government has pronounced their doom, and the once gay and glamorous capital of the Habsburgs has been reduced to a haunt of terror. The League of Nations, by the Treaty of St. Germain, was pledged to safeguard the civil rights of the Jews, as of other minorities, in Austria, but is impotent to help them. For the Jews are the victims of a brutal and fanatical power, ruthless and aggressive, that knows neither law nor justice, neither truth nor honour. But they are not its only victims: the foundations of civilisation itself are being slowly destroyed.

VERAX.

Strange to say, there are Hungarian nationalists who do not mind the artificial creation of a minority question, nor even the Germanic reinterpretation of Hungarian history and civilisation. Yet Oedenburg and the minority question are but small matters. Germany is generally expected to line up against Czechoslovakia, and indeed the campaign has already started by different sorts of pressure. Hungary's territory would be needed for such German action. Proposals in this sense are said to have been put before the Hungarian Premier and the Foreign Minister, Darányi and de Kánya, when they visited Berlin early this year, and apparently they refused the German demand for an air force base in Hungary. In case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia Hungary may turn into a new Belgium, with the difference that Nazism prepares invasions by propaganda and carries them out by pseudo-patriots.

The usual themes of propaganda are anti-Semitism and the Nazi conception of a tribal nation, which have their effect on basic instincts. In Hungary the brutal tone and localised excesses became so general after the invasion of Austria that the subtle Transylvanian aristocrat and former Premier, Count Bethlen, thought a stern warning in Parliament necessary :

The next five years will decide the Danubian question. . . . If these years do not find in Hungary a united society, an energetic and lawful government and law-abiding citizens, conscious of their duties towards the nation, Hungary may perish. The present right-wing government would do well to fix a line between their own right-wing character and the right-wing revolution of conspirators against the laws and the constitution.

The Agrarian deputy Tibor Eckhardt did not hesitate to add that "this line of discrimination ought to be, if necessary, a barbed wire defended by machine-guns." The Regent Horthy, abandoning the usual reserve imposed upon the head of a state, appeared at the microphone to reassure "the country driven into panic by strange rumours." The economic activities in which Jews and semi-Jews play such an important part have nearly stopped, and without the strongly worded appeal of the Regent to the Army and the authorities to keep order the prospects even of the immediate future appeared dark. It is, however, no secret that the lower ranks of the administration are penetrated by Nazism and that

even the honest, clear-sighted but not very strong Darányi Government has been divided between two tendencies.* To some Cabinet Ministers willingness to play the part of Seyss-Inquart is attributed. The Regent interpreted the acts of aggression in recent years not as "aggression" but as a "drive towards a more just division of the world, a task in which the League of Nations failed." Thus he made it clear that, if on the one hand Hungary fears the German control over herself, she hopes for the rearrangement of the map to her own profit through Germany's assistance. As Princess Odescalchi-Andrássy, a leading Catholic, points out in a letter to the liberal paper *Magyar Hírlap* :

it counts as Hungarian patriotism to attack Czechoslovakia, while the same Hungarian patriots are friendly towards the two other states which took Hungarian territory, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The reason for this duplicity is not Hungarian national interest but the interest of the axis policy.

When another Catholic and Conservative with an equally historic name, Count George Széchenyi, expressed in Parliament his sympathy for Dr. Schuschnigg and "the loyal working class of what was till recently our friend, the Austrian Federal State," he was politely stopped by the Speaker. Moreover, "Jewish legislation" is being introduced rationing the employment of Jews. These features of the régime, the duplicity of foreign policy, the authoritative limits imposed not upon Nazi propagandists but upon their critics, the tendency to gratify Nazism by concessions, are matters of grave concern.

The "Jewish legislation" was certainly a grudging concession by a liberal-minded Premier. Though comparatively mild, it affects economic life, depriving Hungary of sympathies, and is a dangerous abandonment of civil equality. The Hungarian Jews are very often completely assimilated, being old settlers and useful citizens. As a whole they are less assimilated than the British or French Jews, but much more than the Jewry of Poland or Rumania. In Eastern Europe the contrast between town and countryside is striking. The Jews are mostly town folk both in social position and mentality, and this is all that can be said in fairness about them, or

* Since the above was written, the former Minister of Commerce, M. Imredy, has succeeded M. Darányi. Events will show whether the new government can fight Nazism more energetically. The dilemma described above is, however, likely to remain.

against them. The same objection against town folk in a peasant country may apply to German burghers who are the asset of Nazi propaganda. Supposing an ethnic minority is necessarily a national peril, are 500,000 Jews with no coherent nation behind them really a greater danger than 300,000 Germans backed by a neighbouring Great Power? Such a question would be logical, but Nazism appeals not to logic but to envy, credulity, obscurantism and atavism.

For what end? For German hegemony over Europe? No lesser goal seems credible for such immense efforts, for such frenzy and fanaticism. Greater Germany needs an agrarian basis extending down to the Ukraine, and a way to the three seas, the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, an old aim of German expansionism. Hungary is situated on the route of this "*Drang nach Osten*." Can she escape her fate? Whatever one may think of her present régime, the disappearance of her independence, cultural traditions and character would be a loss to Europe. The Government ought to be encouraged to stand firm, the more so if it is hesitating. So should the people, of which the best heads certainly understand Hungary's mission. Every further step by Germany southwards or eastwards may provoke a counter-move by Russia, who cannot passively await Germany's coming to her door. No reasonable person can welcome this eventuality. None can desire for Danubian Europe the fate of a battlefield between the two Powers. Britain, with her past struggles for the freedom of the seas, cannot be indifferent to the question of supremacy on three seas.

Two immediate steps, one political and one economic, may yet stop Germany's push in this dangerous direction and uphold peace. Into the East European system of the Little Entente and Balkan Entente, Poland and Hungary should enter by a third pact. A neutral *bloc* between Germany and Russia could protect the latter against aggression: aggression in the opposite sense is unlikely. The Little Entente has largely lost its meaning. It was originally intended to prevent a Habsburg restoration. This eventuality no longer exists. Prague's acceptance of it as a "lesser evil" would, however, have given a chance to those pro-Nazis in Belgrade and Bucharest who advocate their countries' release from Little Entente obligations. Yet the three States appreciate the advantage of the Little Entente which made

of them a joint Great Power. As to the Balkan Entente, it is one of the few lasting solutions in Europe.

When the Habsburg Monarchy was split up, Europe believed in the ethnographical principle, in the peacefulness of peoples united and left alone. Now it is proved that it serves and must needs serve Germany's purpose, she being numerically the largest nation. Not the ethnographic principle alone but its combination with historical realities holds out prospects. The historical national principle offers a hope for Hungary. Her great aspiration is the saving of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. She can achieve it through coming to terms with Rumania within an East European *bloc*. If it is difficult for Hungarian Székels to become Rumanians, there is no difficulty for them to be Transylvanians in an autonomous province, an old historical and cultural entity, that eastern Switzerland of three nations, Rumanians, Magyars and Germans, called Transylvania. Such a province would offer a prospect also to 400,000 Transylvanian Saxons, who otherwise are an easy prey to Pan-Germanism and a potential danger for Rumania by serving as a German pretext against Rumania.

The other, economic, step should be an action by Britain. Germany's offer of economic advantages to South-Eastern nations is a danger, while Britain's offer would be a gain for Peace—even if financially there were no substantial gain for Britain. If Western policy is based on a larger and deeper vision of history and of Europe, there is hope. If it degenerates into a policy of expediciencies called "realism," everything is lost. Hungary celebrates this year the ninth centenary of the death of St. Stephen, the founder of her Christian realm. This king, to whom Pope Sylvester II sent the legendary crown in the millenary year of Christendom, wrote a famous book to teach his son Emmerich the duties of a Christian prince. In his *Admonitions* he advises the young prince to receive foreigners hospitably into his kingdom, leaving them their language and their habits, "because a realm of the same language and the same habits is imbecile and fragile." Nine hundred years after this great converted barbarian spoke thus an unheard-of effort is made by neo-barbarians on the border of his Hungary to build a monster realm of the "same language and the same habit." "*Imbecile et fragile est*," replies the Holy King.

BÉLA MENCZER.

FINLAND: DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY.

AT a time when there is so much ideological conflict among the nations, when the terms "Fascism," "Democracy" and "Communism" are hurled about with little conception of their real meaning, it is specially interesting to watch what is happening in the Finnish democracy which has in fact succeeded in steering a course midway between the two extremes. The Republic of Finland has just celebrated the twentieth anniversary of her independence. During these years the fight against Communism, which was never serious after the war of 1918, has ended with the exclusion of Communists from parliamentary representation. On the other hand, any tinge of so-called Fascism that emerged from the Lapua Movement against Communism remains a negligible quantity in the country to-day. Finland is a country where democracy has been most successful, and may be regarded as a model in this respect. The fact that the Finns are a highly educated peasant people has prevented any real class distinctions; and this, combined with the absence of any great wealth and comparatively no poverty, has greatly contributed to the solidarity of the nation. But this is not to say that the Finnish system of government has succeeded simply because of its democratic label. It has succeeded because the Finns have chosen a form of government specially suitable to their needs and capabilities.

The co-operative movement, which is probably more successful and more advanced in Finland than anywhere else, is an example of the Finns' capacity to obtain the best results by united effort. The co-operative societies have the wholehearted support of the farmers, who obtain by this means better prices for their produce, while the consumers benefit from cheaper distribution. The agricultural producers are also encouraged to increase their financial returns by payments based on quality as well as quantity. The people are naturally suited to such a system, by which they achieve better results than would otherwise be possible. The standard of living in Finland is high, yet the cost of living is low compared with British prices. The housing accommodation for town workers is very good, and it is interesting to note that the large industrial enterprises have done much to bring this

about. Many of the buildings are provided by the employers, and in some cases land for cultivation by the workers is also supplied. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the newest dwelling-houses in the towns and rural centres of industry are for comfort among the best in Europe.

The trade union movement is not yet so far advanced as in other Scandinavian countries. This is partly due to the fact that industrial labour (about 60 per cent. of the people are employed in agriculture) is a comparatively recent development; but it is also a result of the young trade unions taking part in politics and suffering from the mistakes of the Social-Democratic and Communist parties of earlier days. Although unemployment during the world depression of 1931-2 affected nearly 6 per cent. of the workers in various trades, the number of unemployed in the last three years has been negligible. This is due to the relatively small proportion of industrial workers in an agricultural country. Unemployment benefit has therefore never been found necessary, although the newly constituted trade unions assist unemployed members on occasions when unemployment is caused by strikes. Until recently the only form of compulsory insurance in Finland was that relating to accidents, and this only applies to those employed on manual labour. In this category the whole cost of insurance is paid by the employer, but there is no provision for those who work with their brains. Nor is there any scheme for insurance against sickness. This deficiency is never met by means of private funds and societies, and in case of sickness a worker is further entitled under the Labour Contract Law to wages corresponding to the period of notice in his particular trade up to a maximum of fourteen days' pay. The form of insurance to which the Finns attach most importance at present is that for old age and disablement, for which there is now a law making this form of insurance compulsory for everyone from the age of 18 onwards. In this question of insurance, as well as in social services, the Finns have advanced ideas; and no visitor to Finland fails to be impressed by the up-to-date public institutions for the welfare of the people. This is largely due to the high cultural level of the people, who take a great interest in all social questions.

Finland's economic policy is based on the belief that countries benefit more from the free exchange of goods than by

attempts to attain self-sufficiency by restrictions of all kinds. As in 1936 her imports amounted to over £28,000,000 and her exports to over £31,000,000, her trade balance was on the right side. In the same way there never have been any restrictions on currency or commercial exchange, and this freedom of trade has encouraged private enterprise to put forward its best efforts even during the most difficult years of trade depression. Yet Finland was compelled to follow the other Scandinavian countries in abandoning the gold standard. This, however, had the effect of stabilising the currency, which has remained steady ever since. Although as independent as any country in Europe, and more independent than many, this northern republic essentially forms part of the peace-loving Scandinavian family, whose political, economic and cultural interests are intimately bound up with one another.

Before turning to the question of foreign policy let us consider the reasons why Finland strongly favours a policy of peace. To begin with, a population of about 3,980,000 with under ten inhabitants to the square kilometre is not one of the factors that give rise to thoughts likely to lead to warlike designs. In addition to this, the Finns live in the sixth largest country in Europe, and have never yet experienced anything as land shortage. Although a considerable part of the country lies north of the Arctic Circle and there is much land unsuitable for cultivation, there is an adequate amount of undeveloped but cultivable land to meet the natural increase of the population. Another point to remember is that Finland's principal source of wealth lies in timber, in which there has been less over-production than in most other industries. There is therefore no struggle for new markets, while a sufficiency of raw materials precludes the necessity of looking for them elsewhere. Geographically the country has a seaboard adequate for its maritime needs, and for defensive purposes is more favourably placed than many others. Above all, a people vitally dependent on their exports cannot but be gravely apprehensive of anything that would hamper international trade. "Peace" is therefore the watchword of Finnish foreign policy.

Hence the most striking characteristic of Finnish foreign policy is a desire to keep out of all groupings of Powers which might involve the country in conflict arising out of interests

and disputes that do not concern the Finnish people in their isolated northern position. This is specially the case with regard to the present critical state of European affairs brought about by ideological groupings. In Finland, where freedom of thought has long been regarded as the birthright of the people (this applies to all the North European countries), the rise to power in a foreign country of the representatives of any particular political thought in no way affects the general attitude of the nation towards that country. The Finns believe in minding their own business and in leaving others to mind theirs. It is this way of thinking by all sections of the Finnish people that forms the foundation on which Finland's foreign policy is firmly based. But in the appreciation of the wisdom of such a policy Finland does not stand alone. Her views are shared by the other Scandinavian countries, whose neutrality policies have already become traditional. Hence the Finnish desire to maintain neutrality in all circumstances has brought her, also with regard to foreign policy, into the closest co-operation with her Scandinavian neighbours. Although this Scandinavian orientation of Finland was formally declared only a few years ago, when it was unanimously approved by the Finnish Parliament, it is only one of the many forms of co-operation which have long existed between the peoples of Northern Europe. Such collaboration in most spheres of life is only natural among people with no outstanding disputes to settle, with a common religion and history, and with similar legislative, administrative, economic, judicial and social conditions. Furthermore, their Scandinavian languages (Swedish is the second language of Finland) are so similar that the peoples have little difficulty in understanding one another.

A striking feature of this political collaboration between the North European countries is the absence of written treaties or pacts, which are regarded as superfluous and even undesirable in some ways. But this does not mean that the Scandinavian peoples have lost faith in written agreements and regard them as mere "scraps of paper." It is an outcome of the fact that these countries co-operate so naturally and with such general approval on all sides that there is nothing to be gained by written documents. Moreover, their absence gives more elasticity to a form of collaboration solely based on common interests and historical facts, and leaves the way open for changes in method of execution as circumstances demand.

There are already signs that any deterioration of the international situation has the effect of tightening up this commercial orientation of the north. Furthermore, it is owing to initiative from this common source that the "Oslo Group" came into being—now consisting of the North European countries, Holland, Belgium, and in a sense Switzerland, but open to other countries that may wish to participate. While its primary object is to facilitate international trade, the group is also referred to as the "Group of Neutral Countries" which also confer on questions of a purely political nature.

There remains to record the relations between Finland and certain individual countries where she has interests of various kinds. Ever since the conclusion in 1920 of the Treaty of Dorpat, successive Finnish governments of different political views have all without exception tried to develop the most friendly relations with Russia as with all other countries, and to-day there are no outstanding questions on either side. In spite of these continued efforts, there have appeared from time to time in Russian and other foreign newspapers reports that Finland has entered into some kind of agreement with certain great Powers against Russia. In this there is no truth whatever, as is obvious from the Finnish policy already outlined, and as is shown by the official visit to Moscow of M. Holsti, the Finnish Foreign Minister, in February of last year. On this occasion M. Holsti had the opportunity of discussions with the political leaders of the U.S.S.R. on various questions that might benefit from exchanges of view, and these conversations were conducted in a friendly spirit. This visit also had the effect of showing the world that Finland sincerely desires to preserve good relations with Russia, and since then mutual confidence has improved. Unfortunately certain frontier incidents from the Russian side have given a check to Finnish confidence; but, however regrettable these incidents may be, the Finnish Government will not permit these incidents to check their continuous efforts to bring Finnish-Russian relations into line with the good relations existing between Finland and other countries.

Finland has always been on the best terms with her southern neighbours in the Baltic States, especially with Estonia. Estonia is Finland's opposite number across the water, and the two peoples are closely tied by bonds of history and language. Also, Finland's relations with Poland have

always been most friendly and satisfactory in every way. Between Finnish and German ports there has long been much coming and going. Next to Great Britain, Finland's best customer is Germany, who not only buys a large quantity of goods from the ever-growing industries of Finland, but also takes from her a considerable amount of agricultural produce, on the export of which the Finnish peasants depend to a considerable degree. On the other hand Finland buys machinery, etc., in important quantities from Germany. But perhaps the most interesting feature of Finnish-German relations is the fact that the advent to power of an autocratic form of government in Germany has in no way affected Finland's friendly relations with a country that is governed on purely autocratic lines. An appreciation of this is to be found in the reception given to the Finnish Foreign Minister when he visited Berlin last year.

Relations with Great Britain are, specially from an economic point of view, the most important of all; for we are Finland's best customer. But Anglo-Finnish relations are also based on the fact that the Finns have got into the way of regarding Great Britain with her smooth-running parliamentary system as a safeguard for democracy in its various forms throughout the world. These considerations have not only intensified the confidence of the Finns in Britain at a time when the autocratic form of government finds favour in many countries, but they have produced in Finland an increasing desire to know more about British economic, cultural and social conditions. In recent years great efforts have been made, specially among the younger Finns, to learn the English language; and this has received quite an important stimulus from the ever-increasing number of British visitors to Finland. At the Coronation last year, Finland was represented by the Foreign Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Prominent among those who have worked for a high standard of friendship between Great Britain and Finland is Field-Marshal Baron Mannerheim, President of the Finnish Council of Defence, who has paid many visits to England and other parts of the Empire. On this side another distinguished soldier, Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh, has, as President of the Anglo-Finnish Society in London, devoted much of his time through a long period of years to the fostering of mutual co-operation and friendship.

Among the factors which have in recent years helped to increase the interest of the Finns in the Anglo-Saxon world is the friendship and sympathy shown them by the United States. As in recent decades hundreds of thousands of Finnish emigrants have made their new homes across the Atlantic, it naturally follows that there should be a great number of ties of personal relationship binding the two countries together. Finnish blood ties with the United States date back to the foundation of the settlement at Delaware, where the Finnish Government will be represented at the tercentenary celebrations this year.

As far as other countries are concerned, an important recent development has been the growth of interest in Finnish progress during the last ten years. This progressive northern State is attracting more and more attention from the states of Central and Southern Europe, as shown by the increasing number of visitors from these countries in recent years. With France cultural relations have been established since the Middle Ages, when Finnish professors held high positions in the University of Paris, and this mutual interest has been maintained. With Italy there has lately been a development of cultural relations both on the part of the Finns and by Italian professors who have been sent to Finland.

As the present disputes that divide Europe against herself do not really concern Finland, her official attitude, as well as that of public opinion generally, is as a matter of course one of passive reserve. The only aspects of the Spanish civil war that have interested the Finns in any way have been the threat to the general peace of Europe, interference with Finnish-Spanish trade, and such minor inconveniences as have been caused to their merchant shipping. Otherwise this conflict of ideologies has no repercussions in Finland, where the people have more sense than to get all heated up over a quarrel that is no concern of theirs. Of still less concern to Finland is the trouble in the Far East.

Here is a nation of highly educated peasant people of the hard-thinking and cool-headed variety, who have chosen for themselves a form of democracy which has in Finland produced the very best results. They are satisfied ; they preach nothing ; they are content to practise the virtue of minding their own national business to their own benefit and that of their neighbours and friends.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

CREATIVE EDUCATION.

LET me first try to define what I mean by Creative Education, which, when properly understood and practised, may prove to be the most important advance in modern times in public school and secondary education. The term, as I use it, means the use of a wide range of manual and noble activities as definite instruments of spiritual, physical and intellectual education. Until recently manual activities in public schools were frequently regarded with suspicion, were generally non-existent, and in many schools were at least little more than an unimportant "extra" for the boys who desired them. Even now this position is unchanged in a great number of public schools. It is also particularly to be regretted that in many schemes of reorganisation undertaken by public bodies in connection with secondary education some schools are maintained on an almost exclusively academic basis, whilst the higher types of elementary schools, such as the senior and central schools, have a more liberal curriculum so far as creative activities are concerned. What has still to be generally recognised is that creative activities are essential accompaniments to all forms of education. In the not distant future they will play a greater part not only in the schools but in the universities.

I can best illustrate my meaning by describing briefly some of the methods followed at Bembridge. Every boy during the whole of his school life is taught the use of tools. His timetable includes a regular weekly period, usually lasting for half a school day, in the arts and crafts rooms. He makes, in co-operation with others, simple, useful things for common use, and is given whatever expert help is necessary to enable him to express his own sense of craftsmanship and reach a high level of work. In the free parts of his time and on his half-holidays, every boy may go voluntarily to the arts and crafts rooms, and there design and make anything which he desires and have expert assistance in doing this. In this way there has been brought into the life of every boy in the school a large number of good hobbies and interests. These have naturally led, as boys leave school, to noble interests in life, and it is possible to record certain definite conclusions as a result of the work which has been carried on. The more important of these are as follows :

1. It has been found that the practice of manual activities has a definite influence upon the intellectual development of the boy. It is very good for the most intellectual, for it brings a balancing factor into their lives. It is very good for the boy who may not be particularly good at intellectual work in its narrower scope, for the method helps him with his intellectual work and enables him to keep his self-respect. Not only the hand and eye but the brain is being trained.

2. The work brings great joy into a boy's life. A busy boy is a happy boy, and a happy boy is a good boy in the real meaning of the word. Under the system adopted, a boy is enabled to realise in some degree his own aptitudes, and ultimately expresses himself in his work.

3. The system enables a boy unconsciously to attain an appreciation of real values in life and gives him standards of judgment. It enables him to place games in a proper perspective, and, whilst not interfering in the least degree with his love for them, it helps him to bring into and keep in his life other and more permanent interests.

Our own school is near the sea with the greater life that it means for all its members. I suppose it would be difficult to over-estimate the happiness brought into the lives of youth by the activities possible in and on the sea. But let me give one instance of what Creative Education means in this connection. Our boys, trained regularly in the use of tools, in the principles of construction and in true craftsmanship, turn naturally in their spare time to create the things they want for their own use and pleasure, and these things naturally include boats and canoes. On half-holidays the school bay is gay with little fleets of canoes, each paddled or sailed by its owner-maker.

Let me briefly describe what the building of a canoe means in the life of a boy. The making of it forms a splendid hobby for him in winter evenings, bringing him great happiness. He is increasing his powers of craftsmanship, for the building of a canoe requires sincere and careful work. It is in a broad sense a piece of work which gives him standards of criticism and appreciation of what constitutes true beauty. A boat is one of the most beautiful things made by man. It achieves beauty by the absence of needless ornamentation, by being constructed solely with a view to its function, and by its craftsmanship. Even the making of a canoe enables a boy to realise these things and to get a little understanding of the

vital principles of beauty. When the canoe is finished another part of its influence comes into play for, if the boy has not already done so, he must obtain a certificate of honour by swimming half a mile in the open sea. This is a condition of his being able to use the canoe at all. A boy who can swim half a mile in a fresh sea has a splendid training in courage and resourcefulness, and has permanently added to his equipment for life. The use of the canoe on the sea is not only a constant delight, but it is associated with other good hobbies in the life of the boy. He uses it, for instance, to go on photographic expeditions, to paint the rocks off Culver, to study the life of sea birds, to add to the records in his commonplace book. Here then you have a striking example of what one item of creative work means in the life of the individual boy.

At Bembridge drawing is taught to every boy at every stage of his school life. If he enters at the age of 7 and leaves at 19 nothing has ever interrupted his work in drawing and allied subjects. Drawing should not be taught at school with the object of making boys professional painters. It should be taught to give them the opportunity of giving expression to their creative faculties. It is perhaps equally important in the case of young boys as it is in the case of older boys. But the technique of young boys and of older boys is different in vital respects, and masters responsible for guiding them must recognise this difference and be sympathetic towards forms of expression which might at first appear strange and incoherent.

I have sometimes been asked whether every boy is capable of drawing, and I have replied that I have never met a normal boy who could not be taught to draw. My friend, Donald Maxwell, who has enriched life with so many drawings of landscapes and buildings and was one of the pioneers in connection with the decorative posters which do something to redeem even the squalor of the English railway station, confirmed my own experience. Everyone, he told me on one occasion, could be taught to draw what was seen provided it was stationary. He told me an experience of his own. He had made an after-dinner speech and had expressed this view. A retired Colonel sitting next to him had listened to him incredulously. "Do you mean to tell me," he asked at a later stage of the proceedings, "that I could learn to draw at the age of 60?" "Certainly," replied Maxwell; "I am willing

to prove to you the truth of my observation." There was further conversation and argument. The two men were friends and Maxwell arranged to give the Colonel a demonstration lesson the following morning. The room in which it took place overlooked a cathedral and the pupil was told to begin to draw it. He was to begin at one end and to draw exactly what he saw. "But," said he, "I only see a straight line." "Then draw it," said Maxwell; "if it looks to you quite straight you can rule it." "Would that be quite the thing to do?" asked the Colonel. "Certainly," said Maxwell; "this is not a lesson in morals." The experiment went on, and was successful; the Colonel was convinced of his power to draw and pursued his new interest with enthusiasm. Maxwell ended his account of this incident by declaring that a year later the Colonel sent one of his drawings to the Royal Academy where it was accepted and exhibited. I will not answer for this final flourish, but the rest of the story is true.

The values of the regular practice of art as an essential part of the school curriculum are many. I should like to summarise them. The power of observation is developed and the student is enabled to see life from new angles. It is not an exaggeration to say that he acquires new powers of understanding which help him not only in many other subjects but in his life as a whole. His work in drawing would include, for instance, nature study with its records of flowers and trees, birds and animals and the other wonders of the natural world. He thus acquires not only a knowledge of nature but a love of beauty and an understanding and sympathy which he could probably acquire in no other way. As he becomes conscious of his own powers and of the interest of the new world he has entered, he experiments in all kinds of ways and brings constant enrichment to his own life. He is able to relate the subject to other interests and studies, architecture, literature, design of common things in common life.

It is natural that boys should be led on from their practical work in art to be interested in pictures generally and in the art of other countries. My own experience has been that boys eagerly avail themselves of the opportunity to examine great pictures and to study the lives and times of great painters. All branches of the work in art are greatly helped by the foundation of two art galleries at the school. These contain not only a great collection of original drawings

by Ruskin, but also works by other great painters including Albert Goodwin, Walter Crane, Sir Edward Burne-Jones, Arthur Severn, Edward Clifford, and T. M. Rooke.

These galleries are open for boys to visit singly or in little groups. Every Sunday afternoon, for instance, receptions are held there, and all boys are invited in turn to visit them then, apart from other occasions. The attempt is made to teach boys how to use an art gallery. They are not invited to make themselves familiar with all the contents of the galleries at one visit, but some detail of the subject of art is taken. The boys have one or two pictures explained to them, and, by being taken along gently, lose their shyness of pictures. By understanding one artist, or a great picture of one painter, they acquire a key with which they can gradually unlock other rooms in the mansion of art.

Not only are pictures shown in these galleries, but an attempt has been made to furnish the galleries with examples of practically all the arts of civilised man. Thus there are examples of old oak furniture, wood-carving, sculpture, pottery, metal-work, stained glass, writing, bookbinding. Everything in the galleries has been made by either old or modern craftsmen. A boy is therefore able to see examples of simple, beautiful things, and to live amongst them. He has explained to him from time to time some of the principles of beauty, and is thus able to cultivate his own taste and judgment.

We have a private printing press at Bembridge, which has been a great cultural influence. All boys up to a certain form have one or two periods a week in school time in the printing room. It forms a very pleasant change from the ordinary work of the form rooms. The boys regard it as a time of sheer joy and it is all to the good that they do. But the period spent with the press is also directly educational. Boys set up on the same hand press which Morris used for the Kelmscott books things they have written themselves or their friends have written. It increases their interest in literary activities. They learn to spell correctly unconsciously, for they set up letter by letter and correct their mistakes. They add to their standards of taste, for they set up according to the old principles introduced when printing was discovered and never bettered since. These principles affect margins, purity of type, relation of the type to the page, and other things which every educated person should be able to appreciate.

Perhaps not the least of the advantages of a private press is that it offers boys a little window through which to look upon the world of industry. They know something, at least, of one of the great crafts of civilisation. Every term the boys produce on their press a large, handsomely printed magazine. It includes examples of their work in art, and particularly woodcuts, designed, cut and printed by themselves. There is, therefore, a synthesis about all this work which makes it extremely valuable from an educational standpoint, as well as from a human one.

Space compels me to omit any detailed reference to other manual activities in the scheme of Creative Education, such as pottery—so useful for teaching the beauty of form and colour—the making of scientific and other models to illustrate school work in the form rooms; the decoration of rooms by friezes and other schemes undertaken in fellowship; practical work in the playing fields. I ought however at least to record that creative work is not confined to manual activities. Many literary experiments have been carried out. A group of boys undertook the study of various aspects of the district of which the school is the centre. Its history in Roman times was studied by one boy, its bird life by another, its literature by another, its geology by another. Regular meetings were held to discuss the results, and ultimately the collected papers were published under the title of *Bembridge: An Historical and Social Survey*, by the Oxford University Press. Not very long ago the boys of one form published a book entitled *A Form Room Fellowship*. It included poems, stories, essays and travel records, and was wholly the unaided work of the contributors. This book excited considerable attention both here and abroad. Another literary experiment was the bringing together of a number of papers on scientific subjects, under the general title of *Adventures in Science*, by the boy members of the Scientific Society. This book not only dealt with a number of scientific questions, including modern developments of science, but it contained a large number of illustrations done by the boys. Many other similar schemes have been carried out. They stand for a great amount of interest in intellectual things, and have encouraged the pursuit and love of literature.

It may be claimed without exaggeration that under a system of Creative Education a boy acquires a range of intelligent and satisfying hobbies with which his life is enriched.

These naturally lead to noble interests as a man. So far from hindering they greatly help his intellectual work and assist his success in formal examinations (we are proud of our own successes in these). They develop his personality in every way—not least in widening the range of his sympathies—especially by bringing him into touch with the spirit of the great creative workers of other ages and other lands. I think, too, he will be saved in this way from falling a victim to the mass mind. I suppose that one of the greatest creative workers in the history of mankind was Michelangelo. Four and a half centuries after his birth the civilised world still finds inspiration in the works of the man who brought life to stone and expressed with his mallet the sorrow and the hope of mankind ; who influenced a people with his paintings and made deathless the fame of the building which contains them ; who as an architect vitally influenced the buildings of Europe, and was withal a poet and philosopher holding fast to the cause of truth. Is it not worth while to remember that this man from his earliest years was fortunate in being under a system of natural creative education ? As a little motherless boy he was taken care of by the wife of a stonemason and found his chief joy in attempting to express his feelings and ideas by practising on stone with the mason's tools. Later he was able to see as a youth the finest work in all branches of creative art which was then being produced in Italy. He was able to develop his gifts and to experiment in nearly all of them. He thus preserved his own individuality. The influence of his practical work, aided by the constant stimulus around him to unite it with spiritual and intellectual adventure, produced the greatest inspiring genius of the age.

We are not setting out to produce a race of Michelangelos. Our object is a humbler one ; it is to give to our youth the environment and the opportunity to preserve their individuality, to develop their potential gifts and to acquire through the work of mind and hand a sense of final values. They may become members of a great brotherhood, which began centuries ago, and add to their academic equipment the sympathy, toleration, and love of truth which come to those who seek through their own work to add to the beauty of the world in human life and achievement.

J. HOWARD WHITEHOUSE,

Warden of Bembridge School, Isle of Wight.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BULGARIA.

WHILE the wave of Fascism is sweeping over the world with increased violence, the Bulgarian people are striving to re-establish the rule of democracy. After four years of a semi-dictatorial régime Bulgaria is again on the threshold of parliamentary government. During March general elections took place and 160 representatives of the people were returned. It is interesting to discover the grounds on which King Boris held the elections, and to estimate the result.

In his Introduction to Bagehot's *The English Constitution* Lord Balfour remarks: "Constitutions are easily copied, temperaments are not; and if it should happen that the borrowed constitution and the native temperament fail to correspond, the misfit may have serious results." When in 1879, after the liberation from the Turks, the Constitutional Assembly created a constitution, modelled on the most democratic Western constitutions, the truth of any conception like Lord Balfour's could barely influence the jubilant members of the Assembly. They were the same men who took part in the gallant struggles to liberate their country from the five-hundred-year-long Turkish yoke. The memory of oppression, tyranny and cruelty was still very much alive in their minds. The ideal of freedom which upheld the national spirit intact for five centuries was attained. So they embodied it in the constitution of the reborn Bulgarian State.

For more than fifty years the country has been ruled according to the new constitution. Perhaps the temperament of the people did not quite correspond to the new constitutional principles, or perhaps the people were not yet mature enough to employ successfully the sacred dream of liberty for the practical uses of everyday life; but the Parliamentary régime in Bulgaria has shown at times serious signs of disease. After the Great War the record became rather disquieting. The standards of political life, due to a great extent to the disastrous clauses of the Peace Treaty and Bulgaria happening to be in the losing camp, deteriorated considerably. The number of rival parties grew with unusual speed, and often the divisions merely represented the selfish ambitions of would-be political leaders. This multiplication of rival

groups, coupled with the instability of the administration, brought about corruption and jobbery, and tended to foster terrorism. Violent methods were used often in the political struggles, culminating in the bombing outrage in Sofia Cathedral, which resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives.

Army leaders grew increasingly interested in politics and decided to play some part in it. Two *coups d'état* were performed with the help of the Army. While the first, in 1923, changed only the *personnel* without infringing the constitutional order, the second of May 19th, 1934, abolished every semblance of democratic life. Parliament was dismissed, the Constitution was suspended, political parties were abolished and the Press was put under strict censorship. The new men who, backed by the military force of the country, took the wheel of government in their hands proclaimed the birth of a new era. Their ascent to power came at a very favourable psychological moment for their ideas. The people longed for new methods which would bring decency in politics. Thus, when the new rulers fiercely attacked the shortcomings of the party system, the first reactions in large sections of the population were, if not enthusiastic, favourable. The people, while not approving of the methods employed for the effected change of government, agreed with the severe criticisms of the past. They decided to judge the new leaders by their deeds.

Here came the tragedy of a dictatorship which proved to be unable to benefit even by the most obvious advantages left by its predecessors. The people desired a spirit of unity, honest leaders to employ it in the right direction. They hated the abuses associated with the democratic constitution, but liked the constitution itself and the ideas behind it. They would have greeted with enthusiasm a new and honest interpretation of it. This the new rulers failed to understand. They attacked the constitution itself instead of exposing the politicians who had abused it. They showed from the beginning a lack of unity among themselves. They possessed no outstanding personality. The most significant figures who planned and carried out the *coup d'état* remained behind the scenes after their initial success, and desired to direct the State from the background without taking any responsibilities. The new régime proved to be a dictatorship without a dictator.

Failing thus to establish themselves as a respected government, they continued to undermine their position by exposing their complete lack of any positive programme for domestic reforms. They were strong only in negation. Project after project was entertained and abandoned. The people grew increasingly impatient and discontented. Many papers were suppressed and the rest were under a rigid censorship. The freedom of the platform was equally destroyed. Between Government and people grew a thick wall of aloofness and distrust. Hundreds of Government orators sent to towns and villages to spread the new creed could not move the hearts of the people.

The position of King Boris was most difficult. When on the night of the *coup d'état* he received the unexpected visit of the rulers of the morrow, he found himself in a painful dilemma—to work with the new political forces who had behind them the strength of the Army and only vague ideas of government, or to abdicate. The first course meant deviation from his strong democratic feelings, the second course spelled serious disorders and perhaps revolution. He chose the first alternative in the belief that by tact and conciliation he would be able to restore the country to normal political life. He changed Cabinets and Ministers. He met difficulties everywhere. Many of the military leaders began to realise that, though genuine and honest, their desire to reorganise the State on a semi-dictatorial basis did not correspond to the deep-rooted affection of the people for freedom and democracy ; but it was difficult for them to admit their error.

At the first signs of hesitation on the part of the King, an extreme group of military men tried again to conspire against him. They were put on trial and sentenced to death by a military tribunal. He exercised his right of mercy and the sentence of death was commuted to imprisonment. Disliked by the extremists of the Army for his democratic leanings, suspected by the former party leaders of trying to establish a personal dictatorship, and faced by the strong popular disapproval of dictatorial methods, he had to move very cautiously. Some of the extreme officers were dismissed, others concentrated again on purely military matters. When he felt himself strong enough, he proclaimed his intention to hold elections and re-establish Parliament.

The Government of M. Kiosseivanoff, a devoted friend of

the King, promulgated a new electoral law, which was declared to be an outcome of the general desire to give the people their share in the government and to avoid the shortcomings of the old system. Its most characteristic feature is the exclusion of the political parties as organisers of public opinion and a medium for expressing the will of the people and providing candidates. The ban on the political parties remained: only individual candidates could stand as individuals. Candidates had to be over 30 years of age, to possess a moderate educational qualification and to have paid their taxes. They had to declare that they did not belong to movements employing violent methods and that they would, if elected, stand for the interests of the whole people, not for group or class interests. They were disqualified if they had been convicted or were on trial for treason or other major crimes, or if they had served foreign countries without the consent of the Government. Every candidate had to register his candidature with the district judge, and, if found qualified, was allowed to address meetings and employ other means for canvassing during the electoral campaign. For the first time Bulgarian women obtained the right to vote.

The number of candidates for the 160 constituencies was over a thousand. The results, as officially stated, are: 104 supporters of the Government and 56 oppositionists. The interest shown by the electorate surpassed expectation. A good sign of the growing sense of responsibility was the fact that for the first time for many years elections were held without the usual disturbances and even bloodshed. The large number of candidates caused such a splitting of the votes that only about 25 per cent. of the elected received more than half the votes in their respective constituencies. The authors of the *coup d'état* of 1934 were defeated.

How is the new system going to work? Will it be permanent, or will it be just a stepping-stone? A definite answer cannot be given before Parliament has assembled. Some indications are found in a recent declaration of the Prime Minister, who stated that it would have the functions laid down by the old Constitution. It would exercise control over the Government and vote the budget. Its first task would be to pass the laws promulgated by the Government. The régime would be parliamentary but without political parties.

Before summoning Parliament, the Cabinet held conferences

during the past few weeks with the supporters of the Government. The resolutions embodied the ideas of the Prime Minister's declaration. They also demanded annulment of the mandates of some of the opposition who, it is alleged, were elected as a result of Soviet radio propaganda in their favour. If such a purge is effected when the Chamber meets, it will decrease the size of the Opposition. The Moscow broadcasts lasted throughout the electoral campaign. They were in Bulgarian and consisted of attacks on the Government and elaborate propaganda for the opposition candidates. The Prime Minister protested vigorously to the Soviet Government, but the broadcasts continued. Bulgarian technicians failed to jam the powerful Moscow station. Thus an unusual violation of international ethics took place on the shores of the Black Sea almost unnoticed by the Western Powers, which were occupied with the position in Central Europe.

What of the future? One thing is clear beyond doubt. There is a strong drive towards establishing the rule of democracy. That drive reflects the national disposition of the people, expressed so vividly during the short-lived experiment in semi-dictatorship. The new order is an experiment in semi-democracy, a considerable step towards full democratic régime. It does not entirely correspond with the British ideas, but we have to bear in mind that it is not the final form of government. New forms may be introduced. Perhaps in this method of applying the basic idea of freedom and democracy to the possibilities of practical life, a constitution will be created suited to the temperament of the people. It is consoling to think that in the heart of this people the torch of freedom and democracy burns and calls for action. The best proof of that was the national character of the funeral of Alexander Malinoff. He had devoted his life to the building of democratic institutions. Leader of the former Democratic Party, leader in Parliament and several times Prime Minister, he had been the staunchest supporter of democracy in Bulgaria. He died on the platform while speaking on the eve of the elections. He was buried as a national hero and mourned by the whole nation. His death is a symbol of the resolution of the honest democratic leaders to fight to the end for their principles; his funeral showed the appreciation of these principles by the masses and their desire to follow them.

N. PENTCHEFF.

MISSOLONGHI.

WITHIN easy access of Patras, beyond Leukadio Point on the other side of the gulf, lies the little town of Missolonghi. The crossing takes about an hour. The gulf was smooth and glassy at six o'clock in the morning, reflecting the blue heaven above it. The sun had not yet looked over the edges of Sappho's black, frowning precipices as we drew in to the tiny quay. The small curve of water at their base was of a bitumen darkness. About two hours of railway travelling between the sea and a long line of blue-brown hills brought me to Missolonghi.

When I began asking the way to Byron's house, no one seemed to know whom or what I was talking about. Byron? No such person lived there. Oh yes—there was a Byron Hotel; I should come to it if I kept straight on. At last a dim recollection seemed to dawn on someone, and orders were given to a regiment of children—evidently some school let out—to conduct me somewhere. We marched through the streets and arrived at the sea. Standing a little back from the others, with an untidy garden in front fenced off from the road by a high iron railing, was a house with a balcony on the first floor and windows on either side of it. The whole place looked neglected, but it was inhabited, so I was not able to go in. This did not much matter, however, as I understood afterwards that the house in which Byron had lived was pulled down a long time ago, and this one was built on the site. In front was a harbour encircled by sand-banks, with only two or three outlets crossed by bridges. Two thatched fishing huts looked golden against the silky blue of the sea and mountains. To the right as one faced the sea was the long succession of rocky islets—the Scrophes—on which Byron's ship had struck twice and just missed being wrecked.

Surely few historical incidents are as touching and pathetic as the death scene of this man, who had come out to devote his genius, his fortune, and finally his life to a cause which he had dreamt of so ardently in his youth, but which he could scarcely have imagined would take the shape of a practical possibility in such a short time. A man whose thoughts had flamed through the whole of Europe, inspiring poets and thinkers with the loftiest ideas of beauty and freedom—even in Russia and the cold recesses of the Caucasus, men like Pushkin,

Turgenieff and Lermontoff moulded their work on Byron's. A proud, sensitive man, whom the homage of the most brilliant intellects of a whole continent could not satisfy while his own country branded him as an outlaw; although he chose to hide his feelings under a mask of devilry and drown them in a life of abandonment and excess. How many men after leading such a life have had the strength of character to break away from it when they so desired, to undertake a task as difficult as the liberation of an oppressed nation, and to bring to its achievement a mind whose strength was unimpaired by the wanton usage to which it had been put?

Eight long years of bitter fighting, and then the intervention of the European Powers, followed Byron's death before the end was in sight; and he himself had no illusions about the difficulties awaiting him when he set sail for Greece. With the object of enlisting the sympathies of Europe to their cause as many young men as could went to the European universities to study, and there formed revolutionary committees. Doubtless they hoped that the Powers—or at any rate Russia, who had always tried to obtain a footing in the Balkans—would come to their assistance—"as if," says Moore, "the Courts of Europe would, now or ever, regard with favour the attempt of any people, under any circumstances, to be their own emancipators." Byron himself had said as much in his well-known lines:

Trust not for freedom to the Franks,
They have a king who buys and sells;
In native swords and native ranks
The only hope of courage dwells.
But Turkish swords and Latin fraud
Would break your shields, however broad.

And again:

Greeks must free Greece,
Not the Barbarian, with his mask of peace.

Those connected, like the present writer, with other unhappy nations, know only too well the wisdom of such warnings.

Colonel Napier, the British Resident at Kephalaria, says that of all those who came to help in the revolution only two justly estimated the character of the Greeks; Byron was one of them. "He came," he writes, "not thinking to find them good, but to make them better. . . . Others came and fled,

expecting to find the Peloponnesus filled with Plutarch's men, they returned thinking the inhabitants of Newgate more moral." Byron thought he could help in at least three ways : by rendering financial assistance, by keeping the Greek leaders from quarrelling amongst themselves, and by trying to humanise the feelings on both sides, and so mitigating the horrors of the war. "As for his generosity," writes Colonel Stanhope, "it is before the world. He promised to devote his large income to the cause of Greece, and he honestly acted up to his pledge." Amongst the deeds of humanity recorded of him is his returning to the Turks many Turkish prisoners who had fallen into the hands of the Greeks. He sent a courteous letter with them, begging the Turkish Governor, if he remembered this act, to show the same leniency to any Greeks that might fall into his hands during the war ; and he promised a reward for every Turkish prisoner taken alive by the Greeks.

A provisional government had been formed in Western Greece under Prince Mavrocordato, and it was at their invitation to go and help that Byron decided to undertake the task. But he was unlucky from the very start. On putting out from Leghorn they were met by contrary winds, which damaged the ship so badly that they had to turn back into port for repairs. It had been decided that he should land first at one of the Ionian Islands—then under British rule—to inform himself accurately about the state of affairs in Greece. Colonel Napier, the Resident at Kephallonia, was a liberal-minded man, but not knowing the attitude that England would take up with regard to the struggle, Byron hesitated some time before landing, lest he should embarrass or offend the officials on the island. He remained six weeks on the ship which had brought him, living in the most uncomfortable way—"pent up with pigs and poultry"—and ships were not then what they are now. When finally he did land, he and the English residents on the island were mutually surprised and charmed with each other—there had been so much prejudice on both sides. The meeting was extraordinarily cordial, and at a dinner offered him by the officers of the garrison, he was so touched with the toast to his health that he expressed his regret at not being able to reply adequately in English "on account of his having spoken a foreign tongue so long."

Meanwhile all over Greece the leaders were impatiently awaiting his arrival, so at last he decided to cross over. They

were chased by a Turkish frigate on the way, and had to put in at the harbour of Dragomestri, where they waited for five days before a Greek gunboat could come to take them on. It was the beginning of January, and Byron indulged in a long swim in the cold, wintry waves, which his friends considered the first cause of his fatal illness. Continuing their voyage they were twice driven on to the Scrophes, where, had it not been for Byron's presence of mind, the men would have abandoned the ship and lost all the food and money they were carrying for the relief of Missolonghi, which was being blockaded by the Turks. When at last they did get to Missolonghi they had the utmost difficulty in landing. The scene of this landing, when the idol of Europe set foot in this small, besieged Grecian town to help them in their struggle for liberty, must have been truly thrilling. He was met by the whole population, the troops, and the military and civilian dignitaries, with Prince Mavrocordato at their head; while shouts, music and discharges of artillery accompanied him to his house.

Nearly four months of strenuous work followed. All was chaos in Missolonghi. One of Byron's most difficult tasks was to keep the peace between the Greek leaders. As in the case of their ancestors, their greatest advantage lay in the character of the country. In the mountainous districts the people had never been thoroughly subdued by the Turks, who extorted as much revenue as they could out of them, and then offended their own government by sending them as little as possible of the plunder. The country was broken up by cross factions and divisions, of which the Greek chieftains were not slow in taking advantage, and although they were all united in desiring the liberty of Greece, each thought that his own way was the right one, and hoped to be favoured and supported by the great Englishman. Byron pointed out the danger of this rivalry very clearly to them, but they were wild, turbulent and undisciplined. The troops were hungry, and thinking of plundering the town. The chieftains from the mountains assembled there with the object of organising affairs, but they were ready to fly at each other's throats.

An attack had been planned on Lepanto—the ancient Naupaktus of the Herakleidæ—as it was a fortified town and commanded the whole Gulf of Korinth. Byron was invested with full civil and military powers, and was implored to take

the lead. No doubt he felt flattered at this, and even his adoring biographer Moore admits that he undertook it "partly in the hope that it would lead him either to a glorious success or a glorious death," for at this time he was obsessed with a foreboding of his approaching end. But so wild and unmanageable were the elements with which they had to work that the enterprise was abandoned on the eve of the date fixed for it.

This disappointment, and the worries caused by the inextricable confusion around him, added to the miserable conditions under which he was living, brought on the fit that was the beginning of his last illness. The doctors were probably incompetent. They bled him, and could not stop the bleeding until he fainted. While he was still too weak to move from his place a band of mutinous Suliote troops broke wildly into his room, brandishing their swords and demanding what they considered their rights. Hungry as they were, with their families starving, this demonstration was the culminating point in all his dealings with them. But even then he was equal to the situation. "Electrified by this unexpected act," says Colonel Stanhope, "Lord Byron seemed to recover from his sickness, and the more they raged, the more his calm courage triumphed. The scene was truly sublime."

Even this did not make him draw back. Most of his letters at this time are orders to his bankers for the transmission of great sums of money, all to be spent in the Greek cause. And he writes to his doctor, who is urging him to leave on account of his health, that so long as his presence in Greece is of any use he will not consider his own interests. He now set about repairing the fortifications of Missolonghi, as an attack by the Turks was expected. He asked the engineers to make an estimate of the costs and quote only one-third of the figure, secretly promising that if the Greeks would pay that he would pay the rest. The fortifications were repaired and successfully withstood the attack.

And now some of Byron's English friends went over to the party of Odysseus in Eastern Greece, which made it even more difficult to induce the leaders to show a united front. A conference was to have been held at which the rival parties were to meet and discuss plans, but floods prevented its taking place; and in the meantime Missolonghi was again attacked by the Turks and rent by internal fighting.

So once more Byron remained on the spot, although his health was deteriorating more and more. He complained of giddiness, which he attributed to a "fulness of habit"—for he was still obsessed with his youthful horror of getting fat. But as he was leading a perfectly abstemious life, not touching either meat or spirits—and very little besides—the attacks of "vertigo" were more probably caused by extreme weakness. He rode out one day and was caught in a storm and drenched, which resulted in an attack of what the doctors diagnosed as rheumatic fever, followed by inflammation of the brain. The closing scenes are almost too painful to dwell on—the comfortless surroundings, the absence of everything that is necessary in a sick-room, the anxious crowds thronging the streets for news of his condition. Once more the doctors wanted to bleed him, and he resisted until they told him that if the fever were unchecked it might produce insanity. And when they wanted to put blisters on his feet he asked whether they "could apply both to the same foot," shrinking even in that condition from exposing his deformity. So the blisters were applied above the knees. And it would appear that the "strong anti-spasmodic potion" which they administered mercifully hastened the end, putting him into the twenty-four hours' sleep from which he never awoke.

Thus on that Greek Easter Eve passed away one of England's finest spirits, although she herself has not fully recognised him yet. The news was received with consternation all over Greece. The Provisional Government issued a proclamation that no Easter festivities were to be held, and all shops and public offices closed for three days; and a general mourning was ordered for twenty-one days. At dawn on Easter Sunday thirty-seven minute guns were fired, corresponding to the years of the deceased. Funeral services were held in all the churches and prayers and masses offered up. The body was embalmed, and carried to the church in a coffin that was a "rude, ill-constructed chest of wood," covered with a mantle for a pall, with a helmet, a sword and a crown of laurel on it. But, rude and primitive as were the surroundings, the scene was a very touching one, with the thronging crowds of mourners who had come to look their last on him.

The people of Missolonghi were anxious for him to be buried in their town. Odysseus and the Eastern Greeks wished to pay him the tribute of interring him in the Theseion at Athens.

But his English friends finally decided to convey him to England, leaving only his heart to be buried in Greece—"the only country," as he said, "that he had ever been contented in." He was buried at Bucknell, near Newstead Abbey, since the doors of St. Paul's and Westminster Abbey were closed to him. But One greater than the dignitaries of His Church received a malefactor who had fewer redeeming qualities than our Byron, into a holier place than any earthly temples.

Faults belong to human frailty, but genius and the passionate devotion to a noble ideal make of a man something more than average humanity. The testimony of all those who were intimately connected with him during this last phase of his life—high and low, English, Greek or Italian—all go to show how selfless he was, how considerate of others and beloved of all. The devotion of his servant Fletcher and his Venetian gondolier Tita is well known, as well as their grief at his loss. He had passed the difficult test of being a hero to his own valet.

His literary fame, which he guarded so jealously at first, became as nothing to him when he came into contact with the more poignant sides of life. "Poetry should only occupy the idle," he said. "In more serious affairs it would be ridiculous." So he broke even the string of his lyre at the altar of Greece—that lyre which had thrilled so many hearts, whose strains will hover eternally over the waters of "clear, placid Leman," and over the "holy" prison of Chillon where Bonnivard had worn away the rock with steps that "appeal from tyranny to God"; and over this other land, which his glowing words have taught many besides himself to love so well.

ZABELLE C. BOYAJIAN.

ED.—A chapter from the author's forthcoming book, *In Greece with Pen and Palette*.

THE JANSEN CONTROVERSY.

WHEN Cornelius Jansen, sometime Professor of Theology at Louvain University, and Bishop of Ypres from 1636, died of the plague there in 1638, leaving behind him a work that was published two years after his death, he little dreamed of the controversy his writings were to rouse in a great neighbouring country—France, or that this controversy would rage over the greater part of two centuries. As everyone knows, the work left by Jansen was called *The Augustinus*, because in it the author supported the arguments of Saint Augustine concerning “Free Grace,” in opposition to the opinion of the Pelagians, with whom he was disputing.

It seems quite possible that, other things being equal, the doctrine might have remained a purely academic question to be hammered out between the Dominicans and Augustinians on the one side, and the Franciscans and Jesuits on the other, for it was mainly an attempt to purify the Church of Rome from within, and in no sense intended as schism or heresy. That it came to be so regarded mainly resulted from the vehement outbursts of its earliest advocates in an attack upon the most powerful of these religious orders—the Jesuits, who struck back with every weapon on which they could lay their hands, and never desisted until they had laid their opponents in the dust.

Examined closely, Jansenism will be seen as an attempt to re-spiritualise religion which, during the recent disturbances in the realm, had grown into a mere formal lip-service and a dead, outward observance, lacking the inspiration of the soul. In some aspects the Jansenistic outlook tended somewhat towards an ecstatic mysticism which its opponents, the Jesuits, feared might withdraw worshippers from the active performance of good works, by which the Church was largely sustained. The popular Order of Jesus had at this time adopted an easy-going creed that was in no respect akin to the stern, high teaching of its great Namesake : they obtained influence over all classes by maintaining the theory that any sin could be atoned for by benefactions to the Church. Penitence did not matter very much, but there must be alms.

Not so the Jansenists : theirs was a much more uncomfortable doctrine. True and long repentance for sin was essential,

and even after this it did not follow that a soul would be saved unless God willed it, and chose him among the elect ! He had to be predestined to salvation ! This strange theory seems actually to have been held by Saint Augustine, who professed to deduce it from the teaching of Saint Paul. It was adopted by Calvin, and in this particular aspect of Jansenist doctrine the Jesuits might well cry out upon those who advocated it, that they were heretics.

"Jansenism," observes M. Boulenger,* "was an episode of the Catholic reaction of the Seventeenth century against the religious anarchy, the heresy and the pagan 'libertinage' of the Sixteenth."

He then goes on to quote Lanson :—

"The years of dissension and misery which revived the energy of French souls, inclined them to evolve a hard, virile, and ascetic form of Catholicism, which, while asking much of man, gave him back much in depth of emotion and capacity for action." "Jansenism," continues Boulenger, "which prostrates man before a terrible God ; which fills him with despair by denying him even the assurance of salvation through his efforts ; which treats as a crime the love of art, science and even of Nature, . . . which systematically stripped the churches of ornament . . . this dreary and ardent creed was the antithesis of the amiable, facile and worldly faith of the Jesuits. Moreover, the company of Jesus felt itself to be menaced socially by the Jansenists, who competed with it successfully for the direction of souls and the education of children, and whom it considered the advance guard of its Gallican adversaries. This was why it attacked them from the outset."

But as early as 1594 the Society had already been attacked by a certain Dr. Antoine Arnauld, who was employed by the University of Paris, of which he was a distinguished ornament, to attack the Order of Jesuits, and to urge the State to expel them from France. Naturally the Society did not forget either this attack or the leader of it. An unlooked-for opportunity of repaying it was to arise at a later date, as will presently be seen.

The great apostle of Jansen's ideas in France was a certain Duvergier de Hauranne, Abbot of Saint Cyran in Paris. As early as 1632 he published his *Petrus Aurelius*. The Bishop of Langres was so impressed by the sanctity and learning of this great man, that he pressed him to undertake the

* *The Seventeenth Century*, pp. 266-9.

spiritual care and instruction of the nuns of the convent and monastery of Port Royal—a sisterhood of great sanctity who had formerly inhabited an old Cistercian house in the country near Chevreuse, known as Port Royal des Champs. They had moved to Paris partly because of the decay of the old building, and partly to enjoy the ministrations of this saintly spiritual adviser, the Abbot of Saint Cyran, under whose tutelage they imbibed the tenets of Jansen—possibly without realising whither it was going to lead them.

Now as the discovered author of the work *Petrus Aurelius*—a work hurled against the Jesuits, “which,” says Racine, “smashed into powder all the replies of the Jesuits”—the Abbot of Saint Cyran was marked out for destruction. Mazarin imprisoned him, and he remained incarcerated till the Cardinal’s death, but died soon after being set at liberty. His work was however accomplished. His espousal of the doctrines of Jansen—who in his *Augustinus* had combated the arguments of the prominent Jesuit Molina—was sufficient to condemn him and all who had listened to him, in the eyes of the Order. The fact that the family of the old Antoine Arnauld, who had attacked them in 1594, were the chief residents and recluses at Port Royal des Champs, that his widow had bought the house for the Paris branch of Port Royal, that his daughter was the Abbess there, that his sons, M. Andilly and Dr. Antoine Arnauld, with two nephews, lived at the old monastery and made it their permanent retreat from which they issued their famous writings, and where they took pupils, all this naturally proved that Jansenism and the Arnauld family were more or less identical. Matters came to a head when this same Antoine Arnauld issued a work in the late forties bearing the name of *De la Fréquente Communion*.

“Although the Jesuits were not mentioned in the book,” says Racine,* “it can scarcely be imagined with what fury they raged both against the book and against the author. They completely ignored the verdict of sixteen Bishops and Archbishops, and twenty-four of the most celebrated Doctors of the Faculty whose approbation was printed on the title-page. . . . They ordered all their preachers to decry it in every sermon. . . . As for the author he was a monster who ought to be strangled, and they cried out for his blood to the rulers of the earth.”

* *History of Port Royal.*

Unfortunately for the Jesuits, the reigning Pope, Alexander VII, approved of the book, the Jesuits therefore had to revenge themselves some other way. They decided to destroy both Port Royal and the Arnaulds.

To do this it was necessary to convict them of heresy. The process was complicated. As we have seen, in his many writings Antoine Arnauld busied himself with a defence of Jansen's *Augustinus*, "and," says Racine, "had composed several works upon 'Grace' which had a prodigious success." These however caused much discussion—fomented by the Jesuits—among those of the Faculty who were opposed to the doctrine of Saint Augustine, and a certain member, a former Jesuit, drew up five propositions on "Grace," and laid them before the Faculty to be examined. These propositions were so cleverly worded as to present an appearance of heresy, but it could not be affirmed that they were extracted from the book or teaching of Jansen. Parliament, when appealed to, imposed silence on both parties.

But the Jesuits would not leave the matter there. In 1650 they sent a letter to Pope Innocent X praying him to pronounce upon the propositions, which, three years later, he condemned. To prove their orthodoxy Arnauld and his friends at once received and accepted the Holy Father's decision, and agreed that the propositions were heretical. Such a decision ought to have satisfied the Jesuits, had they been, as Racine remarks, "children of peace who only sought the truth." But they were determined to ruin their opponents, and the house of Arnauld in particular. They continued therefore to fulminate against them and to bring all manner of wild and improbable charges against the community of Port Royal. They even excited the Queen Mother, Anne of Austria, against the convent. Mazarin also was worked upon, and this was fatal.

Hitherto the Cardinal, having disposed of his great opponent, De Retz, remained indifferent to the disputes of Jesuits and Jansenists alike. But on the arrival of Father Annat from Rome, deputed by the Pope as the young King's Confessor, Mazarin learnt that nothing would please the Pope more than that his recent pronouncement should be universally accepted in France at some public council or other. Whereupon the Cardinal called together a great meeting at the Louvre, at which were present at least thirty-eight Archbishops and

Bishops, and the charge was brought that the substance of the five propositions was to be found in the book written by Jansen, and the Pope having condemned the propositions, it followed *that Jansen was condemned likewise*.

Meantime, Arnauld kept silence. He was much occupied at this time in religious writings, particularly on *Lives of the Saints*, and a book giving passages from the Fathers for every morning in the year. This was compiled at the special request of the nuns of Port Royal, and the Duc de Luynes, a learned recluse of the Monastery, contributed largely to the translations. It was also about this time that the subsequently famous Blaise Pascal made the acquaintance of Port Royal and of Antoine Arnauld. His sister was a nun at the convent, and it was through her example that this brilliant young man retired from the world, renounced his prospects of matrimony, and even gave up his mathematical studies to devote himself entirely to the study of religious truth and the salvation of his soul. It was, as everyone knows, his gifted pen that subsequently did such yeoman service on behalf of the Jansenists against their unscrupulous enemies the Jesuits. They certainly came to need help, for the Jesuits pressed on with an almost annihilating attack on the monastery and on Dr. Arnauld himself, who was publicly censured by the Faculty—or at least that portion of them who could be induced to attend for the purpose. Orders were given for the immediate cashiering of all the Jansenist teaching establishments—which had long been objects of jealous rivalry to their opponents—and soldiers were sent to Port Royal to execute the order. Arnauld went into concealment.

The poor Sisters at the Monastery were in a state of the greatest consternation, not understanding in the least what they had done to deserve this treatment. Their enemies on the other hand were at the very culmination of their triumph, or thought they were, when—the unexpected happened, and Port Royal was saved by a miracle, or what was in all good faith regarded as one. The story, as given by Racine, is briefly as follows :—A novice, the niece of Blaise Pascal, was suffering from a distressing disease of the face, and the doctors, three of the first surgeons of Paris, thought there was no alternative but to operate. This was just before the upset already related, and the nuns in their distress had begged that a famous relic, a supposed piece of the Saviour's crown

of thorns, should be carried in procession through the church. The poor little novice was bidden to press against it and pray for healing. When she had passed to her room she was at once conscious of recovery. The doctors who examined her next day were utterly amazed, and filled all Paris with the story.

Such a vindication of the piety of this convent duly impressed the Court, and it was made possible for the Arnaulds to return. Needless to say, however, the Jesuits did their utmost to throw discredit upon this supposed "Miracle of the Holy Thorn," as it was called; and might have succeeded had not another champion appeared in the person of Blaise Pascal, whose *Provincial Letters* provided a complete bush of thorns to prick and sting the enemies of Les Messieurs of Port Royal. They were especially directed against those "who under the pretext of making clear a case of conscience, had in their books advanced an infinite number of abominable maxims which tended to destroy all the high moral teachings of Jesus Christ."

The Jesuits must have writhed under a relation that exposed their miserable casuistry to the contempt and laughter of all the world, but, nothing daunted, they brazenly issued an *Apologia* which, to their supreme mortification, was condemned both by the Pope Alexander VII, and by the Inquisition. Stung to madness, they set to work in 1655 to draw up an ingenious formulary to trap their opponents, and presented it to the General Assembly of the Church in Paris. The prime object of this declaration was to convict the defenders of Jansen of heresy.

Thanks to the brilliant help of Pascal's *Letters* the Jansenists might have still come out victorious, but for the fact that their enemies had powerful support at Court. The young King's confessor, Father Annat, and the Archbishop of Paris had the ear of the King, who was persuaded to summon an Assembly, which was to seek means for the extirpation of Jansenism. All the King knew of it was what the Jesuits told him, but he did remember that some of the famous Frondists had, at certain intervals, sought and found shelter at Port Royal des Champs, and henceforth Jansenism was, in his narrow and prejudiced mind, more or less associated with the idea of rebellion. He classed the Jansenists pretty much in the same rank as Huguenots: that is as men in opposition to his ideas. Therefore the order went forth that

Jansenism was to be exterminated. He thought it as easy as that ! Yet at his death, fifty-five years later, Jansenism was flourishing even more strongly than before.

For the time being, however, the Jesuits triumphed. The Assembly produced that "confounded formulary" which Madame de Sévigné made such fun of, but which proved the complete undoing of the poor nuns of Port Royal, who were brutally evicted, and, by a refinement of cruelty, they were deprived of the use of the Holy Sacrament which had always been the central inspiration of their lives and teaching. In 1665 they were again brought back to Port Royal.

Meanwhile the persecution of Dr. Arnauld did not abate, and in 1679 he judged it best to leave Paris for Brussels, from which place he continued to publish his various writings. His place as leader of the Jansenist party was taken by a certain Father Quesnel, who in the early nineties issued a truly monumental work, a translation of *The New Testament with Moral Reflections*. In 1695 this attracted the attention of the Bishop of Chalons, who warmly recommended it to all the faithful in his diocese.

This same Bishop Noailles was, largely by the influence of Madame de Maintenon, subsequently translated to the Archbishopric of Paris. It was her dream to have this high-minded prelate at hand, and she hoped greatly that he might work with her to rescue the King from the strong influence of the Jesuits. But unfortunately De Noailles was not interested in the management of the royal conscience, and began to show marked leanings towards Jansenism. It was now the turn of the Jesuits to come rather into disfavour, for the Archbishop prohibited any Jesuit from hearing confession throughout his diocese. He continued to approve the *Moral Reflections* of Father Quesnel, though in 1708 the Pope condemned them, and issued his famous bull *Unigenitus* against the book. The witty Parisians however made fun of this condemnation and asked "if the Holy Father considered it an offence to read the Gospel ?"

After the King's death the fight between the parties still continued; but though, thanks to the support of Louis XIV, the Jesuits appeared to have gained an outward victory, the writings of Blaise Pascal had done their work: the world had come to see that it was worldly power that they were seeking rather than holiness. As the new reign went on they

fell more and more into disrepute, and their expulsion from France in 1764 by order of Louis XV was felt as a great public relief.

Jansenism, as we have seen, owed its origin to the revulsion of feeling caused by the unscrupulous worldliness of the Jesuits: it was an attempt to reaffirm the spiritual side of the Catholic religion. In their efforts to destroy Jansenism the Jesuits only succeeded in ruining themselves. But when the exciting cause that had roused them to protest was removed by the expulsion of the Order, the Jansenists also more or less disappeared as a religious community, although an isolated section remained, who fell into such extremes of eccentric behaviour as to bring their profession into contempt. Their work was done when, during the hundred years following the death of their founder, they waged unceasing warfare against the cynical creed of the Jesuits, and brought serious-minded men and women back to the study of the Christian code as discovered in the Gospels. And in doing this they could have done no greater service to France or to the world.

ALICE LAW.

ONCE UPON A TIME . . .

TO survey the material of fairy tales a strict distinction must be made between three very different sorts of things. First, there is the real folk fairy tale. Second, there is the "myth" which deals with epics of gods and heroes. And third, there is the "artefact," the invented fairy tale, the product of the minds of literary men. In the two latter categories, the myth and the artefact, the creative spirit has freed itself from the unconscious and is striving towards artistic or educational ends. The myth incites to emulation of former greatness and power, reviving heroic figures of the past. The author of the artefact, like every genuine artist, seeks to imitate and to surpass nature. Both myth and literary fairy tale break the laws of natural causality and use magic and miracle, but this is not essential to them. The true folk fairy tale with which alone we are here concerned could not exist without the miraculous element. Further, myth gives names to its heroes, though these names are often disfigured and sometimes purposefully changed. Myths have a historical basis, though that is often profoundly concealed and perverted. In myths we see ideals mingled with or in conflict with historical records. It is a very different thing with fairy tales. They are strictly speaking anonymous.

In the two hundred fairy tales of the collection made by the Brothers Grimm only two family-names are mentioned. This anonymity is typical, especially for the German fairy tale. Fairy tales are dreams; the history that they recall is not a history of "events," of annals, but a dark memory of periods long forgotten and wholly misunderstood when they were first told. The world they tell of is irrational, and its very air is unreal. In fairy tales the powers of nature are not merely exaggerated but perverted as in dreams or delirium. Despite this, the aims of the fairy tale are real enough and material enough though they are very different from those of the myth. The fairy tale seeks eternal riches, the beautiful princess, gold and love, but its means of getting these things are of another world, they are sudden transformations, magic, ban and curse.

The fairy tale does not pretend to educate. Its purpose is to amuse and particularly those whom it is at once easy and very difficult to amuse—the children. Its contrasts are vivid.

To raise pity and fear it must stint neither cruelty nor improbability. Its shades are black and white. Its passwords are angel or devil, gold or dross, entrancing beauty or reptilian hideousness. Virtue is ever rewarded and that in the world of the living. Above all no sustained attention is asked.

Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, who collected all the German fairy tales that they could find, were born in Hanau near Frankfurt and were for some time professors at the Hanoverian University at Göttingen and later in Berlin. Their relations with Göttingen are of topical interest. That university was founded in 1737 by George II. In 1837, just a hundred years ago, the liberal constitution that had been granted to the people of Hanover a few years previously was revoked by their sovereign Ernest Augustus, son of George III. Seven of the most distinguished professors of Göttingen, the famous *Göttinger Sieben*, were expelled, including the brothers Grimm who migrated to Berlin.

Those were days when "Germany awoke." The romantic school strove to revive German culture and the German spirit that is believed to have flourished most beautifully in medieval Gothic art. This national revival was tolerant and instinct with a humanity that overflowed all national frontiers. Herder, pioneer of the romantic school, collected the folk-songs of every nation. To Goethe a purely national political revival was anathema. "Science and art," he wrote to a friend in 1813, "belong to the whole world, and the barriers of nationality vanish before them." In Berlin the romantic school gained much from its intimacy with the gifted men and women of the Jewish salons. Mendelssohn and his family, emerging from the ghetto, threw the glamour of their genius on the newly formed social life of the Prussian capital. German scholarship was nothing if not universal and international. Alexander von Humboldt, the acknowledged head of the German learned world, lived during his most active years in Paris and called his great scientific encyclopedia *KOSMOS*. There was nothing of which Schlegel and Tieck were prouder than of their translation of Shakespeare. The brothers Grimm with their dictionary and grammar did more for Germany than any general or minister of their or any other time. They loved their country and they were conscious that their collection of fairy tales played its part in the political revival. What queer dear fellows were the

two brothers ! Indeed, they seemed to come out of a fairy tale themselves ! They were inseparable, though one of them was a bachelor and the other happily married. They were industrious, quiet, slow, representatives of that "other Germany," spiritually free, culturally all-embracing, loving, humane, deep and simple. Such were the men who gave to the world in their fairy tales a thermometer to gauge a fever which now threatens the very life of their own people.

The basic group of their stories, first written down in 1812, the Grimms obtained from the peasant woman Viehmann in the village Zwehrn and from old Marie, maid of their friend the chemist Wild of Kassel. Once fired with the idea the Grimms sought everywhere for further material. Shepherds and waggoners, vagrants and grandmothers, nurses and maids were their experts. Most of these fairy tales were written down for the first time in the nineteenth century, though some of them unquestionably go back to very remote times.

How old are these stories ? Some can be traced to the times before the *Völkerwanderung* and perhaps before the Christian era. Some originate from the vagrant fiddlers who were well known in Germany in the tenth century. The main part probably took something like their present shape during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At that time Chivalry had disappeared in Germany, for in none of the tales is there a knight or a true knight's castle, nor even such memories of these things as we read of in *Don Quixote*. Nor do the tales tell us much about the clergy. Artisans and craftsmen, on the other hand, are everywhere. The Free Cities have taken shape. The class of hired foot-soldiers flourished. The country is still covered with the vast dark forests, such as Tacitus tells are the chief characteristics of the German landscape, and it is these forests which have made the most decisive impression on the tellers of the stories and their listeners. It is these forests that stay in our memories ; their murmurings, their "enchantments drear, Where more is meant than meets the ear," their lively and cheerful clearings, the joy and comfort that is in them, and that oppressive darkness with its horror and fear.

Woods and forests are the background of about a quarter of the tales. It is in the forests that witches, dwarfs, wicked kings and murderers nearly always dwell. It is in the forests that the magical meetings take place. The forest is thick,

weird, immense, but at times it may be cosy and friendly. The storyteller sometimes sketches the landscape in a few strokes of unimportant detail—perhaps at moments when he or she can think of nothing better. Often the forest itself plays an all-important part in the action, foreboding danger to the hero. "It was as quiet in the woods as in a church. There was no breath of wind, no murmur of brook, no bird sang and no sunbeam pierced the thickly leaved boughs." Do we not feel the terror approaching?

On the edge of the woods or sometimes in its midst is the enchanted castle. Sometimes there is what looks like a common inn, but inside it is as eerie as elsewhere in the magic realm. The innkeeper is without exception a villain, usually an impostor or murderer. This is nothing but a memory of olden days when predatory bandit-knights, the *landsknecht* of German history, who for long misruled large areas of that unhappy land, would present a superannuated and ruffianly retainer with the hostelry on the domain. And many other memories there are of those evil days of earlier gangster rule.

The forest of the fairy tales is primeval and comparable with the tropical jungles. Ferocious animals are among its dangers. The fox is cunning, the wolf is fierce, the lion—perhaps an Asiatic memory, strange to the story-tellers or listeners save on coats of arms—is usually a bewitched prince. Beyond the forest is the city, the king's castle, peace and a very different world. The stories are essentially those of a continental people and we have nothing of maritime adventure. The sea appears but four times as background of a story, and even then we do not venture far from the shore. In "The Fisherman and his Wife" we are on the coast, but the tellers know little of the sea and it is evident that the tales originated in southern Germany.

Surrounded by fairy trees, gazing into the fairy well, drinking at the magic fountain, in cottage and charcoal-burner's hut, in inn and castle, the heroes and heroines move through these German fairy tales. Who are they? What do they look like? What is their purpose in life? They are, in fact, nothing but children or rather children's pictures of children. Beautiful as daylight, golden-haired and blue-eyed, they have no character at all though they are sometimes kind to animals and to beggars. Like all children—and like all primitive peoples too—they have not the slightest idea of

the real meaning or nature of knowledge. Their purpose in life is a propitious marriage, an enlargement of power, above all to live happily ever after—an ever after in which these children arrange their weddings, for fairy tales never think of time. The ages of the actors are blurred. In the beginning of the tale of the "Frog-King" the little princess is playing with her golden ball; a few hours later she takes as husband the prince, now freed from the ban!

In the fairy tales there are two essential types of hero. Firstly there is the cunning, clever fellow, destined from the beginning to conquer fate by his strength, his courage and last but not least by his brains. Such is the type of Odysseus. Secondly there is the young, weak, slightly stupid type of Parsifal. In the German fairy tale the latter is particularly prominent. The hero is usually the youngest of three brothers, the heroine the youngest sister. God or the good fairies save those handicapped by stupidity from the snares of destiny and lead them on to victory. Class distinctions are very definite. Everyone is either high-class or low-class. Their ways of life are in sharp contrast: palace and cottage. The peasant is always very poor and his poverty is described with sympathy. Soldiers are always embittered victims of some injustice by a superior. For their services they have received little reward or none at all. The fairy tales reflect the war periods when some of them were first told. Craftsmanship exhibits a certain hierarchy. Tailors are particularly favoured. Their qualities are not always good, but they are usually cunning and plucky in spite of bodily weakness. The broom-maker and the charcoal-burner take the lowest rank. The representatives of professions—doctors, clergy, ministers and counsellors—are just as much disliked as broom-maker and cobbler. They are either stupid and wicked, or their intellect is not of much use to them and the less gifted but more fortunate heroes easily get the better of them.

The life of the hero, his way through the adverse world, makes up the bulk of the tales. Their nameless heroes cannot raise the sustained interest achieved by the mythological biographies. In the fairy tale, therefore, the hero's adventures must be so thrilling that the reader or listener is fascinated by the events rather than the persons. As the hero has no character at all, the fairy tale must depend upon a continuous succession of magic and miracle. The greatest miracle

is the bodily transfiguration, next to it the miraculous change of the circumstances of the hero's life. There is no evolution in a fairy tale, though there is constant revolution. The naive listeners ask only for the happy end, and that is nearly always a wedding. And yet even this end is not as important as the excitement of the approach.

It is noteworthy that the German fairy tale shows a prepossession towards women. The men are never quite as angelic or as diabolic as the women. If traces of characterisation are to be found anywhere they are in the descriptions of women. It has even been suggested that the wicked step-mother, who in many cases is also a real mother, is an attempt to assert the lapsed authority of "mother-right." Actions are rarely dictated by reason. We seek in vain for the educational or evolutionary element beloved of the Orient. Only in one tale do we meet as hero one who acts uniformly on the standards of common sense, and he turns out to be a master-thief. The trials and riddles that test the acumen of the heroes are solved neither by skill nor virtue, but only by the action of chance as in "Rumpelstilzchen." The common sense that does appear is the astuteness of peasants. Of true intellectual effort, even on the lowest plane, there is no trace. The simple clearness of the plot would be disturbed by the complicated operation of the intellect.

The literary style of the German fairy tale is equally simple. Descriptions are never detailed. The same event is repeated three times so as to incite the simple-minded listeners to join in guessing the further developments. Nor is there any dramatic impulse. We can never say that "the plot thickens." The climax is always at the end. A German scholar tells us that the death of the hero was not among the "Aryan" motives. When in popular myths, as in *The Horned Siegfried*, the hero is killed, a "non-Aryan" tradition must, he assures us, have intruded. "The Aryan attitude," he gravely writes, "always aims at revival." The hero therefore must not perish.

We learn little or nothing as to the life of hero and heroine after their wedding. There is nowhere any mention of a Christian paradise, nor is there any reference to a numerous and blessed progeny, so often encountered in the Oriental tales. The collection has only ten unhappy endings. Nevertheless the happenings are not especially cheerful, sunny or

peaceful: Just as the dark and eerie forest is ever in the background, so the wings of death shadow the hero in his victorious course. His path through life is sown with the corpses of his more or less innocent adversaries and many of those, too, who have not opposed him. Cruelty and atrocity of every kind are parts of the fairy tales and myths of all peoples. On a certain level of civilisation punishment is meted out without any direct relation to guilt. Achilles drags without pity the corpse of gallant Hector ten times round the walls of Troy. Ulysses slays his wife's suitors for no greater sin than revelling. Such things are common enough. But typical of the German fairy tale is the juxtaposition of the commonplace, the intimate, even the profane element with the horrors of death and all the tortures of a calculated cruelty. Goethe observed this before the Grimms, and strove to take the fairy tale out of its humdrum and over-domestic surroundings and to place it in a truly romantic setting. Such an effort betrays a literary origin and produces a result utterly different from a genuine folk-tale.

In the decreeing of punishments and their execution the German story-teller reveals something deeper than he knows. The bad step-mothers are torn to pieces by wild beasts or have to dance to death in red-hot slippers or are thrust into a den full of vipers. The stingy cobbler, for a loaf of bread, gouges out first one eye of the merry but wasteful tailor and then, for another loaf, his other eye. How for three long nights the errant prince is pricked, pinched and beaten by devils, and each morning dressed and nursed by the compassionate princess, reads like a story from a more modern German institution. Neither children nor animals are spared painful punishment in these stories. "The Merry Fiddler" tied fox and wolf between two trees though they had done him no harm. "The Child that would not obey the Almighty" fell ill and was buried, and his mother was forced to flog his arm that grew out of the grave.

To find a comparable obsession with death we have to turn to ancient Egypt. But where Egyptians linked death with elaborate ritual and a mysterious and traditional piety, the German fairy tale challenges it in a mood of hysterical fear and revenge. It was the German psychologist Wundt who first pointed out that primitive man can only face the inevitable either with horror or with something like irony. The hero in

German fairy tales is in the position of a primitive man who conquers his physical enemies by cruel methods, but contends against his spiritual foes with scorn and sneer. He derides the professions of doctor, scholar and professor, while the Jew, the product of a very ancient civilisation, comes in as target for the arrows of his revenge. One of the most popular fairy tales in the collections of the "new" Germany is the story, called in the collections of the Grimms *The Jew Among Thorns*. In the selections made during the "liberal" period of German history this was omitted, with many other of the more cruel pieces, from editions intended for children. Now, it is almost needless to relate, they have gone back and Grimm's Fairy Tales are read by children unexpurgated.

Over a hundred years ago the brothers Grimm sought to present these treasures of old stories to a people without political guides. They filled the nurseries with princes, fairies, gnomes, and sprites. It was theirs to amuse, not to instruct. Their stories were beyond the realms of reality, and their horrors were as unreal as their princesses. They knew that children are children and they would not have them other. But now the primitive instincts of the child, which are not very different from those of the savage, have been elevated into a place of authority. The rulers of Germany would have us reverence those instincts at which we thought we could afford to laugh. It is no accident that Folklore is now raised to a special place of honour in Germany.

VINCENT BRUN.

THE NINTH SYMPHONY OF BEETHOVEN.

OF all the world's great epics in music I suppose none has commanded so great a library of human criticism as the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven. Even the Ring Cycle of Wagnerian opera and Bach's Mass in B minor are not exceptions. All who do not approach it from the merely academic standpoint have been struck by its intellectual and emotional content—its power to search the soul to its depths and to disclose human experience upon a scale seldom perceived in artistic creation. We are conscious, in its four movements, that something is being worked out—some panorama is unfolding; and its form alone is provocative in this respect. It develops as a Shakespearian or Tolstoyian tragedy develops. One movement leads inevitably to the next—even though the mood is completely changed; and it is important to notice that in this, his final symphony, Beethoven for the first time put the *scherzo* before the Slow Movement—a blazing blasting ecstasy of beauty and terror, before the deep and concentrated intellectuality of the *adagio*. This transition from the second to the third movement must remain inexplicable, I must think, to all but those who realise the gradual achievement of the latter—its final resolution in thought and purpose of all that preceded it.

I maintain, moreover, that the whole of the symphony describes the universal story of mankind from the premundane fall to its final consummation in eternity; and that its separate movements constitute the stages by which the pilgrimage has been made. Opening with *allegro non troppo* it passes to *scherzo*, thence to *adagio*; and finishes with the famous Choral Movement. This last, of all the movements, alone (to many minds) fails to convince; and I think that the argument which I hope to propound will show why Beethoven was unable to achieve conviction here. It cannot be said, however, that the first three movements may stand upon their own—either artistically or philosophically; but they must be said to do so in the sense that they present the uncompleted story of mankind.

That story begins in the opening bars of the first movement; and they are the most ethereal, perhaps the most haunting, in the whole symphony. One immediately senses the notion of

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creation, but not from chaos. There is a chaotic atmosphere in the first few bars ; but this is almost immediately split to nothing by the heart-shaking announcement of the predominating theme. It is, in fact, a void rather than chaos into which the orchestra pours itself ; and one becomes conscious, as the original and ghostly theme of the opening bars returns, that it is anything but chaotic. I feel that here we are in the presence of the unearthly—of some spiritual world which existed æons of ages before our own began.

Into this pale theme, ever falling and falling, those terrible peals of tragic reality keep bursting ; and I regard this movement as a sublime recreation in music of the premundane fall of man. Herein is told the story of material creation and the casting out of the fallen angels to take their part in the moulding of human history. If the theory of man's fall, which is now beginning to gain ground, is the true one, and it occurred before the creation of matter, we have in the first movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony a perfect panorama of the tragedy of material creation as a result of the fall. On and on the two themes go—the innocence of primeval spirituality and the falling into the tragic depths of material existence. It has often been said that this movement constitutes a great epic tragedy ; but what has seldom been observed is the fact that tragedy is here implicitly, rather than explicitly, revealed. That which becomes terribly apparent in the second movement, in all its details, here remains a single vast potentiality. You cannot split up the emotional content of the first movement as you can that of the second ; but must review it as a whole. The only variations that it discloses are spiritual—in that continuous interplay of primeval spirit falling, ever falling, into material potentiality.

As soon as the primeval, haunting theme of the introduction has burst into that anguished materiality of universal creation, it begins to dwindle ; and it is soon lost in the depths of sound that the fallen creation naturally assumes. It is then, as the symphony proceeds, that we become aware of all that is involved in this great premundane catastrophe known to theologians as the Fall ; and this is in a sense true of the whole symphony, although in the first movement it is viewed retrospectively and as a whole. For Beethoven vindicates in the Ninth Symphony a final expression of racial experience from the moment of creation ; and this could, of course, only

be achieved by drawing upon the deep, unconscious forces that he has inherited from mankind and are welling up into the subliminal area of his mind from those dark recesses of racial consciousness. He is not here swept off his feet by the sustained ecstasy that produced the *Eroica* Symphony, nor is he deliberately contriving the delicate emotional and intellectual æsthetics that went to the making of the Quartet in C sharp minor. He is, in the total isolation of his soul, giving to the world his philosophy of life in the method of which he had come to be a supreme master; and for that purpose he was drawing upon his own profoundest emotional experiences—beginning from the depths in the hope of ultimately storming the heights in the *Finale* Movement with a version in music of Schiller's *Ode to Joy*.

So, in the first gigantic movement, we get what may fairly be called the travail of the World Soul—even before its birth to evolution. In that vast potentiality, that appalling pregnancy, is contained all the anguish of the heart, the perplexity of the mind, the agony of the body and the yearning of the soul, that is one day to dawn in the materialisation of human experience. It is a poignant and vivid rumination upon the fate of a fallen universe—inevitable and inexhaustible; and in it we can hear the great tragedy of natural and human existence shaping itself. The crash of earthquake, the inexhaustible hungers of the sea, tempests and calms, the wild ravages of disease and the still small voice of martyred man, form the emotional content of this earliest movement—until it ends in a final *coda* that gathers all into its spell and ends, almost abruptly, in a final assertion of the predominating theme—that cast man out of Paradise.

The *scherzo* begins with a sharp announcement which is almost like a burst of that first movement; and all that was implicit in it, the whole vast potentiality, is pouring out into reality. The music of the first subject is swift and terrible—too massive to be brittle; and swelling in great gusts of sound to the blazing triumph of its repeated theme. The changes in key and *tempo* are almost miraculously swift—attended by glimpses of whole universal possibilities; and I think that the notion of active creation is as perfectly expressed here as in any work of creative art that the world has known. The rapid changes, the lightning flashes of orchestration, the intermittent thunder of drums and the haunting

undertone of attendant tragedy, give to this movement a detail which the first does not possess ; and a sense of development which I feel is vital to the symphony's meaning as a whole.

For here there is no sense of contemplation. The story of creation is rapidly developing ; and in every change, I had almost said in every phrase, we see the story of creation going forward. For there is humour as well as tragedy in the story—terror perpetual ; but none of the pity which, in the first movement, seemed to be coming from the heart of God Himself at the spectacle of human tragedy. Here, in the *scherzo*, the hideous story of Nature "red in tooth and claw" is alternated by an almost human chuckling of the Creator over the weird shapes and curious formation that the panorama discloses. Great gusts of blinding animal fury are relieved at intervals by curious chucklings and almost demoniacal rejoicings—until the music breaks suddenly into the middle section—a theme that is tender, almost pitying, in its appeal.

It is then that all that is more beautiful in Nature begins to take shape in the music—growing and ever growing. The mad turmoil of a blind creation has developed suddenly into a universe of beautiful shapes, variegated colours, the maternal instinct and the glow of sunset. It is only a glimpse—poignant and unforgettable that we have ; but it is just enough to assure us that terror and humour are not the only forces that have been at work in the creation before the music bursts again into the kaleidoscopic tragedy of creation. The first subject is repeated full blaze and the movement ends in the triumph of those dark and cruel forces out of which the material creation has evolved.

Then follows the Slow Movement—one of quiet intensity whose profundities of thought and feeling seem to plumb the very core of human personality. Here surely, if anywhere in music, the dignity and suffering of man are perfectly distilled into the expression of a mental and spiritual pilgrimage as a thing of power, of love, of ceaseless searching and yet of brave tranquillity. The teeming lusts and woes of nature's big creation have long tumbled into silence ; and one feels that evolution's goal has here been reached—man is full-fledged—a creature of thought and prayer who knows the yearning quality of life and the strange tragedy of death. All the highest aspirations of man's thought and feeling seem to find

expression here ; and that *searching* for something higher than himself, the keenest faculty of his existence, has always struck me as the final quest of this movement in the symphony.

It has often been remarked that in the Ninth Symphony Beethoven reversed his usual custom by placing the Slow Movement beyond the *scherzo* ; but I think that any who realise the epic quality of the symphony must acknowledge the inevitability of the plan. For the First Movement and the *scherzo* are alike in their tragic assertion of man's defeat by the powers out of which he was created ; but the Slow Movement is a vindication of his ability to make something of his destiny by converting it into a pilgrimage. For this movement is something more than a quest. It is, I think, a searching for higher things ; but it is also an answer to the First Movement and the *scherzo*—that nature "red in tooth and claw" does not have the last word ; and that man, if he can endure, will ultimately triumph.

At this moment the symphony becomes most completely retrospective because the thoughts and emotions which the composer is here expressing are those that lie nearest to the threshold of consciousness. He is no longer dealing with those splendid and terrible emotional depths that well out of our most primitive unconscious self but with educated and rationalised spiritual aspirations. For this reason the third movement is the most profoundly intellectual—the most subtle and penetrating ; and each fresh hearing of it brings to light beauties and complexities of thought or utterance which had been concealed before. At last it closes—not upon a note of triumph or complete understanding, but rather as something whose echoes of hope, yearning, suffering and aspiration linger on when all else in the great symphony has died out.

Then comes what I must regard as a movement too consciously elaborate to be the crowning achievement of the world's great epic in music ; and can deduce evidence to show that Beethoven was himself conscious of the great choral movement's partial failure as the climax of the Ninth Symphony. It begins with a fanfare—ugly but ruggedly magnificent. Then begins the search for a theme. The composer seems conscious of the fact that here the epic must go beyond the mind of man—to something higher than his pilgrimage so

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perfectly expressed in the music before. He attempts to introduce the cataclysmic announcement of the First Movement, but without result. Then come the opening bars of the *scherzo's* terrific pageantry ; but to no avail. Finally, the yearning theme of the Slow Movement is expelled ; and the fanfare is repeated to usher in the first notes of the choral theme. There is, however, one moment, between the rejection of the third theme and the repetition of the fanfare, in which a few chords of the most angelic beauty are heard. It is only a moment—scarcely a breath of orchestration ; but I cannot help a profound conviction that in that moment of inspiration Beethoven caught the echoes of a theme which would have carried his music into those realms beyond the mind of man in its present state of pilgrimage, and so have completed his destiny ; but, if so, he must have known that he could never sustain the theme. So he accepted one whose triumph is of this world rather than the next.

It is a movement of great power and beauty—in which human voices consummate the victory to which the symphony has been leading up—a victory of mankind over the forces that seemed once to have defeated it. I cannot doubt that, in the lights and shades, the undulations and modulations of this movement, Beethoven intended us to realise man's triumph over the dark forces ranged in order from the beginning of creation ; and he himself admitted his ambition to set Schiller's *Ode to Joy* to music. It is, indeed, a triumphant achievement ; but when put in the scales against the movements which led up to it—against the power and beauty of their universal appeal—I cannot help feeling that that movement fails to achieve its gigantic purpose.

For, if there is anything at all in my theory of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, this movement should express the full consummation of man's eternal bliss in Heaven. The symphony began with the fall and its resultant material creation, it then burst into the colossal panorama of evolution ; and we have but recently heard the strains of man's mental and spiritual search for his Creator in the third movement. Now should come that final consummation of the creative process by which man achieves the vision of God in the eternity of Heaven. There can really be no wonder that even Beethoven's genius failed in this superhuman task ; and that this movement is a deliberately conscious creation rather than a

daring uprush of those deep, unconscious impulses, that went to the making of the other three.

There can be no doubt that the composer himself accepted it as second best. For not only did he contemplate its complete revision as an orchestral piece a few years later ; but we hear the battle raging in his own mind in the opening bars. That introduction throws a wealth of light upon his whole conception of what was involved in this final creative act. I have already spoken of the manner in which he tested the three former themes and found them unable to bear the full glory of the last triumphant movement. This has often been observed before ; but what has been seldom noticed is the fact that, after all this labour, he finally accepted the theme with which the movement opens as a herald to the human voice. It is as though he despaired of ever finding anything rich and deep enough to express the harmonies of Heaven.

It has been said that Beethoven, unlike other composers who even possibly surpassed him in stature, wrote music that contained more than the essence of pure music ; and of nothing that he ever wrote is this more true than of the Nine Symphonies by which he is most famously remembered. This is the more curious in view of the fact that his sacred music was, with the glorious exception of the great Mass in D, a partial failure. It was only when he looked down into the depths of his unconscious self—that part of him which had inherited all the strivings and potentialities of mankind—and drew upon them, that he was able to give us the full blast of his genius.

ASHLEY SAMPSON.

REPTILES.

REPTILES ! The mere intonation with which, quite instinctively, one gives utterance to the word, makes cause for wonder whether there is any good to be said of them. Yet—I write of Western India—one's principal feeling towards the little house lizard or gecko, upon the wall of one's bungalow, is sheer gratitude for the zealous manner in which he is wont to polish off one after another of the myriad winged nuisances of a monsoon evening. The internal capacity of the little creature always seems too good to be true. And the garden lizards scurrying across one's path, with long brittle tails designed, if seized by a hostile beak, to come off in the hand so to say, and be discarded, are harmless things. The most conspicuous of them is the so-called "blood-sucker," who puffs out his throat at you in the endeavour to look important, but only succeeds in being a figure of fun. In the effort his whole throat becomes suffused with crimson, a change of colour which is presumably responsible for his sometimes being called a chameleon, which he certainly is not.

The true chameleon is a lizard of more prehistoric mould, which I have personally come across, in India, only in the Nilgiri Hills, but have also met in Southern Arabia. An amazing creature I found him. His colour transformation schemes were, it seemed, dependent in part upon the hues of his environment and background, and in part upon the nature of the light falling on him. They varied from brilliant green, with black spots and blotches, to orange brown or a dirty cream marked with brown. But, apart from changes in his uniform, it was his eyes and the character of his movements which gave one the impression that here was a unique personality. A squint-eyed regard can make one feel uncomfortable, you never know whether the eye concerned is looking at you or not. But the effect is still more disconcerting when a creature, in the act of contemplating a blue-bottle, deliberately swivels round one of the ball-and-socket arrangements—to use E. H. Aitken's apt epithet—which serve it for eyes, in order to study you, while the other continues, without interruption, the more important business of estimating the range of that fly. The thing purports to be a lizard, but you cannot believe it to be real, and feel sure there must be an invisible someone pulling a string to work the machine.

Having decided that you are not a person of any account, the right eye returns to the assistance of its colleague ; and the owner of both, after some further consideration, concludes—unless the blue-bottle has in the meantime become bored and moved on—that the range is excessive and must be reduced. To that end he uncoils his tail, which has been wound round a supporting twig or other perch, leisurely unclasps the grip of the fingers of one fore-paw, and as leisurely moves it forward to take up a fresh grip. Then, at the pulling of that invisible string again, the other hand does likewise ; after which a rest is necessary before the right hind foot begins to take its share in the advance. And so on.

It is slow motion *in excelsis*. When the whiting was impelled to invite the snail to walk a little faster, I expect the latter was doing his little best. The snail is slow, not a doubt of it ; yet he does not move with the studied super-deliberation of the chameleon. The panther stalking a wary prey can, by virtue of sheer concentration, move his paw at a rate of fractions of an inch per second ; but you know that same paw can strike like the lightning itself. The chameleon, however, cannot be imagined progressing any faster than he does. Not because you think he cannot do so, but just because he does not choose ; while any attempt to hustle him would, you feel, be an unwarrantable interference with one of the fixed laws of dynamics.

When at length he has arrived within range—perhaps six inches—of his quarry, the chameleon tightens his grip with hands and tail, parts his lips, thinks hard, and the next moment the blue-bottle has disappeared, with a leap within those cavernous jaws that the eye is unable to follow. It is just as fast as that ; after the portentous slowness of every previous movement it leaves you gasping. One cannot help wondering whether the real explanation of the reptile's superlative leisureliness of limb, up to that point, is not to be found in the necessity of concentrating all the speed of which his being is capable into the manipulation of the lasso which is his tongue. For, in fact, it is like a lasso that he wields his weapon, with the difference that instead of a noose he employs a blob of liquid glue on the tip of his tongue. I have taken longer than I had intended over a description of the chameleon's methods ; but what is one to do with a creature to whom time is of no account ?

In Gujarat I never met a chameleon. A reptile, however, which is frequently in evidence there, especially if you keep fowls, is that big lizard of antediluvian appearance commonly miscalled the iguana, in reality a monitor. I once had a neighbour who was a poultry fancier and found his prize white leghorn chickens disappearing in mysterious fashion. He set traps for the mongoose which he believed to be the culprit, but without success. One afternoon he and I were in his compound when we saw something scuttle away from the vicinity of a wired-in fowl run, then sit up on its haunches and look round to inspect us—exactly as a mongoose will do when he cannot quite make out what you are. "I knew it was a mongoose," said my friend. But it was not. The next moment it was down on all fours, and its gait as it waddled off gave it away—a monitor or *ghorpad*, what the Gujarati calls a *gho*. This particular specimen escaped for that time, but was shot a day or two later, a big fellow nearly four feet in length. In its interior were found the remains of a couple of chickens and of a young partridge, as well as of eggs of some small bird.

The *gho* is a voracious poacher; but the evil reputation in another respect which he bears among the natives is undeserved. I once picked up a young one by the tail in the presence of a *patawala*—the office menial whom they call a *chuprassi* farther north—and it turned and seized my finger in its teeth. I have never seen a brown skin turn such an extraordinary hue; the man was livid with genuine horror, fully expecting me to drop dead. For the *ghorpad*, when young and spotted—it loses its spots as it grows up—is credited with a bite more deadly than the cobra's; a complete delusion, for India possesses no poisonous lizard known to science.

What the creature does own is a set of powerful claws with which it can maintain a most tenacious grip. It is said that in olden days burglars used to employ the *ghorpad* to assist them to climb up walls and into houses, sending it on ahead with a light rope fastened around its waist, when it would cling so tightly in some crevice or corner as easily to support the weight of a climber. And tradition has it that the Marathas once utilised the services of a large specimen in just this fashion, to provide them with a means of scaling the impregnable and therefore unwatched side of the ancient

fort of Singarh, and thus to capture it from the Moghals. Life is not always easy for the *ghorpad*. Poisonous or not, the Waghri—a low-caste hunting tribe—and other unfastidious folk have always eaten him with gusto, while in these days his hide makes ladies' handbags.

In the case of that still bigger lizard, the mugger (crocodile), it is suitcases and so forth. Which is just as well, for, unprepossessing anachronism that he is, I do not know what else he is good for in the modern world. Like every lizard, large or small, his one interest in life is food. Other animals will regard you with frank curiosity, or as frank suspicion. But the eyes in that horny head, the top of which, as it floats slowly past you standing on the bank, is all that is visible above the surface of the water, are solely concerned to appraise your possibilities as meat. So at least I always fancy. The particular mugger we are observing is probably not big enough—few are in those parts of which I write—to tackle an adult human being if it had the chance. None the less I believe it constitutionally incapable of considering a living creature from any other point of view. Look into the chill expressionlessness of the crocodile's lidless grey-green orbs. I have seen cold cruelty in the eyes of a jungle cat, and there seems a sinister quality in those of a wolf; but these are warm-blooded animals, and their eyes capable of varying expression in tune with varying moods. In the eye of a crocodile is an element of changelessness that chills one with an impression, such as no mammal's eye ever gives forth, of unmixed evil. Catch a wolf-young and you may tame him. One cannot conceive of any response from a mugger. But enough of these foul relics of a vanished age.

And so to the snakes. Nobody loves snakes. The same, it is true, may be said of the mugger; but comparatively few folk ever meet the latter, while snakes, though to a much less degree than often supposed, are liable to enter into the life of anyone in India. And many of them are not only entirely harmless, but do valuable work in the destruction of rats and suchlike vermin. Moreover, prejudice apart, some of them have their attractive points. Squirmy things; no doubt; but does one ever see a snake that is not sleek and clean, with a well-groomed look about him, in fact? Except, of course, at the uncomfortable, dishevelled time of sloughing his skin. And some are often beautiful of colouring.

None of which alters the fact that the snake is anathema to mankind in general ; this for a combination of reasons. Its writhing mode of progression, for one thing, tends to have a discomfiting effect upon the human observer. And man can never quite forget, either the traditional association of the serpent form with the Evil One, or the possession by some of the race of an instrument of death, the deadliness of which seems out-of all proportion to the importance of its possessor. Well do I remember the horror of my first intimate contact with—but the tale will not take long in the telling.

It was my first year in India. A young subaltern dressing for dinner, I pulled on a mess wellington boot to feel something alive under my heel—heavens ! a snake ! With a presence of mind on which that sudden deathly cold feeling up my spine did not prevent my priding myself, I rammed my heel down and stood upon it hard ! After a couple of minutes, when surely it must be safe, I got my bearer to pull off the boot, to find the loathly remains of—a miserable toad !

Since that memorable night I have neither experienced nor witnessed any hairbreadth escapes. Unless it be the case of a Rajput motor-driver, bitten by a *phoorsa*, which gave me an opportunity of testing a much advertised cure for snake-poisoning, permanganate of potash. This drug acts by neutralising the venom ; to be of any use, therefore, it must be brought into actual contact with the venom itself before the latter has entered the blood-stream. In the instance in question I was able to cut across the site of the bite and rub in the permanganate crystals within a couple of minutes, with the result that practically no symptoms of poisoning developed. Had action been delayed by half an hour it would probably have been a very different matter.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that there is no known cure for snake-poison, once it has entered the blood-stream, except anti-venine prepared from a serum of the venom of the particular species of snake responsible for the bite. There are no doubt measures which a medical man can take that may be helpful in border-line cases. But it may safely be maintained that the great majority of recoveries from snake-bite poisoning are due to the simple fact that the amount of venom injected was not enough to constitute a fatal dose. The old-fashioned belief dies hard that the best thing to do is to fill the victim up with alcohol. In the view of modern

science this is a dangerous error, and the practice likely to do more harm than good.

Considering how abundant snakes, sometimes are, it is rather remarkable how seldom one actually sees them. Snakes one has encountered, of course, and naturally calls to mind first the most notorious kinds—Cobra; daboia or Russell's viper; *krait*; *echis* viper or *phoorsa*, already mentioned, a trifle less deadly than the first three.

It was a large black cobra which once afforded a Muhammadan mounted police orderly of mine a chance of displaying his prowess with the sword. We were riding along a sort of lane with a bank on one side, when a cobra that had been coiled up on the bank, roused by the vibration of the passing hoofs, reared itself up with hood expanded after the fashion of its kind, its head about saddle high as we rode below. Maula Baksh was an ex-sowar of a famous cavalry regiment, and an expert performer at "heads and posts." At the sight of this heaven-sent opportunity his dark eyes gleamed, as he begged eagerly to be allowed to practise his favourite exercise on the person of a living foe. Back he cantered some sixty paces, then, as all unwitting of its danger the cobra held its ground, down upon his enemy swept the old soldier in a whirlwind charge. Above his charger's ears, and perfectly timed, came the swishing back-hand stroke of a blade in whose keenness its owner had always taken pride, and that swaying menacing head was removed as cleanly as had been each coconut at the last competition which Maula Baksh had won.

Even the cobra, when his hood is not expanded, is not always recognisable at sight by the inexperienced eye. And Kipling's description of "Krait, the dusty brown snaking that lives for choice on the dusty earth," fits the *phoorsa* even better than it does the *krait* itself. In fact the observer who desires to indentify any snake with certainty will be well advised to study the character and arrangement of their scales—with the assistance of some authority on the subject. Reliance on size and colouring will be found a broken reed. The trouble is that no live snake is going to allow you to count his scales, and the wise man will use the stick first and then look up the book.

From time to time, usually during the monsoon season, a commotion in one's compound is accompanied by the cry,

“*Samp hai! Bara samp!*” (Big snake!), and presently the bearer appears, either to beg the sahib to come forth and deal with the intruder, or to invite attention to the sweeper who, at the foot of the verànda steps—which his “untouchable” form must not pollute by ascending—holds out in deprecating triumph a stick, from which dangles the limp corpse of the enemy. Occasionally *krait* or cobra, more often an entirely harmless species. To one’s retainers the whole tribe is deadly; or, if prepared to admit that there may be exceptions, they deem it wiser to act on the sound principle already advocated, of making sure first and enquiring after. This does not of course apply to the Brahmin, who looks upon the cobra with veneration; or the Jain, to whom the taking of any life is a sin. Should venomous snakes become too abundant round about a gentleman’s domicile to be entirely comfortable, recourse can be had to the snake-charmer. This individual will always be prepared, for a consideration, to beguile with sweet music that inconvenient cobra from its hole and convey it, without ostentation, to the sufficiently distant compound of a neighbour. Whether the cobra so beguiled had, or had not, previously been put into that hole by the charmer himself is a matter upon which I do not venture to hazard an opinion.

A few people in India learn to identify the principal venomous snakes; none but the professed naturalists know anything about the harmless ones. Yet of these there are many more species, from the magnificent python to the slender green whip-snake, or the barred wolf-snake, often, to its cost, mistaken for the *krait*. Then there is the big *dháman* or rat-snake, the baleful glance of whose eye at milking-time, I have been solemnly assured, will dry up the udders of a cow, to say nothing of the *amphisboena*, who bears a head at each end of his body! It will be gathered that there is quite a lot to be learned about the non-venomous snakes. For most people, however, it remains the venomous minority that matters.

Of this venomous minority in India there are—apart from the sea snakes—but four species at all generally common whose bite is liable to prove fatal to a human being, the four I have already mentioned: cobra, *krait*, daboia and *phoorsa*. One cannot but wonder why this should be so. The existence, indeed, of snakes furnished with an elaborate apparatus for the injection

of deadly poison has always been one of nature's mysteries. The majority of the race, living a similar life to the specialised minority, feeding on similar prey and subject to similar dangers, seems to get on very well without any such equipment. The grass snake of the English countryside, for example, appears to make just as much a success of life as does the adder. Why then should the few be provided with a death-dealing weapon of appalling efficiency, which the many neither possess nor need, but by reason of which they must share universal obloquy?

The question is one to which science has no satisfactory answer. But there is no getting away from the fact. Observe a grass snake in the woodland, as it glides away before our approach: can we fail to admit the grace in its movements? And the formidable daboia at the Zoo, his old coat recently sloughed, one cannot deny the brilliancy of colour and pattern of the new one, with its triple chain of large orange-brown diamonds outlined in greenish-black or deep purple and contrasting white. And in a state of freedom, if he will not put himself out unduly to make way for you, he is yet not usually aggressive of disposition and will give you fair warning of his presence with a resounding hiss which is meant to be heard. Not his the blame if you ignore it. It is even true that his venom provides the doctors nowadays with a valuable means of treating that peculiar complaint, hæmophilia. And yet . . .

An altercation, once, with a large daboia which I met out shooting, ended in the demise of the latter, a specimen, as it turned out, of the female sex. The funeral rites disclosed no less than 53 unhatched eggs from which, but for my untimely interference, there would presently have emerged fifty-three infant vipers, each with curved fang and poison gland and forked tongue all complete. One has tried, for the moment, to adopt a more kindly attitude towards an unloved race. But the mental vision of that multiple reptile progeny gives one pause. It may be that the daboia wears a beautiful coat, and will not bite unless conceiving itself provoked. It may be that human science can use the poison from under his lips to bestow life rather than death. Yet—flat scaly head and flickering forked tongue! I fear me that a serpent remains a serpent, cursed above every beast of the field.

A. H. E. MOSSE.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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A GREAT FRENCH DIPLOMATIST.*

During the critical years before the World War France was fortunate in possessing three diplomatists of the first rank in the key cities of Europe—Paul Cambon in London, Jules Cambon in Berlin, and Camille Barrère in Rome. A charming memoir of the first, written by his son, was published last summer, and now a more substantial biography of the second has been written by his niece. The name of Mme Tabouis is known wherever French journalism is studied, and her reputation will be enhanced by this loving tribute to her distinguished uncle. France is rich in political memoirs and poor in political biographies. It is to be hoped that her example may be followed, and that we may in due course be able to read authoritative biographies of Clemenceau, Jaurès, Poincaré, Delcassé and other French statesmen of European stature.

The careers of the brothers Cambon, a singularly devoted pair, were curiously parallel. Both took an active part in the war of 1870, both had administrative experience in France, both were Governors of African territory, Paul in Tunis and Jules in Algeria, both entered diplomacy in middle life and rose to the highest posts. If Paul has the higher reputation is it not because he had the greater opportunity? To win the enduring friendship of Great Britain after centuries

* *The Life of Jules Cambon.* By Geneviève Tabouis. Cape. 15s.

of hostility and suspicion was assuredly an historic achievement ; but even he could not have effected a rapprochement between France and Germany. Wherever his lot was cast the younger brother rose to the occasion and won the respect of those with whom he had to deal. The picture drawn in these pages of a highly cultured and affectionate human being is most sympathetic, and Mme Tabouis is to be congratulated on her work, which gains in interest by numberless intimate touches.

Jules Cambon's years at Washington were memorable for the Spanish-American War, and the succeeding years at Madrid witnessed the making of the Franco-Spanish treaty concerning Morocco in 1904. In describing the latter Mme Tabouis draws heavily on the Ambassador's despatches published in the great official series of *Documents Diplomatiques Français*. From Spain, then 'a quiet backwater', to Germany, then and always in the centre of the world's life, was indeed a change, and even as early as 1907 Cambon instinctively foretold trouble. "I hope that my departure from Berlin may be as fine as this, but I doubt it," he exclaimed as the train drew out of the Spanish capital. The political tension and the social contacts in his new post made the seven years in Germany the most memorable in his life. He never trusted Bülow, of whom he writes that under a mask of dilettantism was hidden a Prussian—very Prussian and not very scrupulous. The Crown Prince was as frank in his bellicose utterances as in his criticism of the Kaiser. Bethmann he respected, but he realised that he was never master in his own house.

The two main diplomatic crises with which the Ambassador had to deal were those of Agadir and the outbreak of the World War. His long and on the whole successful duel with Kiderlen in the summer of 1911 is fully described, and the reader is impressed by the patience, tenacity and tact with which the representative of France carried through very delicate and dangerous negotiations. Kiderlen was not an agreeable person, but Cambon learned to respect his ability and, after a bad beginning, his relative moderation. "It has never been sufficiently realised," he wrote later, "how greatly the peace of the world was in danger during the second fortnight of August 1911. . . . At bottom, the only thing of which I am proud is that I avoided war in 1911."

His services to peace were recognised by Kiderlen, who remarked that "if the negotiators had been anybody but Jules and I there would have been war." Hotheads in both countries were furious at the Morocco-Congo treaties of November 4th, 1911, and the fiery Déroulède refused to shake hands with the Ambassador on his next visit to Paris; but the moderates on both sides of the Rhine were fairly well satisfied. When reproached by a friend for not playing a stronger hand, Cambon calmly replied that he had never been a gambler.

As the sky darkened again in 1913 during the later phases of the Balkan war, and as talk of war became general in both countries, the Ambassador lost the gaiety and sprightly wit which had made him such a welcome figure in the salons of Berlin. He confided his growing anxieties to Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister, as well as to his chiefs at the Quai d'Orsay. The conversations between the King of the Belgians and his hosts on his memorable visit to Berlin in November 1913 left no doubt that peace was hanging by a thread. While Paul Cambon naturally retained his London post throughout the war, Jules returned to Paris and was employed in various duties of the highest importance. In the autumn of 1914, before Italy had declared her intentions, he was sent to Rome on a temporary mission to plead for France. The post of Secretary-General at the Quai d'Orsay was created for him in the autumn of 1915, and for the rest of the long struggle his advice counted for more than that of any other official. The veteran of the war of 1870 followed every phase of the conflict with the strained anxiety of a great patriot, and he was full of gratitude to all who rendered service to France. When he congratulated Joffre at Chantilly after the victory of the Marne, the Commander-in-Chief replied: "Do not congratulate me. It was von Kluck who lost the battle, not I who won it." When Clemenceau was called to the helm in 1917 at the darkest hour, Cambon learned to know both the merits and faults of the Tiger. He regretted the Premier's studied humiliation of President Poincaré, but the greatness of the old man was beyond dispute. "When I see the courage and effort with which he fights from day to day against the worst difficulties and the lowest intrigues in order to rescue France, I cannot help loving him."

As a member of the French delegation Jules Cambon took

an active part in the making of the peace, and the chapter entitled "The Peace Treaty" is one of the most interesting in the book. He describes in vivid language the first contact with the German delegates at Versailles and the historic scene when Clemenceau and Brockdorff-Rantzau met face to face for the presentation of the terms of the victorious Allies. Cambon was too experienced not to know that the peace settlement was unduly severe, and, despite his admiration for Foch, he described him as wild in his demand that German sovereignty should end at the Rhine. The Treaty of Versailles was the end of the World War but not of our troubles, and as chairman of the Conference of Ambassadors he had plenty to do during the coming years. He died at the age of 90 in 1935, when Germany was on her legs again, and all Europe was talking of the next world war.

G. P. G.

A FULL LIFE.*

Once, when Whistler was asked to prove his assumption that he had painted a certain picture in a week—or it may have been a day—he gave an answer that has become a quotation: "It took me all my life to paint that picture." The proud retort comes to one's mind on reading this autobiography of a woman whose years of apprenticeship in the service of humanity brought her inevitably to the position of leadership in a struggle for human freedom. For while the militant suffrage agitation could not fail to affect, in a more or less degree, the outlook of all serious women in the decade preceding the Great War, only some, even of those who took active part in it, could have said with Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence that their whole previous career had been a preparation for their response to the call when it came.

That is why her written story presents a picture of a full life, in which the movement led by the Women's Social and Political Union, though occupying the most remarkable portion of it, fits naturally into its place in the narrative. The beginning of her book covers that period when the well-to-do English middle class were awakening to a sense of their responsibilities towards the workers. Emmeline Pethick in

**My Part in a Changing World.* By Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence. Gollancz. 15s. net.

her comfortable Cornish home never knew poverty, never had to earn her living ; but she had imagination and sincerity of vision, and her account of her early years reveals those mingled feelings of sympathy and indignation, united with a passion for doing something to alter things, that created the rebel of later years. Paying full tribute to family affection and care, she does not minimise the lack of understanding and denial of freedom that in those days characterised the grown-up attitude towards children.

"I believe that to-day the majority of children are relatively happy," she writes. "Half a century ago, the majority were, in my opinion, often desperately miserable." When a teacher, whose misplaced harshness had failed to destroy her spirit, rewarded her unexpectedly for a rare exhibition of good conduct, she cried to the other girls—"See what I get for being good *sometimes*! You are good *all the time* and you get nothing!" The future advocate of militant as against non-militant political tactics was already in being. But the years in between were to be full of quiet endeavour, largely spent in living and working among girls at the West London Mission, years of keen observation of social conditions, all working up to the conviction that without direct political power practical improvement of their status was beyond the reach of women.

One source of her strength was her ability to use experience, however bitter. An early love affair left her desolated, yet "planted new seeds of courage and self-confidence" in her heart because its mere occurrence had destroyed her shy sense of being unattractive. Some of the most beautiful passages in the book, by the way, describe her relations with her husband, Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, who stood side by side with her all through the suffrage agitation.

Of this agitation, which raged in the years 1905-14, much has been written. It is therefore all the more necessary, now that a new generation has arisen, ignorant of what the movement meant in a world since changed past recognition, that a dispassionate account of it should be available ; and we have this in Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence's book, the greater portion of which deals with the militant campaign. The story is presented with an impartiality that only those who lived through it can properly appreciate ; it can be trusted for its accuracy ; it reveals for the first time much that puzzled many people in the difference of opinion with the Pankhursts which led to the

secession of the Pethick-Lawrences from the W.S.P.U. ; and it is told with a saving grace of humour and a raciness that makes it a thoroughly good story, as a story. If there were nothing else in her book than this description of one of the most remarkable rebel movements of modern times, it should be read by every student of history and sociology.

There is, of course, much more in her book, and I wish I had space to describe the writer's work for peace, not only after the War when everybody was a pacifist, but from the first day of it until the last, and on until the present time when the shadow of war lies on us once more. But no present discontent or past disillusionment has more success than had her early teachers in breaking the spirit of Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence. Having seen, as she says, most of her dreams come true, she writes in conclusion—

Because I have witnessed a change of heart and a corresponding change in circumstance happen many times, I cherish the dream, which is also a faith, that it is going to happen again. And when that dream "comes true" it will mean an end of war for ever.

So *My Part in a Changing World* ends characteristically on a note of hope.

EVELYN SHARP.

LAMENT FOR ECONOMICS.*

Mrs. Wootton here applies an exceedingly acute mind to an exposure of certain fundamental defects in modern "economics" regarded as a science or an art. In the pursuit of scientific exactitude most professional economists have ignored the wider human significance of the efforts and satisfactions attendant in economic processes; and have devoted themselves to an analysis of markets and of laws appertaining thereto that is based upon assumptions which ignore the current facts underlying these operations.

The economic theory of to-day, it is alleged, is useless because it is unintelligible; because after all these arduous studies, the economists cannot be relied upon not to give diametrically opposite diagnoses and prognoses of the same situation (not to mention the incompatibility of the various remedies which a few of the more courageous among them are sometimes induced to prescribe); because the economists feed on their own tails by

* By Barbara Wootton. Allen & Unwin. 6s. net.

busying themselves with the analyses of imaginary worlds which they have themselves invented; and, finally, because they are passing off as purely scientific enquiry what is in reality no more than a partisan advocacy of particular social policies (p. 35).

Though Mrs. Wootton does not formally adopt the whole of this indictment, it forms the substance of her argument against the futility of "laws" which ignore the human facts that underly and diversify all market processes, and the "bias" in favour of the existing private rule of industry which academic and business economists unconsciously display. The chief defect of market laws as indicative of a sound distribution of productive resources is found to be the absence of any presumption of equality of opportunity among consumers. For, though most economists have given a formal recognition to this need, its absence from the operation of most markets (especially for the sale of labour) has not kept them from identifying market values with optimum human values and from rejecting almost all public interference with free marketing as detrimental to maximum production and consumption. The impossibility of an exact measurement of the amount of satisfaction or welfare which different persons will get from the same expenditure is taken by rigorous economists as a final argument against attempts to equalise money-incomes.

Mrs. Wootton notes how most leading economists from Adam Smith to Marshall, and even later, have shown definite leanings towards a humane theory of values, but the drive towards exactitude and quantitative measurements has prevailed. The erratic movements of money in recent years and their obvious bearings upon employment and prosperity have concentrated attention upon the instrument of exchange.

In a long concluding chapter Mrs. Wootton turns to her "researches into the nature of social ends in modern communities and the means by which these may best be formulated" (p. 282). Here she develops a policy of public planning, the rudiments of which she set forth in an earlier treatise, and which is fortified by the recent evidence of waste and misdirection furnished by the experience of all nations. The book, though brilliantly written, is not all easy reading, but it deserves to be widely read by all who are dissatisfied with what is known as "the economic system."

J. A. HOBSON.

SOUTH OF HITLER.*

This book, by a well-informed journalist who worked for many years in Vienna, presents an interesting and vivid picture of what happened in Central and South-Eastern Europe during the last twenty years. The reader will find a competent introduction to the constantly shifting political aspect of the regions between Vienna and Angora. As the author is also well acquainted with the situation in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he has been able to visualise his object from a broad historical point of view. This, for instance, enables him to connect, very correctly, National Socialism with the *grössdeutsch* movement of Hapsburg times. Already then, the "eternal student" Wolf and a bourgeois like Schoenerer actually created all the myths, slogans and ideas that constitute Hitler's panacea. German historical and political writers never mention this spiritual parentship. It is, however, of no small importance for an exact understanding of the ideological, social and political forces working within the Third Reich. As far as National Socialism bears the *pétit bourgeois* imprint, its origin is to be found in pre-war Austria. One can, however, hardly agree with the author's opinion that the Pan-German ideal originated also in the Hapsburg Monarchy. The *alldeutsch* movement was characteristically German in its nature, and ideologically linked up with big industry.

Many of the problems at issue in Central and South-Eastern Europe are similar to those that were solved elsewhere during the nineteenth century. The Hapsburg Monarchy failed to solve them during the revolution of 1848 as well as afterwards. Economic unity had to be co-ordinated with democratic institutions which would safeguard the inalienable rights of men and nations. It is to be regretted that the author did not think it worth while to mention at least the constructive ideas on this problem put forward by writers and politicians of different persuasion, and especially the Socialists, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. Even to-day they would prove to be useful for an appropriate understanding of the South-Eastern situation. The author makes it quite clear that the consequences of the Treaty of Trianon were disastrous for the economic life of the region. The leaders

* *South of Hitler*. By M. W. Fodor. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 10s. 6d.

of that time, and even a convinced democrat like Masaryk, saw the only way which would satisfy the legitimate demands of the different nationalities in splitting up the Hapsburg Monarchy into sovereign States, i.e. into separate economic units.

The Slav nations of Austro-Hungary as well as of the Balkans strove for independence; it is, however, open to debate whether this so-called Pan-Slav movement could actually be considered as aiming at political unity of all the Slav nations. In our opinion the author overestimates the purely national motives. Otherwise he could hardly consider Stambolisky's Bulgarian Peasant Party to have been imbued by Pan-Slav notions. It was primarily a peasants' movement, like that in most South-Eastern countries, Slav or non-Slav. The countries of South-Eastern Europe are about to become industrialised, and the peasants who, on the average, constitute three-quarters of their population are those who have to pay for it. In other words, the destruction of the large estates and the land reforms did not bring in their wake the ascendancy of the peasant class, but the rise of an industrial bourgeoisie which stands behind the dictatorships that have been set up in the Balkans. This very stimulating book gives cause to reconsider our conceptions. The future of the South-East is of great concern for the whole of Europe.

G. O. GARDENER.

THE SILENT SOCIAL REVOLUTION.*

The year 1895, in which the Bryce Commission on Secondary Education presented its report, provides a convenient date from which to begin an account of the expansion of public education in England and Wales. Forster's Education Act of 1870 had been in operation for a quarter of a century. The extension of the school accommodation and the improvement in the education were having their effect upon the rising generation. Those who had had opportunity to observe the children throughout the period noticed "how roughness of manner has been smoothed away, how readily and intelligently they can answer a question, how the half hostile

* *The Silent Social Revolution*. By G. A. N. Lowndes. Humphrey Milford. 6s. net.

suspicion with which they regarded a stranger has disappeared; in fact, how they have become civilised." The contribution of the educational system to the social history of the country has been even more remarkable in the ensuing forty years. Mr. Lowndes's study is "based on the reading during the past seventeen years of many thousands of reports on schools of all kinds in every part of the country," in addition to a wide range of reports of official and voluntary bodies as well as numerous monographs and biographies, of which he provides an admirably complete bibliography. In dealing with this mass of material his aim has been to provide a living record of social progress. The result is a most readable volume in which the children and their teachers can be seen at work and play. The majority of children left school disciplined and well grounded in reading, writing and arithmetic. But they left too young, though the parents of some were beginning to realise the need for a longer school life and evening schools were increasing in popularity. Little, if anything, was done for the physically defective child, and the time had not yet come for the education authorities to be concerned with the health of the children. Secondary education was only nominally available. Mr. Lowndes estimates that "probably not more than thirty thousand out of a total of seventy-five thousand [in grammar schools] were as yet receiving an education which could be recognised either in point of quality or length of school life as a sound secondary education to-day." Into this inchoate medley of educational effort the Education Act of 1902 introduced order and defined responsibility for the establishment of a comprehensive system. Higher education has been organised and the methods of the elementary school have been revised almost beyond recognition, but the most remarkable feature has been the introduction of the school medical service. Moreover, Mr. Lowndes claims that "just as the school medical service has . . . become a principal foundation of national health, so the public system of education has become a principal foundation of practically every new activity in the community." The evidence in support of this claim is admirably presented in this volume which might be extended in a new edition to cover the century, to be completed next year, since the State first took an active interest in elementary education.

C. E. A. B.

THE ART OF THE ADMIRAL.*

Owing to the peculiar nature as well as the magnitude of the medium in which it has to move, naval strategy constitutes a complex of paradoxes infinitely more difficult to explain to the lay mind than those of land warfare. It is, therefore, a most ambitious as well as a highly topical task which Commander Grenfell has set before himself in trying, for the first time in the history of naval theory, to reinterpret the mysteries of this highly fascinating no less than important subject in a language and form capable of attracting the attention of the general reader. Wisely refraining from deterring his readers at the beginning by lengthy expositions of the wider aspect of naval strategy in its relations to the conduct of war as a whole, he has gone immediately to the heart of the matter by starting to examine in turn the elementary features : overseas expeditions, the attack and defence of trade and the defence against invasions ; although in view of the peculiar nature of naval defence the whole would have become even more clear if he had given it precedence as the corner-stone of the structure and dealt with the attack afterwards.

As it stands the offensive aspect of sea-power, having been disposed of in advance, does not further receive that amount of attention that it would deserve even under present-day conditions ; though this is somewhat offset by the strong emphasis rightly laid by the author upon the moral factor, related to but, as Commander Grenfell's study very clearly shows (Chapter X), by no means identical with the offensive factor. The further progress of his treatment, however, giving the reader step by step just that amount of information which he needs as the basis for the understanding of the next is an admirable bit of literary workmanship, the full value of which only a few will be able to estimate even amongst experts. Thus the discussion of the various fundamental aspects of naval strategy is followed by two very well conceived chapters on the "moral" element and an excellent one upon "the technique of victory," conspicuous above all by a very clear exposition of the problems involved in the nature of the objective in naval war. The concluding two chapters upon the influence of the air and the composition of

* *The Art of the Admiral.* By Commander Russel Grenfell. Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.

fleets are just what they should be in a study with so wide an appeal: cautious estimates of the situation as it stands at present, without any violent fancies as to the future, yet not without a justified element of intelligent anticipation. Thus even from this short examination it can be seen that Commander Grenfell's study by no means restricts itself to the popularisation of existent doctrines; in fact its value as an original study, though less obvious, is hardly less great than its primary function. The only serious criticism that could be advanced against it is a defect of omission rather than of error. Commander Grenfell restricts his study exclusively to the examination of "naval" war as an independent act of war, whereas to-day the likelihood of such a purely "naval" war—rare enough in the old days—is practically nil and the importance of naval strategy lies in its contribution to the larger "maritime" strategy of the war as a whole. In the beginning the discussion of this point, as we remarked above, would have been apt to disturb and perplex; at the end it seems to us indispensable.

HERBERT ROSINSKI.

WORLD UNITY.*

In his latest book, *The World's Design*, Señor de Madariaga presents an analysis of the world situation and suggests proposals towards its solution which bear the full weight of his long and distinguished career in international affairs. With all his experience, he remains essentially an idealist believing in world unity as an eventual product of human endeavour. Whether the present situation is to become a progressive stage or another setback in historical progress is primarily a spiritual question.

Señor de Madariaga's argument follows familiar, though no less pregnant, lines. The world has failed to set up or to operate sincerely institutions to co-ordinate and supervise a host of problems which are no longer soluble by each State alone. In short, a stage of unity in human affairs, economic and otherwise, has been reached which is ahead of and inconsistent with the prevailing spirit of nationalism. The League itself is warped by the selfish aims and rivalries of competing national units, particularly the Great Powers.

* *The World's Design*. By Salvador de Madariaga. Allen & Unwin, 10s. 6d. net.

Absence of a "truly collective spirit" in operating Article XI has been a fundamental weakness in the system of collective security. Señor de Madariaga has no use for sanctions under Article XVI because, apart from lack of essential American co-operation, they involve war. It is "a fundamental error" to imagine "that war can ever be a co-operative action." In applying sanctions, a State must inevitably look to its own interests. He cannot grasp that Great Britain was prompted by altruistic intentions in the Abyssinian question. "We know that British motives were mixed all along." He points to the reinforcement of the British fleet in the Mediterranean as an "impulsive and imperial gesture . . . at bottom far more in the style of the Italian aggression than in that of the sanctions against it." It is noticeable, however, that, while opposed to sanctions, Señor de Madariaga regards an international army under a world authority as "a consummation devoutly to be wished." Although he argues that "the main utility of a League army would be . . . its moral force," he is here approaching a thesis which elsewhere he resolutely opposes, namely that peace may be safeguarded by force. The need for an international force presupposes the permanent danger of delinquent States, even after the adjustment of grievances by a World Court, which the author advocates.

As an initial step towards the federal World Commonwealth, "all that is wanted" is "a solemn, clear, simple word from Great Britain" of belief in this conception. She would be joined by the United States in such "collaboration for peaceful aims" and also by France and other free States. With the announcement of the New Covenant, Great Britain and France must renounce the ex-German colonies; the former "indirectly yet quite definitely" are the causes of the "Empire-Errantry" of Germany, Italy and Japan and they must remove the latter's jealousy and imitative spirit. The author envisages a World Mandates Administration which, beginning with the German colonies, will eventually govern all colonial territory. Nations bound to the New Covenant will aim at once "to organise on a world basis all that works already on a world basis," setting up international institutions such as a World Trade Commission, and a real World Bank. Señor de Madariaga concludes by pleading for a voluntary association as a centre for cultural co-operation

and the study of common problems. By such methods would germinate and grow a world consciousness and wish for collaboration even among ultra-nationalist and autarkist States.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Professor Gilbert Murray's little volume, *Liberality and Civilisation*,* consisting of lectures recently delivered under the auspices of the Hibbert Trustees at the Universities of Bristol, Glasgow and Birmingham, proclaims once again the gospel of Liberal Humanism of which the world stands desperately in need. The veteran scholar and publicist is a practical idealist, clinging tightly to the traditional values of Western civilisation, yet fully aware of the foes, old and new, which they have to fight. No one speaks more persuasively and with greater authority both on what Gladstone called "Real Liberality" and on the League of Nations, in which he continues to see the best hope of the world. Where all is good, special attention may be called to the last five pages, in which, in a world dominated by fear and degraded by the return of savagery, he summons us to build and rebuild our city wall, to keep our eyes open and our consciences alert; to resolve that our courage shall not fail.

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Those who have appreciated Sir Arnold Wilson's earlier books, *Walks and Talks* and *Walks and Talks Abroad*, will welcome his latest, *Thoughts and Talks, 1935-7*.† It records month by month between April 1935 and September 1937 multifarious impressions left on his mind in the course of a varied and vigorous life as a Member of Parliament. The reader will be interested not only in his comments, derived frequently from first-hand knowledge, on the major events of those years but in the numerous contacts and conversations with all types of ordinary people. Sir Arnold has a happy facility for seeking and ascertaining their feelings and outlook, even in chance conversation in the train. A volume of this kind is quite valuable as a medium of public opinion. The author's own views on numerous topics are also incidentally, but no less definitely, expressed. His attitude to problems abroad is well known and tends, as for example on Spain, to the Right. In home affairs, "instinct and experience" also lead him in some measure "to the Left"; "for I am more in sympathy with Disraeli, the Tory Radical, in his outlook on society than with any of his successors."

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World Natural History, by Mr. E. G. Boulenger,‡ is a veritable treasure-house for a child. It will answer, too, many of the difficult

* Allen & Unwin. 2s. 6d. † Longmans. 12s. 6d. net. ‡ Batsford. 7s. 6d.

questions with which the harassed parent is bombarded when he takes his children to the Zoo. In an appreciative Introduction Mr. H. G. Wells refers to the book as a "brightly illustrated revival of that classic of my childhood," Wood's *Natural History*. There are 150 photographs and over two dozen drawings.

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The first volume of Witherby's *Handbook of British Birds* (single volumes 25s. net, the set 21s. net each. H. F. Witherby) shows at a glance that this new work, which is to be published in five volumes, is very much more than another edition of its predecessor, *A Practical Handbook of British Birds*. The headings under each species give a good idea of its very wide scope: habitat, field-characters (in which important diagnostic features are italicised) and general habits, voice, display and posturing, migrations, distribution abroad, a detailed description of the bird's various plumages, and finally a section on characters and allied forms. Moreover there is an excellent and unique series of coloured plates, showing each species in many plumages—where necessary male, female, summer, winter and juvenile. It is a pity, however, that some of these are too small to be of much assistance in the identification of a bird. The book is so well arranged that it will be of as much value to the beginner as to the professed ornithologist—which is saying a lot. So far as the latter is concerned, it may be mentioned that the authority for almost every statement is given. As regards the former, it will perhaps encourage him to learn that even in the case of the familiar house sparrow much of its display and posturing is still "not well understood." For not the least value of this excellent book lies in the fact that it points out the gaps in our knowledge as surely as the recent advances in field ornithology. Those gaps it will give every bird-lover a new incentive to fill.

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Mr. K. C. Wheare has written a new work on *The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status** which supersedes an earlier essay published in 1933 and deals with subsequent developments. In the course of this important book, Mr. Wheare discusses both the significance of the Statute in the general field of imperial constitutional development and its place in relation to each of the Dominions.

In considering, for example, the legal status of Eire, he doubts whether the Statute conferred upon the Irish Free State the legal power to enact the new constitution. There are undoubtedly obscurities in the Statute, and though in this case interpretation is academic it may be of great importance in many instances. Professor W. P. M. Kennedy pleads for a liberal construction in the new second edition of his standard work, *The Constitution of Canada*,† which contains an extra Part dealing with the vital years of Dominion growth, 1922-37.

* Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 10s. net.

† Oxford University Press. 25s. net.

Amendment of the British North America Act was, of course, expressly excluded from the ambit of the Statute and the question of conventional practice remains of great importance in view of the Canadian controversies relating to constitutional change. Mr. Wheare argues that there is "a usage of consultation" with the Provinces though no convention. Professor Kennedy declares it "idle to think" that the United Kingdom Government would delay legislation requested by the Dominion Government until provincial agreement were reached. Such view would seem largely to nullify the express proviso in the Statute. In Professor Kennedy's view constitutional amendment should be by way of Canadian legislation with safeguards, somewhat analogous to those in the United States. He would also abolish Privy Council appeals and substitute a great imperial-tribunal upon the lines of the Hague Court. It ought to be added that Professor Kennedy agrees with the view of Mr. Justice Evatt that a Governor's exercise of the Royal Prerogative should be governed by definite legal regulations.

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In view of the negotiations for a commercial agreement with the United States, the Information Department of Chatham House has prepared a useful succinct Paper on *Anglo-American Trade Relations*.^{*} It indicates, with the assistance of statistical summaries, the existing character of our trading relations and the concessions likely to be sought by either side and the obstacles to agreement. The Paper also considers the question of mutual concessions between the United States and the Dominions, particularly Canada and Australia, consequent upon the main Anglo-American Agreement. The world significance of the two nations' trading relations is also discussed, and the conclusion is reached that while direct economic benefits to other countries from an Agreement may be doubted, the indirect advantage "might be considerable."

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Mr. Percy Cohen has written a detailed and lucid exposition of *Unemployment Insurance and Assistance in Britain*† in a manner useful and informative to the general public. Lack of references in the text, however, makes it of less value to the student and specialist. The account is preceded by an historical outline which traces the vicissitudes and growth of the system from the first experimental provisions in the National Health Act, 1911, to its present stable and financially sound conditions. It is a bald, almost colourless, statement of historical facts which studiously avoids the political controversies from which the existing law has emerged.

^{*} Royal Institute of International Affairs, St. James Square, London, S.W.1. 1s. net.

† Harrap. 8s. 6d. net.